

# HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES—Thursday, June 18, 1987

The House met at 10 a.m.

The Reverend Buddy M. Owens, executive director, Rio Grande Children's Home, Mission, TX, offered the following prayer:

Our most gracious Heavenly Father:

We thank Thee for last night's rest and protection. We earnestly pray that You will bless these, our Representatives, as they meet and carry on the affairs of our great Nation.

Dear Father, we are all mindful of the unrest that grips our world. We sincerely believe that without Your divine guidance our Nation or any nation cannot long endure.

Father, before we start this session this morning, we want to acknowledge that You are God and we desperately need Your wisdom and discernment for the problems we face. Please, dear Lord, bless these dedicated men and women and bless their families as well.

We ask all these things in Jesus' precious and holy name. Amen.

## THE JOURNAL

The SPEAKER. The Chair has examined the Journal of the last day's proceedings and announces to the House his approval thereof.

Pursuant to clause 1, rule I, the Journal stands approved.

## MESSAGE FROM THE SENATE

A message from the Senate by Mr. Hallen, one of its clerks, announced that the Senate had passed without amendment bills of the House of the following titles:

H.R. 191. An act to authorize the establishment of a Peace Garden on a site to be selected by the Secretary of the Interior; and

H.R. 2100. An act to designate the border station at 9931 Guide Meridian Road, Lynden, WA, as the "Kenneth G. Ward Border Station".

The message also announced that the Senate had passed with amendments in which the concurrence of the House is requested, a concurrent resolution of the House of the following title:

H. Con. Res. 131. Concurrent resolution providing for the attendance of Representatives, Senators, and other appropriate persons at a special ceremony and related events to be held in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, in honor of the bicentennial of the Constitution and in commemoration of the Great Compromise of the Constitutional Convention.

## ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE SPEAKER

The SPEAKER. The Chair desires to announce his intention to recognize only one request to speak for 1 minute, that of the gentleman from Texas [Mr. DE LA GARZA], who represents the district of our guest chaplain.

Further 1-minute requests will be postponed until after the conclusion of legislative business.

## THE REVEREND BUDDY M. OWENS

(Mr. DE LA GARZA asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. DE LA GARZA. Mr. Speaker, it is my honor and privilege to welcome the Reverend Buddy Owens and members of the choir of the Rio Grande Children's Home, from Mission, TX.

Mr. Speaker, those of us who serve in public office know full well the responsibilities that we share, but the good Lord blesses us with people that He puts in special places to do special things in our society. One of these is the Reverend Buddy Owens, whom the good Lord has blessed with an interest and has placed his ministry in giving a helping hand to youngsters in need.

We are very happy that he has come along and that so many youngsters have been helped along the way through his ministry. We are honored that he would share the prayer this morning with us here in the House of Representatives.

## PERMISSION TO OFFER AMENDMENTS EN BLOC TO H.R. 1777, FOREIGN RELATIONS AUTHORIZATION ACT, FISCAL YEARS 1988 AND 1989

Mr. MICA. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that, during the consideration of H.R. 1777 in the Committee of the Whole, it be in order for me to offer en bloc amendments that have been printed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD in accordance with the rule—or amendments that are modifications of any such amendment, that the amendments be considered as read and printed in the RECORD, that the amendments be in order even if amending portions of the bill that have not yet been read for amendment, and that said amendments not be subject to a demand for a division of the question.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Florida?

Mr. GALLO. Reserving the right to object, Mr. Speaker, at this point we do not have any Members from the committee here on our side. We expected that 1-minute were going to take place, and they are on their way. I am not aware of whether this has been discussed with the ranking minority member.

Mr. MICA. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GALLO. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.

Mr. MICA. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, we understood that the gentlewoman from Maine [Ms. SNOWE] did have a little problem, and the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. BROOMFIELD] is en route, but that these particular amendments had been totally agreed to with minority and minority staff, and that there is no question on that.

Mr. GALLO. Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my reservation of objection, based on the assurance of the gentleman from Florida.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Florida?

There was no objection.

□ 1010

## JOINT REREFERRAL OF H.R. 2241

Mr. MICA. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to have the bill H.R. 2241 jointly rereferred to the Committee on Ways and Means, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

The SPEAKER. The Chair will announce that this matter has been discussed with the Chair and the Chair is familiar with the request.

Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Florida?

There was no objection.

The SPEAKER. The bill is so referred to the Committee on Ways and Means, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

□ This symbol represents the time of day during the House proceedings, e.g., □ 1407 is 2:07 p.m.

Matter set in this typeface indicates words inserted or appended, rather than spoken, by a Member of the House on the floor.

# REQUEST FOR PERMISSION TO TAKE UP UNANIMOUS-CONSENT REQUESTS, NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT OF THE ABSENCE OF CERTAIN MINORITY MEMBERS

Mr. DYMALLY. Mr. Speaker, I am wondering if in the next 5 minutes or so I could have permission to take up two resolutions? The minority leader Member anticipated, as did I, 1-minute speeches this morning.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman refers to commemorative resolutions?

Mr. DYMALLY. Yes, Mr. Speaker.

The SPEAKER. Once we go into the Committee of the Whole that would not be in order, were it not to be done immediately.

Mr. DYMALLY. I am wondering if my friend would accommodate me on a couple of commemoratives that we could take up right now?

Mr. GALLO. Mr. Speaker, I move a call of the House.

The SPEAKER. The Chair would ask the gentleman from California [Mr. DYMALLY] to withhold his request at this time, and would also ask the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. GALLO] to withhold his request also at this time.

## FOREIGN RELATIONS AUTHORIZATION ACT, FISCAL YEARS 1988 AND 1989

The SPEAKER. Pursuant to House Resolution 190 and rule XXIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill, H.R. 1777.

□ 1012

### IN THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill (H.R. 1777) to authorize appropriations for fiscal years 1988 and 1989 for the Department of State, the U.S. Information Agency, and for other purposes, with Mr. SWIFT in the chair.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The CHAIRMAN. When the Committee of the Whole rose on Tuesday, June 16, 1987, title I was open to amendment at any point.

Are there any further amendments to title I?

### AMENDMENTS OFFERED BY MR. MICA

Mr. MICA. Mr. Chairman, pursuant to the unanimous-consent request previously agreed to, I offer amendments en bloc.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendments.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendments offered by Mr. MICA: Page 55, after line 25, add the following:

### SEC. 192. PROBABLE EXEMPTIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS EMPLOYEE HIRING FREEZE.

(a) FINDINGS.—The Congress makes the following findings:

(1) In April 1986, the Secretary-General of the United Nations adopted a freeze on the hiring of personnel within the United Nations Secretariat.

(2) The conditions of the freeze were such that, as the terms of office for the personnel expired, replacements would not be recruited or hired to fill the vacant positions, with minor exceptions.

(3) The freeze was designed to reduce United Nations personnel by 15 percent over three years, as recommended by the Group of High-Level Intergovernmental Experts to Review the Efficiency of the Administrative and Financial Functioning of the United Nations (commonly referred to as the "Group of 18 Experts").

(4) On May 5, 1987, the Secretary-General reported to the Department of State that he was considering granting 156 exceptions to the hiring freeze.

(5) Of these 156 probable exceptions, 104 would be Soviet and Soviet-bloc nationals currently employed in the United Nations Secretariat—of 298 Soviet and Soviet-bloc nationals currently employed in the United Nations Secretariat—who would be replaced over the next 18 months.

(6) According to a report from the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate on "Soviet Presence in the United Nations Secretariat" (Senate Print 99-52, May 1985), approximately one-fourth of the Soviets in the United Nations Secretariat are intelligence officers, many more are co-opted by the Soviet intelligence agencies, and all Soviets in the United Nations Secretariat must respond to KGB requests for assistance.

(7) Other United States intelligence authorities estimate that as many as one-half of the Soviet and Soviet-bloc nationals in the United Nations Secretariat are officers of the KGB or the GRU.

(8) If the Secretary-General's probable exemptions are adopted, the Soviet Union will be allowed to replace retiring Soviet and Soviet-bloc personnel with new, highly skilled and well-trained intelligence officers of the KGB or the GRU.

(9) The Secretary-General's proposed exemptions would thus provide the Soviet Union with the capability to rebuild its intelligence apparatus within the United States, which was devastated in recent years when the United States ordered severe reductions in the size of the Soviet mission to the United Nations, the Soviet Embassy in Washington, District of Columbia, and the Soviet Consulate in San Francisco, California.

(10) Article 100 of the United Nations Charter calls for the establishment of an international civil service whose members are neutral and loyal only to the United Nations.

(11) Section 3 of Article 101 of the United Nations Charter calls for the appointment of individuals who are professionally qualified for the positions they are to fill and maintains that due regard shall be paid to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible.

(12) As of September 1985, 442 of 446 Soviet nationals employed throughout the United Nations system are "seconded", that is, serve on short, fixed-term contracts.

(13) Through the abuse of short, fixed-term contracts, the Soviet Union has maintained undue influence and control over major offices of the United Nations Secretariat, thereby effectively using the United

Nations Secretariat in the conduct of its foreign relations, in clear violation of Articles 100 and 101 of the United Nations Charter.

(14) The Secretary-General's proposed exceptions to the hiring freeze (as described in paragraphs (1) through (5)) would continue the gross violations of Articles 100 and 101 of the United Nations Charter described in paragraph (13).

(15) The Secretary-General's proposed exceptions to such hiring freeze would be clearly inconsistent with the terms of the United Nation's self-imposed reform program.

(16) The United Nations has not yet achieved its reform goals and there is no indication that the United Nations can afford to make such large exceptions to such hiring freeze.

(b) REPORT TO CONGRESS.—(1) The Secretary of State shall report to the Congress not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act and annually thereafter as to the status of secondment within the United Nations by the Soviet Union and Soviet-bloc member-nations.

(2) Such report shall contain as a minimum, a thorough analysis of the following issues:

(A) The number of Soviet and Soviet-bloc nationals who are currently seconded to the United Nations system on short, fixed-term contracts in New York, Geneva, Vienna, and Nairobi, and the percentage such number is to the total number of Soviet and Soviet-bloc nationals so seconded.

(C) The number of Soviet and Soviet-bloc nationals who are currently employed in the United Nations system on long-term contracts.

(D) The measures undertaken by the United States to persuade the United Nations Secretariat to enforce the provisions of the United Nations Charter which specifically govern the behavior and activities of United Nations employees, especially Articles 100 and 101.

(E) The measures undertaken by the United States either through bilateral or multilateral channels with the Soviet Union and other members of the Soviet-bloc to end their abuse of secondment.

(F) The measures undertaken by the United States to challenge Soviet and Soviet-bloc nationals' credentials and to deny them entry visas, in order to keep Soviet and Soviet-bloc intelligence operatives out of the United States and United Nations.

(G) The counterintelligence efforts undertaken by the United States to protect United States national security from hostile intelligence activities directed against the United States by Soviet and Soviet-bloc intelligence operatives employed by the United Nations.

(c) SENSE OF THE CONGRESS.—It is the sense of the Congress that—

(1) the President should take all such actions necessary to ensure compliance with the hiring freeze rule, including withholding all assessed United States contributions to the United Nations, and denying United States entry visas to Soviet and Soviet-bloc applicants coming to the United States to replace Soviet and Soviet-bloc nationals currently serving in the United Nations Secretariat;

(2) the President, through the Department of State and the United States mission to the United Nations, should express to the Secretary-General of the United Nations the insistence of the American people that the hiring freeze continue indefinitely, or



until the United Nations has complied with the Group of 18 recommendations and can thus afford to make exceptions to the freeze;

(3) the Secretary-General should revoke all exceptions to the hiring freeze rule, excepting those member-nations which have 15 or fewer nationals serving in the United Nations Secretariat, or those positions not subject to geographical representation, such as those of the general service category;

(4) the long-term, flagrant violations of Articles 100 and 101 of the United Nations Charter and the abuse of secondment by the Soviet Union and Soviet-bloc member-nations are reprehensible;

(5) the United Nations should adopt the recommendations of the Group of 18 (as referred to in subsection (a)(3)) that no member-nation be allowed to have more than 50 percent of its nationals employed under fixed-term contracts;

(6) the Soviet Union is hereby condemned for—

(A) its refusal to adhere to the principles of the United Nations Charter calling for an international civil service,

(B) its abuse of secondment, and

(C) its absolute disregard of the solemn purpose of the United Nations to be an international civil service; and

(7) if the Soviet Union and the Soviet-bloc intend to remain member-nations of the United Nations, they should adhere to Articles 100, 101, and all other principles of the United Nations Charter to which every other member-nation must adhere.

(d) DEFINITION.—For the purposes of this section, the term "Soviet-bloc" means the countries of Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Nicaragua, North Korea, Poland, and Romania.

Page 55, after the text following line 25, insert the following at the end of part E:

SEC. 192. FORCED DETENTION BY THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT.

Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit a report to the Congress on detention camps maintained by the African National Congress and on detention in South Africa since the South African Government enacted a State of Emergency in June 1986.

Page 55, after the text following line 25, insert the following at the end of Part E:

SEC. 192. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING PANAMA.

(a) CONCERN OVER INTERNAL DISTURBANCES.—The Congress expresses its deep concern over internal disturbances in Panama including suspension of most constitutional rights.

(b) SUPPORT FOR ELECTIONS.—The Congress supports free and constitutional elections in Panama.

Page 70, after line 16, insert the following:

TITLE VII—DEMOCRACY IN TAIWAN.

SEC. 701. CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS AND STATEMENT OF POLICY.

(a) FINDINGS.—The Congress finds that—

(1) stability and peace prevail on the island of Taiwan and in the Western Pacific region;

(2) prosperity and educational progress on the island of Taiwan have created conditions in which a democratic system of government can thrive;

(3) the people on Taiwan, in both national and local elections, have shown themselves fully capable of participating in a democratic political process;

(4) only a small minority of the seats in the central legislature and central electoral college are filled through periodic elections, with the vast majority of seats still being held by individuals who took office in the late 1940s;

(5) on October 7, 1986, President Chiang Ching-kuo, announced that the Kuomintang intended to end the state of martial law and to lift the ban on the creation of new political parties;

(6) the Kuomintang has also indicated a desire over the next few years to make more representative Taiwan's central representative bodies, to broaden decisionmaking within the Nationalist Party, to enhance the rule of law, and to increase the powers of local-level government;

(7) on September 28, 1986, Taiwan's democratic opposition announced the formation of the Democratic Progressive Party; and

(8) an acceleration of progress towards a full democracy on Taiwan, including full respect for human rights, will strengthen United States ties with the people on Taiwan.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—The Congress—

(1) commends the authorities on Taiwan, the democratic opposition, and the people of the island for the recent progress in building a framework for full democracy in Taiwan;

(2) will welcome the day that the state of martial law is ended and the ban on new political parties is lifted; and

(3) urges the authorities on Taiwan to continue and accelerate progress toward a fully democratic system of government, in particular by—

(A) guaranteeing freedom of speech, expression, and assembly; and

(B) moving toward a fully representative government, including the free and fair election of all members of all central representative bodies.

Page 70, after line 16, insert the following new section:

SEC. 602. HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

(a) FINDINGS.—The Congress finds that—

(1) the advancement of human rights is a stated objective of the foreign policy of the United States;

(2) the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech, press, and peaceful assembly have not been respected in the People's Republic of China;

(3) the exercise of religious activities has a detrimental effect on a participant's civil, social, and economic status within the People's Republic of China;

(4) the rights of citizens within the People's Republic of China to travel freely throughout the country, to have contact with foreigners, and to form trade unions and other voluntary associations are severely curtailed;

(5) there have been some encouraging developments including an effort by the current leadership of the People's Republic of China to develop economic policies without regard to a rigid application of Maoist ideology; and

(6) the American people's desire to extend their moral support to the struggle for freedom and justice within the People's Republic of China.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of the Congress that the leadership of the People's Republic of China should take necessary steps toward establishing a more democratic society, with a free and open political system that will protect the essential human rights of all people living within that country.

Page 70, after line 16, insert the following:

TITLE VII—HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN TIBET BY THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

SEC. 701. FINDINGS.

The Congress finds that—

(1) the People's Republic of China imposed its rule over Tibet through military force in 1949, and continues to exercise dominion over the Tibetan people through the presence of a large occupation force;

(2) over one million Tibetans have perished since 1949 as a direct result of political instability, imprisonment, and widescale famine;

(3) after 1949, particularly during the ravages of China's Cultural Revolution, over 6,000 monasteries, the repositories of 1,300 years of Tibet's ancient civilization, were destroyed and their irreplaceable national legacy of art and literature either stolen or removed from Tibet;

(4) the Tibetans' standard of living, health, and human services remain far below those of the People's Republic of China as a whole;

(5) Tibetans and others are concerned about the political, cultural, and economic implications of the policy of the People's Republic of China of encouraging large numbers of Chinese to move to Tibet;

(6) there are credible reports, confirmed by Amnesty International, of Tibetans being incarcerated and killed for the non-violent expression of their religious and political beliefs;

(7) His Holiness and the Dalai Lama, spiritual and temporal leader of the Tibetan people, in conjunction with the 100,000 refugees forced into exile with him, has worked tirelessly for almost thirty years to secure peace and religious freedom in Tibet, as well as the preservation of the Tibetan culture;

(8) in 1959, 1961, and 1965 the United Nations General Assembly called upon the People's Republic of China to end the violation of Tibetan's human rights;

(9) 91 Members of the Congress signed a letter to President Li Xiannian of the People's Republic of China on July 24, 1985, expressing support for direct talks between Beijing and representatives of His Holiness the Dalai Lama and the Tibetans in exile, and urging the Government of the People's Republic of China "to grant the very reasonable and justified aspirations of His Holiness the Dalai Lama and his people every consideration"; and

(10) there has been no evidence of any such consideration being granted by the Government of the People's Republic of China.

SEC. 702. STATEMENT OF POLICIES.

It is the sense of the Congress that—

(1) the United States should express sympathy for those Tibetans who have suffered and died as a result of fighting, persecution, or famine over the past four decades;

(2) the Government of the People's Republic of China should respect internationally recognized human rights and end human rights violations against Tibetans;

(3) the United States should urge the Government of the People's Republic of China to actively reciprocate the Dalai Lama's efforts to establish a constructive dialogue;

(4) Tibetan culture and religion should be preserved and the Dalai Lama should be commended for his efforts in this regard;

(5) the President should instruct United States officials, including the United States

Ambassadors to the People's Republic of China and India, to pay greater attention to the concerns of the Tibetan people and to work closely with all concerned about human rights violations in Tibet in order to find areas in which the United States Government and people can be helpful; and

(6) the United States should urge the People's Republic of China to release all political prisoners in Tibet, including Geshe Lobsang Wangchuk, Thupten Kalsang, and Lobsang Chodag, who have been adopted by Amnesty International as prisoners of conscience.

#### SEC. 703. ASSISTANCE FOR DISPLACED TIBETANS.

Within 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall determine whether the needs of displaced Tibetans are similar to those of displaced persons and refugees in other parts of the world and shall report that determination to the Congress. If the Secretary makes a positive determination, of the amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Department of State for "Migration and Refugee Assistance" for each of the fiscal years 1988 and 1989, such sums as are necessary shall be made available for assistance for displaced Tibetans. The Secretary of State shall determine the best means for providing such assistance.

#### SEC. 704. SCHOLARSHIPS FOR STUDY IN THE UNITED STATES BY TIBETAN EXILES.

For each of the fiscal years 1988 and 1989, the Director of the United States Information Agency shall make available to Tibetan students and professionals who are outside Tibet not less than 10 scholarships for study at institutions of higher education in the United States.

Page 70, after line 16, add the following:

#### TITLE VII—LIMITATION ON FUNDING OF UNITED NATIONS

#### SEC. 701. LIMITATION ON FUNDING OF UNITED NATIONS.

(a) **LIMITATION.**—No funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act may be obligated or expended to pay to the United Nations or to any United Nations affiliated agency any amount which exceeds 50 percent of the total payments by the United States for its assessed contributions to such organization or agency in 1986, except that the limitation under this section shall not apply to payments for peacemaking activities of any such organization.

(b) **WAIVER.**—The President may waive subsection (a) if he determines that such a waiver is in the national interest of the United States.

Page 70, after line 16, add the following:

#### TITLE VII—CONFLICT IN CENTRAL AMERICA

#### SEC. 701. PEACE IN CENTRAL AMERICA.

(a) **FINDINGS.**—The Congress finds that—

(1) the heads of state of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras met in San Jose, Costa Rica, on February 15, 1987, for the purpose of formulating a regional proposal for bringing about an end to the armed conflict in Central America;

(2) these heads of state have reaffirmed—

(A) their faith in finding a political solution to the problems in the region and have recognized their regional responsibility to seek a stable and durable peace through diplomatic negotiations and political dialog; and

(B) their belief that such a durable peace is only possible within the context of democratic regimes which are committed to eradicating extreme poverty, to establishing an effective means for equal opportunity for

all elements of society, and to establishing a pluralistic society where dialog among the various elements of society is permitted to occur and free and periodic elections are held;

(3) these heads of state specifically endorsed the "Procedure for Establishing a Firm and Durable Peace in Central America" proposed in San Jose by Oscar Arias Sanchez, the President of Costa Rica, as a useful and constructive proposal for discussion with the ends of establishing a definitive timetable for ending the cycle of violence in Central America and executing a plan for a definitive and verifiable program for establishing peace in Central America;

(4) the Arias initiative recognizes that internal democratization is the key to peace in Central America; and

(5) the President of Nicaragua, Daniel Ortega, recently stated that "our internal policies will never be the object of any negotiations whatsoever".

(b) **PEACE INITIATIVE.**—The Congress applauds the recent bold initiative by President Arias of Costa Rica and the heads of other democracies in Central America, and congratulates them on the significant contribution made by this initiative toward ending armed conflict, and reinforcing democracy, in Central America.

(c) **GOVERNMENT OF NICARAGUA.**—The Congress urges the Government of Nicaragua to endorse the Arias peace process and indicate its willingness to negotiate in good faith toward peace and democracy in Central America.

(d) **SUPPORT FOR SUMMIT MEETING BETWEEN CENTRAL AMERICAN HEADS OF STATE.**—The Congress strongly supports this initiative and looks forward to a summit meeting as the next phase in this historic effort of the Central American heads of state to forge a firm and lasting peace in Central America.

Page 55, after the text following line 25, insert the following:

#### SEC. 192. UNITED NATIONS PROJECTS WHOSE PRIMARY PURPOSE IS TO BENEFIT THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION OR THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS.

(a) **PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION.**—Section 114(a) of the Department of State Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1984 and 1985 (22 U.S.C. 287e note), is amended—

(1) by redesignating paragraphs (3) through (6) as paragraphs (4) through (7), respectively; and

(2) by inserting the following new paragraph (3) after paragraph (2):

"(3) 25 percent of the amount budgeted for that year for the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories (or any similar successor entity);"

(b) **AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS.**—Section 114 of that Act is further amended—

(1) in subsection (a)(4), as so redesignated by subsection (a) of this section—

(A) by striking out "it or" and inserting in lieu thereof "it," and

(B) by inserting before the semicolon "or to the African National Congress"; and

(2) in subsection (b)—

(A) by striking out "it or" and inserting in lieu thereof "it," and

(B) by inserting before the period at the end thereof "or to the African National Congress".

Mr. MICA. Mr. Chairman, as my colleagues know, we have some 43 remaining amendments to this legisla-

tion. During the intervening period yesterday when the committee was considering other legislation, we were able to take nine of these amendments on which we had agreements and put them en bloc. We have agreement from the minority and the majority and we are asking that they be approved en bloc.

I would like to yield to my ranking minority member, for any comment on this particular amendment.

Ms. SNOWE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MICA. I yield to the gentlewoman from Maine.

Ms. SNOWE. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

The minority has reviewed all of these amendments contained in the en bloc amendments and we certainly accept them. We approve of them, and I think it will expedite the process.

So I urge adoption of the en bloc amendments.

Mr. ROSE. Mr. Chairman, Tibet, an independent country, has in this modern age been invaded, occupied and turned into a colony by China, a country that claims to be one of the world's most forceful opponents of imperialism and colonialism.

For over 25 years the People's Republic of China has tried systematically and brutally to crush the Tibetan people, in particular their nationalism and religion. That policy has failed, but since 1983 the People's Republic of China has launched and implemented a plan to flood Tibet with Chinese settlers in order to reduce the Tibetan to an insignificant minority in their own country. That is clearly the purpose of China's "final solution;" To destroy the Tibetans as a people, as a nation, while preserving the more unusual aspects of Tibetan culture as a tourist attraction drawing foreign exchange.

This policy can be stopped. When over 90 of you signed a letter to the President of China 2 years ago, the Chinese were made to abandon their policy of destroying the religion and culture of the people of Tibet by brutal force. China's leaders today are highly sensitive about international concern about Tibet. The Chinese are responsive to international pressure because of their desire to create a good image abroad: An image of a country governed by the rule of law and respect for human rights. China's desire for high technology and its need for tourism—which provides the foreign exchange indispensable to her modernization campaign—are perhaps the most important causes for China's responsiveness. With our help, the Tibetan people can be saved before the effect of China's genocidal policies will have become irreversible.

Why should we be interested in what happens on the "roof of the world?" You should be interested in what happens for at least four important reasons:

First. We should express the moral outrage that we all feel in the face of willful infliction of suffering and the deliberate destruction of an entire people. In short, a valuable part of our very humanity is at stake. Today, China is implementing a massive transfer of Chinese into



Tibet to drown the Tibetan people in a sea of Chinese.

A respected international lawyer recently shared his observations about his trip, earlier this year, to Tibet with me. He said, "That I have never felt so depressed in my life is an almost grotesque understatement. I had never before personally witnessed, felt, the systematic destruction of a people, heard the silent cries of an entire generation that spent the greatest part of its life in prison, labor camps, \* \* \* 'political reeducation centers.' I had never felt the oppressiveness of a military occupation, the fear of one's own words spoken in whispers \* \* \* it was simply heart wrenching."

He went on: explaining an encounter with one of the few Tibetans serving in the Government in Tibet.

"A middle-aged man, who after his release from prison, has been given a high position in Tibet by the Chinese, pushed a little note into my pocket while we drank tea, in loaded silence, in a small living room in the backstreets of Lhasa. I could hear the silence despite a laughter in the adjoining room. The note said:

"I am so sorry, I cannot talk openly now, for there are progressive comrades in this house. We thank you for your help in our cause. Do not be deceived by the talk of liberalization and religious freedom. It is not real. There is no freedom. Please tell his holiness the dalai lama we live in a large burning hole of fire. Please help our dalai lama to rescue us."

Second. We should be interested in the Tibetan issue also for the legal reasons: Because the Tibetan struggle is what America stands for: The struggle of a people to regain the freedom and independence that is rightfully theirs.

Tibet is an independent state under foreign occupation—illegal occupation to be precise—just as is the case in Afghanistan.

Communist China has justified its occupation on two grounds only: That Tibet has always been an integral part of China; that Tibetans were economically, socially, and technologically backward.

But Tibet was never a part of China, and it was fully independent when 80,000 Chinese troops launched the invasion in 1949. The military attack was blatant aggression, and it was strongly denounced as such by the free world—including the United States. The issue has been successfully confused by repetitions of Chinese propaganda. But a serious study of Tibet's status makes the point self-evident.

Tibet's backwardness, of course, is irrelevant. It is true that Tibet was materially backward, but how could this ever justify invasion, occupation and genocide!

Alarming, Tibet is the largest territory to have been robbed of its sovereignty since World War II. It is a sad irony that Tibet was occupied and turned into a Chinese colony in the age of decolonization, when so many other countries and people had regained their independence.

Third. The Tibetan issue is a human rights issue; the Tibetan people's fundamental rights have been trampled on for decades now. 1.2 million Tibetans lost their lives and at least as many lingered in prisons or labor camps as a result of the occupation. Solzhenitzyn called the Chinese regime in Tibet "the most brutal

Communist regime in the world." And the International Commission of Jurists concluded after an investigation that China was guilty of genocide.

Today Tibetans have no political rights at all in their country's affairs, not even economic, agricultural, or educational affairs. Behind today's facade of religious freedom, the very Tibet identity is being wounded more deeply than the previous overt persecution could do.

The United Nations General Assembly passed 3 resolutions strongly supported by the United States, urging the People's Republic of China to put an end to the violations of fundamental human rights and freedoms in Tibet and calling for the exercise of the Tibetan people's right to self-determination. This has been the U.S. position in the past; it should be our position today.

Fourth. But you do not even have to be interested in the Tibetan cause or support it to be interested in what happens in Tibet today. There are important geopolitical reasons why you should be interested. What do we know about what happens on the vast Tibetan Plateau? Do we realize the importance of this to the Chinese? How many people are aware, for example, that one of the six charges used to depose of Hu Yaobang, in December of last year, was his effort to initiate policies to alleviate the strife suffered by the Tibetans in their own country? How many papers pointed out that China's "one country—two systems" idea for Hong Kong and Taiwan is not novel, but a repetition of China's unified front 1951 "agreement for the peaceful liberation of Tibet," imposed on the Tibetan Government?

There is a great misconception of the relevance of Tibet in China's policies, including her foreign policy. That alone is reason to be interested in what happens in Tibet. Let me give you another example: How much do we read in the paper about Sino-Indian relations? And when we do, does Tibet feature prominently in those articles? Yet, Sino-Tibetan relations are of necessity bound to the whole issue of Tibet. So are the imminent, seasonal border conflicts. Again troops are facing each other on the Indo-Tibetan border. Last summer many men died on both sides in a conflict that was hardly reported. This summer you can expect even more serious fighting. In Tibet, Chinese are telling Tibetans to be prepared for a conflict. Watching what happens in Tibet is important to understand what happens in China.

We forget that Tibet is a vast country, one-fourth the surface area of the People's Republic of China. It is the size of India or Saudi Arabia, it is equal in size to one-third the United States or the size of Western Europe minus Scandinavia. Tibet is located in Asia's strategic heart and, at one time, separated the continents great powers. This is precisely why Asia's empires went to great pains to keep each other out of Tibet in order to preserve what was considered to be a crucial buffer state—a Switzerland of Asia as it were—essential to peace and stability in Asia.

It is Tibet's strategic location that was China's principal reason for invading the country. The invasion has made China a neighbor of India, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nepal, and other south Asian states it would otherwise be thousands of miles away from.

What can we do to help? I believe that the basis not just for helping the Tibetan people but for helping the United States in shaping its foreign policy with respect to Asia should be to recognize the situation for what it is; genocidal colonialism. We can help Tibetans by exposing what China is really doing in Tibet: It has launched an all-out offensive to eliminate the Tibetans as a people and to secure a dominant position in the area. The eventual presence of 10 million or 20 million Chinese on the Indian subcontinent's border will change the demographic and political map of the region and is certain to heighten tension in the area, adding one more focus of conflict in the world.

The Tibetan people have suffered too much. We helped the Tibetans in the past, and I believe that now is the time to renew our commitment to these noble people. We turned our backs on Tibet once, and our Nation, and the Tibetans, have paid dearly. The human rights abuses in Tibet and the Chinese population transfer must stop. China is very sensitive to this issue, and the United States can influence a change in the many tragedies that plague Tibet. Accordingly, I urge you, my honorable colleagues, to adopt this amendment to H.R. 1777.

Ms. SNOWE. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Neal-Snowe amendment which is incorporated in the amendment en bloc.

Mr. Chairman, in February of this year, the leaders of the democratic nations of Central America met in Costa Rica to present a new peace plan for that troubled region. This document, drafted by Costa Rican President Arias, takes a new and promising approach to the conflicts of Central America.

The Arias plan recognizes that the key to peace in the region is internal democratization. As President Arias told me last summer, "There will never be peace in Central America as long as there is a Marxist regime in Nicaragua with the characteristics of the nine commandantes."

The amendment offered by the gentleman from North Carolina applauds the initiative of the Central American leaders, and expresses the support of Congress for the regional summit to discuss the Arias plan that was scheduled to take place next week in Esquipulas, Guatemala.

Unfortunately, this meeting has been postponed. For this reason, it is especially timely today to commend the Central American democracies on their initiative and encourage them to persevere in their long and difficult search for a negotiated settlement to bring peace and democracy to the region.

The gentleman from North Carolina graciously accepted a perfecting amendment which I offered to focus attention on what may be the most important factor in the search for peace in Central America, the commitment of the Government of Nicaragua to negotiate in good faith.

The Sandinista regime has taken at best a lukewarm attitude toward the Arias plan, alternately raising objections and then finding positive aspects, but without coming out with a clear endorsement of the Arias process.

I am especially concerned over a recent statement by President Ortega that "Our inter-

nal policies will never be the object of any negotiations whatsoever." This statement was cited in a Reuters dispatch of June 6.

President Ortega's statement runs directly contrary to the spirit of the Arias plan, and raises serious questions over the intentions of the Sandinista regime in entering these negotiations. My amendment to the amendment of the gentleman from North Carolina urges the Sandinista government to endorse the Arias peace process and to indicate its willingness to negotiate in good faith toward peace and democracy in Central America.

Mr. Chairman, the Members of this House are divided over United States policy in Central America. However I believe that we all agree on the importance of democracy in bringing peace to that region. I ask my colleagues to support the Snowe-Neal amendment and the amendment en bloc.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, we have agreed with the chairman of the subcommittee, Mr. WOLPE, on this amendment, which calls for a report on detention camps maintained by the African National Congress and detention by the South African Government during the state of emergency.

It is our understanding from United States Government sources that several hundred to a thousand South African blacks are being held by the African National Congress in Mungwa, in Zambia.

In addition, the Washington Post and the Christian Science Monitor have both published interviews with ANC defectors who confirm the existence of an ANC prison camp in Angola.

We would like the State Department, in conjunction with the intelligence agencies, to issue a report on these forced detention camps. The report should be unclassified to the maximum extent possible, and should discuss both the human rights situation in these camps and circumstances surrounding the detention of South Africa blacks by the African National Congress.

I would like to submit the articles for the RECORD at this point.

[From the Washington Post, Mar. 10, 1987]  
SOUTH AFRICAN BLACK TELLS INFORMER'S  
TALE

(By William Claiborne)

PRETORIA, SOUTH AFRICA.—The young black man dressed in jeans and jogging shoes fidgeted, shifting in his seat when talk turned to "necklacing," the execution ritual in which those denounced as police informants are burned alive with a gasoline-filled tire around their bodies.

"I'm scared of it, yes. But one should always be vigilant and carry a gun" said the 28-year-old, an ex-guerrilla of the African National Congress who turned undercover police agent after nine years of training to overthrow the white-minority government he now serves.

Identifying himself as "John," he softly described a life in a twilight zone of fear of being unmasked and dragged before one of the "people's courts" that dispense curbside justice in South Africa's violent black townships. "I try to avoid people I knew before I went out of the country. I try to avoid these places," he said.

John, by his own account and that of the South African security branch, fled South Africa after the 1976 riots in Soweto town-

ship and began an odyssey with the ANC that took him through Angola, communist East Germany and the Soviet Union.

A two-hour interview, arranged by the security police after a request, was conducted under the supervision of his control agent, Col. Jac Buchner, who did not interfere in the questioning and frequently left the room for lengthy periods.

Repeated questioning of John about his circuit of ANC training camps and his eventual capture and turn to undercover police work evoked consistent answers that appeared to conform to verified accounts of activities of guerrillas in exile.

John said he was arrested last year after infiltrating through the Botswana border carrying an AK47 automatic assault rifle, six magazines of ammunition and six hand grenades. Since then, he has been reporting to the security police whatever he can learn about subversive activities in the townships, and also briefing his employers about guerrilla tactics for a monthly salary of about \$200.

Born in Krugersdorp, west of Johannesburg, John grew up in Soweto and fled to Swaziland in 1977 as part of an exodus of black militant students following the bloody 1976 Soweto riots. Initially, he said, he had no intention of becoming a guerrilla, but fell under increasing ANC influence while attending a Mennonite missionary school in Swaziland.

He said he then moved to Mozambique, where for two months he received ideological instruction with 50 other black South Africans at an ANC residence before being flown to Luanda, Angola, and taken overland to the Quibaxe guerrilla training camp in northern Angola.

With about 400 other recruits, he received basic training in bush warfare tactics, ambushes, topography, explosives and the use of small weapons and mortars, John said. He described himself as "very dedicated to the liberation struggle in South Africa" by the time he was assigned to a detachment of the ANC's military wing, Spear of the Nation.

John said that with 40 other guerrillas he was then flown to Teterow, East Germany, for six months of advanced training by East German instructors. Deeply religious at the time, and subjected to intensive indoctrination in dialectical materialism, John said he experienced his first ideological conflicts there.

In late December 1979, he said, he was returned to Angola and for four years served as a prison guard at an ANC camp called Quatro, where defectors, suspected South African agents, ideological deviants and common criminals were incarcerated. John described conditions in the prison as "brutal" and claimed to have participated in the fatal beating of some prisoners.

In early 1984, he said, he was flown to the Soviet Union, where for 10 months he trained with ANC guerrillas and English-speaking Soviet instructors in a camp outside Moscow, learning how to infiltrate South Africa and establish small cells of three to four ANC operatives.

After returning briefly to Angola, he said, he was taken across the Botswana border with two other guerrillas and arrested a month later before he even had time to organize a cell.

"We knew that John was on his way back to South Africa," Buchner said, adding that the security police have "quite a few" agents that have infiltrated ANC guerrilla camps in Angola.

John said he was interrogated at length, but not physically abused, and he decided to accept an offer to become an undercover police agent because he wanted "to try to stop the atrocities that were going on inside South Africa. I thought it was my duty to expose those who want to carry out genocide in South Africa."

When pressed on the question of how, after nine years of self-sacrifice and commitment to a revolutionary struggle, he could so quickly turn sides, John shrugged and replied, "I feel free. I feel liberated. Things have changed since 1976. Things are changing unlike ever before."

Complaining that the ANC is dominated by tribalism and that a successful revolution would result in a "Marxist dictatorship" dominated by the Xhosa tribe, John described himself now as "an ordinary policeman upholding the law."

"There's no alternative other than to put terrorists in jail. It's for the government to act against those activities. We must take the bad element out—those who come to influence the youth with Marxism and Leninism," John said.

But when he mixes with young militant blacks in the townships, John said, he strikes an entirely different pose, one that keeps him constantly on edge against making a fatal slip and always aware of the nine-year gap in his life that he must obfuscate with deception.

Buchner, who calls John and the other turncoat ANC guerrillas he controls "my chappies," described them as "highly motivated for us," adding, "They accept the danger as a consequence of what they have done for the ANC. I won't say they regard it as punishment for their past, but there is definitely physical danger and they are resigned to living with it."

Buchner said the ANC command is certain to know which of their former guerrillas are working for the police. "They know that if a guy is arrested and doesn't turn up in court, he has turned coat. That makes our people all the more careful," he said.

Asked about the possibility that John was a double agent, Buchner said his answers in debriefings were convincing, and in any case John had access only to information that the ANC already could obtain. Both men denied that John had gone into exile already in police employ.

The security police colonel acknowledged that the "necklacing" executions of exposed black informants have made the recruiting of agents more difficult, particularly in the eastern Cape Province. "Necklacing" originated there as an outgrowth of the traditional Xhosa belief that if an evil spirit is discovered, it should be expunged by burning the body before death.

"It's an effective lever. Kids tell other kids not to allow their fathers to inform," said Buchner. But he said that recently a growing revulsion among blacks to such summary executions had generated a backlash. He said the emergence of black vigilante groups has had an inhibiting effect on the young radical "comrades" responsible for many "necklacing" executions.

Nonetheless, the threat to "sellouts" like John remains strong, Buchner said, displaying some handbills that he said were printed and distributed by the ANC.

One of them, with photos of seven alleged informants, proclaims in English and Zulu, "Death to the traitors. These are the unforgivable traitors of our people. They deserted from the ranks of the ANC Spear of the Nation to continue their tasks as servants of



the racist dogs and security branches. . . . They should never be left to live a minute longer."

John has not yet appeared in the leaflets, Buchner said.

[From the Christian Science Monitor, Mar. 11, 1987]

# SWITCHING SIDES: YOUNG BLACKS LEAVE ANC FOR ARMS OF PRETORIA—SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE KEEP AN EYE OUT FOR DISENCHANTED DISSENTERS

(By Ned Temko)

For safety's sake, the slight, soft-spoken black man calls himself simply "John."

In the past decade, he recounts, he has fled his native South Africa, trained as an African National Congress activist in Angola, East Germany, and the Soviet Union—and beaten a dissident to death in what he terms an ANC "prison" in Angola.

Now, he has switched sides. He works for the South African police.

Hundreds of other blacks have made the same journey—even crossed the same fences—in the intensifying battle over South Africa's future. It is a tangled struggle, fought with ideology as often as with guns or mines.

It is a struggle both sides say they're confident of winning.

On the ground, there can be little doubt the momentum has shifted in the government's favor since the declaration of a state of emergency last June. For 21 months, the authorities—more often, their alleged black supporters—had come under violent assault in black townships.

In the six months before the emergency, an academic here calculates, there were some 120 separate gunfire incidents or mine explosions presumed to be the work of ANC supporters or of its military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe ("The Spear of the Nation"). The figure was up 30 percent on the previous six-months—and nearly three times the figure for all 1984.

"The future is within our grasp!" blared an ANC pamphlet handed to this reporter in a black township shortly before the emergency.

Since then, thousands of activists have been jailed without charge. "The people responsible for the unrest have been removed from the community," declares Col. Jak Buchner, a top South African police expert on the ANC. "There is no instigation, no more playing with emotions."

The government has also curbed local news media coverage of the ANC, barring reports deemed likely to improve the political image of an organization increasingly seeking support from whites inside South Africa, and from Western governments. President Pieter Botha has stressed the tie between the ANC and the similarly outlawed South African Communist Party. He has argued that an ANC takeover would bring not a nonracial democracy, but Communist autocracy.

Separate interviews with John and Col. Buchner in Pretoria—and ANC officials in Lusaka—reveal the rivals starkly different strategies, and assumptions.

Buchner, who has compiled profiles on some 200 captured or "turned" ANC men in the past 10 years, says patterns have emerged. His aim, he says, is to "see these men as people"—in trace their roots, discover what forces drive them.

Many of the armed men that the ANC has been reinfiltrating into South Africa left after the black-student uprising in Soweto in 1976, he says. Virtually all had poverty,

Christianity, and a lack of deep-rooted political militancy in common.

"They might have been involved in a stone-throwing incident, or attended a demonstration. But they weren't members of any political group." As the Soweto unrest spilled into other areas, they typically "heard the police were looking for them," and fled to neighboring states until things cooled down.

"I went to further my studies in Swaziland," says John, whose smattering of Russian, and geographic description of his places of exile, lend apparent credibility to the account of his odyssey. "There were many refugees in our school, and a strong ANC [recruiting] influence." Under ANC auspices, he says, he went to Mozambique for lectures in "political strategy," to Angola for weapons training; then to East Germany for "more advanced studies in topography, military engineering—and political theory."

Above all, he says, he was taught "conspiracy . . . secrecy."

He says he felt torn between an urge to "liberate" his country and, as a devout Christian, doubts about Marxist ideology.

Returning to Angola, he spent five years as a guard at an ANC camp known, he says, as No. 4 "It was a prison . . . for suspected infiltrators, agents, misfits—for suspicious people." John says he watched some of them being shot by firing squad. He participated in beating others—at least once "beating a person to death."

Sent to Moscow for what he describes as 10 months' training in infiltration, political agitation, and organization of "cells of four people" inside South Africa, John slipped back onto his native soil with two ANC comrades last year.

He says he was by then disillusioned with the ANC—its ideology, its "violence," its laws of "conspiracy." Also, he makes clear, he felt homesick. He says he did not dare turn himself in, figuring "this would mean death." But the point proved academic: The police were waiting for him.

In what has become a pattern in recent years Buchner and others "debriefed him for several months" then recruited him, fairly certain he was never hard core ANC material. "We know," says Buchner, "what the situation was after 1976."

Gradually, he says, South Africa has built up a store of knowledge on ANC activities. It comes from captured infiltrators—and, he says, from agents inside the ANC abroad. "In the case of most people, we know beforehand when ANC men are about to return."

Buchner says the ANC faces mounting difficulties in finding official haven for its cross-border infiltrators in neighboring black states. "The ANC," he adds, "has no infrastructure here. They have some 3,000 trained people outside—of whom roughly 30 are active at any one time in South Africa."

Some academics posit a higher figure. John says he's not sure. "The cells are organized without one's being aware of the others."

Whatever the numbers, the ANC has so far failed to unleash a full-scale "armed struggle." Hopes for an open-ended national strike and a rebellion by South Africa's 25,000 black policemen—aired in the pre-emergency pamphlet—have not borne fruit. The ANC did, by last year, seem near to one shorter-term goal—to make black townships "ungovernable." But independent analysts say it is unclear how much of the unrest was the direct work of the ANC. Buchner feels

certain the initial upheaval—over rent in black townships—"was not orchestrated." The ANC, he says, "grabbed on to it."

In Lusaka, ANC's base, officials seem very aware of South African moves to "turn" their activists.

"Habashwe Abafel!" proclaims an ANC pamphlet distributed in South Africa: "Death to the Traitors!" It pictures seven ex-ANC men who testified against former cohorts in South Africa courtrooms.

But, suggests an ANC official, a main focus of the group's evolving strategy is long term political organization in South Africa. While confirming an overlap between the ANC and the Communist Party, he stresses the ANC is an umbrella organization—of dedicated men who aim to topple a "racist" system.

"Regardless of the short-term effects, the imposition of the state of emergency is not a sign of strength," he says. "It is a sign of weakness, a sign that this is the only way the South African government feels it can rule."

John does not underestimate the power of the ANC's political weaponry. "People [in the townships] can't even tell you what the strategy and tactics of the ANC are. But still, they say they support the ANC. The ANC is bringing propaganda and agitation to the youth. This thing is spreading."

According to Buchner, the ANC is now seeking to minimize the effect of South Africa penetration: by training black exiles more rapidly, reinfiltrating them in months.

He adds that he has begun to discern a new "exfiltration" of young blacks to neighboring states, similar to the flight after 1976.

"But," he adds, "there is no 'revolutionary climate' here. There are revolutionary-minded people who try to influence others . . . the dissident types, especially in our cities."

ANC sources counter that their supporters remain able to organize, in township "street committees" and other grass-roots bodies, despite the state of emergency.

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of these three amendments that are being considered en bloc. One-fifth of the world's population is Chinese, and by passing these amendments we are expressing our continuing commitment to promoting respect for human rights—the rights of the Chinese people, and all people.

Mr. Chairman, each of these three resolutions is somewhat different from the other two, thus reflecting the different situations that prevail in each of these areas.

The resolution concerning Taiwan is primarily positive in tone, reflecting the important progress the Government and people there have made toward the establishment of a genuine, pluralistic democracy. Indeed, before this bill finally becomes law, I believe that we can expect martial law to be lifted in Taiwan and ground rules to be established concerning political dialog and multiparty competition. I am advised, in fact, that the end of martial law is only weeks, even days, away.

The resolution concerning the People's Republic of China concerns the much more comprehensive denial of basic human rights in that country. Much as we would like to see comparable progress on the mainland as that in Taiwan, the fact remains that the PRC is a centralized Communist dictatorship whose citizens exist to serve the state.

A final resolution concerns the specific situation in Tibet. Why single out Tibet for special consideration when human rights conditions elsewhere in the PRC are equally grievous? The answer simply is that Tibet was given the same promises 30 years ago that Hong Kong and Taiwan are being given today—promises about respecting culture and traditions and preserving the people's way of life. Needless to say, Beijing's promises to Tibet were never made good.

History has yet to record a single instance of a Communist regime being willing to tolerate cultural traditions and expressions of ethnic and social diversity that do not conform to the dictates of the Communist Party. The people in Hong Kong and Taiwan are wise to be skeptical about what is being promised them by the PRC.

And so I urge adoption of these three resolutions, offered en bloc as amendments.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, today I received a copy of a letter written by noted author and fellow New Yorker, John Avedon, in regard to our amendment concerning human rights violations in Tibet. I found his remarks to be very interesting and so I would like to share them with my colleagues:

While India and China's armies face off across Tibet's high Himalayan borders, there has been a renewed interest in this remote nation. Congress will soon be considering legislation concerning human rights in Tibet. The amendment has provoked vigorous opposition from the State Department, who feels it will harm our China policy. Given its view, why should Americans support or even care about Tibet?"

The legislation acknowledges Tibet's heretofore hidden holocaust under three decades of Chinese rule: 1.2 million Tibetans killed, 6,250 monasteries destroyed, the presence of a large occupying army and the internment of thousands of political prisoners. It calls for monitoring human rights in Tibet, and a return by China to negotiations with the Dalai Lama and Tibetan government-in-exile; forfeited in 1984 in favor of a final solution—the massive transfer of Chinese civilians into the region.

Though Tibet has been a non-issue for the West, in China it remains critically important. Comprising more than a quarter of its land mass, the Tibetan plateau houses close to one third of the PRC's nuclear arsenal. Tibet policy has a high profile in Beijing's inner circles: Deng Xiaoping himself was purged in the cultural revolution for his Tibet record; the second of the five points cited for Hu Yao Bang's recent dismissal was his failure to resolve Tibet's instability.

The State Department feels that censoring China on Tibet will compel her assailed moderates to retaliate, weakening our overall interests. This view is not only wrong, it squanders a unique opportunity to strengthen U.S. China policy.

A tough stand on human rights in Tibet will remind China's leaders that democratic values are as important to us as arms sales or new contracts. At the same time, it will assist them in their current power struggle. Though much of America's strategic and economic stake in China may survive whichever wing of the Community party emerges victorious, our political goal—fostering democratization as a means to temper China's advent on the world scene—can only be pursued under the moderates. We therefore need to support them. This is best done, not by disengaged prudent of the State Depart-

ment, but by direct criticism of China on Tibet. Armed by a resolution from the U.S. Congress, the party's rights can confront its left with proof that a resurgent radicalism has already eroded the foreign support both deem critical for modernization.

In the long run, the State Department and Congress alike should recognize the profound geopolitical incentives for raising America's voice on Tibet. By the loss of Tibet's status as an independent buffer state, India was compelled to befriend the Soviet Union; China, in return, courted Pakistan. The result has been the vexed equation, propagating the dramatic political fault lines at the heart of modern Asia. Unless China's massive population transfer into Tibet is halted the tenuous foundations sustaining central Asian security will inevitably collapse. It is therefore deeply important that the long dormant question of Tibet be more aggressively addressed. Over half the world's population is now engaged across the Rubicon of this high plateau. Finding a formula for restoring its ancient neutrality is in the interest of us all.

As an additional point, perhaps it should be noted that despite Tibet's often murky political status, the International Commission of Jurists, whose two reports formed the basis of the United Nations three resolutions condemning China's annexation of Tibet, maintains that Tibet was a de facto as well as de jure independent state at the time of its invasion by the People's Republic of China in 1949.

Accordingly, I urge my colleagues to support this important measure not only because of the blatant and inexcusable human rights violations, but also because of the global ramifications it addresses.

Mr. BUSTAMANTE. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Rose amendment which promotes Tibetan human rights.

According to congressional hearings on religious persecution as a violation of human rights, the extent of the religious persecution carried out by the Chinese in Tibet will ultimately require volumes to document. In 1959 there were an estimated 200,000 monks in Tibet. Following the Tibetan revolt, the entire clergy, and especially the highly revered incarnated lamas, were singled out by the Chinese for the most inhumane treatment, including, public execution, torture, and hard labor. The majority of the clergy has since perished.

While the People's Republic of China has made efforts to convince the world that the Tibetan people are now being allowed religious freedom, religious practice is still punishable. Tibetans journeying on pilgrimages forgo their vital work-points and, often, their ration cards and are harassed. The recent easing of certain restrictions, although providing some relief for the Tibetan people, is not evidence of any change in China's basic policy which denies fundamental human rights and political self-rule to Tibetans. The exiled Tibetan leader, the Dalai Lama, has refused to return to Tibet until the basic requirements of a civilized life are provided for his people—including, food, clothing, shelter, education, health care, and the certainty that Tibetan culture, including Buddhism, will not only be preserved but developed.

Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support the Rose amendment which addresses serious human rights concerns in Tibet.

Mr. PORTER. Mr. Chairman, beginning with the entrance of the Chinese Army into Lhasa in 1951, over 1.2 million Tibetans have died during the past 33 years of Chinese occupation.

Since February 1987, 2 Tibetans were publicly executed, 3 were sentenced to death, and 30 sentenced to hard labor. The charges were stated as "economic sabotage," with no further explanation. Although religious freedom is a right guaranteed under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the teaching and study of Buddhism is banned in Tibet and over 6,000 monasteries, temples, and historic structures have been demolished.

Since the Cultural Revolution in the 1960's, the Chinese have forced the Tibetans to stop growing barley, their largest commodity, and allowed them to grow only wheat. This constitutes "induced famine" by the Chinese Government.

On March 31, 1959, His Holiness the Dalai Lama, when only 25 years old, led the Tibetan Government and 100,000 Tibetans through the Himalayan Mountains into India, escaping execution by the Chinese. Since then, the Dalai Lama has headed the Tibetan Government-in-exile.

Recently, the Chinese Government has transferred hundreds of thousands of ethnic Chinese into Tibet in an apparent attempt to force the entire Tibetan population out of their country. The Chinese population in Tibet currently exceeds the Tibetan population by 1 million people. This has caused massive unemployment, a 300-percent inflation rate, and a two-class society divided along racial lines.

Mr. Chairman, the Tibetans are concerned with peace, religious freedom and preservation of their culture. These are fundamental freedoms that should be available to all persons. I strongly support this amendment introduced by my colleague, Mr. ROSE, on human rights violations in Tibet by the People's Republic of China. Human rights abuses, regardless of where they are committed, cannot be overlooked or tolerated.

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, as one who has been very actively involved in this whole issue of U.S. funding for the United Nations, I would like to make a few comments concerning this amendment.

When H.R. 1777 was marked up in committee earlier this spring, I offered a bipartisan compromise amendment that served to modify the original Kassebaum-Solomon amendment that was enacted 2 years ago. The amendment I offered is contained in section 191 of the bill. Essentially, this new language establishes a different procedure whereby our Government will make available to the United Nations the American contribution to the U.N. assessed budget and the budgets of U.N. specialized agencies.

I will make this brief, but my amendment, as passed by the committee and incorporated into the bill, would make the amount of American money to be provided to the United Nations each year dependent on a Presidential determination that the reform process at the United Nations is working. When the President so reports to Congress each year, 80 percent of the money he would propose for the United Nations would go to the United Nations auto-



matically. The other 20 percent would be withheld for 30 days, during which time Congress could enact a resolution of disapproval. That remaining 20 percent would then go to the United Nations if Congress took no such action.

The amendment I offered in committee represents a bipartisan effort that was undertaken in good faith, keeping in mind several important considerations.

First, the new language in section 191 pays due recognition to the reform process that has been initiated at the United Nations since the original Kassebaum-Solomon amendment was enacted.

Second, this new language was so crafted as to take into account the fact that the reform process at the United Nations is a long way from being completed, much of it could still come unraveled. Therefore, the need to maintain American financial leverage is very important. By linking the amount of money to be made available to the United Nations to a Presidential determination that the reform process is underway and achieving results, we are maintaining our leverage over that process. Our Government will be in the position of being able to encourage success while at the same time we will not be committed to providing any support if the reform process fails.

That brings me now to the gentleman from Virginia's amendment. What concerns me about what he is trying to do is that a further dramatic reduction in U.S. support for the United Nations could well cause us to lose the kind of leverage we need. The committee bill, in its current form, contains, I believe, the critical mass necessary to encourage reform at the United Nations and to maintain U.S. leverage. I am greatly concerned that any further reductions will undercut Ambassador Walters and all of his efforts in New York, as well as to derail the possibility for significant U.N. reforms.

I understand the gentleman's motives, and I am not unsympathetic to them, and as the gentleman knows, I have tremendous respect for him. But I am quite leery of making any more cuts at this time.

Let me also point out something very interesting. I know the gentleman from Virginia has often talked about reducing the level of United States support to the United Nations to the level of the Soviet Union's support. We are just about at that point now, because of the Kassebaum-Solomon amendment and the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings reductions. Last year, the United States contributed \$131.2 million to the U.N. assessed budget and peacekeeping forces. The Soviet Union paid \$128.7 million for the same purposes. So as you can see, we are just about on a level of parity now.

Mr. PARRIS. Mr. Chairman, this amendment would have the effect of reducing the assessed contribution of the United States to the regular budget of the United Nations by 50 percent based on United States 1986 contributions—the last year for which such figures are available. Under this amendment, the President would have the authority to waive the reduction if he determined that such a waiver would be in the national interest of the United States. There are a number of reasons which necessitate this action.

The United States plays a very important role in the United Nations of today; specifically, that of whipping boy for the Soviets and chief financier of the cause.

The facts are clear: There is no incentive at the United Nations to cut costs or otherwise hold down budget growth. The vast majority of nations voting on the budget pay a minuscule share of U.N. outlays, and, yet, everyone is given an equal vote. As a matter of fact, 143 of the 159 member nations, or 90 percent of the membership, pay less than a 1-percent share of the U.N. regular budget. More than half of those 143 contribute the minimum 0.01 percent of the budget.

For the latter group, every \$1 million increase in the U.N. budget costs them only \$100 per nation. Clearly, these developing countries receive a substantial return on their \$100 investment; yet, it is the United States and other developed nations that bear the brunt of these increased costs. The trouble is that the United States and other 1-percent plus contributors have only 16 of 159 votes, or about 10 percent of the total vote, with which to control or even influence budget decisions.

The Soviet bloc and the so-called Group of 77, actually a group of 120—the Third World bloc—use the United Nations to attack the free enterprise system in general, the multinational corporations and the United States in particular, as the alleged source of the world's economic ills. Increasingly over the years, there has been a developing pattern of so-called nonaligned nations voting with the Soviet Union in a knee-jerk reaction condemning the United States. In fact, we find that the nonaligned nations have voted 86.2 percent of the time with the Soviet Union. When you vote consistently 9 out of 10 times on one side of an issue, you can hardly be considered nonaligned.

When was the last time the United Nations passed a resolution condemning Soviet use of chemical weapons in Cambodia or Kampuchea? When was the last time the United Nations passed a resolution condemning the Soviet occupation of Poland or Afghanistan? When was the last time the United Nations passed a resolution condemning human rights abuses by the Governments in Cuba and Nicaragua—or by the Soviets in Russia, for that matter?

As I have repeatedly stated, the United Nations has become a bottomless pit, into which the United States has dumped literally tens of billions of dollars. In 1946, the United States paid 40 percent of the United Nations regular budget or \$7.7 million. By 1985, our percentage assessment had been reduced to 25 percent, however, our payment to the United Nations regular budget amounted to approximately \$205 million, a 2,500-percent increase in 40 years. Indeed, in the past decade, the United Nations regular budget has more than tripled in size.

According to the official U.N. General Assembly Report of the Committee on Contributions, dated August 9, 1985, the total cash payments received in satisfaction of assessments for 1984 was \$1,607,446,000. Of that amount, only \$134.7 million, or 8.3 percent, was received from the Soviet Union. At the same time, \$450.23 million was received from

the United States—28.01 percent of the total amount—almost four times the amount furnished by the Soviets.

With respect to voluntary contributions, that same report shows that the Soviet Union contributed only one-half of 1 percent of the total \$2.1 billion received, while the United States contributed 23.82 percent of it. A substantial margin of difference by anyone's standards.

It is also interesting to note that according to data obtained from the U.N. Secretariat's January 20, 1986, report on the status of assessed contributions, the Soviet's are in arrears on their "mandatory assessed" payments to the United Nations in the amount of \$235.6 million, nearly 80 percent of which is peacekeeping nonsupport. By and large, what the Soviets have paid, they have paid in rubles, which are useless outside of the Soviet Union.

The fact of the matter is, the Soviet Union contributes as little as possible, yet maintains near complete control over the disbursements at the United Nations—and we've seen what that has gotten us. It's time we put a stop to our role as financier of the Soviet cause until we regain some degree of control over the process.

I am not suggesting that we withdraw from the United Nations. In fact, I believe we should maintain our membership and continue our efforts to bring that organization back to the original purpose for which it was created. But until it returns to an institution dedicated to the resolution of world conflict, I believe we should dramatically reduce our financial support of its operating and other program budgets, at least to a similar level of funding as the Soviet Union.

I urge my colleagues to speak for all of America and support the amendment.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, under current law, the United States withholds its proportionate share of assessed contributions to the United Nations for projects whose primary purpose is to benefit the Palestinian Liberation Organization and SWAPO, the South West Africa People's Organization.

This amendment would do two things. First, it would close a loophole in the language that allows U.S. funds to go to one of the United Nation's pro-PLO activities. Second, it would add the African National Congress, a terrorist organization closely allied with the PLO and SWAPO, to the organizations we withhold from.

The law stipulates that the United States must withhold from two U.N. organizations, that clearly benefit the PLO—the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, and the Special Unit on Palestinian Rights. There are other U.N. projects that the United States does not withhold from because the State Department is interpreting the law as narrowly as possible.

One of these pro-PLO projects is the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories. This committee is obviously spouting pure PLO propaganda and should have been withheld from long ago.

The special committee was established by a United Nations resolution in 1968, which already concluded that Israel was violating Pal-

estinians' rights. The purpose of the yearly so-called investigation has been to ratify what the United Nations has already decided. None of the committee members have relations with Israel, and Israel has refused to cooperate with the committee, which is clearly rigged against her. So the "investigation" consists of interviews in neighboring states and press reports.

It is time that we stop paying for PLO propaganda. This amendment closes one more loophole and is a step in the right direction.

This amendment also provides for withholding United States funds from U.N. projects whose primary purpose is to benefit the African National Congress.

This idea should not be controversial, as the House has already voted 369 to 49, to prohibit United States taxpayers dollars from going to the African National Congress.

At the time, some members said they thought that the amendment was unnecessary because no funds were being sent to the ANC. Well, in this case there is now doubt that we are helping the United Nations fund the ANC.

It is impossible to know for sure just how much the United Nations is giving to the ANC. Estimates range from \$28 to over \$40 million a year. One thing we do know is that the United Nations is funding the ANC offices in New York, because it says so in the United Nations' own documents.

Another thing we know is that the Special Committee Against Apartheid is so anti-Western that no Western nation sits on the committee. Its staff is dominated by the Soviet bloc, which tends not to be motivated by humanitarian concerns. Last year, for example, the SCAA held hearings in New York, to which student leaders from all over the United States were invited. The hearings were organized by a Mr. Oudovenko, of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

Another thing we know is that the ANC and the PLO have had a long relationship. In May of last year the Anti-Defamation League issued a report entitled "The African National Congress: A Closer Look." According to the report:

As a revolutionary movement oriented towards Moscow, the ANC has long echoed Soviet attempts to undermine the legitimacy of Israel. Moreover, the ANC is a strident supporter of the PLO.

The ADL report goes on to make these points:

In 1970, the ANC denounced "Israel's aggressive expansionism" and urged "all peace-loving nonaligned states to immediately sever their relations with Israel."

In September 1980, ANC president Oliver Tambo spoke in Paris at a conference sponsored by the World Peace Council, a Soviet front. He said:

I would like to assure our comrades in the liberation struggles \* \* \* and the PLO \* \* \* that their struggle is ours \* \* \* our fight is carried on in the knowledge of the degree of intimacy and political, military and economic alliance that has been developed between racism and Zionism.

In July 1982, the ANC United Nations observer referred to Israel's policies as "Zionist Nazism."

Witnesses testifying before a Senate subcommittee stated that the ANC members trained with PLO cadres in the Soviet Union.

The ANC, the PLO, and SWAPO were all observers at the U.N. Symposium on the Question of Palestine in July 1985. According to the ADL, the symposium "was held to plan an anti-Israel propaganda campaign in the United States and Canada, was replete with an anti-Israel propaganda campaign in the straddled the fine line between criticism of Israel \* \* \* and outright anti-Semitism."

According to an Israeli official quoted in the press "the PLO smells blood in South Africa. \* \* \* The PLO thinks its long-term investment in the ANC finally has a chance to pay off." These Israeli sources would not say exactly how much the PLO has given the ANC, except that it is "in the millions," and that for more than 5 years the PLO has provided the ANC with arms, logistical support, and military training.

Both the PLO and the ANC exhibit the hallmark of a true terrorist group: They kill more moderates who are on their side than the enemy they are supposedly fighting. Just as the PLO has killed far more moderate Arabs—just because they oppose the PLO—than they have Israelis, the ANC has mainly killed moderate blacks who oppose ANC terror.

According to the Institute of Race Relations, a respected independent social research institute in South Africa, 2,326 blacks were killed from September 1984 until December 1986. About half of these deaths were caused by black-on-black violence.

The ANC has made very clear that it will kill anyone in its way, black or white. The ANC's radio station is constantly exhorting people to violence in the most graphic terms. One broadcast proclaimed:

Our people must organize themselves into groups to manufacture traditional weapons which must be used against the enemy. After arming themselves in this manner, our people must begin to identify collaborators and enemy targets and kill them.

In another broadcast, on May 4, 1986, the ANC's radio said:

Let us take all our weapons, \* \* \* our necklaces, our grenades, our machine guns, our AK-47's, our limpet mines and everything we can get—let us fight the vigilantes \* \* \* together with the apartheid regime \* \* \*.

The "necklace" referred to in this broadcast is perhaps the most gruesome instrument of terror used in modern times. It consists of putting a tire doused in gasoline over the head of the victim, tying his or her hands, and then lighting the tire on fire so the victim slowly burns to death. Hundreds of blacks have died this way.

The ruthlessness of the ANC is perhaps best expressed by Johnny Makatini, the ANC's representative at the United Nations, who I think joined Oliver Tambo for tea at the Foreign Affairs Committee and the State Department. He said—as reported in the New York Times:

If there were only 4 million of us left after the revolution, that would be better than the present situation.

He alludes here with indifference to the possibility of deaths of 17 million South African blacks.

I am not accusing those who support the ANC of deliberately supporting communism, just as I would hope they would not charge that because I oppose the ANC that I support apartheid. It is just not true that to oppose apartheid we must support the ANC. Major South African black leaders, such as Chief Buthezi, Bishop Mokoena, Bishop Lekanyane, even Bishop Tutu, have bitterly opposed ANC terrorism.

In any case, the House has already voted that the United States should not fund the ANC and its necklace terrorism. This amendment simply says that the United States should not be funding United Nations programs whose "primary purpose" is to provide benefits to the African National Congress. I believe this is a modest measure that the American people would support, and I am pleased that the Committee on Foreign Affairs has accepted this amendment with the understanding of the majority.

I would like two supporting documents, one a report by the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, the other an article from the Washington Jewish Week to appear at this point in the RECORD.

[From the ADL Bulletin, May 1986]

#### THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS: A CLOSER LOOK

(By Nathan Perlmutter and David Evanier)

Discussion of the political scene in South Africa properly begins with the self-evident stipulation that apartheid is racist and dehumanizing.

If you are a black citizen of South Africa, you cannot vote in national elections; you must generally use separate public facilities; you are not allowed to own real estate in 87 percent of your own country; you are told with whom you may socialize, and where you can look for a job. If the government wants to resettle you, it can do so at any time for any reason.

The "homelands" resettlement drive has forced half of South Africa's blacks into overcrowded, unproductive segregated Bantustans, areas with no industrial base that are so overpopulated hardly any viable agricultural land remains. Drinking water is unsafe and sanitation deplorable. Since the Bantustans are little more than detention camps, many Africans migrate to urban centers as "illegals" subject to arrest. Forty percent of black children are estimated to be malnourished and ten percent suffer from kwashiorkor (extreme protein deficiency).

In 1984, Pretoria's Constitution granted Parliament chambers to Asian and "colored" communities but not to blacks.

On the positive side, black, colored and Asian trade union membership has grown from 150,000 after legalization in 1979 to 750,000 today and blacks' real income has risen substantially in the last 25 years, higher than in any other African country. The U.S. State Department says that more positive changes have taken place in South Africa in the last five years than in the previous 300.

Hotels, parks and theaters are being integrated, and the pass laws controlling where black can live and work were recently revoked. Other reform commitments that are going to be translated into legislation in-



clude guaranteeing blacks freehold property rights.

Paul Johnson, British historian and former editor of the *New Statesman*, recently wrote in *Commentary*: "There is . . . overwhelming evidence that South Africa has been moving away from apartheid . . . It is quite clear that P. W. Botha . . . is convinced that apartheid has to go and has been dismantling it almost by stealth to avoid panicking the regime's followers."

Nevertheless, apartheid remains in force today. We, as Jews, with a collective memory of centuries in European ghettos and who have experienced the singular evil of racism, feel a special personal responsibility to insist on its dismantling.

But this is not to suggest closing our eyes to what may emerge once apartheid is gone. Political morality demands that the values that see us abhor apartheid also measure the society that will follow. We must distinguish between those who will work for a humane, democratic, pro-Western South Africa and those who are totalitarian, anti-humane, anti-democratic, anti-Israeli and anti-American.

It is in this context that the African National Congress (ANC), so frequently discussed as an alternative to the Botha Government, merits a close, unsentimental look.

The question can be fairly asked, what has all this to do with Jews?

As a revolutionary national liberation movement oriented toward Moscow, the ANC has long echoed Soviet attempts to undermine the legitimacy of Israel. Moreover, the ANC is a strident supporter of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

In 1970, the ANC denounced "Israel's aggressive expansionism" as "supported to the hilt by the ruling circles of the U.S. and their allies" and urged "all peace-loving non-aligned states . . . (to) immediately sever state relations with Israel . . ."

An article in the September, 1971, issue of *Sechaba*, the monthly ANC magazine headlined, "Zionism, South Africa and Apartheid—a Paradoxical Triangle," was adapted from a pamphlet with the same title published by the Palestine Research Center, an affiliate of the P.L.O.

In September, 1980, ANC president Oliver Tambo spoke in Paris at an International Conference on Solidarity with the Struggle of the Namibian People, sponsored by the World Peace Council, a Soviet front. He said:

"... I would like to assure our comrades in the liberation struggles . . . and the P.L.O. . . . that their struggle is ours . . . our fight is carried on in the knowledge of the degree of intimacy and political, military and economic alliance that has been developed between racism and Zionism."

At the 60th anniversary meeting of the South African Communist Party (SACP) in 1981, Tambo stated: "Today, in the anti-imperialist struggle, we have won new allies like the struggling people of Palestine. We have thrown up new enemies of peoples, like those who murder civilians in Beirut."

In July, 1982, during the Israeli military action against Lebanon-based P.L.O. terrorism, ANC chief United Nations observer Johnstone M. Makatini denounced Israel for its "flagrant and unprovoked aggression against Lebanon" and its "attempted extermination of the Palestinian people. He referred to Prime Minister Begin's policies as 'Zionist Nazism.'"

Witnesses who had been associated with the ANC testified before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Security

and Terrorism in March, 1982, that the ANC cooperated with the P.L.O. and that some members trained in the U.S.S.R. with P.L.O. cadres.

In 1983, a controversy erupted at the State University of New York at Stony Brook involving Professor Ernest (Fred) Dube, who taught a course on "The Politics of Race." Dube, an ANC representative at the United Nations serving on the ANC's National Educational Council, taught that Zionism is a form of racism and suggested as a term paper theme "Zionism is as much racism as Nazism is racism." Dube spoke at a teach-in on Palestine" in New York in December, 1983, sponsored by the November 29 Coalition, a pro-P.L.O. organization of radical leftist and Arab-American groups. In an interview published in the July-August 1985 issue of *Palestine Focus*, a publication of the now renamed November 29 Committee for Palestine, Dube said that "what the Zionists did to the Arabs in Palestine was exactly the same that the whites did to us" in South Africa.

At the ANC National Consultative Conference in June, 1985, Oliver Tambo stated: "In 1973, the Arab armies succeeded to inflict a major defeat on Zionist Israel for the first time in a quarter of a century, forcing U.S. imperialism to seek new measures to protect its client state in the Middle East."

The ANC, the P.L.O. and the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) were observers at the second annual United Nations North American Regional Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) Symposium on the Question of Palestine, in July, 1985, under U.N. auspices in New York. The symposium, held to plan an anti-Israel propaganda campaign in the U.S. and Canada, was replete with anti-Israel and pro-P.L.O. declarations that often straddled the fine line between criticism of Israel and its supporters and outright anti-Semitism.

The ANC and the November 29 Committee for Palestine cosponsored a meeting in New York in April, 1986, on the subject, "Israel-South Africa: The Apartheid Connection?" Similar meetings have since been held in many other American cities.

The ANC, which seeks to overthrow the South African government is a "national liberation movement" that, plainly said, is under heavy Communist influence.

The ANC has been allied with the South African Communist Party (SACP) for 30 years.

The ANC is oriented toward the Soviet Union and its East Bloc allies, who have furnished it with arms, funding, military training and other logistic support.

Oliver Tambo, who has headed the ANC since 1964 when former president Nelson Mandela was sentenced to life imprisonment for acts of sabotage, is a member of the Presidential Committee of the World Peace Council (WPC), a leading Soviet-controlled front organization based in Helsinki. Tambo has been a speaker or guest at various forums sponsored by the U.S. Communist Party.

The ANC is a member of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO), described in 1983 by the U.S. State Department as a Soviet-controlled front.

*Sechaba*, the ANC magazine, is printed in Communist East Germany.

Moses Mabhidha, General Secretary of the South African Communist Party, speaking at the SACP 60th anniversary meeting in 1981, said: "Our Party . . . fully supports the same program of liberation as the African National Congress for the seizure of power and black majority rule."

In 1982, seven members of the ANC national executive committee were identified in sworn testimony before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism as SACP members. The 30-member national executive committee now has 12 to 15 members said to be affiliated with SACP.

The ANC supports the Soviet Union on foreign policy issues. Tambo told the June, 1985, ANC National Consultative Conference: "... the democratic, anti-feudal and anti-imperialist revolution in Afghanistan had been saved, with the support of the Soviet Union."

In a message to the same conference, the SACP Central Committee stated:

"... The SACP . . . pledges to do its utmost to ensure that your decisions are carried into the field of struggle and implemented."

ANC spokesmen were featured speakers at banquets sponsored by the Communist Party newspaper, *People's World*, held this spring in California.

The fall of South Africa to such a Soviet-oriented and Communist-influenced force would be a severe setback to the United States, whose defense industry relies heavily on South Africa's wealth of strategic minerals. If America's defense industry were handicapped, our allies' security would also be at peril. A recent Commerce Department report noted that South Africa possesses 83.6 percent of the world's chromium; 80.8 percent, platinum; 70.8 percent, manganese; and 47.7 percent, vanadium.

In the event of a Communist-influenced or controlled revolution, South Africa's dependence on income from the export of strategic metals would perhaps result in continued sales to the West. However, if South Africa's strategic metals were controlled by a regime favoring the Soviet Union, American vulnerability to making political concessions to Moscow would increase substantially.

Moreover, should South Africa be controlled by a regime supportive of the Soviet Union, sea lanes and "choke points" around the Cape of Good Hope through the Red Sea, trade routes to the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans, and from the Persian Gulf would be at risk.

During the last three decades, it has been made painfully clear to the American Jewish community and to all supporters of human rights, that while tyrannies can be overthrown, at times the regimes replacing them may be even worse.

Some examples: In Cuba, the authoritarian Batista was replaced by Castro's Communism; in Iran, the undemocratic Shah's fall brought to power the tyrannical Ayatollah Khomeini, in Nicaragua, the corrupt Somoza's ouster saw the Communist Sandinista regime rise to power. And in Vietnam, the boat people are our times' searing reminder of the spawn of Communism.

As Freedom House has stated, "... South Africa bears the major onus for the bloodshed. Oppressed by the system of apartheid imposed on them by the white minority, the Africans are fighting back in whatever ways possible."

The ANC and the South African Communist Party are not root causes of the upheaval in South Africa. Communists exploit and manipulate economic and political desperation and oppression for their own purposes. South Africa is a tinder box; the Communists are poised to strike the match.

Yet there is still time for other agents of change to take hold and a number of them exist today in South Africa. Those partisans

of democratic alternatives can take heart at the recent outcome in the Philippines, in which a democratic force, Corazon Aquino, emerged triumphant.

One example of assistance to a democratic alternative is the two-month training program in political, economic and social self-sufficiency for leaders from the black township of Soweto taking place at the Afro-Asian Institute in Tel Aviv, Israel.

Israel's labor federation, the Histadrut, a staunch opponent of apartheid, runs the Afro-Asian Institute. The training program focuses on unionizing South Africa's black workers, developing black civil infrastructures, organizing black women and teaching social work.

Israel has repeatedly condemned apartheid and has expressed its willingness to join other countries in economic sanctions against South Africa.

The writer Thomas Mann wrote at the conclusion of his epic novel, "The Magic Mountain":

"Out of this universal feast of death, out of this extremity of fever, kindling the rain-washed evening sky to a fiery glow, may it be that Love one day shall mount?"

The same question applies to violence-ridden South Africa. The survival of freedom in South Africa will be possible only if the forces of violence on the far left and of racial violence on the far right are defeated by the democratic forces of moderation.

[From the Washington Jewish Week, July 10, 1986]

#### ARAB TERRORISTS AID SOUTH AFRICAN GROUPS

(By Charley J. Levine)

JERUSALEM.—The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) is stepping up its support for the African National Congress (ANC), the most prominent of the outlawed organizations seeking to overthrow white minority rule in South Africa, according to both Israeli and South African intelligence sources.

"The PLO smells blood in South Africa," an Israeli expert on the country said. "With international pressure for sanctions against South Africa building, and with the internal situation in South Africa worsening, the PLO thinks its long-term investment in the ANC finally has a chance to pay off."

Israeli officials are reluctant to criticize the ANC publicly for fear of appearing proapartheid. Privately, however, they freely share their growing concern over the prospect of an ANC takeover.

"It's one thing to be opposed to apartheid, which is anti-democratic, unjust, unworkable and altogether doomed," explained an official in Jerusalem who keeps a close eye on events in southern Africa. "But it's quite another thing to be in favor of replacing the existing government with an anti-democratic, anti-Western, and, I must say, anti-Israeli regime."

The ANC is the most well-known and well-heeled of the various underground South African groups. Operating from its headquarters in Lusaka, Zambia, some 750 miles north of Johannesburg, the ANC boasts an annual budget in excess of \$20 million, much of which is obtained in grants from foreign governments.

Though the Soviet Union is a major ANC backer, the single largest foreign donor is Sweden, which reportedly gave the organization \$6 million last year.

Officials in Israel and South Africa, which this reporter visited for nearly two weeks in early June, would not say exactly how much money the PLO has given the ANC, except

that "it's in the millions." In addition to financial aid, these sources add, the PLO has for more than five years provided the African group with arms, logistical support and military training.

ANC acting president Oliver Tambo visited Lebanon as far back as 1980 as a guest of the PLO, according to Israeli and South African sources. Liaison and cooperation between the two organizations were among the key issues reportedly discussed during that visit.

Speaking in Paris following his trip, in September of that year, Tambo publicly assured the PLO—his "comrades-in-arms," as he put it—that "by definition their struggle is ours."

South African government sources say that in 1981 PLO instructors trained ANC terrorists in the use of hand weapons, explosives and military tactics. The training reportedly took place in Mozambique. A year later, the PLO continued its ANC training program in Ethiopia.

ANC parachutists were subsequently trained by the PLO, and Soviet-made explosives were delivered to the ANC's Zambian headquarters via PLO operatives, according to South African officials.

Israeli experts on international terrorism—who include the ANC on their lists of active terrorist organizations—note the ANC's use of PLO-style tactics. The recent car bomb that destroyed a seaside section of Durban, killing three women—two white and one of Indian descent—and wounding 69 people, is the latest in a series of car bombings that have been attributed to the ANC. (Tambo acknowledged after the bombing that it might have been carried out by his guerrillas.)

The first such incident seems to have occurred in May 1983, when an ANC "cell" claimed credit for a car bomb that wrecked a government office building in Pretoria.

Israeli and South African sources say that the man behind the car bombings and other ANC terrorist attacks is the organization's only white executive committee member—a Lithuanian-born Jew who is also chairman-in-exile of the outlawed South African Communist Party (SACP). His name is Joe Slovo, and he serves as deputy chief of the ANC's military wing, known as Umkhonto We Sizwe, or "Spear of the Nation."

Slovo, 60, came to South Africa with his parents at age nine. A lawyer by training, he has spent his entire adult life as an SACP activist, even marrying the daughter of the SACP's treasurer. She was killed years ago by a mysterious letter bomb.

Slovo, who is said to travel regularly between Zambia and the Soviet Union, is the author of numerous ANC tracts. He frequently singles out "Zionist Israel" as "the proxy of U.S. imperialism."

In the Middle East, Slovo has written, U.S. imperialism "has encouraged the forces of reaction to liquidate the PLO and permitted Zionist Israel to invade Lebanon."

South African officials point to the ANC's formal alliance with the SACP and the disproportionate number of SACP members who sit on the ANC's executive committee to support the government's depiction of the ANC as a Communist-run organization.

ANC leaders deny the charge of Communist control, while acknowledging the long-standing ties between their organization and the SACP. At most, ANC leaders and their supporters say, a dozen or so executive members are Communists. The South African government puts the number at somewhere between 19 and 24—out of a total executive committee membership of 30.

"The South African government is caught up in this numbers game," an Israeli analyst said. "The real issue is simply that SACP members occupy a significant number of important, decision-making positions in the ANC."

In addition to Slovo, ANC executive committee members who are said to be active in the SACP include: Alfred Nzo, the ANC's secretary-general, who also serves as deputy chairman of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization, a Cairo-based Soviet front group; Dan Tloome, the ANC's deputy secretary-general and deputy treasurer-general; Cassius Make, senior commander of Umkhonto We Sizwe; Francis Meli, editor of *Sechaba*, the ANC's official publication, and Mzawili Pliso, a special aide to Oliver Tambo.

South African investigators say that Tambo is not a Communist, in keeping with ANC tradition. But the organization's secretary-general—currently Nzo—is always a SACP member, and the SACP secretary-general always sits on the ANC executive.

The PLO does not appear to be the only Arab force behind the ANC, nor is the ANC the only underground South African group receiving assistance from the PLO.

Israeli and South African sources say that Libya has trained members of a rival South African organization, the Pan African Congress (PAC), since the early 1970s. Two PAC members were arrested in South Africa two months ago and admitted to being trained in Libya, according to David Steward, a South African government spokesman. The PAC members alleged mission: to eliminate certain moderate Black leaders.

Another Libyan trained hit team consisting of a dozen Black South African Muslims, was apprehended—weapons and all—at the Athens Airport in February. Members of the group confessed to local police that they were on their way home to assassinate Black moderates.

Sources familiar with the PLO's operations in southern Africa say that PAC agents stay in weekly contact with the official PLO mission in Zimbabwe, where the Palestinians maintain a transmission station in the PAC communications network.

Ali Halimeh the PLO's representative in Zimbabwe recently explained his organization's support for South African underground groups to foreign newsmen. "It is necessary for the PLO and the liberation movements in southern Africa to work together and exchange information on their struggles and their plight," he said, "because we are convinced that the collapse of the South African system will lead to the destruction of the Zionist state in the Middle East."

In March of this year, ANC and PAC members went to Tripoli for an international conference of terrorists that brought together representatives of the PLO and the Irish Republican Army, among other organizations. The conference was sponsored by a body calling itself the "World Center for Struggle Against Imperialism, Zionism and Racism."

South African officials say that two visiting ANC members, Thabo Mbeki and Johnny Makatane, used the occasion of the conference to visit the Sabaha terrorist training base in the northwestern Gharyan area of Libya, where ANC gunmen are regularly instructed in bombing and assassination methods.

Mr. ROBERT F. SMITH. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment by the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. PARRIS].



The current deficit situation has deteriorated so badly—become so desperate—that next week we will be asked to approve a \$65 billion tax increase. Yet we are also being asked, once again, to underwrite one-fourth of the operating costs of the United Nations, where we literally cannot buy a friend.

In 1985, the Soviet Union and the United States voted together in the General Assembly of the United Nations 12.2 percent of the time. Of course we did not extend any aid to the Soviets, either.

But that same year we gave \$2.5 billion to Egypt and over half a billion to Pakistan, when both nations had voted with the Soviets 75 percent of the time the previous year.

Our \$250 million goes to Sudan, when 71 percent of their vote goes to the Soviet Union. Marcos, whose nation received \$270 million, voted in agreement with the Soviets 64 percent of the time.

A total of \$1.2 billion went to El Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Panama, yet these nations averaged only 27 percent support of United States positions in the General Assembly.

The famous Group of 77, which really represents 120 nations, have voted with the Soviet Union in recent years 86 percent of the time. None of these nations pay more than 1 percent of the U.N.'s costs, and the Soviet Union pays less than 10 percent.

I don't expect our contributions to international organizations such as the United Nations to be profitable, but wouldn't it be nice to break even? Indeed, only 19 of 159 members of the United Nations voted with the United States more than half the time.

Everyone would like to be known as a philanthropist, but no one wants to be a sucker.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Chairman, for 4 years, I, along with a number of other Members of Congress, have sought an expression of the sense of Congress regarding the political situation on the island of Taiwan. We have done so because we believe that democracy is an idea whose time has come for the people on Taiwan. We have done so also in response to the aspiration of Americans of Taiwanese descent that their brothers and sisters on Taiwan enjoy the fruits of democracy and freedom. I am pleased, therefore, to offer a provision on "democracy in Taiwan" to H.R. 1777.

It has been almost 40 years since the Kuomintang regime imposed martial law on the island of Taiwan. Whatever justification there may have been at the time for denying the political rights of the people of Taiwan, that rationale has long since vanished amid the prosperity and stability that the island enjoys—and has enjoyed for a long time. No matter how much the restrictions embodied in the original martial law regime have been reduced, the net effect of these so-called emergency measures is to guarantee KMT one-party rule on Taiwan.

It was 40 years ago this year that a majority of the members of the National central legislature and electoral college were elected. Because they supposedly represent districts on the Chinese mainland, they are not required to stand for reelection. There are members of those bodies who are elected from constituencies on Taiwan, but because of the number

of "life members," majority rule does not exist on Taiwan.

I am pleased to acknowledge that significant political changes are occurring in Taiwan. In September 1986, the democratic opposition in Taiwan announced the formation of the Democratic Progressive Party. A couple of weeks later, President Chiang Ching-kuo announced that the Kuomintang regime intended to lift martial law and end the ban on the formation of new political parties. Other reforms, which hold out the promise of an evolution toward a democratic system, are to occur later.

The transition toward democracy in Taiwan will not be easy. Some groups believe that progress is too slow, and others want no change at all. The pace and content of change is up for the authorities and people of Taiwan to work out. But it is appropriate for the United States Congress to pay tribute to the social and economic development which has taken place in Taiwan over the last few decades, and to the recent positive steps toward democracy. It is also appropriate, in the context of that commendation, for the Congress to indicate its hope that the endpoint of this political transition will be a democratic system. That is what the provision on democracy in Taiwan seeks to do.

Mr. NEAL. Mr. Chairman, I'm delighted to join my State's distinguished Senator, TERRY SANFORD, in urging that Congress endorse the Central American peace proposal advanced by President Oscar Arias of Costa Rica.

As you know, earlier this year, President Arias presented his plan for a "Procedure for Establishing a Firm and Durable Peace in Central America." It offers a long-range plan for ending guerrilla wars in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala, and bringing peace and democracy to the region.

On March 4, I introduced House Concurrent Resolution 63, the House version of the Sanford resolution, which expresses the strong support of the U.S. Congress for the Arias peace proposal. We now have 62 House cosponsors of this resolution.

Today, I am offering the resolution, with some relatively minor modifications, as an amendment to H.R. 1777, the State Department Authorization Act.

In essence, the Arias plan is an attempt to find a peaceful, political solution to the problems of Central America. Our resolution reflects the belief of President Arias and the region's other democratic leaders that "a durable peace is only possible within the context of democratic regimes which are committed to eradicating poverty, to establishing an effective means for equal opportunity for all elements of society, and to establishing a pluralistic society where dialog among the various elements of society is permitted to occur and free and periodic elections are held."

Our resolution notes that the Arias initiative recognizes that internal democratization is the key to peace in Central America. It also acknowledges that Daniel Ortega, the President of Nicaragua, has said, "our internal policies will never be the object of any negotiations whatsoever."

Further, our resolution urges the Nicaraguan Sandinista government and our own administration to get behind this initiative, which is de-

signed to end armed conflict and reinforce democracy in Central America.

And finally, our resolution says that Congress strongly supports the Arias initiative and looks forward to a summit meeting as the next phase in this historic effort to forge a firm and lasting peace in Central America.

Mr. Chairman, it's important that we pass this resolution to demonstrate the support of Congress for the Arias proposal. As I said, it has already passed the Senate on an overwhelming vote. If we pass it today, as an amendment to H.R. 1777, maybe the administration will pay some attention.

I say maybe. Because the fact is, our administration is virtually alone in the world in pursuing its policy of supporting the Contras in Nicaragua. No Central American country supports the Contras. No Latin American country supports the Contras. Even our strongest allies in Europe and elsewhere do not support the Contras. Even Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, President Reagan's closest friend in Europe, does not support the U.S. policy in Central America.

In fact, most Western European countries are trading with the Government of Nicaragua, and in some cases providing aid to that country. Clearly, I think, anyone who looks at the situation will recognize immediately that our policy has been an abject failure. We've spent about a thousand million dollars of American taxpayers' money in support of the Contras. Yet the Contras control no territory in Nicaragua and do not have the support of the people.

As President Arias said this morning when several of us were having breakfast with him, the United States stands alone in the world, the United States is isolated in its stubborn support for the Nicaraguan Contras.

What can we legitimately expect from the Arias proposal? If the administration finally gets the message that Congress is behind a negotiated settlement, and if that persuades the administration to support the Arias plan, and if the Sandinistas come to support the Arias plan, and if the Sandinistas come to support it, then I think we will achieve a lasting peace in Central America. It's possible.

What if we get behind it and the Sandinistas do not? I don't know whether the Sandinistas are going to take this seriously or not. But if they do not, it will be clear for all the world to see who is for peace and democracy in Central America and who is not.

Unfortunately, as it now stands, much of the world sees the United States as the aggressor in Central America. They see us almost as terrorists. But if we truly get behind this peace proposal, and it doesn't work out because the Sandinistas will not cooperate, the world will be forced to take another look at the Sandinista regime.

It's not necessary to say now what the next step will be. I'm not sure what the next step should be. The key thing for us is to accept this resolution today, to send this clear message from the Congress to the administration and to the Sandinista government and to the people of Nicaragua that we support a negotiated settlement, that we support peace, democracy, and the restoration of human rights in Nicaragua and in the other countries of

Central America. That's the purpose of this resolution. I urge my colleagues to support it.

At this point, I would like to repeat for my colleagues the 10 major parts of the Arias peace plan:

First, amnesty for political and related offenses, monitored by a commission, and dialog with internal opposition groups.

Second, a cease-fire.

Third, a process leading to a democratic representative form of government, with honest periodic elections and guaranteed civil rights.

Fourth, free and democratic elections, monitored by the OAS, for membership on the newly created Central American Parliament.

Fifth, a suspension of all extra-regional military aid, overt or covert, to insurgent or irregular forces.

Sixth, an end to attempts to destabilize the governments of Central American countries.

Seventh, a reduction of arms.

Eighth, supervision of the plan by the United Nations, the OAS, and the Contadora group.

Ninth, an evaluation of progress by the Presidents of the five Central American countries.

Tenth, economic and cultural agreements which will permit accelerated development.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. Chairman, I support the spirit of the amendment from the gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. NEAL]. I think it important that the Congress applaud the bold initiative of President Arias of Costa Rica. Mr. Arias himself met with some of the distinguished Members of this Chamber yesterday, and was encouraged by the supportive language of Mr. NEAL's amendment.

Nonetheless, it seems to me that current events have overtaken the substance of the amendment. The U.S. Congress finds itself in the awkward position of applauding a nation that has delayed the progress of peace in Central America, and chastising a nation that had agreed to participate in the Arias plan.

Shortly after meeting with Philip Habib, President Reagan's special envoy to Central America, President Duarte of El Salvador unexpectedly withdrew from the Central American summit conference scheduled for June 25. President Duarte says further preparatory meetings are needed, and that he will attend if it is rescheduled for August. But as a result of the postponement, Nicaragua has now pulled out of the talks, and we see the Arias peace plan unraveling before our eyes.

I don't think I am alone in being extremely troubled by these developments. A summit conference among the Central American leaders is a key feature of the Arias plan. Open, candid talks are the greatest hope for peace among the leaders of that region.

Lets look at the history of the Reagan doctrine in Central America. From Ronald Reagan's boasting about breaking up the Contadora initiative, to the discovery of an assassination manual, to the mining of harbors, to making illegal payments, we have seen the Reagan administration undermining any efforts toward peace in the region. Now that administration has told Duarte to ask for postponement of an important summit, giving Daniel Ortega the propaganda advantage he needed in order to pullout of the talks.

I think we need to give President Duarte, who is receiving \$2 million per day of American taxpayers money, the message that he will gain greater support from this body for participating in the peace plan than he will for postponing it.

In short, all Central American nations should participate in this important conference. It is about time the American people realize that the Reagan administration continually undermines progress toward peace in Central America. By giving Daniel Ortega this propaganda advantage, we are shooting ourselves in the foot instead of holding his feet to the fire.

Mr. MINETA. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment to order a report on the human rights situation in Tibet and for other purposes.

The People's Republic of China has occupied Tibet since 1950. It has been estimated that as a direct result of this occupation, 1.2 million Tibetans out of a population of 6 million have died. The causes of these deaths include political executions, persecutions, torture, and suicide.

Today the Tibetans continue to suffer many types of persecution. It is estimated that 100,000 Tibetans are presently being held as political prisoners. Included in this number is the elderly scholar Geshe Lobsang Wangchuk, a fact which demonstrates the fallacy of the claim that all Tibetans being held are common criminals.

Furthermore, despite propaganda efforts to the contrary, in reality the teaching of Buddhism is banned, and only a facade of the religion, geared toward pleasing the tourists, is allowed to exist.

As a part of Chinese policy, native Chinese are encouraged to relocate in Tibet, and for the first time ever, the Chinese population outnumbers the native population. As a result of this infusion, the native culture and identity of Tibet threatens to be overwhelmed, much as was that of the native American Indian.

The living standards of Tibetans are strikingly lower than those of the Chinese occupants. In fact, the standard of living is still below what it was in 1959, and the literacy rate is now the lowest in Asia. Furthermore, of the 8,000 monasteries, temples, and historical monuments which have been destroyed over the past 30 years, some are being rebuilt, but those only for purposes of tourism.

This situation is unacceptable, Mr. Chairman, and so for this reason I urge my colleagues to support the amendment.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of the amendment offered by the gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. NEAL] to require the State Department to submit a report to Congress on the human rights situation in Tibet and to earmark funds in the Migration and Refugee Assistance Program for assistance to Tibetan refugees.

Mr. Chairman, the West is too little aware of the tragedy of Tibet. Long an independent country, it was invaded by the People's Republic of China in 1959 and has been occupied ever since. During this occupation living standards for the Tibetans have dropped dramatically, with one-sixth of the population having died between 1949 and 1979. For those who have survived the economic depri-

vation there has been the additional threat and reality of forced labor, imprisonment and the loss of human dignity. One out of ten Tibetans have been imprisoned at some time in their lives and tens of thousands of others held in labor camps.

The Tibetans' unique cultural heritage has also been savaged; 6,254 monasteries have been destroyed, their art and statuary either melted into bullion or sold for foreign exchange; at least 60 percent of Tibet's philosophical, historic, and biographic literature burned.

In just 20 short years, 2,100 years of civilization was destroyed.

But there is still a dearth of information on the true situation in Tibet today which I hope this amendment will remedy. Mr. Chairman, in closing I would like to quote the spiritual and temporal leader of Tibet, his holiness the Dalai Lama. This passage is from his book, "My Land and My People":

When the Chinese Communist Armies marched into Tibet in 1950 and occupied the eastern part of it, I and my people found ourselves in a helpless and almost hopeless situation. We appealed to several of the leading nations of the world and to the United Nations, to intervene on our behalf, but our pleas for help were rejected. It was many centuries since Tibet had been a military power, for we believe in the path of peace and have tried to follow it ever since the wisdom of Lord Buddha was brought to our country from India over a thousand years ago; and since our national life was devoted to our religion, our material resources were very small. So denied the help of other nations, we were soon overwhelmed by the armed might of China. We sent delegation to Peking, in the hope of making an honorable treaty, but it was coerced by threats into signing away our sovereignty. Our Government never ratified the agreement which was forced on us.

But it was clear to all of us that if we rejected it, more bloodshed and destruction would inevitably follow. To save my people from worse disaster, I and my government tried to abide by the agreement, unjust though it was; but the Chinese broke every promise they had made in it.

The grim tragedy which followed in Tibet has been told in great detail in the reports of the International Commission of Jurists. In this book, I have tried to give a more personal account of our life in Tibet, and of the sad events which for the present have brought it to an end. I have also mentioned some principles of buddhism, and the religious course from suffering to the path of happiness; for nobody can understand Tibet without some understanding of our religion.

I am a steadfast follower of the doctrine of nonviolence which was first preached by Lord Buddha, whose divine wisdom is absolute and infallible, and was practiced in our own time by the Indian saint and leader Mahatma Gandhi. So from the very beginning I was strongly opposed to any resort to arms as a means of regaining our freedom. All my efforts through these years were spent in a search for a just and peaceful settlement with China, and I tried my best to discourage violence even at the risk of displeasing some of my own people. For 9 years I managed to persuade those of my people who were still under the authority of the Tibetan Government not to take arms against the Chinese oppression, because I believed that course would be immoral and knew it



would cause havoc on both sides. But in the eastern part of the country which had already been invaded, neither I nor my government had any means of communication through which we could use our influence on the people; and there they rose in revolt against the Chinese. Finally, the oppression by the invaders throughout the country became intolerable, and the patience of my people broke.

This is the story I have done my best to tell, in manner which everyone will understand, and I am happy to leave my readers to form their own conclusions. But I must add that we Tibetans still have no feeling of hatred for the great Chinese people, although their representatives in Tibet have treated us so barbarously. Our only wish is to live our own lives in peace and friendship with all our neighbors, including the Chinese; but for that we appeal to all men and women all over the world who value tolerance and gentleness.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendments offered by the gentleman from Florida [Mr. MICA].

The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the ayes appeared to have it.

Mr. GALLO. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote, and pending that, I make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The CHAIRMAN. Evidently a quorum is not present. Pursuant to the provisions of clause 2 of rule XXIII, the Chair announces that he will reduce to a minimum of 5 minutes the period of time within which a vote by electronic device, if ordered, will be taken on the pending question following the quorum call. Members will record their presence by electronic device.

The call was taken by electronic device.

The following Members responded to their names:

[Roll No. 192]

ANSWERED "PRESENT"—402

Ackerman	Borski	Combest
Akaka	Bosco	Conte
Alexander	Boucher	Cooper
Anderson	Boulter	Coughlin
Andrews	Boxer	Courter
Annuzio	Brennan	Coyne
Anthony	Brooks	Craig
Applegate	Broomfield	Crane
Archer	Brown (CA)	Crockett
Armey	Brown (CO)	Dannemeyer
Aspin	Bruce	Darden
Atkins	Bryant	Daub
AuCoin	Buechner	Davis (IL)
Baker	Bunning	de la Garza
Ballenger	Burton	DeFazio
Barnard	Bustamante	DeLay
Bartlett	Byron	Dellums
Barton	Callahan	Derrick
Bateman	Cardin	DeWine
Bates	Carper	Dickinson
Beilenson	Carr	Dicks
Bennett	Chandler	DioGuardi
Bentley	Chapman	Dixon
Bereuter	Chappell	Dorgan (ND)
Berman	Cheney	Dornan (CA)
Bevill	Clarke	Dowdy
Biaggi	Clay	Downey
Bilbray	Clinger	Dreier
Bilirakis	Coats	Duncan
Billey	Coble	Durbin
Boehlert	Coelho	Dymally
Boggs	Coleman (MO)	Dyson
Boland	Coleman (TX)	Early
Bonker	Collins	Eckart

Edwards (CA)	Latta	Rahall
Edwards (OK)	Leach (IA)	Ravenel
Emerson	Leath (TX)	Regula
English	Lehman (CA)	Rhodes
Espy	Lehman (FL)	Richardson
Evans	Leland	Ridge
Fascell	Lent	Ritter
Fawell	Levin (MI)	Roberts
Fazio	Levine (CA)	Robinson
Feighan	Lewis (CA)	Rodino
Fields	Lewis (FL)	Roe
Fish	Lewis (GA)	Rogers
Flippo	Lightfoot	Rose
Florio	Lipinski	Roth
Foglietta	Lloyd	Roukema
Foley	Lowery (CA)	Rowland (CT)
Ford (MI)	Lowry (WA)	Rowland (GA)
Frank	Lujan	Russo
Frenzel	Lukens, Thomas	Sabo
Frost	Lungren	Saiki
Gallegly	Mack	Savage
Gallo	MacKay	Sawyer
Garcia	Madigan	Schaefer
Gaydos	Manton	Scheuer
Gejdensen	Markey	Schneider
Gekas	Marlenee	Schroeder
Gephardt	Martin (NY)	Schuetz
Gibbons	Martinez	Sensenbrenner
Glickman	Matsui	Sharp
Gonzalez	Mavroules	Shaw
Goodling	Mazzoli	Shumway
Gordon	McCandless	Shuster
Gradison	McCloskey	Sikorski
Grandy	McCollum	Sisisky
Grant	McCurdy	Skaggs
Gray (IL)	McDade	Skeen
Gray (PA)	McEwen	Skelton
Green	McGrath	Slattery
Gregg	McHugh	Slaughter (NY)
Guarini	McMillan (NC)	Slaughter (VA)
Gunderson	McMillen (MD)	Smith (FL)
Hall (OH)	Meyers	Smith (IA)
Hall (TX)	Mfume	Smith (NE)
Hamilton	Mica	Smith (NJ)
Hammerschmidt	Michel	Smith (TX)
Hansen	Miller (CA)	Smith, Denny
Harris	Miller (OH)	(OR)
Hastert	Miller (WA)	Smith, Robert
Hatcher	Mineta	(NH)
Hawkins	Moakley	Smith, Robert
Hayes (IL)	Molinari	(OR)
Hayes (LA)	Mollohan	Snowe
Hefley	Montgomery	Solarz
Hefner	Moody	Solomon
Henry	Moorhead	Spence
Herger	Morella	Spratt
Hertel	Morrison (CT)	St Germain
Hiler	Morrison (WA)	Staggers
Hochbrueckner	Mrazek	Stallings
Holloway	Murphy	Stangeland
Hopkins	Murtha	Stark
Horton	Myers	Stenholm
Houghton	Howard	Stokes
Howard	Nagle	Stratton
Hoyer	Natcher	Studds
Hubbard	Neal	Stump
Huckaby	Nelson	Sundquist
Hughes	Nichols	Sweeney
Hunter	Nielson	Swift
Hutto	Nowak	Swindall
Hyde	Oakar	Synar
Inhofe	Oberstar	Tallon
Ireland	Obey	Tauke
Jacobs	Olin	Taylor
Jenkins	Ortiz	Thomas (CA)
Johnson (CT)	Owens (NY)	Thomas (GA)
Johnson (SD)	Owens (UT)	Torres
Jones (NC)	Oxley	Torricelli
Jones (TN)	Packard	Towns
Jontz	Panetta	Trafficant
Kanjorski	Parris	Traxler
Kaptur	Pashayan	Udall
Kasich	Patterson	Upton
Kastenmeier	Pease	Valentine
Kennedy	Pelosi	Vander Jagt
Kennelly	Penny	Vento
Kildee	Pepper	Visclosky
Kolbe	Perkins	Volkmer
Kolter	Petri	Vucanovich
Konnyu	Pickett	Walgren
Kostmayer	Pickle	Walker
Kyl	Porter	Watkins
LaFalce	Price (IL)	Weber
Lagomarsino	Price (NC)	Weiss
Lancaster	Pursell	Weldon
Lantos	Quillen	

Wheat	Wise	Wyllie
Whittaker	Wolf	Yates
Whitten	Wolpe	Yatron
Williams	Wortley	Young (AK)
Wilson	Wyden	Young (FL)

□ 1025

The CHAIRMAN. Four hundred two Members have answered to their names, a quorum is present, and the Committee will resume its business.

Does the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. GALLO] insist upon his request for a recorded vote?

Mr. GALLO. Mr. Chairman, I do not.

The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the voice vote prior to the quorum call and the Chair's announcement that the ayes appeared to have it, the amendments are agreed to.

So the amendments were agreed to.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. SWINDALL

Mr. SWINDALL. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. SWINDALL:

Page 27, after line 13, add the following:

SEC. 137. TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN FOREIGN MISSIONS AND FOREIGN ORGANIZATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES.

(a) IMPOSITION OF RESTRICTIONS.—The State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (as amended by section 128) is amended by adding at the end of title II (22 U.S.C. 4301 et seq.; commonly referred to as the "Foreign Missions Act") the following:

"SEC. 216. TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN FOREIGN MISSIONS AND FOREIGN ORGANIZATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES.

"(a) TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS.—The travel of any individual while in the United States, other than a national or permanent resident alien of the United States, who is one of the personnel of—

"(1) an international organization defined in section 209(b)(1),

"(2) an official mission to an organization defined in section 209(b)(1) from a country specified in subsection (c)(1),

"(3) any organization specified in subsection (c)(2) which has a standing invitation to participate in the sessions and the work of the General Assembly of the United Nations as an observer and maintains a permanent office at the United Nations headquarters,

"(4) any organization specified in subsection (c)(2) which is not described in paragraph (3), or

"(5) any foreign mission (as defined in section 202(4)) of a country specified in subsection (c)(1),

shall be limited to the municipal city limits of the city in which such organization or mission is located, except that for purposes of travel between missions of a country, direct access shall be permitted to and from airports serviced by major air carriers providing interstate or intrastate service.

"(b) SPECIAL RULE FOR WASHINGTON, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.—For purposes of paragraphs (4) and (5) of subsection (a), the metropolitan area of Washington, District of Columbia, is that portion of the area which is encircled by interstate route 495 on the west and 95 on the east (commonly referred to as the "Beltway").

"(c) COUNTRIES AND ORGANIZATIONS TO WHICH RESTRICTION APPLIES.—

"(1) The countries referred to in subsection (a) are Afghanistan, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the German Democratic Republic, the Hungarian People's Republic, Iran, Libya, the Mongolian People's Republic, Nicaragua, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the People's Republic of China, the Polish People's Republic, the Republic of Cuba, the Socialist Republic of Romania, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (including the Byelorussian S.S.R. and the Ukrainian S.S.R.).

"(2) The organizations referred to in subsection (a)(1) are the African National Congress, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and the South West Africa People's Organization.

"(d) WAIVER.—The Secretary of State, after consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation may waive the restrictions in subsection (a) if the Secretary determines that the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States require that such restrictions be waived.

Mr. SWINDALL (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the RECORD.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Georgia?

There was no objection.

□ 1040

Mr. SWINDALL. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that my amendment be considered with modifications which are at the desk and which the majority and the minority have already seen.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will report the modifications.

The Clerk read as follows:

Modifications to the amendment offered by Mr. SWINDALL: Page 3, line 8, strike "Syria".

Page 3, line 15, strike "Attorney General of the United States" and insert "Secretary of State, after consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation".

Page 3, line 16, after "subsection (a)", strike the balance of line 16 and the language through line 23 and insert "if the Secretary determines that".

Page 3, line 23, strike the dash, and on line 24 strike "(1)".

Page 4, line 1, after "waived", insert a period and question mark and delete the balance of line 1 and the ensuing language through line 21.

Mr. SWINDALL (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the modifications be considered as read and printed in the RECORD.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Georgia?

Mr. WEISS. Mr. Chairman, I object. I have not been able to hear the amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. Objection is heard.

The business of the committee cannot continue unless we have better order.

#### PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY

Mr. MICA. Mr. Chairman, I have a parliamentary inquiry.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state it.

Mr. MICA. Mr. Chairman, I would like to know if the situation is correct as I have stated it.

We had a vote prior to the quorum call on the en bloc amendments. The en bloc amendments were approved, but there was a quorum call and a possible call for a recorded vote. After the quorum call, there was a decision not to request a recorded vote, so we are now moving on in regular order for amendments, with amendments to this bill.

An amendment has been offered, and there has been an objection raised as to whether or not the amendment would be accepted at this time pending the quorum in the House; is that correct?

The CHAIRMAN. That is correct. And the objection was raised on the basis that the gentleman from New York could not hear the unanimous-consent request of the gentleman from Georgia to dispense with the reading of his proposed modification of his pending amendment.

Mr. WEISS. Mr. Chairman, I could not hear, and so I did not know what the request of the gentleman was. I would appreciate it if the gentleman would restate his unanimous consent request.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair understands that the gentleman made a unanimous consent request, and the gentleman from New York reserved the right to object.

Mr. WEISS. I did, yes, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will again try to achieve order in the Chamber.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Georgia to restate his unanimous-consent request.

Mr. SWINDALL. Mr. Chairman, my unanimous consent request is that my amendment be considered with modifications at the desk which the majority and the minority have already seen. I have an amendment which I have modified, and that modification is currently at the desk. It has been distributed literally 48 hours ago.

Mr. WEISS. Mr. Chairman, on that basis, I withdraw my objection.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Georgia?

There was no objection.

The test of the amendment, as modified, is as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. SWINDALL, as modified: Page 27, after line 13, add the following:

#### SEC. 137. TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN FOREIGN MISSIONS AND FOREIGN ORGANIZATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES.

(a) IMPOSITION OF RESTRICTIONS.—The State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (as amended by section 128) is amended by adding at the end of title II (22 U.S.C. 4301 et seq.; commonly referred to as the "Foreign Missions Act") the following:

#### "SEC. 216. TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN FOREIGN MISSIONS AND FOREIGN ORGANIZATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES.

"(a) TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS.—The travel of any individual while in the United States, other than a national or permanent resident alien of the United States, who is one of the personnel of—

"(1) an international organization defined in section 209(b)(1),

"(2) an official mission to an organization defined in section 209(b)(1) from a country specified in subsection (c)(1),

"(3) any organization specified in subsection (c)(2) which has a standing invitation to participate in the session and the work of the General Assembly of the United Nations as an observer and maintains a permanent office at the United Nations headquarters,

"(4) any organization specified in subsection (c)(2) which is not described in paragraph (3), or

"(5) any foreign mission (as defined in section 202(4)) of a country specified in subsection (c)(1),

shall be limited to the municipal city limits of the city in which such organization or mission is located, except that for purposes of travel between missions of a country, direct access shall be permitted to and from airports serviced by major air carriers providing interstate or intrastate service.

"(b) SPECIAL RULE FOR WASHINGTON, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.—For purposes of paragraphs (4) and (5) of subsection (a), the metropolitan area of Washington, District of Columbia, is that portion of the area which is encircled by interstate route 495 on the west and 95 on the east (commonly referred to as the "Beltway").

#### "(c) COUNTRIES AND ORGANIZATIONS TO WHICH RESTRICTION APPLIES.—

"(1) The countries referred to in subsection (a) are Afghanistan, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the German Democratic Republic, the Hungarian People's Republic, Iran, Libya, the Mongolian People's Republic, Nicaragua, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the People's Republic of China, the Polish People's Republic, the Republic of Cuba, the Socialist Republic of Romania, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (including the Byelorussian S.S.R. and the Ukrainian S.S.R.).

"(2) The organizations referred to in subsection (a)(1) are the African National Congress, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and the South West Africa People's Organization.

"(d) WAIVER.—The Secretary of State, after consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation determines the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States require that such restrictions be waived.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Georgia [Mr. SWINDALL] is recog-



nized for 5 minutes in support of his amendment.

Mr. SWINDALL. Mr. Chairman, the purpose of my amendment, simply stated, is to limit spying within the borders of the United States. It does so by limiting travel within the United States by certain foreign employees of the United Nations missions to the U.N. and the U.N. Secretariat's office located in New York and foreign diplomats of the foreign embassies and consulates located in major cities, including Washington, DC, New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Chicago, among many others.

The purpose of this amendment, as I stated, is to address a situation that is not new to the American people, but certainly in the last several years we have heard a great deal more about the problems presented by the Soviets and Soviet bloc countries spying within our borders. In short, they use foreign diplomats for spy purposes. That alone has cost us millions, if not billions of dollars in losses and damages to U.S. military programs and national security.

For example, from 1980 to 1981 Lt. Christopher Cooke, Deputy Commander of the Air Force Titan missile crew, passed classified information to the Soviets on United States strategic missile capabilities. In 1984 Thomas Cavanaugh, an engineer for the Northrop Corp., tried to sell Stealth technology to the Soviet that cost literally a million dollars per hour in Stealth research. From 1979 to 1981 James Harper sold Minuteman missile technology to Polish intelligence authorities. More recently, John Walker and Jerry Whitworth passed cryptographic material to the Soviets on United States naval communications. This enabled the Soviets to read over a million coded messages over 20 years.

In addition to that, we expend millions of dollars each year for FBI surveillance of these individuals who are spying here. One of the reasons it costs so much is that they are limited under current law to only a 25-mile radius. Others are literally restricted in no fashion whatsoever.

According to the Senate Intelligence Committee, up to one-quarter of the Soviet and Soviet bloc diplomats and employees are KGB. Let me read just briefly, Mr. Chairman, one of the reports of the Senate Intelligence Committee.

It states that "The Soviet presence in the U.N. Secretariat is comprised of one-fourth of the Soviets that are KGB or co-opted by the KGB and GRU. All Soviets in the Secretariat must respond to KGB requests for assistance. The Soviet intelligence services use their U.N. assignments to collect information on U.N. activities; to spot, assess, and recruit agents; to support worldwide intelligence operations, and to collect scientific and technolog-

ical information of value to the U.S.S.R." According to the FBI, U.N.-based Soviet intelligence officers are assisted by the intelligence services of the East Bloc European Soviet satellites.

It is these nations that we are under my amendment going to slap travel restrictions upon. With the exception of Libya, today all of the Soviet Bloc countries can travel up to 25 miles away from a city.

Let me give an example of what that entails. These East Bloc diplomats are not subject to the closed-area restrictions that the United States reciprocally places on the military of the Soviets. Thus in just 3 hours they can legally drive to Fort Dix military reservation near Browns Mill, NJ, operating out of New York, or to the submarine construction facility at Groton, CT.

To make matters worse, the Hungarians and the Romanians are currently under no restrictions whatsoever. They are not even under the 25-mile restriction. This is a serious oversight in our own intelligence.

The purpose of this amendment would be to expand the number of restricted countries to include East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Cuba, Nicaragua, and a list of others and to expand the number of organizations to include at least the PLO, SWAPO, and the ANC.

The restriction that we have placed at Washington, DC, if this amendment is adopted, would be basically within the Beltway. In New York it would be a restriction to the five-borough area. Elsewhere it would be the statutory city limits.

In essence, Mr. Chairman, by adopting this amendment we would save ourselves millions of dollars in countersurveillance that we now expend for the FBI by bringing down the amount of broad geographic area which they must observe and keep surveillance upon from a 25-mile radius to roughly a statutory city limit radius, and in the case of Washington, DC, the beltway.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. SWINDALL] has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. SWINDALL was allowed to proceed for 20 additional seconds.)

Mr. SWINDALL. Mr. Chairman, the other aspect of this bill is that it would save us billions and billions of dollars with respect to what we lose to the Soviet Union in stolen technology.

Lastly, I would say that there is a concern that we would be retaliated against by some of the East Bloc countries, and I would say that we have so much more to protect than do the East Bloc countries that that is a small price to pay for the American people.

Mr. MICA. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to this amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I do not want to take too much time on this matter, but I do want to say that I understand that my colleague, the gentlewoman from Maine [Ms. SNOWE], will also oppose the amendment. It is not that we do not have any interest in controlling and, where necessary, to restrict the movements of diplomats in the United States. We have tried to assess the impact of this amendment. The committee has talked directly with the CIA and with our own intelligence community. The basic problem with the way this piece of legislation is drafted is that ultimately we will win only the first move.

We restrict the movements of foreign diplomats in New York City and in Washington. But, at the same time, American diplomats, today enjoy such free access in a number of East Bloc countries we would lose 80 percent of the freedom we have under this amendment.

As chairman of the subcommittee—and I might ask my ranking minority member to work with me on this—we might be able to fashion legislation that would accomplish this goal. But we do have concerns about the amendment offered today without the benefit of any further study. I would accept the view of the Director of the CIA that the ultimate problem with this amendment, as worded, is that we would end up briefly restricting some foreign diplomats and mission officials in the United States, an action which will trigger a reprisal under the guise of reciprocity aimed against American diplomats around the world. As I have said we would lose about 80 percent of the time.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MICA. I yield to the gentleman from Indiana.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, let me get this straight. I think the gentleman just said that this would restrict the mobility of our agents in Communist bloc countries or that there might be retaliatory action that might be taken and it would be to the detriment of the United States.

I wish the gentleman would elaborate on or illuminate that statement a little bit more for me. It seems to me that we have beaucoup Communist bloc agents in this country who are able to go almost anywhere, at will, and I do not see how it is going to be counterproductive if we restrict them just a little bit. If there is some kind of a point that I am missing here, I would like to know more about it.

Mr. MICA. Mr. Chairman, let me again just state this: I do not have the numbers at hand, but the committee has consulted with the Director of the CIA and our intelligence community.

First, the U.S. Government has already moved recently to tighten restrictions on Soviets traveling in the United States.

Second, American diplomats throughout the world are given pretty free latitude in a number of countries, including some East bloc countries, to travel. Yet, if we enforce this amendment, we have been told it is almost a certainty that countries affected will take total reciprocal action on this matter, and if it is applied to the numbers worldwide, we will lose in 80 percent of the benefits we enjoy today.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, if I might follow up on that, my colleague who is sponsoring the amendment indicated that 25 percent of the Soviet bloc employees at the U.N. are KGB agents. They are Communist spies. Is the gentleman saying that the people who are going to be hampered, our American citizens around the world, are also spies?

Mr. MICA. Mr. Chairman, I disagree with the gentleman and I disagree with that number. I would say that it is probably a higher number. But that does not change the net result. If we restrict the movement of foreign diplomats the way the amendment proposes, we seriously run the risk of having the countries named in the amendment take similar steps against our people. In 80 percent of the cases, we will lose an advantage we have enjoyed for some time. What I would like to do is work it out so that at least we have a parity, that we restrict in such a manner that will properly take into account our interests overseas. If not, we will ultimately end up having some of our numbers restricted three times more.

Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MICA. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding. I appreciate the gentleman's comments, and I agree with them.

I would like to ask the gentleman a few questions. Am I correct in my understanding that the administration opposes this amendment?

Mr. MICA. Yes. The Director of the CIA have asked us to strongly oppose this because, although they agree with the intent, they continue to say that as carried out on a second and third move, we would lose, as I said, 80 percent of the time.

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Mr. BERMAN. I appreciate knowing and being sure of that opposition by the administration to this amendment.

Am I also correct in my understanding that this administration and this Secretary of State could do every single thing provided for in this amendment under Executive discre-

tion, if he thought it were wise to do so?

Mr. MICA. Absolutely.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Florida has expired.

(At the request of Mr. BERMAN, and by unanimous consent, Mr. MICA was allowed to proceed for 3 additional minutes.)

Mr. MICA. The administration at this time can do everything in this amendment under existing authority. Under this amendment, there would be no mandatory enforcement because the Secretary does have a waiver. So that in essence, the only thing that we might care to do beyond this is micro-manage. We do not have the ability right now. Maybe we need it in the future.

Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield further, I have several more questions.

It is also my understanding that based on a very clear record, evidence from the historical record, these types of restrictions would naturally result in similar restrictions within the countries who they are imposed upon; is that correct?

Mr. MICA. That is correct.

Mr. BERMAN. And would not those kinds of restrictions in those countries limit the ability of our embassies and our diplomats in those countries to deal with contacting and outreach to people who are victims of the kinds of human rights violations and oppression and who need help in facilitating emigration and other kinds of assistance to this country?

Mr. MICA. Absolutely, and without a doubt we could name the list throughout the East bloc, of countries where we do have access to numerous groups from the refuseniks on down the line that could be restricted, under the amendment.

Mr. BERMAN. I also note that the People's Republic of China is one of the countries mentioned on this list. Would my understanding of the restrictions imposed by this amendment, which the administration opposes, be that the commercial attachés of the Chinese Embassy in this country seeking to work with American exporters on permitted exportable technologies in this country would be restricted from visiting the plants and the corporate headquarters in these companies that fell outside the limited geographic areas that would be imposed by these restrictions?

Mr. MICA. The gentleman is absolutely correct, but I just want to restate this. I do not oppose this amendment simply because the administration opposes it or because the CIA opposes it, but because in the long run, and I have said it several times, I will say it again, we will lose in 80 percent of the cases.

I would like to structure this, if we get the opportunity in the future, so that we get some kind of parity.

Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman.

Ms. SNOWE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MICA. I am happy to yield to the gentlewoman from Maine.

Ms. SNOWE. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I must correct the gentleman's statement on the fact that I am in opposition to this amendment. I did have concerns with the original amendment of the gentleman from Georgia, which would have restricted the ability of the Secretary and discretion in imposing these restrictions; but as I understand it now, reading the gentleman's amendment, he provides a waiver which states that the Secretary of State after consultation with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, as well as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, can make his determinations as to whether or not the Secretary should impose restrictions.

As we know in the course of the hearings that we have held by the subcommittee in the case of Arkady Shevchenko indicated the scope and the nature of the Soviet bloc personnel working at the United Nations, engaged in intelligence gathering.

I do not think, obviously, that we want to hamper the ability of the Secretary of State in imposing these restrictions, because we could invite reciprocity in these countries, and obviously it would make it difficult for us to conduct our own activities; but I think the flexibility invites the support of the Members of the House, because it does provide that discretion.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

I think the gentlewoman makes a very good point. There is a waiver. It was not mentioned by my colleague on the other side of the aisle.

The Secretary of State, after consultation with the CIA Director and the FBI, can waive this provision if they feel it is necessary; but let us get at the real issue, I think, and that is that around the world in the last 16 years, 700 Soviet agents have been expelled from various countries. That does not include other Communist-bloc countries.

In the United States, since 1947, 66 Soviet employees have been expelled. They are working very hard to get whatever intelligence data they can to spy on the United States at every opportunity. We need to do everything we possibly can to curtail that activity.

I think the gentleman from Georgia has a very fine amendment, one that everybody in this body ought to embrace if they are really going to try to get at the problems we have been



facing regarding spying and the tremendous loss of intelligence data that has been going to the Soviet Union.

In addition to that, we have lost an awful lot of technology that has undermined the security of the United States.

Now, one more point that I would like to make, and then I will yield to the gentleman from Georgia.

The gentleman from Florida indicated that this affects commercial attachés. I would like to point out that it does not affect commercial attachés. It only affects diplomats. I think that point needs to be made very clear.

Mr. SWINDALL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. I am happy to yield to my colleague, the gentleman from Georgia.

Mr. SWINDALL. Mr. Chairman, I would just like briefly to respond by saying, first and foremost, the waiver provision here addresses virtually every concern that the gentleman from California and the gentleman from Florida have already stated; but what I think needs to be addressed with respect to the comment of the gentleman from Florida about micro-management is this. It is this Congress that bears the responsibility of appropriations. It is this Congress that bears the responsibility of the \$2 trillion debt that we currently are passing along to our children and our grandchildren, and part of that debt has been accumulated because we have to spend more on defense in order to basically do research to pass along, inadvertently, but nonetheless it is still being passed along to the Soviet Union, because through our own ignorance, naivete, or whatever, we allow literally hundreds of KGB and spy activities to occur under our very noses, and what makes this that much more I think naive is that we are a free society. Once these folks get outside of the restricted area, they basically can do whatever they choose. If you go to any of the Eastern-bloc countries, they do not really need any type of these restrictions anyway, because you cannot sneeze without someone being aware of what you are doing. Certainly that is not the case in this country. We would not want it to be the case.

One last point. A 1986 October Senate Intelligence report makes the following statement:

The hostile intelligence threat to the United States is severe, and it confronts the Government and the American people with increasingly serious challenges. The threat spans all types of intelligence operations from traditional human espionage to the most sophisticated electronic devices. Every kind of sensitive information is vulnerable, including classified Government information, emerging technological breakthroughs, and private financial transactions. Foreign intelligence services also sometimes target the political process, seeking both information and influence.

We are not only talking about those individual spies, but we are talking about the recruitment that occurs as a result of our giving them, under diplomatic immunity, free access to this entire country in some cases and a 25-mile radius that is loosely enforced in the final case.

For no other reason, we ought to be concerned in terms of the financial impact in saying to the FBI and to the members of the Judiciary Committee, I can tell you they are already under-financed, that it is ludicrous to stand here today and leave them with that large an area for surveillance, when we could narrow the focus down to the statutory city limits inside the beltway in Washington and the five borough area of New York.

Mr. MICA. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SWINDALL. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.

Mr. MICA. Mr. Chairman, let me just make it clear, I do not oppose the goals of this. The only concern I have is that we are going to pass an amendment here that has a waiver here that everybody says they are going to exercise, the CIA, the FBI and the State Department.

Also I would add that the committee is concerned about this. We agree with everything that has been said.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Indiana has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. BURTON of Indiana was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

Mr. MICA. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield further?

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.

Mr. MICA. We agree, Mr. Chairman, with everything that has been said about the problem. We have, as I opened up and indicated, been advised that the way the language is drafted, it is ultimately going to hurt us.

I would just point out, too, that because we had such concern on this, we adopted a provision earlier in this bill 2 days ago, in H.R. 2410, that calls for studied moves on reciprocity and asks the State Department and all the agencies to join together to figure out the puzzle so that when all the pieces come together, we do not lose; but I do not disagree at all with the points that have been made. I have seen the figures. We have heard the testimony about the agents operating in this country.

I just want to move in a way that we can best be helpful; so I have no quarrel with what has been said, but a little bit about the way it is being done.

As I indicated, and as the gentleman said, it does have the waiver which the gentleman offered and which we accepted, and that waiver, we have been told, is all going to be exercised. Once

it is exercised, everything that we say is already in law anyhow.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, let me just end up by saying that in the last couple of days it was brought out by the gentleman from California [Mr. HUNTER] that it is going to cost billions of dollars because of the loss of technology to the Soviet Union regarding the sale of high technology to the Soviets as far as submarines are concerned for us to bring our defenses up to snuff. Anything that this body can do to curtail espionage and Soviet activity of the KGB in this country should be done, and this legislation that we have in hand today I think is an excellent amendment. I commend the gentleman from Georgia for introducing it and I hope everybody in this body will embrace it and support it.

Mr. SMITH of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I want to commend the gentleman who proposed the amendment for what I consider to be basically an attempt to address a problem that all of us are concerned about. The problem is that, unfortunately, there has not really been a good answer up to this point and this amendment really does not go too far beyond what has already been thought about, and I am not saying that in the negative sense. It means that we still have a problem addressing this issue and we do not know exactly what to do.

My colleagues ought to be aware that this administration has already moved in certain areas to foreclose movement of certain of the organizations which would be affected, so we are talking about travel restrictions that already are being imposed on terrorists groups, like the PLO. They have already been imposed on Libya and they have already been imposed on other countries which are already on the list that the gentleman from Georgia has provided in the amendment.

But the problem of the amendment arises not in the intent, but in the execution. As has been said by both the gentleman from Florida and the gentleman from Maine and others, there is a problem here with limiting access of U.S. personnel overseas. That is a very, very big problem. It should not be downplayed.

Let me explain to you why, and I will be reading from a background paper from one of our intelligence agencies. I would be happy to show it to anyone here. It is not classified, but I do not think it is any more germane to know which agency, and so it really is not appropriate. If anyone on the other side would like to see it, I would be more than happy to show it to you.

But let me read:

c. The Swindall amendment, if enacted, would affect the Soviet and NSWP military attaches, and those of the other countries identified, very little. Last year, Soviet attaches made only seven trips outside metropolitan Washington. Destinations included: New York City; West Point; Florida via Alabama, North Carolina, Georgia; Los Angeles and Anaheim. A Czechoslovak attaché made the only trip by an NSWP attaché. Thus, one can deduce that their work does not oblige extensive travel. In contrast, for U.S. military attaches, travel in the Warsaw Pact and other countries above is the most significant issue in their ability to carry out their missions. In a closed society, the attaches must travel to observe and report on military activities. In 1986, a significant part of their work effort required travel outside the capital area.

d. In the event that travel restrictions are imposed for foreign personnel in the U.S., we foresee a strong possibility of reciprocal actions against our attaches that would diminish and restrict their work. For example, reciprocal actions might include closing major areas of military significance, restricting personnel to capital city or consular offices. At the same time, similar restrictions would not seriously affect foreign attaches because they rely very little on travel for their purposes. The net loss, then, would fall on the U.S. attaches.

Let me further continue. The amendment is written in such a fashion as to possibly also cover personnel in the mission of our allies. Thus, we might jeopardize their support for our efforts. With the exception of the U.S.S.R., right now U.S. diplomats may generally travel freely in all of the countries named in that amendment.

While the gentleman wants to do a noble thing, invoking this travel restriction could result in our being restricted in almost every country that is mentioned when we are not restricted now.

There are serious consequences. Not that the gentleman's amendment is wrongheaded—it is not. The problem is that we have attempted to deal with this—and the executive branch—the Secretary of State and the Department of State—already has the capability to do that under the current law—on a piecemeal basis so as not to have a blanket retaliation. And it is important for us not to have that retaliation, because we do the kind of work that is being done in those countries only because of our free access, even though we are fearful that they have the right to travel in this country.

Let me just say also that there is no enforcement mechanism in this amendment, so the reality is that there would be, unfortunately for us, no kicker in the event that they violate it.

Now, with the reference to the gentleman from Indiana and his assertion that this only covers diplomats, let me suggest to the gentleman that a reading of the statute would probably suggest otherwise. The Foreign Missions

Act and the definition of foreign missions, and the personnel therein, is much broader than the gentleman would suggest, and I doubt very seriously whether we want to get into the area that has been explored by the gentleman from California here with references to commercial and other missions and all of the other ramifications.

I again reiterate, the gentleman from Georgia is not addressing a problem that does not exist. It is a real, legitimate problem. The problem that we have had for more than just the recent past is that we really have not found a satisfactory solution, and we really have not with this amendment found any better way than we have already reviewed over the course of years, and that is why we should oppose this amendment, but force the administration to continue to do what it has been doing, and that is close down and restrict travel when the circumstances warrant it, as they have in the past.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Florida [Mr. SMITH] has expired.

(On request of Mr. SWINDALL and by unanimous consent, Mr. SMITH of Florida was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

Mr. SWINDALL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield for a question and a colloquy?

Mr. SMITH of Florida. I yield to the gentleman from Georgia.

Mr. SWINDALL. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, the question is: How many U.N. Secretariat's offices and U.N. missions are contained in either the Soviet Union or the Soviet-bloc countries?

Mr. SMITH of Florida. It is obvious that there are very few, and mostly because the headquarters of the United Nations is here, and most of the work that they do is not in the Soviet Union.

Mr. SWINDALL. That is my whole point. That is the focal point, among other areas, of this legislation. It is no accident that we have much of the spying activity emanating out of offices that are unique to this country because we allow, if you will, the United Nations to base in our country. There is no counterpart upon which retaliatory measures could be taken, first.

Second, I think that it is very important to recognize that today Libya and Libya alone has any type of restrictions of the magnitude that we suggest here. Certainly we are not naive enough to believe that Libya is the only country that poses a threat to our own intelligence in this country, our own technology in this country, yet that is the state of the world today—we recognize only Libya as a threat if you are to match those types

of restrictions that we place on Libya to the others.

Mr. SMITH of Florida. The gentleman is not exactly correct. Travel restrictions have been issued against others than the Libyans and foreign diplomats. There are radius requirements on a number of other organizations and others represented.

The problem is that we have basically unimpeded access in most countries around the world except for the Soviet Union.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Florida [Mr. SMITH] has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. SMITH of Florida was allowed to proceed for 1 additional minute.)

Mr. SMITH of Florida. The reality is that every one of our organizations, both the administration, the Secretary of State, and our intelligence-gathering organizations that are responsible for what we want them to do overseas, what is our role overseas, indicate, and I read from one of their background papers, that they do not want a blanket restriction imposed, nor do they want to get into a battle which would ultimately reduce their capability of traveling overseas. They gave some indication of what the travel was of some of the attaches in the area that they deal with, and it has not been that extensive.

I am confident that this administration will continue to clamp down on the travel when it appears that our rules are being violated or our security is being impaired. We all agree that they are probably sending people here who are wolves in sheep's clothing. The problem is that we have some of our own agenda to run, and this has a very threatening aspect to it which the experts say should not be implemented. It is really that simple.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Florida [Mr. SMITH] has expired.

(On request of Ms. SNOWE and by unanimous consent, Mr. SMITH of Florida was allowed to speak for 2 additional minutes.)

Ms. SNOWE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SMITH of Florida. I yield to the gentleman from Maine.

Ms. SNOWE. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I think that the gentleman is overlooking one point, and that is that the Secretary does have discretion as to whether or not imposing these travel restrictions would invite reciprocity that ultimately would endanger our national security interests and restrict our activities in other countries.

Second, the gentleman mentions a report in which personnel of the Soviet Union have only requested on seven specific occasions to travel out-



side their travel area. I mention to the gentleman that those were the only seven occasions that we are aware of. Several years ago a KGB agent working for the United Nations approached a member of my staff about a Presidential document that should not have even been known to exist. We reported it to the FBI which ultimately took the action of expelling this individual from the United States, and he went back to the Soviet Union. But that is an incident which we were able to bring to the attention of the U.S. Government. Had we not brought it to the attention of the U.S. Government, obviously it would not have been known.

The point is that we do not know the extent to which these individuals are engaged in intelligence-gathering operations. So I think that the travel restrictions the gentleman from Georgia is attempting to impose are reasonable because the Secretary will have the discretion to make decisions to the contrary.

Mr. SMITH of Florida. Mr. Chairman, it is a very, very good argument that the gentleman makes, except for one thing. The gentleman discounts or in fact does not acknowledge at all that the ability to do so already exists within the Department of State through the executive capability of the President. There is no reason, as a matter of fact, to pass this amendment, because this could be done already.

If you are going then to blanket restrict and then have them opt out or be allowed out by waiver, you have sent a very chilling signal which our own experts, our own intelligence-gathering network, says is the wrong thing to do. And in this particular case I personally would urge my colleagues to listen to the experts on this particular issue. This is where their expertise lies, and this is where they know what they need to do.

Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I will not take the entire amount of time. We have let the rhetoric I think become a little bit hotter than the actual amendment at hand. I would like to refocus it, if I could.

What the gentleman from Georgia is attempting to do is to rein in some of the Communist countries and their allies from roaming around this country. He proposed adding eight countries or organizations—the African National Congress, China, Hungary, Nicaragua, Romania, South Yemen, the Southwest Africa People's Organization, and Syria—to the list of restricted nations or organizations as far as traveling in this country.

I think that that is a pretty straightforward amendment. The gentleman from Florida I believe made reference

to the fact that the Soviet attaches did not make but seven trips outside of Washington. Well, they did not have to. They had all these other folks running around loose, and the fact of the matter is that if you do not believe that there is a terrorist network and you do not believe that these organizations interact, then you have not been reading the newspapers, you have not been studying up on what is really going on.

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I think this is a fairly straightforward amendment. It would not unduly restrict the workers, the employees of the missions and the embassies from doing what they ostensibly are here to do, which is to conduct diplomatic activities in the city in which they are assigned.

For that reason, I think the gentleman should be commended for offering the amendment, and we should vote on it in a very positive fashion.

Mr. HALL of Texas. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BARTON of Texas. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. HALL of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding and of course I rise in support of the amendment.

I think the major test is not what the President thinks of this amendment nor the Secretary of State, but what the amendment people think of it, and I really challenge each Member of this body to go among your districts and ask or make the inquiry as to whether or not they are in favor of allowing foreign agents from the Soviet Union, its satellites and client states to conduct the host of subversive activities that they are free to conduct today; I think that is the major test.

If my colleagues remember about 4 years ago we had a bill up relating to the United Nations, giving an opportunity to have the U.N. hosted every other year by Russia. Of course, that would show the difference in the lifestyle, the security, the privation that is known by the citizens over there. I think those are the tests we need.

I also think we should address the fact that about 45 years ago today Yamamoto and the Japanese fleet limped back from the Battle of Midway that left the Pacific safe. And I think about 270 years ago today a fellow named Napoleon met his Waterloo. I think those two are significant in that this is an effort to restrict and to protect this country. And to follow on that with what George Washington said when he addressed the Congress and he said when you go through the Augean stables of government, put the Americans on guard, and I think that also includes protecting this area.

Surely this is a step in the right direction. Surely we want to mandate tighter travel restrictions.

I really and truly challenge every Member to ask himself and to ask his constituents, and I would say that not 9 out of 10 but 99 out of 100 would be in favor of this amendment, and I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. ARMEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BARTON of Texas. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. ARMEY. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding. I will very quickly make three points.

I am in support of the amendment. I think it is a judicious thing to do and necessary thing to do.

In that regard, let me remind the Members of this body it was not but about 3 years ago that when a Soviet guard discovered our Major Nicholson in Eastern Germany where the Soviet guard suspected he ought not be, he fired on and shot the major. The major then was left to lay and die while his driver was restrained from going to his aid by Soviet guards in East Germany.

There has been and there is today some doubt whether or not the major was spying, was not spying, whatever. But in East Germany, Soviet guards do not give Americans the benefit of the doubt; they give them a bullet.

I might also mention that I made a recent visit to Mount Alto with a defector from the Soviet Union who had been a KGB agent in the Soviet Union.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Texas [Mr. BARTON] has expired.

(On request of Mr. ARMEY and by unanimous consent, Mr. BARTON of Texas was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

Mr. ARMEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BARTON of Texas. I am happy to continue to yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. ARMEY. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman who had defected as a KGB agent from the Soviet Union told me that the Soviet Union will generally have up to 30 percent of their diplomatic personnel who will be KGB agents in the United States and elsewhere. When I asked him about other Eastern European-bloc nations, he said the ratio was about the same.

Finally, let me mention for those who do make an argument, and I think a very interesting and convincing argument, that there may be times in which it would be better for us to not exercise this restraint on travel, the gentleman from Georgia has provided a waiver here that allows the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Director of the CIA, to exercise that waiver, so it need not necessarily be enforced rigorously. But to the extent that it is deemed to be in our national interest, the Secretary

has the authority to do that, and that is far better than giving a Soviet KGB agent a bullet for the benefit of the doubt.

Mr. SWINDALL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BARTON of Texas. I yield to the gentleman from Georgia.

Mr. SWINDALL. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to briefly address several of the points the gentleman from Florida [Mr. SMITH] made which I think are slightly confusing to the record.

First of all, with respect to the status of individual countries that are limited to the same restrictions as Libya, there are no others. Libya and Libya alone is limited to the five-borough area of New York City.

It is true that there are other nations that have a 25-mile radius restriction, nations that are equally as dangerous I think as Libya, nations like the Soviet Union, the North Koreans, the Iranians who are limited.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Texas [Mr. BARTON] has again expired.

(By unanimous consent Mr. BARTON of Texas was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

Mr. SWINDALL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BARTON of Texas. I continue to yield to the gentleman from Georgia.

Mr. SWINDALL. But there are other nations that have absolutely no radius restrictions whatsoever. These include China, Bulgaria, East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Nicaragua, and Cuba. I think that is a significant number of countries that have no such restrictions.

Finally, I would suggest that there is a substantial difference between these types of restrictions placed and then require the Secretary of State to make waivers, as opposed to giving blanket, full unlimited accessibility to our country, and then saying it must be restricted on a case by case basis. The reality is we have been too lax and it is time that this Congress stood in and said these are the restrictions, we want to be reasonable, and if you think that there ought to be waivers, tell us what those waivers are, why you think, for example, Nicaragua or China or East Germany or Poland deserves to have absolutely no restrictions whatsoever.

Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Chairman. I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. SWINDALL. Mr. Chairman, I include the following materials from the State Department and a former American intelligence of the CIA to be inserted into the RECORD:

1968 ANNUAL REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FOREIGN MISSIONS ACT OF 1982, AS AMENDED (P.L. 97-241), APRIL 1987

#### COUNTRIES SUBJECT TO OFM TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS

Embassies and Consulates: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Cuban Interests Section, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Poland, USSR.

UN Missions and Secretariat Officials: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Byelorussia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Iran,<sup>1</sup> Libya,<sup>1</sup> Mongolia,<sup>1</sup> North Korea,<sup>1</sup> Palestine Liberation Organization,<sup>1</sup> Poland, Ukraine, USSR, Vietnam.

Miscellaneous: Bulgarian Office of Commercial Counselor, Bulgarian Travel Office in New York, Czechoslovak Tourist Office in New York (CEDOK), Czechoslovak Financial Office in New York (OMNI-TRADE), Czechoslovak Commercial Section in New York, German Democratic Republic Commercial Affairs Office, Polish Tourist Office in New York (ORBIS), Polish Office of Commercial Counselor in New York, USSR International Cotton Advisory Board, Soviet news media personnel.

#### USSR

	Categories						
	Diplomatic, consular (incl. TDYers) personnel, military attaches, News media personnel, & Aeroflot (addendum A)	USSR missions at the UN (incl. Byelor. & Ukrainian missions)	UN Secretariat personnel	Intourist personnel	Business residents Amtorg, Sovfracht, Belarus, Marine resources, UZTEC, and Soviet clergy (addendum B)	US-USSR exchange programs and delegations (incl. short-term visitors)	Tourists
Regulations:							
1. Must submit TSRs for air and ground transp. and hotel acc.	Yes .....	Yes .....	Yes .....	No .....	No .....	No .....	No .....
2. Tvl note submitted to EUR/SOV, USUN, FLOs.	Yes .....	Yes .....	Yes .....	Yes .....	Yes .....	No .....	No .....
3. Itinerary submitted with visas	NA .....	NA .....	NA .....	No .....	NA .....	Yes <sup>1</sup> .....	No .....
4. Subject to closed areas	Yes .....	Yes .....	No .....	Yes .....	Yes .....	No .....	No .....
5. Time requirements (addendum A)	Yes .....	Yes .....	Yes .....	Yes .....	Yes .....	No .....	No .....
6. Subject to 25-mile radius (addendum C)	Yes .....	Yes .....	Yes .....	Yes .....	Yes .....	Yes .....	Yes .....

<sup>1</sup> Any change in itinerary after issuance of a visa must be approved by EUR/SOV. Notification and approval are done telephonically. The change in the itinerary is conveyed to the FBI. OFM receives no notification.

#### INCORPORATED EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

	Countries				
	Bulgaria, Embassy, Mission to the UN, Commercial Office NY, Travel Office NY	Czechoslovakia, Embassy, Mission to the UN, Commercial Office NY, CEDOK NY, Omnitrade	GDR, Embassy, Mission to the UN Commercial Office NY	Poland, Embassy, Mission to the UN, Consulate General NY, Commercial Office NY, Orbis Travel Bureau NY, Consulate Gen. Chicago, Polish National Tourist Office (PNTOT) Chicago	UN Secretariat, Bulgarians, Czechoslovaks, East Germans, and Poles
Regulations:					
1. Must submit TSRs for air and ground transp. and hotel acc.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
2. Tvl note submitted to EUR/EE, USUN, FLOs	No	No	No	No	No
3. Itinerary submitted with visas	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
4. Subject to closed areas	No	No	No	No	No
5. Time requirements	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
6. Subject to 25-mile radius	No	No	No	No	No

<sup>1</sup> UN Missions (including Observer Missions).



## OTHER NATIONALITIES SUBJECT TO TRAVEL CONTROLS

Categories	Embassy of Afghanistan	Afghanistan mission to the UN	Libyan mission to the UN	Outer Mongolian mission to the UN	North Korean observer mission to the UN	PLO observer mission to the UN	Vietnamese mission to the UN	Cambodian mission to the UN	Iranian mission to the UN	UN Secretariat personnel (re: Iranians, Vietnamese, Libyans and Afghans)
Regulations:										
1. Must submit TSRs for air and ground transp. and hotel acc.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
2. Tvl note submitted to DoS or USUN	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
3. Subject to closed areas	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
4. Time Requirements (addendum D)	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
5. Subject to 15-mile radius	Yes	Yes	Yes <sup>a</sup>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

<sup>a</sup> Afghan citizens assigned in Washington and accredited to the US, and their dependents are authorized free travel within a circular zone whose radius is 20 kilometers (12.43) of the center of Washington, measured from the dome of the US Capitol.

<sup>b</sup> Libyan Mission personnel are restricted to the following boroughs of New York City: Manhattan, Bronx, Queens, Brooklyn, and Richmond County (Staten Island).

Addendum D: Time Requirements;

(a) Travel Services for UN Secretariat personnel (re: Libyans, Iranians, Afghans, Vietnamese citizens) and Afghan Embassy personnel: The above individuals are required to submit a Travel Service Request (TSR) to travel in the US two full working days in advance. The processing time does not include the day the request is submitted or the day the travel documents are released.

(b) Travel Notifications for Mission personnel listed in this chart must be submitted at least 48 hours in advance of any travel to any point outside the free movement zone of New York.

## CUBA

Regulations	Cuban interests: Section personnel (including TDYers)	Cuban mission to the United Nations (CUMUN)	Cuban secretariat personnel
1. Must submit TSR for air and ground transp. and hotel accommodations <sup>1</sup>	Yes	Yes	Yes
2. Travel note submitted to Cuban desk of USUN	No	Yes	Yes
3. Is OFM notified of new arrivals, (incl. TDYers)? How?	Yes (CUBIS notifies OFM by phone).	No	No
4. Subject to closed area restrictions.	No	No	No
5. Subject to 25 mile radius.	No	Yes <sup>a</sup>	Yes <sup>a</sup>

<sup>1</sup> There is no time requirement per se, although, both CUBIS and CUMUN have been "trained" to submit TSRs at least two days in advance of contemplated travel. In the case of Cuban Secretariat personnel, the requirement is two full working days.

<sup>a</sup> From the center of Columbus Circle in New York City to outlying areas not to exceed 25 miles.

## ADDENDUM

## Addendum A. Time requirements

(a) Travel Services for diplomatic, consular (including TDYers), Military, Soviet news media, Aeroflot, URMUN, and UN Secretariat personnel: The above categories are required to submit a Travel Service Request (TSR) to travel in the US two full working days in advance for any destination other than the cities of New York and San Francisco—their only other posts—. The processing time does not include the day the request is submitted or the day the travel documents are released. The processing time required for DC-NYC or DC-SF travel is one full-working day (with respect to Secretariat personnel, the requirement is two full working days). Note: the Service Bureau is officially closed to the embassy on Fridays (does not apply to OFM/NY). However this does not mean that a TSR received on Thursday cannot be processed on Friday. Unlike in DC, the Service Bureau remains open on Fridays for San Francisco TSRs, based on reciprocity.

(b) Travel Notifications for aforementioned travelers must be submitted to EUR/ SOV (to FLOs, for Military attaches; to USUN for URMUN and Secretariat) at least 48 hours in advance of any travel to any point outside the free movement zones of New York, Washington, or San Francisco as defined in Addendum C. These regulations also apply to Business Residents (i.e., Amtorg, Sovfracht, Belarus, Marine Resources Company, US-USSR Trade & Economic Council) and Soviet Clergy.

## Addendum B. Projected travel program

(a) For Business Residents (Amtorg, Sovfracht, Belarus, Marine Resource Company, and US-USSR Trade & Economic Council): when Soviet Business Residents are required to use the OFM travel program, they will be subject to the same measures and restrictions in effect for Soviet diplomatic and consular personnel.

## Addendum C. Free movement zones

In Washington, DC: The zone of free movement in the Washington, DC area for diplomats and journalists, and for other Soviets subject to these regulations and resident in Washington, DC, is defined as follows:

1. All open areas within 25 miles of the White House, and those portions of Loudoun County, VA within 25 miles of the White House.

2. King's Dominion amusement park in Doswell, VA via route I-95.

3. Front Royal, VA via routes I-66 and US 340.

4. Luray, VA via routes I-66 and US 340.

5. Annapolis, MD via route 50.

6. Colonial Williamsburg and William and Mary College at Williamsburg, VA via routes I-95, I-295 and I-64.

7. Ocean City, MD via routes US 50.

8. The Soviet Recreational property at Pioneer Point, MD via routes US 50, US 301 and MD 18.

In New York City: The zone of free movement in the New York area for diplomats and journalists, and for other Soviets subject to these regulations and resident in New York City, is defined as all open areas in the States of New York and Connecticut within 25 miles of Columbus Circle, and in the State of New Jersey those portions of the counties of Bergen, Essex (except for the City of Nutley), Hudson (except for the City of Bayonne), Middlesex, Monmouth, Morris, Passaic, and Union within 25 miles of Columbus Circle.

In San Francisco: The zone of free movement in the San Francisco area for diplomats and journalists, and for other Soviets subject to these regulations and resident in San Francisco, is defined as follows:

1. The City and County of San Francisco.

2. San Francisco International Airport via route US 101 from and to the City and County of San Francisco.

3. In Alameda and Contra Costa Counties (via the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge) an area bounded by California Route 17 from the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge to its intersection with route I-580, thence east on route I-580 to route I-680, thence north on route I-680 to California Route 24,

thence west on California Route 24 to the point where California Route 24 intersects an arc of 18.5 statute miles radius centered at the intersection of the roads Skyview Way and City View Way (southwest of Twin Peaks Park) in San Francisco, thence northwest along the arc to the Contra Costa County/Marin County boundary in San Pablo Bay.

4. In Marin County (via the Golden Gate Bridge) an area bounded by a continuation of the 18.5 mile radius arc from its intersection with the Contra Costa/Marin County boundary in San Pablo Bay to its intersection with route US 101 in Marin County, thence north on US 101 to Lucas Valley Road, west on Nicasio Valley Road to Petaluma-Point Reyes Road, and west on Petaluma-Point Reyes Road to its intersection with California Route 1 (Shoreline Highway), and thence north on California Route 1 for two statute miles, thence by a line due west to the low water line in Tomales Bay, thence, following the low water line, along the west side of Tomales Bay to the Pacific Ocean and south to the Golden Gate Bridge.

5. Drake's Estero, Estero de Limatour and Bolinas Lagoon are included within the free movement zone.

6. In Marin County, only those portions of San Francisco Bay within one kilometer of the low water line are included in the free movement zone.

7. Angel Island is included in the free movement zone and may be reached by any commercial means of transport.

[Foreign Affairs Note, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC, January 1987]

## EXPULSIONS OF SOVIET OFFICIALS, 1986

The expulsions of Soviet representatives from foreign countries continued throughout 1986. Host governments in six countries last year expelled 19 Soviet officials for espionage and related activities, down from 57 in 1985, according to publicly available information. All six—France, Italy, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States—had expelled Soviet officials in previous years.<sup>1</sup>

EXPULSIONS OF SOVIETS, 1970-86<sup>1</sup>

	1970-79	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
Africa/Middle East	6	1	11	(*)	1	2	13	(*)

<sup>1</sup> A sampling of expulsion cases from 1970 through 1985 can be found in Appendix A.

EXPULSIONS OF SOVIETS, 1970-86<sup>1</sup>—Continued

	1970-79	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
Asia/Pacific.....	6	102	6	7	41	1	5	( <sup>2</sup> )
Europe.....	150	13	( <sup>2</sup> )	23	82	16	39	12
Western Hemisphere.....	88	( <sup>2</sup> )	10	19	11	( <sup>2</sup> )	( <sup>2</sup> )	7
Total.....	250	116	27	49	135	19	57	19

<sup>1</sup> Figures for 1970 through 1980 are approximate.<sup>2</sup> No expulsions publicly announced.<sup>3</sup> See page 3 for a discussion of Soviet officials expelled from the United States in 1986.

Because many governments prefer not to publicize such expulsions, the total number in 1986, as in previous years, is higher than the public record would indicate.

## BACKGROUND

Over the years, Soviet diplomats of all ranks—from ambassadors and ministers counselor to administrative personnel such as library employees, translators, and clerks—have been accused of espionage and expelled from the foreign countries to which they had been assigned. Individuals from nondiplomatic occupations have also been expelled, including correspondents from TASS, Moscow Radio, *Novosti*, the newspapers *Pravda*, *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, *Izvestiya*, *Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya*, and the weekly magazine *New Times*; Aeroflot and Morflot officials; trade union officials, UN employees; employees of other international bodies such as the International Wheat Council, the International Cocoa Organization, the International Labor Organization, and the International Civil Aviation Organization; officials of the Moscow Narodny Bank and Soviet state companies Mashinbortorg and Elektronorg; and Intourist representatives. Many of these individuals have been publicly identified as KGB (state security/foreign intelligence) and GRU (military intelligence) officers.

Some expulsions of Soviet officials have been preceded or followed by a break in diplomatic relations (Liberia, for example) or by a significant reduction of the Soviet presence in the country and/or closure of Soviet auxiliary institutions (for example, in Portugal, United States, Costa Rica, Equatorial Guinea, Sudan, and Iran).

As the public record demonstrates, foreign governments most often have expelled Soviet officials for engaging in espionage. This activity has included attempted penetration of the host country's security organization (Canada, February 1978); setting up illegal agent networks (Switzerland, January 1983); establishing local front companies for the reexport of sensitive embargoed Western technology to the U.S.S.R. (Norway, February 1982; Japan, June 1983); and bugging foreign embassies (Ireland, September 1983).<sup>2</sup> Soviet agents also have

sought to obtain information on local armed forces, military installations, defense cooperation with foreign governments, foreign military and political alliance, and local civil defense programs. In seeking such information, these agents have sought to recruit congressional aides, businessmen, technicians and scientists, military officers, students, industrialists, aides to prime ministers, and foreign government officials.

Other Soviet officials have been expelled for actions deemed hostile or threatening by foreign governments. These have included infiltrating agents for the purpose of sabotage (United Kingdom, September 1971); assaulting local officials (Bangladesh, August 1981); conspiring to kidnap and murder local officials (Jamaica, November 1983); and involvement in local narcotics smuggling (Indonesia, February 1982).

Finally, some Soviet officials have been expelled for active-measures-related including:

Plotting to foment religious and sectarian strife (Egypt, September 1981);

Maintaining contact with and financing leftist rebel movements, communist parties, and other local opposition groups (Bolivia, April 1972; Liberia, April 1979; New Zealand, January 1980; Bangladesh, November 1983);

Complicity in antigovernment coup plotting (Sudan, August 1971; Liberia, November 1983);

Dissemination of hostile propaganda (Pakistan, August-September 1980);

Manipulation of local media and financing local peace and antinuclear movements and groups (Denmark, October 1981; Switzerland, April 1983; Federal Republic of Germany, May 1983);

Maintaining contact with suspected terrorist and other "extraparamilitary" organizations (Spain, February 1980, March 1981);

Infiltrating and influencing local exile communities and ethnic emigre groups (Sweden, April 1982)<sup>3</sup> and

Manipulating local agrarian reform movements, fomenting local labor strikes, and helping to organize demonstrations against food price increases (Ecuador, July 1971; Liberia, April 1979; Costa Rica, August 1979, Portugal, August 1980).

Soviet officials engaged in espionage have gone to great lengths to avoid detection and apprehension. In one case, French authorities in October 1976 expelled a Soviet commercial officer after he was caught, disguised in a wig and dark glasses, with information on plans for a secret new French jet engine. A Soviet second secretary in Singapore, expelled in February 1982, sought to pass himself off as a foreign journalist in an attempt to obtain sensitive military information from a local army officer. And in yet another case, the highest ranking Soviet military officer (an identified GRU agent) at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C., was apprehended and found to possess in-

criminating documents following a high-speed car chase through the city in February 1982; he was expelled soon thereafter.

Some Soviet officials who have been expelled for espionage subsequently have been nominated to important national and international posts. Vsevolod Sofinsky, the U.S.S.R.'s former Ambassador to New Zealand who was expelled in January 1980 for passing funds to the local communist party, subsequently was nominated by the Soviet Government, on January 27, 1981, to the UN Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities; later he represented the U.S.S.R. at a UN human rights seminar, June 21-July 2, 1982, in Colombo, Sri Lanka. And Nikolay Chetverikov, expelled along with 46 other Soviet officials from France in April 1983 for espionage, subsequently reentered the Soviet bureaucracy, first as a member of the CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] Central Committee's International Information Department (IID), and then, in April 1986, as chairman of the board of the U.S.S.R.'s all-union copyright agency, VAAP [see Appendix A].

## EXPULSIONS IN 1986

## EUROPE

## France

Late January: Four unidentified Soviet diplomats, accredited as military and trade attaches and suspected to be GRU members, were expelled from France for espionage. The action came just 1 week after the arrest of a retired French Air Force officer for allegedly tracking, at Moscow's behest, French naval and nuclear submarine movements at strategic ports near Brest. According to French judicial sources, the retired French officer was arrested after being seen making trips to Soviet war cemeteries in northwest France which corresponded to visits by Soviet military delegations.

Prior to the officer's arrest, French authorities had noted a persistent Soviet interest in the Brittany region of France. According to press reports, this included the unusual presence of Soviet trucks equipped with parabolic antennae, allegedly picking up freight, and efforts by Aeroflot (the Soviet airline) to begin services to Brest, site of a minor regional airport. Soviet trawlers, also fitted with parabolic antennae, regularly cruise the inshore waters of the region and often ask permission to dock with "technical problems." In November 1983, Brest mayor Jacques Berthelot suspended a "friendship agreement" with Tallinn, claiming his city was becoming a key point for Eastern-bloc espionage. In July of that year, an Aeroflot plane arriving in Brest to take tourists to the Soviet Union allegedly missed its landing, made a prolonged flight over the Brest anchorage, then overflew the nearby Landivisiau naval air base, which provides space for Super-Etendard strike fighters and antisubmarine detection helicopters.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>2</sup> The Swedish Foreign Ministry announced November 1, 1986, that hidden microphones had been found during renovation work at the Swedish Embassy in Moscow; the listening devices had been planted when the embassy was first constructed in 1968. *Svenska Dagbladet* (November 2 and 9, 1986) reported that a "particularly sophisticated system" of between 30 and 100 microphones were built into the embassy; one source cited by the paper claimed that every room in each of the separate buildings making up the embassy was bugged. In another separate development, Danish Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen on December 3 announced that the Danish Embassy in Warsaw was being bugged by Polish authorities. According to his statement, an investigation had revealed a "number of microphones hidden in the ceilings of a number"

of Embassy offices; Foreign Minister Ellemann-Jensen described the microphones as "ultrasensitive" and linked to a "monitoring center."

<sup>3</sup> For more information on Soviet espionage against and penetration of emigre ethnic groups, see "Cultural Relations of Ethnic Espionage: An Insider's View," *Baltic Forum*, Vol. 2, No. 1, Spring 1985. The Swedish daily *Svenska Dagbladet* (August 25, 1986) reported that Swedish security police wanted to have Dainis Zelmenis, suspected KGB officer at the Soviet Embassy in Stockholm, expelled as far back as 1983 for espionage activities against Baltic exiles in Sweden, but he was warned only to curtail his activities, according to the newspaper. The daily also reported that Zelmenis had been lecturing at a Swedish military interpreter's school in Uppsala.

<sup>4</sup> See *Le Spectacle Du Monde* (Paris), March 1986, pp. 51-57, for an overview of KGB activities in France, including the use of trawlers and trucks for espionage purposes. Also, see the London *Financial Times* (October 16, 1986) for information on "secret internal Soviet documents" obtained by the French Government as long ago as 1979 outlining Soviet plans to acquire high technology from the West. The secret documents reportedly were delivered to the French counterintelligence service between spring 1981 and autumn 1982 by a senior KGB official, codenamed "Farewell," who worked in the KGB's Directorate "T" (science and technology), according to the London daily. See *Le Point* (Paris),



One week after the expulsion of the four Soviets from France, CPSU General Secretary Gorbachev in an interview with *Pravda* (February 8, 1986) noted the "recent expulsion from France of several more Soviet Embassy personnel." Gorbachev downplayed their "supposed pursuit of unlawful activity" and called the expulsion "a totally groundless action undertaken on an invented pretext." Gorbachev revealed detailed knowledge of the case when he declared that one of the Soviets accused of espionage was a "technical assistant who worked exclusively inside the Embassy building, had no contacts with foreigners, and does not even know a foreign language." (France expelled Soviet officials in 1976, 1978, 1980, 1983, and 1984; see Appendix A for more detailed information on those expulsion actions.)

#### Italy

Late January: Viktor Kopytin, Soviet Embassy first secretary, and Andrey Shelukin, Aeroflot station manager at Rome's Fiumicino Airport, were declared *persona non grata* and expelled from Italy for espionage. Press reports suggested that the two may have been involved in illegally obtaining information on the Anglo-German-Italian "Tornado" fighter-bomber. Former Aeroflot deputy director in Rome, Viktor Pronin, was expelled from Italy February 14, 1983, for covertly seeking and obtaining information on the aircraft. (Italy expelled Soviet officials in 1970, 1980, 1981, 1982, and 1983; see Appendix A.)

June: Two unidentified Soviet officials posted at the Soviet Embassy in Rome were expelled for industrial espionage, according to Italian press reports.

#### Portugal

June 23: According to press reports, Soviet commercial delegation members Vladimir Galkin and Gennadiy Chiniev were accused of "unacceptable interference in Portuguese internal affairs and threatening the security of the state." They were declared *persona non grata* and given 3 days to leave Portugal. (Portugal expelled Soviet officials in 1980 and 1982; see Appendix A.)

#### Sweden

June 30: The Swedish Foreign Ministry expelled an unidentified Soviet trade representative in Lidö, a suburb north of Stockholm, for industrial espionage, according to press reports. (Sweden expelled Soviet officials in 1982 and 1983; see Appendix A.)

#### Switzerland

Late July: A Soviet official at the Soviet Embassy in Bern identified only as Davidenko was expelled for economic and scientific espionage. According to the Swiss daily *Blick* (September 25), Davidenko sought to obtain information on computer technology and research projects at the Swiss Federal Technical University. (Switzerland expelled Soviet officials in 1970, 1976, 1978, 1982, 1983, and 1985; see Appendix A.)

#### WESTERN HEMISPHERE

##### United States

June 20: Vladimir Makarovich Izmaylov, air attache at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, was declared *persona non grata* and expelled from the United States for espionage. Izmaylov was in possession of classified documents at the time of his arrest.

January 6 and 13, 1986, for more information on "Farewell." Also see *Le KGB En France*, listed in the Bibliography.

(The United States expelled Soviet officials in 1982 and 1983; see Appendix A.)

August 23: Gennadiy Zakharov, a KGB officer working undercover as a scientific affairs official in the UN Secretariat, was arrested on a subway platform in New York City. He had just received three classified documents from an undercover informant before the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) intervened. According to an FBI spokesman, Zakharov paid the informant thousands of dollars for information on robotics, computers, and artificial intelligence. He left the United States on September 30.

September 17: Twenty-five Soviet diplomats based at the United Nations in New York were ordered out of the country in line with a March 7, 1986, order that the U.S.S.R. reduce its level of representation at the United Nations. That order came as the result of Administration concern over Soviet use of the United Nations as a base for espionage. (See Appendix B for a list of Soviet officials expelled from the United States for espionage activities conducted at the United Nations.)

October 21: Vasily Fedotov (counselor), Nikolay Kokovin (attache), Oleg Likhachev (counselor), and Aleksandr Metelkin (counselor) of the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C., and Lev Zaytsev, consul at the Soviet Consulate in San Francisco, were declared *persona non grata* for "activities incompatible with their diplomatic status" and expelled from the United States in direct response to the Soviet expulsion of five American diplomats on October 19. Fifty other unidentified Soviet officials connected with the Soviet Embassy in Washington and the Soviet Consulate General in San Francisco were ordered out of the United States to equalize the level of diplomatic representation in the two countries.

#### COUNTRIES THAT PUBLICLY EXPELLED SOVIET OFFICIALS, 1970-86

Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Cameroon, Canada, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany, Federal Republic of Ghana, Great Britain, India, Indonesia, Iran.

Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Liberia, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Senegal, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United States, Yugoslavia, Zimbabwe.

#### APPENDIX A: PARTIAL COMPILATION OF EXPLUSION CASES, 1970-85

##### AFRICA/MIDDLE EAST

##### Egypt

September 15, 1981: Egypt expelled Soviet Ambassador Vladimir Polyakov, six other Soviet Embassy personnel, and two Soviet correspondents on charges of plotting to foment sectarian strife in the country. A statement issued by the government accused Moscow of recruiting agents in Egypt and exploiting religious strife as well as "influencing the spread and escalation of sectarian strife," in coordination with leftist elements in Egypt and unnamed hostile Arab countries.

##### Equatorial Guinea

February 1980: Yuriy Kiselev, consular officer at the Soviet Embassy in Malabo, was expelled from Equatorial Guinea on charges of espionage. He had allegedly tried to purchase information concerning the Equatorial Guinean Armed Forces.

April 28, 1981: Soviet Embassy in Malabo was asked to reduce the size of its staff from 195 to an unspecified number, according to Madrid radio. The Equatorial Guinean Military Council also asked the U.S.S.R. to cease using the fishing base to which it had access at the Guinean port of Luba.

##### Ethiopia

February 29, 1984: A Soviet Embassy first secretary and a KGB official were expelled by the Ethiopian Government, according to press reports.

##### Liberia

April 1979: Vladimir Poperechniy (first secretary), Mikhail Timoshkin (Soviet Ambassador's secretary), and Igor Trekhlebov (chauffeur), all with the Soviet Embassy in Monrovia, were expelled on charges of maintaining contact with members of the Progressive Alliance of Liberia (PAL), which had organized demonstrations on April 14, 1979, against food price increases. The three Soviets were allegedly seen at PAL headquarters on the eve of the riot and were believed to have played a role in organizing the demonstrations.

March 18, 1981: Ivan Muzyken, second secretary at the Soviet Embassy in Monrovia, was expelled for engaging in acts "incompatible with his diplomatic status," according to Monrovia radio.

April 2, 1981: Valentin Petrov, first secretary at the Soviet Embassy in Monrovia, was expelled for engaging in acts "incompatible with his diplomatic status," according to the April 1 issue of the *Liberian Daily Observer*.

November 22, 1983: Soviet Ambassador to Liberia Anatoliy Ulanov was declared *persona non grata* and given 48 hours to leave the country on the charges of complicity in antigovernment coup plotting. On November 21, Liberian Head of State Samuel Doe asserted that a "foreign mission" accredited near Monrovia was aware of an impending plot to overthrow the People's Redemption Council, headed by Doe, and promised to support the operation by providing "money, arms, and drugs."

July 18, 1985: The Liberian Government broke diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R. for "gross interference" in Liberian internal affairs; all 13 Soviet diplomats were declared *persona non grata* and given 3 days to leave the country. Only three of the Soviets were publicly identified charge d'affaires Anatoliy Filipenko and embassy officials Yakov Sikachev and Andrey Kurchakov.

The previous day, Liberian authorities had arrested 14 Liberian students as they departed the Soviet Embassy; according to a Foreign Ministry statement, the students had passed on to the Soviets "classified information on various Liberian military installations and defense capabilities." According to Monrovia radio (August 9), the material included sensitive security information detailing military installations, military capabilities, manpower deployment of the Liberian Armed Forces, and "coded instructions . . . for secret communication with colleagues in various organizations." The codes used to transmit instructions and messages were reported to have been identical to those used in World War II, apparently by the U.S.S.R.

##### Sudan

August 2, 1971: Sudanese officials expelled Mikhail Orlov, counselor at the Soviet Embassy in Khartoum, on charges of plotting against the Nimeiri regime. Shortly thereafter, about 200 Soviet military advisers were

expelled from the country. Within the next 5 years, all Soviets economic and technical support personnel were gradually withdrawn from Sudan, although diplomatic relations were maintained.

#### Tunisia

September 23, 1973: Two unidentified Soviet diplomats were declared *persona non grata* and subsequently expelled by Tunisian authorities on charges of "manipulation aimed at Tunisia and a neighboring country," according to *La Presse de Tunisie*. Also implicated in the same espionage-related activity were an unidentified *Novosti* journalist and a number of Tunisian Government officials.

#### ASIA/PACIFIC

##### Australia

April 22, 1983: Soviet Embassy First Secretary Valeriy Ivanov, identified by Foreign Minister William Hayden as a KGB operative, was expelled on espionage charges. Foreign Minister Hayden said that Ivanov "threatened Australia's national security" and, in an April 29 interview, charged Ivanov with "seeking to recruit spies."

##### Bangladesh

August 1981: Aleksey Zolotukhin and Vladimir Lazarev, both third secretaries with the Soviet Embassy in Dhaka, were declared *persona non grata* by the Bangladesh Government for assaulting a local security official during an incident at Dhaka airport in which Soviet Embassy officials attempted to smuggle sensitive electronic equipment into the country.

April 8, 1982: Bangladesh authorities expelled two Soviet Embassy attaches, Lomovsky and Kirichuk, on espionage charges. They were arrested March 31 near a roadside jungle in Jovdevpur, about 25 miles from Dhaka, while attempting to burn 588 rolls of movie film.

November 29, 1983: Eighteen Soviet diplomats were ordered out of Bangladesh and the Soviet Embassy in Dhaka (the largest in the country) was told to close its cultural center, according to press reports. The expulsion order, which cut in half the level of Soviet diplomatic representation in Bangladesh, came 1 day after violent clashes between security forces and antimartial-law demonstrators. The Soviets were accused of interfering in the country's internal affairs, providing funds to antigovernment groups, and otherwise interfering in Bangladesh's political processes.

##### China

January 19, 1974: Chinese vice foreign minister declared *persona non grata* first secretary V. Marchenko and his wife, third secretary U. Semenov and his wife, and A. Kolosov, an interpreter in the military attaché's office, all with the Soviet Embassy in Beijing, on charges of espionage. According to the protest note delivered to the Soviet Ambassador, the five were caught in the outskirts of Beijing with a Chinese national, Li Hung-Shu, as they were handing over a radio transmitter and receiver, communications timetables, means of secret writing, and forged border passes, and receiving intelligence and "counterrevolutionary documents." The entire operation was said to have been filmed by Chinese security and militia officers, according to the Chinese press.

##### India

February 1975: Soviet assistant military adviser Major Kanvasky and one other unidentified Soviet official were expelled on espionage charges.

February 1979: Two unidentified KGB officers, allegedly posing as Soviet diplomats, were expelled on espionage charges.

Early February 1984: Nikolay Golobov, a deputy military attaché at the Soviet Embassy in New Delhi and identified as a GRU operative, was arrested while trying to obtain classified information from a junior officer in the Indian Defense Ministry and left the country the following day, according to a report in the *Far Eastern Economic Review* (April 19). The incident was revealed March 12 by Indian Supreme Court senior lawyer Prannath Lekhi in a telegram to Indian Foreign Minister Rao and released to the press just 3 days before a high-level visit to India by then-Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov.

February 1985: Five Soviet officials—B.G. Krylov, G.N. Rudnev, S.L. Khlebnikov, O.P. Semelenikov, and a man identified only as Portonov—were charged with espionage and harming the "security and safety of India," declared *persona non grata*, and expelled from the country, according to press reports. For about 5 years, the five Soviets had allegedly collected secrets from an Indian espionage ring—the existence of which was revealed by Indian Prime Minister Gandhi to the Indian Parliament on January 18—which had infiltrated the Prime Minister's office and other key government departments. A vast array of secret documents was compromised—including information on Indian foreign policy and from Indian businessmen in the export trade who frequently visited the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe—before the investigators uncovered the ring, according to police reports made available to the local press. According to the *United News of India* (February 8), the documents passed to the Soviets also included information on Indian defense deals with various Western countries; the military hardware production programs undertaken at defense production establishments in India; the operations of the MiG-25 Foxbat reconnaissance squadron of the Indian air force and three *Kachin*-class destroyers that the Indian Navy had acquired from the U.S.S.R.; and the security apparatus of the Prime Minister's office. Polish and East German diplomats implicated in the incident were also expelled, according to the *Hindu* daily (February 5).

The London *Daily Telegraph* (February 11) reported that, as a result of the scandal, India's counterintelligence agencies had been ordered to make a thorough study of the extent, ramifications, and methods of espionage by the KGB and the secret services of its East European allies around the world, according to the paper.

##### Indonesia

February 6, 1982: Indonesian authorities expelled Lt. Col. Sergey Yegorov, assistant military attaché at the Soviet Embassy in Jakarta, for espionage. According to press reports, Yegorov was apprehended with a camera and film he had received from an Indonesian military officer at a local restaurant 2 nights before. Other reports alleged he was involved in a local narcotics smuggling operation.

February 13, 1982: Indonesian Government expelled Aleksandr Finenko, an Aeroflot representative in Jakarta identified as a GRU officer, and Gregor Odariouk, an embassy attaché. Finenko was expelled on charges of espionage and Odariouk for attempting to prevent Finenko's arrest when Finenko was trying to leave the country with Lt. Col. Yegorov.

#### Iran

June 30, 1980: First secretary Vladimir Golovanov of the Soviet Embassy in Tehran was expelled on charges of espionage. According to Iranian domestic radio, he had been caught handing "espionage documents" to a foreign resident of Iran.

August 18, 1980: The U.S.S.R. was instructed to close one of two Soviet consular offices in Iran and reduce its diplomatic staff in Tehran after Iranian Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh at a July 2 press conference accused the Soviets of conducting espionage activities in Iran. The Soviet consulate in Isfahan was subsequently closed and the staff in Tehran cut back.

May 7, 1983: Eighteen Soviet diplomats—Nikolay Kozyrev (counselor), Gennadiy Avrilov (first secretary), Anatoliy Kachev (counselor), Guseyn Guliyev (first secretary), Valeriy Samanyan (second secretary), Valeriy Markov (third secretary), Vyacheslav Zaryia (first secretary), Viktor Kiselev (third secretary), Vladimir Kabalev (attaché), Col. Yevgeniy Sherippanov (military attaché), Col. Andrey Verbenko (military attaché), Anatoliy Lapashin (deputy commercial attaché), Yuriy Ogarev (commercial assistant), Vladimir Plakhtin (counselor), Maj. Aleksandr Pantelev (military attaché), Mikhail Sharov (commercial assistant), Barkhas Artynov (consul in Esfahan), and Allahverdi Asadollayev (first secretary)—were expelled for "interference in the internal affairs" of Iran through "establishing contacts and taking advantage of treacherous and mercenary agents," according to Tehran radio. Another broadcast reported that the TASS bureau was closed; Soviet banks and economic installations in Iran were nationalized; and Soviet diplomats were told to restrict their activities and try not to leave their homes.

#### Japan

June 19, 1983: Soviet Embassy first secretary Arkadiy Vinogradov departed Japan after being expelled on espionage charges. According to a June 21 Japanese Government statement, Vinogradov, a KGB operative, had worked with Boris Kakorin, a Soviet engineer also affiliated with the KGB, to obtain information on high technology from major Japanese computer firms. (Japanese Foreign Ministry sources told reporters that Kakorin had left Japan in January 1982 and will not be permitted to return.) A Foreign Ministry spokesman said the two men asked a senior employee of a major computer company to give them secret information and offered to provide the executive with funds to set up a consulting firm as a cover for illegal transfer of high technology. A third Soviet diplomat and suspected KGB officer, Dmitry Pankratov, was reported by the Kyodo news agency to have departed on the same Moscow-bound flight as Vinogradov. Pankratov, the Soviet Embassy's science and technology attaché, reportedly was the head of a 20-member KGB team assigned to covertly obtain computer, ceramics, optical fiber, and other sophisticated technology.

#### Malaysia

July 13, 1981: First secretary Gennadiy Stepanov, second secretary Vadim Romano, and engineer/interpreter Zardat Khamidulin, all with the Soviet Embassy in Kuala Lumpur, were expelled for espionage shortly after the arrest of Sidek Ghouse, political secretary to the Malaysian deputy prime minister, on charges of spying for the U.S.S.R. The police reportedly seized an as-



sortment of Soviet-supplied espionage equipment, including a portable radio transmitter supplied to Romanov (who was said to have recruited Sidek) which was used to summon Sidek for meetings with him. (Romanov was identified as the KGB "resident" in Kuala Lumpur.)

#### New Zealand

January 24, 1980: Vsevolod Sofinsky, Soviet Ambassador to Wellington, was declared *persona non grata* and subsequently expelled for having supplied Soviet funds to the pro-Moscow Socialist Unity Party (SUP) of New Zealand. The Auckland Star reported on January 25 that New Zealand Security Intelligence Service electronic monitoring had caught Ambassador Sofinsky transferring thousands of dollars to the SUP. The transfer was only one of a regular series of fund transfers.

#### Pakistan

August-September 1980: Alleged espionage activities and violations of the rules governing the dissemination of propaganda in Pakistan reportedly led to the departure of about 100 Soviet diplomats and staff members from Pakistan.

June 1981: Vladimir Baykov, Pravda correspondent in Pakistan, was expelled on charges of engaging in "illegal" and possibly espionage-related activities.

#### Singapore

February 22, 1982: Anatoliy Larkin, second secretary and press officer at the Soviet Embassy in Singapore, and Aleksandr Bondarev, a Soviet marine superintendent overseeing repairs of Soviet merchant vessels at a local shipyard, were both expelled by Singapore on espionage charges. Larkin allegedly represented himself as a Swedish journalist and tried to obtain sensitive military information from a local army officer. Bondarev was accused of running an intelligence network since October 1979.

#### Sri Lanka

September 3, 1977: Envar Kapka, secretary of the Georgian Republic Trade Union Council, and Konstantin Tuzikov, an official of the Soviet All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, were declared *persona non grata* and expelled by Sri Lankan authorities for "interference in the internal affairs of Sri Lanka." Both were in Colombo to attend the Ceylon Workers' Congress.

#### Thailand

May 20, 1983: Soviet Embassy commercial officer Viktor Baryshev, identified as a GRU lieutenant colonel, was expelled by Thai authorities on espionage charges. Baryshev was apprehended on May 19 in possession of secret documents concerning Thai military installations and forces along the Thai-Kampuchean border.

#### EUROPE

##### Belgium

October 1971: Nine unidentified Soviet intelligence officers were expelled on espionage charges.

May 13, 1983: Yevgeniy Mikhailov, director general of Elog, a joint Belgian-Soviet company specializing in the planning and organization of computer and information systems, was expelled on espionage charges. Mikhailov's expulsion was the result of illegal activities aimed at obtaining classified industrial and military information.

August 22, 1983: An unidentified Soviet Embassy official and four Romanian Embassy officers were expelled on espionage charges. The five apparently had supplied sums of money to a high-ranking Belgian

Foreign Ministry official in exchange for information on European economic affairs.

October 22, 1983: Belgian authorities expelled Yuriy Shtinov, second secretary, and Aleksandr Kondratiyev, third secretary, with the Soviet Embassy in Brussels, on charges of military and industrial espionage. According to press reports, they were charged with attempting to bribe Belgian employees at NATO headquarters as well as Belgian army staff officers for information concerning Belgium's fleet of U.S.-produced F-16 fighters-bombers.

May 21, 1984: Belgian authorities announced the expulsions of Vladimir Latchev, an engineer, and an unidentified chauffeur, both attached to the Soviet trade mission and accused of attempting to obtain top secret military information concerning the NATO alliance; expulsion procedures also were initiated against a third Soviet diplomat on similar charges.

According to press reports, the two Soviets—neither of whom had diplomatic immunity—had passed "large sums of money" to a NATO official, who in turn tipped off NATO security forces.

July 19, 1985: The Belgian Justice Ministry announced the expulsion of Vladimir Makeyev, a member of the Soviet trade mission in Brussels, on charges of espionage. Makeyev was apprehended July 17 in Antwerp as he was purchasing scientific documents, according to *Le Soir*.

##### Denmark

October 1981: Vladimir Merkulov, a KGB case officer working under the guise of Soviet Embassy second secretary, was expelled on charges of espionage. According to Danish press accounts, Merkulov *inter alia* arranged through a local KGB agent-of-influence to have some 150 Danish artists sign an "appeal" calling for a Nordic nuclear-weapons-free zone and supplied funds to have the appeal placed as an advertisement in a number of local newspapers. He also allegedly maintained clandestine contact with the Copenhagen-based Committee for Cooperation for Peace and Security, an umbrella organization of about 50 smaller peace-related associations and groups with well-established ties to the Soviet-dominated World Peace Council.

February 10, 1983: Yevgeniy Motorov, first secretary at the Soviet Embassy in Copenhagen since 1979, was expelled on espionage charges. Motorov had collected classified information on advanced military technology.

May 24, 1984: The Danish Government announced the expulsions of two Soviet engineers, attached to the commercial section of the Soviet Embassy in Copenhagen, on charges of engaging in "industrial espionage of a gross nature." The two—who had sought to purchase electronic and computer equipment known to be embargoed for export to the U.S.S.R.—had been under surveillance by Danish security authorities for some time before their arrest, according to an official announcement.

##### Federal Republic of Germany

February 17, 1983: West Germany officials arrested Gennadiy Batashev, a KGB operative and Soviet trade mission member in Cologne. Batashev was charged with trying to buy documents on secret coding machines used in NATO countries.

May 17, 1983: Four Soviet officials—second secretary Yevgeniy Shmagin, Col. Viktor Marchenko (both with the Soviet Embassy in Bonn), Boris Kozhevnikov, and Oleg Shevchenko (both attached to the

Soviet trade mission in Cologne)—were identified in a West German weekly as intelligence agents and reportedly recalled to Moscow. According to press accounts, Shmagin sought to enlist agents to order to influence the West German antinuclear movement; Marchenko (described as a GRU operative) sought secret data from electronics companies; Kozhevnikov had gathered secret information on medical research and sought to bribe industry officials to gain secrets; and Shevchenko recruited students as agents.

##### France

October 16, 1976: French officials announced the expulsion of Mikhail Solov'yev, a member of the Soviet Embassy commercial section in Paris. French counterespionage agents arrested Solov'yev (who was wearing a wig and dark glasses) at the Notre Dame de la Gare Church, after he was handed a dossier allegedly containing plans for a secret new French jet engine.

July 1, 1978: Col. Viktor Penkov, assistant military attaché at the Soviet Embassy in Paris, was arrested and subsequently expelled on espionage charges.

February 9, 1980: Commercial officer Gennadiy Travkov, third-ranking official at the Soviet Consulate General in Marseille with the rank of consul, was expelled on charges of espionage. Travkov was caught photographing documents described by French officials as having "important French national defense value." According to local press reports four unidentified French citizens, believed to be contacts who supplied the Soviets with sensitive material related to air and naval defense matters, were also arrested.

February 28, 1980: Vyacheslav Frolov, public affairs officer at the Soviet Consulate General in Marseille, was expelled on undisclosed charges. Press accounts speculated that he was involved in the Travkov affair.

April 5, 1983: The French Government ordered the expulsion of 45 Soviet diplomatic and military officials and two Soviet correspondents based at various Soviet installations throughout France. Investigations by the French counterespionage service had found the Soviets "engaged in a systematic search on French territory for technological and scientific information, particularly in the military area," according to a French Interior Ministry statement. All 47 Soviets were known to Western intelligence agencies to be affiliated with either the KGB or the GRU.

The Interior Ministry statement noted that the number of Soviet residents in France had increased by about 1,400 over a 10-year period, standing at 2,406 at the beginning of 1982. Of that group, about 700 were believed to hold official passports, an increase of about 500 over the 10 years. News agencies quoted French counterespionage officials as saying that about one-third of the 700 were considered professional intelligence agents.

April 1984: The May 18-24 edition of the French weekly magazine *Le Nouvel Observateur* reported that a Soviet diplomat working at the Soviet trade mission in Paris had been expelled for spying. The publication connected the unidentified official with an espionage ring in the national airline Air France.

##### Great Britain

June 22, 1971: Lev N. Sherstnev (first secretary) and Valeriy S. Chusovitin (third secretary), both with the Soviet Embassy in London, were expelled from Great Britain

on charges of engaging in "intelligence operations" against the United Kingdom.

September 24, 1971: Britain expelled 90 Soviet diplomatic and other representatives on espionage charges and barred the return of 15 others who were temporarily out of the country. The names of the 105 Soviet intelligence operatives had been provided 1 month earlier to British counterintelligence officers by a ranking KGB defector, who also provided information on the planned infiltration into England of Soviet agents for the purpose of sabotage; other documents provided by the defector detailed Soviet plans for infiltrating segments of the Royal British Navy.

August 4, 1981: Second secretary at the Soviet Embassy in London, Viktor Lazin, was declared *persona non grata* by the British Government for engaging in activities "incompatible with his diplomatic status," according to the London Guardian. Lazin's expulsion reduced the number of Soviet diplomats in London to 46, the same number of British diplomats then posted in Moscow.

February 27, 1982: V. F. Zadneprovskiy, an official attached to the Soviet trade delegation in London, was expelled after being caught in possession of classified information and expelled.

December 5, 1982: Capt. Anatoly Zotov, naval attaché at the Soviet Embassy in London since January 1982 and identified as a senior GRU officer, was expelled for espionage. He was the highest ranking Soviet to be declared *persona non grata* in Britain since 1971. Zotov was accused of attempting to set up an agent network to obtain British military secrets.

January 12, 1983: Vladimir Chernov, a translator at the International Wheat Council in London since 1978, was expelled for espionage.

March 31, 1983: Soviet Embassy assistant air attaché Lt. Col. Gennadiy Primakov and Soviet New Times correspondent Igor Titov were expelled for espionage. Another Soviet diplomat not in the United Kingdom at the time, second secretary Sergey Ivanov, was declared *persona non grata*.

September 29, 1983: Vasily Ionov, a member of the Soviet trade delegation in London, was expelled by British authorities for espionage.

May 14, 1984: Arkadiy Gouk, a Soviet Embassy first secretary identified as a KGB officer, was ordered out of the country, according to a May 22 Foreign Office announcement.

April 18, 1985: The Foreign Office announced the expulsions of Oleg Los, assistant naval attaché at the Soviet Embassy in London, and Vyacheslav Grigorov, charter manager of the London staff of the Soviet airline, Aeroflot, both on charges of espionage. The London Sunday Telegraph reported that both men had been under surveillance for 2 months and that "photographic evidence of their spying activities" had been collected. After the U.S.S.R. retaliated by expelling three British diplomats in Moscow, the Foreign Office subsequently expelled three more Soviet officials April 22. They were Capt. Viktor Zalkin, assistant naval attaché; Lt. Col. Vadim Cherkasov, assistant military attaché; and Oleg Belaventsev, third secretary for science and technology.

September 12, 1985: Britain expelled 25 Soviet Embassy personnel for espionage, according to a Foreign Office statement; the massive expulsion action followed the defection of Oleg Gordievski, the KGB resident in London. Among those expelled were first

secretaries Yuriy Ejov, Vyacheslav Kalitin, and Boris Korchagin, second secretary Valeriy Tokar, third secretary Anatoly Meretkov, and technical attaché Dmitry Vasilyev; three Embassy support staff, seven members of the Soviet trade mission; the deputy manager of the Razno Purchasing Agency; and employee of Moscow's Narodny Bank; five journalists representing TASS, Novosti, Moscow Radio, and the daily papers *Komsomolskaya Pravda* and *Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya*; and two Soviet employees of the International Cocoa Organization and the International Wheat Council.

After Moscow retaliated by expelling 25 British diplomats and journalists 2 days later, British authorities on September 16 expelled 6 more Soviet officials for espionage. They were first secretary Yevgeniy Ilich Safranov, assistant air attaché Col. Viktor Aleksandrovich Mishin, embassy clerks Viktor Vasilyevich Daranov and Aleksandr Ivanovich Yerokhin, Anglo-Soviet shipping director Ivan Ivanovich Vikulov, and Novosti correspondent Sergey Aleksandrovich Volovets. Moscow subsequently expelled six more Britons in response.

#### Ireland

September 9, 1983: Soviet Embassy first secretary Gennadiy Salin, second secretary Viktor Lipasov, and Lipasov's wife, Irena, were expelled for espionage. Published accounts indicated that the three had sought information about NATO nuclear submarine forces; contacted agents; collected intelligence from countries outside Ireland for transmission to Moscow; and bugged other embassies in Dublin. Mrs. Lipasov also was reported to have made several trips to Northern Ireland in violation of travel restrictions. Her husband was identified as KGB resident in Dublin.

#### Italy

February 13, 1970: Italy ordered the expulsion of Vladimir Aleksandrov, a Soviet Embassy employee, and Lolli Zamolsky, an *Izvestiya* correspondent, on charges of espionage. The two Soviets were said to have received secret military information from an unidentified Italian noncommissioned officer who had been arrested the previous week.

May 1980: Andrey Kinyapin, employee of the Soviet commercial office in Turin, was declared *persona non grata* and expelled by Italian authorities on undisclosed charges. Local Italian press reports speculated that Kinyapin was involved in clandestine activities.

January 7, 1981: Anatoly Zazulin, an employee of the Soviet Embassy's commercial section in Rome, was expelled on charges of espionage.

December 7, 1982: An unidentified Soviet diplomat was expelled on espionage charges, according to press reports.

December 17, 1982: Lt. Col. Ivan Kheliag, Soviet assistant military attaché in Rome, was expelled on espionage charges. According to the Rome daily *Il Tempo*, Kheliag attempted to obtain NATO defense plans.

February 14, 1983: Viktor Pronin, deputy commercial director in Rome for Aeroflot, and Italian microfilm expert Azelio Negrino were arrested on espionage charges; Pronin was later deported. The two were apprehended as Pronin was about to pick up microfilmed plans of NATO installations in northern Italy and of the European-designed Tornado aircraft, which was due to come into service with NATO air forces. Pronin, reported to be a KGB colonel, and other Soviet intelligence officers had ap-

proached Genoese industrialist Negrino and offered him "huge sums of money" in exchange for microfilms and other documentation of political and military secrets.

February 16, 1983: Two unidentified Soviet officials employed in Italy by Morflot were expelled on espionage charges, according to press reports. It is not known if they were involved in the Pronin affair.

February 24, 1983: Viktor Konyayev, deputy commercial director of the Italian-Soviet petroleum shipping company Nafta-Italia, was arrested by Italian police for complicity in the Pronin affair.

Mid-November 1983: Two Soviet military attaches—Lt. Col. Yuriy Studenikin and Lt. Col. Aleksandr Zhoglo, both attached to the Soviet Embassy in Rome—were believed to be expelled, along with a Bulgarian Embassy military attaché, for espionage. According to *La Repubblica* of November 12, the Italian secret service (SISMI) had recommended that the three be expelled for espionage-related activities conducted around Comiso, where NATO cruise missiles are to be installed. According to the Italian press, the three had been under SISMI surveillance for several months prior to their arrest and expulsion.

#### The Netherlands

May 6, 1970: Second secretary Boris Nerebbskiy and Vladimir Sharovarov, both with the Soviet Embassy in The Hague, were expelled on charges of espionage. Following a car accident in which the two were involved, Dutch police found among their personal belongings in the car a map with Dutch military installations marked on it.

April 7, 1972: First secretary A. Lobanov, third secretary A.N. Illarionov, and attaché M. Makarov, all with the Soviet Embassy in Copenhagen, were expelled on charges of espionage.

July 1975: A.A. Kiselev, military attaché with the Soviet Embassy in The Hague, was expelled on charges of espionage and collecting Dutch military secrets.

March 30, 1978: According to local newspapers, S. Chernyayev of the Soviet Trade Mission and Roman M. Lopukhov, director of the Soviet Intourist office in Amsterdam, were expelled on charges of espionage. A. Poleshchuk, a Soviet electronics specialist, employed in the Netherlands by the Soviet state companies Mashnaborintorg and Elektronorg, was declared *persona non grata* and denied future entry into the country. The three were suspected of trying to obtain secret information about the F-16 aircraft and electronic and military aviation as well as information related to production and research in Dutch military industry. Two days later, Dutch security officials expelled G. Burmistrov, member of the Soviet Trade Mission in Amsterdam, and V. Khlystov, managing director of the mixed Dutch-Soviet company Elorg BV, on similar espionage-related charges.

April 15, 1981: Vadim Leonov, TASS correspondent to The Hague, was asked to leave the Netherlands on undisclosed charges.

February 13, 1983: Dutch authorities expelled Aleksandr Konoval, third secretary at the Soviet Embassy in The Hague on espionage charges.

#### Norway

September 19, 1970: Valeriy Mesropov, Soviet engineer and identified KGB operative attached to the Norwegian firm Kon-eisto Norge A/S, was expelled on charges of espionage.

April 11, 1973: Third secretary Yuriy Polyushkin and attaché Valeriy Yerofoev,



both attached to the Soviet Embassy in Oslo and identified as KGB operatives, were expelled on espionage charges.

January 28, 1977: A. Printsipalov, third secretary at the Soviet Embassy in Oslo, as well as an unidentified embassy chauffeur, were declared *persona non grata* by Norwegian authorities and expelled for their involvement in political espionage activities. In a separate incident Aleksandr Dementev, Igor Izachtirinsky, and Yevgeniy A. Klimanov, all with the Soviet Embassy's commercial section, were expelled on charges of espionage. Also implicated and charged with espionage against Norway was Yevgeniy Zotin, a TASS correspondent.

February 7, 1977: Gennadiy Titov, counselor at the Soviet Embassy in Oslo and identified KGB general and *resident* in Norway, was expelled on charges of espionage.

April 1, 1981: Timor Besedin, Georgiy Petrov, and Yevgeniy Mironenko, all with the Soviet Trade Mission in Oslo, were declared *persona non grata* and expelled from Norway, reportedly on charges of industrial espionage.

February 5, 1982: Oleg Dokudovskiy and Yevgeniy Vopilovskiy, both assigned to the Soviet Trade Mission in Oslo and identified as GRU operatives, were expelled on espionage charges. According to press accounts, Dokudovskiy and Vopilovskiy tried to bribe key members of companies under subcontract to a consortium working on an F-16 project. They also endeavored to set up Norwegian front companies to reexport high-technology U.S. products to the U.S.S.R.

June 22, 1983: Norwegian authorities expelled Lt. Col. Vladimir Zagrebnev, Soviet Embassy assistant military attaché, for espionage. Zagrebnev was reported to have tried to recruit agents for gathering military secrets and to offer a high-ranking Norwegian officer large sums of money in exchange for information.

February 1, 1984: Five Soviet Embassy officials—Leonid Makarov, Stanislav Tchebotok, Yuriy Anisimov, Mikhail Utkin, and Anatoliy Artamonov—were expelled by Norwegian authorities for espionage, according to a Foreign Ministry statement. Four other Soviet officials—Yevgeniy Belyayev, Vladimir Zhizhin, Aleksandr Lopatin, and Gennadiy Titov, a KGB general previously expelled from the country—were declared *persona non grata* and banned from ever returning to Norway. The action against the nine Soviets was linked to the arrest at Oslo airport just 10 days earlier of Norwegian diplomat Arne Treholt, who was on his way to a meeting in Vienna with a KGB official. When arrested, Treholt was carrying classified documents and later admitted to having worked for the Soviets for a number of years, according to press reports.

February 10, 1984: Igor Granov, director of a Soviet import firm in Norway, was expelled on charges of working for the KGB.

#### Portugal

August 20, 1980: Albert Matveyev (minister-counselor), Yuriy Semenychev (counselor), Vladimir Konyayev (assistant naval attaché), and Aleksandr Kulagin (employee, military attaché office), all with the Soviet Embassy in Lisbon, were declared *persona non grata* and expelled from Portugal on charges of "interference in internal Portuguese affairs," in accordance with Article 9 of the 1961 Vienna Convention, according to an official Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs note. Lisbon domestic radio speculated that the four Soviets were involved in "agrarian reform" espionage. Semenychev

was identified as the KGB "residents" in Portugal.

January 22, 1982: Portuguese authorities announced press counselor Yuriy Babyants and attaché Mikhail Morozov, both with the Soviet Embassy in Lisbon since 1978 had been requested to leave, presumably for attempted espionage.

March 4, 1982: Concerned about the size of Soviet-bloc diplomatic missions, the Portuguese Government asked the Soviet, Polish, and East German Embassies in Lisbon each to reduce their staffs by 30 percent. Those ordered to leave the country were Soviet third secretaries Vladimir Gordyev, Sergey Riyabiv, and Vyacheslav Rybachak, attaché Vladimir Novokhatskiy; deputy commercial representative Vyacheslav Obidin; and deputy air attaché Oleg Dubas. Also expelled were first secretary Stanislav Raczka and deputy commercial attachés Andrzej Dabrowski and Jerzy Bardski, from the Polish Embassy, and charge d'affaires Manfred Bleskin and attachés Herbert Staadt and Erhard Schmidt of the East German Embassy.

#### Spain

March 1977: Yuriy Pivovarov, member of the Soviet commercial mission in Madrid for 2 years, was expelled on charges of espionage (the first expulsion of a Soviet from Spain since the Spanish Civil War, according to *Diario 16*). Pivovarov was believed to have been the Soviet GRU "resident" in Madrid.

July 4, 1977: Gennadiy Sveshnikov, director of the Spanish-Soviet maritime company INTRAMAR, was expelled on charges of espionage. Believed to have been a GRU intelligence officer, Sveshnikov was arrested by agents of the Spanish High General Staff in Aranjuez when he tried to discard a packet of documents allegedly concerning Spanish national security affairs, according to *Diario 16*.

April 1978: Yuriy Ysayev, commercial officer with the Soviet Embassy in Madrid, was expelled on charges of espionage.

May 1978: Yuriy Popov, identified only as a Soviet engineer, was expelled from Spain on charges of industrial espionage.

February 14, 1980: Oleg Suranov, director of Aeroflot in Madrid, was expelled on charges of espionage. He was alleged to have maintained contact with the Fatherland and Liberty Basque separatist organization (ETA) and other "ultraleftist" terrorist groups in Spain.

February 16, 1980: Anatoliy Krasilnikov, first secretary at the Soviet Embassy in Madrid, was expelled on charges of espionage. According to Spanish press reports, he maintained contacts with the Movement for the Self-Determination and Independence of the Canary Archipelago and other "illegal extraparamilitary organizations" and had been apprehended with incriminating information on his person.

March 6, 1981: Vladimir Yefremenko, second secretary at the Soviet Embassy in Madrid, was expelled for espionage. He was charged with trying to obtain information about and from the Spanish Defense Intelligence Center as well as about the Movement for the Self-Determination and Independence of the Canary Archipelago. *Novosti* journalist Yuriy Goloviatenko was also implicated with him, according to press reports, and left the country hurriedly when his role was disclosed.

March 27, 1981: Yuriy Bychkov, Soviet director of Sovhispan (the joint Soviet-Spanish fishing company), was expelled on

charges of political involvement and espionage activities in the Canary Islands.

April 28, 1982: Two employees of Aeroflot in Madrid, Director Vasily Fedorin and engineer Vladimir Tirtishnikov, were expelled on espionage charges. The expulsions came after nearly 1 week of reports in the Spanish press that the government had detected two Soviet GRU officers working undercover at the local Aeroflot office. Fedorin tried to infiltrate the Spanish Air Force to ascertain its attitudes toward Spain's entry into NATO. Fedorin was in contact with press and military personnel concerned with the sale of U.S. weapons to Spain; Tirtishnikov with individuals in electronic companies who work on industrial security matters and military communications.

April 1, 1983: The Spanish Foreign Ministry confirmed the expulsion in March of an unidentified Soviet Embassy official for espionage.

January 10, 1985: Yuriy Kolesnikov, cultural attaché at the Soviet Embassy in Madrid, was expelled trying to obtain classified documents on Spanish scientific and technical policy, according to media reports. The daily *El País* reported that Kolesnikov had paid nearly \$3,000 to a member of Spain's High Council of Scientific Research who was working for Spanish intelligence; according to the paper, Kolesnikov had been under surveillance for several months.

#### Sweden

April 1982: Albert Liepa, Soviet vice consul in Stockholm, left Sweden after being charged with attempting to infiltrate and influence the Latvian exile community in Sweden.

December 23, 1982: Yuriy Averine, Soviet consul in Gothenburg, and Lt. Col. Pyotr Skirokiy, assistant military attaché of the Soviet Embassy in Stockholm, were declared *persona non grata* for espionage. Anatoliy Kotyev, a nondiplomatic Soviet official at the Soviet shipping registry in Gothenburg, also was charged. The Swedish daily *Svenska Dagbladet* quoted sources at the National Police headquarters as saying that the diplomats were interested in "electronic components, technical ideas, and details from the drawing boards of Swedish industry." Another paper, *Expression*, noted that the Soviets had attempted to recruit agents among technicians and scientists in advanced electronics and defense industries. During 1981 alone, Soviet intelligence operatives made about 15 recruitment attempts. The paper also stated that nearly 80 accredited Soviet diplomats in Sweden work for either the KGB or GRU.

December 23, 1983: Two unidentified Soviet diplomats and a Soviet citizen were expelled for espionage. Swedish security police reported that the three had been collecting information on the Swedish electronics industry and military technology.

#### Switzerland

February 12, 1970: Aleksey Sterlikov (first secretary) and Nikolay Savin (second secretary), both with the Soviet Embassy in Bern, were expelled on charges of espionage. According to Swiss officials, the two Soviets were contacts of Marcel Buttex, a Swiss spy suspect who had been arrested 1 week earlier. Buttex established "letter drops" for Soviet agents in Switzerland and in West Germany, according to these officials.

August 22, 1976: Swiss officials expelled Yevgeniy Bogomolov, second secretary at the Soviet Embassy in Bern, on charges of political espionage.

June 6, 1978: Vladimir Bukreyev, Soviet International Labor Organization (ILO) official in Geneva, was expelled on espionage charges.

June 26, 1978: Gregoriy Myagkov, Soviet ILO official in Geneva and KGB operative, was expelled on unspecified "intelligence-related activities."

April 4, 1982: The Swiss Justice Ministry announced that two unidentified Soviet diplomats had left Switzerland earlier in the year. One, an assistant to the Soviet military attache posted in Bern, had been collecting information about a third country and was in possession of incriminating documents when detained by police after a meeting with an informant. The other, a consular section employee at Geneva who had been in Switzerland for 4 years, was arrested after trying to persuade a Swiss contact to seek a Foreign Ministry job.

August 21, 1982: Leonid Barabonov, Aeroflot director in Geneva, left Switzerland "under suspicion of espionage" after being questioned by Swiss police, according to a Justice Ministry spokesman.

January 7, 1983: Two unidentified Soviet diplomats, one a member of the Soviet Consulate General in Geneva and the other an official of the Permanent Soviet Mission to the United Nations in Geneva, were expelled on espionage charges. The Swiss Foreign Ministry charged the two diplomats with gathering information about papers required for "settling or getting married" in Switzerland. Swiss media speculated that such information could have been used by Soviet intelligence to establish illegal agents in the country.

March 3, 1983: Swiss authorities expelled Lt. Col. Vladimir Lugovoy, deputy Soviet military attache in Bern, for espionage. Lugovoy was detained by police as he was trying to make contact with a possible informant in Lausanne. Lugovoy's predecessor was deported the previous April after Swiss authorities apprehended him carrying classified documents concerning a third country.

April 27, 1983: According to press accounts, the Swiss Government asked Soviet Embassy first secretary and press attache Leonid Ovchinnikov to leave Switzerland. Ovchinnikov, a KGB officer, had directed the activities of the Novosti director expelled on April 29.

April 29, 1983: The Swiss Government ordered the closure of the U.S.S.R.'s Bern-based Novosti bureau, charging that it had been used as a center for the "political and ideological indoctrination" of young members of the Swiss peace and antinuclear movements and for planning street demonstrations. Swiss authorities said that the Novosti bureau had "served as a center for disinformation, subversion, and agitation" rather than as a news agency. The director of the bureau, Aleksey Dumov, was expelled.

June 30, 1983: Vladislav A. Istomin, a vice consul at the Soviet mission in Geneva, was ordered out of the country for covertly collecting political, economic, and scientific information for Soviet intelligence over a 6-year period.

July 1, 1985: The Swiss Foreign Ministry announced the expulsion of an unidentified second secretary of the Soviet mission at the UN European headquarters in Geneva on charges of espionage against Swiss and Western military operations. According to a statement issued by the Swiss federal prosecutor, the Soviet tried to collect information on national defense programs, includ-

ing civil defense and precautions against nuclear and chemical warfare, and recruit agents for intelligence activities outside of Switzerland.

#### Yugoslavia

March 6, 1976: An unidentified Soviet citizen, described only as a woman in her early thirties, was arrested in Yugoslavia on charges of espionage and acting as a contact between the Soviet Consulate General in Zagreb and pro-Soviet dissident political groups whose activities were linked directly to anti-Tito emigres living in the U.S.S.R. and Czechoslovakia. Her arrest coincided with the sudden departure from Zagreb of Soviet Consul General Yuriy Sepelev, who was ostensibly reassigned to Moscow.

#### WESTERN HEMISPHERE

##### Argentina

November 7, 1970: Yuriy Yabov and Yuriy Mamontov, administrative aides in the commercial section of the Soviet Embassy in Buenos Aires, were expelled by Argentine authorities for "activities incompatible with their function as members of a foreign diplomatic mission." The two Soviets had been arrested 2 days earlier in a police raid on a clandestine meeting in suburban Belgrano.

##### Bolivia

April 10, 1972: Sixty Soviet diplomats working at the Soviet Embassy in La Paz were expelled on charges of financing leftist rebel movements in the country. According to press reports, only four or five Soviets were permitted to remain in La Paz.

##### Canada

January 1974: Pravda correspondent Konstantin Geyvandov was expelled from Canada on espionage-related charges.

December 10, 1976: Vladimir Vasilyev, assistant air attache at the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa, was declared persona non grata by Canada for "activities incompatible with his diplomatic status," according to the Toronto Globe and Mail.

July 1977: Valeriy Smirnov, assistant military attache at the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa, was expelled on espionage-related charges.

February 9, 1978: Canada expelled Nikolay Talanov (embassy counselor); Igor Vartanyan (Soviet Embassy first secretary in charge of sports and cultural affairs); Vladimir Suvorov (second secretary); Oleg Reztsov (embassy attache); Vera Reztsov (embassy library employee); Anatoliy Mikhailin (Soviet trade officer in Ottawa); Vadim Borishpolets (Ottawa consular attache); Vladimir Oshkaderov (Russian translator at the International Civil Aviation Organization headquarters in Montreal); Yevgeniy Kabloy (embassy clerk); Gennadiy Ivashkevich (embassy third secretary); and Pyotr Lellenrum (embassy second secretary)—all on charges of plotting to penetrate the security apparatus of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). In addition, two Soviet officials who had already returned to Moscow, Voldemar Veber and Andrey Krysin, were barred from returning to Canada. According to Canadian officials, the Soviets had offered a member of the RCMP "unlimited" funds for information on Canadian intelligence methods and had actually paid \$30,500 over a period of nearly a year for material deliberately supplied by the Canadians. The operations concentrated on uncovering RCMP methods used in surveillance of Soviet representatives in Canada.

January 21, 1980: Igor Bardeyev (military, naval, and air attache), Eduard Aleksanyan

(assistant military attache), and Vladimir Sokolov (chauffeur to the military attache's office) of the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa were expelled on charges of espionage. After the Soviet Foreign Ministry retaliated by expelling a Canadian diplomat from Moscow, the Canadians on February 7 expelled Vitaliy Trofimov, a clerk in the Soviet Embassy's commercial section.

April 1, 1982: Canadian authorities expelled Mikhail Abramov, Soviet trade representative in Ottawa, on espionage charges. Abramov attempted to purchase and illegally export to the U.S.S.R. high-technology communications equipment which Western countries have agreed not to sell to the Soviet Union.

September 12, 1983: Viktor Tsekovskiy, a Soviet trade mission official, and Anatoliy Solousov, a member of the secretariat staff of the Montreal-based International Civil Aviation Organization, were expelled by Canadian authorities on charges of trying to steal top-secret high technology.

##### Costa Rica

August 19, 1979: Costa Rican President Carazo declared Soviet first secretary Yuriy Chernysh and second secretary Aleksandr Mordovyets persona non grata on charges of inappropriate involvement with local labor unions during an August 1979 general strike in Costa Rica over labor and community issues.

November 11, 1982: Costa Rican authorities ordered 17 Soviet diplomats to leave the country. In addition, the visas of two Soviet couriers, who routinely traveled between Costa Rica and Nicaragua, were cancelled. The drastic cutback in the size of the Soviet mission left an ambassador and eight embassy functionaries in the country.

##### Ecuador

July 6, 1971: Three unidentified Soviet diplomats working at the Soviet Embassy in Quito were expelled "for reasons of state and of internal order," according to the Ecuadorean Foreign Ministry. Press accounts speculated that the diplomats were involved in fomenting labor strikes and conflicts.

##### Jamaica

November 1, 1983: Four Soviet diplomats—first secretaries Viktor Adrionov and Oleg Malov, interpreter Andrey Nikoforev, and attache Vladimir Bondarev, all identified as KGB operatives—were expelled, along with a Cuban journalist, for espionage and conspiring to murder a Jamaican foreign affairs official. Jamaican Prime Minister Edward Seaga announced the action in a November 1 speech to Parliament in which he outlined the "murderous conspiracy." The official, a protocol officer at the Jamaican Foreign Ministry, had uncovered a series of clandestine meetings between Bondarev, Nikoforev, and another Foreign Ministry officer, Joseph Bewry. According to Seaga, the Soviets plotted to kidnap the protocol officer's children and "confront her in a public place and stage a robbery during which she would be murdered."

##### Mexico

March 21-22, 1977: Soviet charge d'affaires Dmitry Diakonov and four other unidentified diplomats working at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City were expelled for engaging in "subversive activities." Their expulsion from Mexico was believed to be related to the arrest 2 days earlier of 20 persons described as members of a revolutionary group trained in guerrilla tactics in North Korea. The 20 had attended the Pa-



trice Lumumba Friendship University in Moscow before going on to Pyongyang. Diaconov had previously been expelled from Argentina in 1959 and from Brazil in 1963.

#### United States

February 4, 1982: Vasily Chitov, an identified Soviet GRU agent and the highest ranking military officer at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C., was expelled on espionage charges. According to press reports, Chitov had incriminating documents in his possession when he was apprehended by U.S. authorities after a high-speed car chase through the city.

April 21, 1983: Three Soviet diplomats—Soviet Embassy military attaché Lt. Col. Yevgeniy Barmyantsev and UN Soviet mission employees Aleksandr Mikheyev and Oleg Konstantinov—were expelled on espionage charges. Barmyantsev had been identified by the FBI as a GRU officer known to have attempted to recruit Americans as spies. He was apprehended April 16 as he retrieved eight rolls of undeveloped 35 millimeter film from a "dead drop" in rural Montgomery County, Maryland; the film was reported to have contained photographs of classified U.S. documents. Mikheyev, reportedly attached to the USA/Canada Institute in Moscow, was expelled for trying to obtain highly classified information from a congressional aide. Konstantinov, an identified intelligence operative, was apprehended by authorities April 2 on Long Island when he met an American from whom he was trying to obtain secret information about U.S. weapons technology and the U.S. aerospace industry.

August 17, 1983: Anatoliy Skripko, an assistant attaché at the Soviet Embassy, was ordered to leave the country after being "caught in the act of handing over money for a classified document he had just received," according to a State Department statement.

August 19, 1983: Yuriy P. Leonov, assistant air attaché at the Soviet Embassy, was expelled after "being apprehended in possession of a briefcase with a classified document inside," according to the State Department.

#### APPENDIX B: SOVIET ESPIONAGE AT THE UNITED NATIONS

The U.S.S.R. has long used the United Nations as a base for espionage activities. Below is a list, arranged chronologically and derived from published sources, of 41 Soviet officials connected to the Soviet Mission at the United Nations or the UN Secretariat who, from 1950 through 1986, have been declared *persona non grata*, requested to leave, or expelled from the United States for espionage. The list does not include the names of the 25 Soviet officials assigned to the United Nations who departed the United States in October 1986, in line with a March 7, 1986, order that the U.S.S.R. reduce its level of representation at the United Nations.

The list is not exhaustive because it does not include the names of UN-based Soviet personnel who have been involved in unpublicized espionage cases.

Name of official	Where assigned	Date of action
Gubitchev, Valentin	UN Secretariat	Mar. 9, 1950.
Kovalev, Aleksandr P.	UN Mission	Feb. 3, 1954.
Martynov, Maksim G.	UN Mission	Feb. 21, 1955.
Guryanov, Aleksandr K.	UN Mission	Apr. 25, 1956.
Gladkov, Boris F.	UN Mission	June 22, 1956.
Shapovalov, Rotislav	UN Mission	Aug. 20, 1956.
Petrov, Viktor I.	UN Secretariat	Aug. 23, 1956.
Yekimov, Konstantin P.	UN Mission	Oct. 29, 1956.
Grusha, Vladimir A.	UN Mission	Mar. 25, 1957.

Name of official	Where assigned	Date of action
Doronkin, Kirill S.	UN Secretariat	Jan. 15, 1959.
Kirilyuk, Vadim A.	UN Secretariat	Dec. 17, 1959.
Melekh, Igor Y.	UN Secretariat	Mar. 24, 1961.
Klokov, Vladimir V.	UN Mission	Jan. 27, 1962.
Mishukov, Yuriy A.	UN Secretariat	Aug. 7, 1962.
Zaitsev, Yuriy V.	UN Secretariat	Aug. 7, 1962.
Prokhorov, Yevgeniy M.	UN Mission	Sept. 29, 1962.
Vyrodov, Ivan Y.	UN Mission	Sept. 29, 1962.
Yegorov, Ivan	UN Secretariat	Oct. 11, 1963.
Pavlov, Gleb	UN Mission	Oct. 30, 1963.
Romashin, Yuriy	UN Mission	Oct. 30, 1963.
Olenov, Vladimir	UN Mission	Oct. 30, 1963.
Kudrashkin, Feodor	UN Secretariat	Jan. 7, 1965.
Novikov, Valentin P.	UN Secretariat	July 7, 1965.
Isakov, Vadim A.	UN Secretariat	Feb. 2, 1966.
Sokolov, Anatoliy	UN Mission	June 23, 1966.
Kireyev, Anatoliy T.	UN Mission	Aug. 25, 1967.
Andreev, Igor I.	UN Mission	July 14, 1969.
Tikhomirov, Aleksandr	UN Secretariat	Feb. 17, 1970.
Markelov, Valeriy I.	UN Secretariat	Feb. 14, 1972.
Yakovlev, Aleksandr	UN Mission	Feb. 23, 1975.
Gadzhiev, Abdulhalik	UN Mission	June 28, 1975.
Petrov, Petros A.	UN Secretariat	June 28, 1975.
Charchyan, Eduard B.	UN Mission	June 28, 1975.
Karpov, Yevgeniy P.	UN Mission	Feb. 6, 1976.
Stepanov, Svyatoslav A.	UN Mission	Sept. 1976.
Zinyakin, Vladimir	UN Mission	May 20, 1978.
Chernyayev, Rudolph P.	UN Secretariat	May 20, 1978.
Enger, Valdik A.	UN Secretariat	May 20, 1978.
Mikheyev, Aleksandr	UN Mission	Apr. 21, 1983.
Konstantinov, Oleg	UN Mission	Apr. 21, 1983.
Zakharov, Gennadiy F.	UN Secretariat	Sept. 30, 1986.

#### EXCERPT FROM "SOVIET PRESENCE IN THE U.N. SECRETARIAT," A REPORT OF THE U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, MAY 1985

The Soviet Union is effectively using the UN Secretariat in the conduct of its foreign relations, and the West is paying for most of it. The 800 Soviets assigned to the United Nations as international civil servants report directly to the Soviet missions and are part of an organization managed by the Soviet Foreign Ministry, intelligence services, and the Central Committee of the Communist Party. The Soviets have gained significant advantage over the West through their comprehensive approach to the strategy and tactics of personnel placement and their detailed plans for using the United Nations to achieve Soviet foreign policy and intelligence objectives.

Soviet and Eastern Bloc personnel use their positions to promote a broad range of foreign policy objectives in the United Nations and its specialized agencies. They gather information to provide early warning of possible UN actions and are involved in shaping conference papers controlling the flow of news to staff and delegations, influencing delegations seeking Secretariat advice, and aiding Soviet diplomats during conference and other deliberations. Western diplomats have protested specific instances of Soviet staff abuses, but no comprehensive effort has been undertaken by the United Nations to enforce UN Charter and Secretariat staff regulations that prohibit employees from acting on behalf of their government.

Soviet employees use the United Nations to support Soviet propaganda activities worldwide. Soviet Secretariat officials receive instructions directly from Moscow on propaganda placements for coverage in the Soviet media and to arrange for the UN Secretary General to make favorable reference to statements of Soviet leaders or announcements of the Central Committee. Documents supporting Soviet interests are entered into UN records and later presented as a UN document in Soviet propaganda placements.

Key Soviet personnel have been placed in UN offices responsible for UN relations with nongovernmental organizations and Soviet front groups. Nongovernmental organizations such as the World Peace Council participate in UN activities. Soviet interest in

these groups stems from their ability to influence UN debate and the domestic political process in their own countries.

Approximately one-fourth of the Soviets in the UN Secretariat are intelligence officers and many more are co-opted by the KGB or GRU. All Soviets in the Secretariat must respond to KGB requests for assistance. The Soviet intelligence services use their UN assignments to collect information on UN activities, to spot, assess, and recruit agents, to support worldwide intelligence operations, and to collect scientific and technical information of value to the USSR.

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#### PARTIAL ALPHABETICAL LISTING OF SOVIET OFFICIALS EXPELLED WORLDWIDE, 1970-86<sup>1</sup>

Abramov, Mikhail N.—(4-1-82: Canada)  
 Adronov, Viktor—(11-1-83: Jamaica)  
 Afonin, V.I.—(12-29-83: Bangladesh)  
 Alekhin, Anatoliy A.—(8-76: United States)  
 Aleksandrov, Vladimir—(2-13-70: Italy)  
 Aleksanyan, Eduard I.—(1-21-80: Canada)  
 Alekseyev, Vladimir I.—(2-77: United States)  
 Alekseyev, V.T.—(12-29-83: Bangladesh)  
 Anan'yev, Vladimir A.—(80: Norway)  
 Andreyev, Anatoliy V.—(1-75: United States)  
 Andrianov, Viktor I.—(11-83: Jamaica)  
 Androssov, Andrey S.—(4-5-83: France)  
 Anisimov, Yuriy—(12-1-84: Norway)  
 Arkhipov, A.A.—(4-83: West Germany)  
 Artamonov, Anatoliy—(2-1-84: Norway)  
 Artynov, Barkhas L.—(5-7-83: Iran)  
 Asadollayev, Allakhverdi—(5-7-83: Iran)  
 Averine, Yuriy D.—(12-23-82: Sweden)  
 Avrilov, Gennadiy—(5-7-83: Iran)  
 Azbukin, Viktor—(1-81: Egypt)  
 Babyants, Yuriy A.—(1-22-82: Portugal)  
 Bakhtin, Nikolay—(2-82: France)  
 Barabonov, Leonid A.—(8-21-82: Switzerland)  
 Baranov, Vitaliy—(2-81: Portugal)  
 Bardeyev, Igor A.—(1-21-80: Canada)  
 Barmyantsev, Yevgeniy N.—(4-21-83: United States)  
 Baryshev, Viktor—(5-20-83: Thailand)

<sup>1</sup> This list has been supplemented with additional entries obtained from the public record.

- Bashmachnikov, Yevgeniy I.—(6-79: West Germany)  
 Bassov, Viktor N.—(4-83: Austria)  
 Batashev, Gennadiy—(2-17-83: West Germany)  
 Baykov, Vladlen V.—(6-81: Pakistan)  
 Belaventsev, Oleg—(4-22-85: Great Britain)  
 Belik, Gennadiy S.—(4-5-83: France)  
 Belosov, Konstantin—(2-73: Denmark)  
 Belova, Timur A.—(4-2-81: Norway)  
 Belyayev, Yevgeniy—(2-1-84: Norway)  
 Besedin, Timor—(4-1-81: Norway)  
 Bezukladnikov, Vladimir N.—(8-78: Botswana)  
 Bochkov, Viktor A.—(4-5-83: France)  
 Bogomolov, Yevgeniy V.—(8-22-76: Switzerland)  
 Bondarev, Aleksandr A.—(2-22-82: Singapore)  
 Bondarev, Vladimir—(11-1-83: Jamaica)  
 Borishpolets, Vadim A.—(2-9-78: Canada)  
 Borovikov, Vyacheslav Z.—(5-12-75: Sri Lanka)  
 Bovin, Oleg G.—(4-5-83: France)  
 Bryantsev, Igor N.—(4-77: West Germany)  
 Brycov, Anatoliy I.—(3-83: Italy)  
 Bukreyev, Vladimir—(6-6-78: Switzerland)  
 Bulyachev, Aleksey—(12-82: Cameroon)  
 Burmistrov, Aleksandr V.—(6-83: Norway)  
 Burmistrov, Gennadiy—(3-30-78: Netherlands)  
 Bychkov, Anatoliy Y.—(8-78: Ghana)  
 Bychkov, Yuri I.—(3-27-81: Spain)  
 Bykov, Yuriy G.—(4-5-83: France)  
 Charchyan, Eduard B.—(6-28-75: United States)  
 Chekmassov, Valeriy V.—(4-5-83: France)  
 Chelyag, Ivan M.—(12-82: Italy)  
 Cherkasov, Vadim—(4-22-85: Great Britain)  
 Chernov, Vladimir A.—(1-12-83: Great Britain)  
 Chernov, Yuriy V.—(4-5-83: France)  
 Chernyayev, Anatoliy A.—(4-15-83: Great Britain)  
 Chernyayev, Rudolf P.—(5-20-78: United States)  
 Chernyayev, Sergey V.—(3-30-78: Netherlands)  
 Chernysh, Yuriy S.—(8-19-79: Costa Rica)  
 Chernyshev, Viktor A.—(7-13-73: United States)  
 Chetverikov, Nikolay N.—(4-5-83: France; as of April 1986, chairman of the board of the USSR's all-union copyright agency, VAAP.)  
 Chiniev, Gennadiy—(6-23-86: Portugal)  
 Chistyakov, Aleksey F.—(9-81: Egypt)  
 Chitov, Vasily I.—(2-4-82: United States)  
 Chulikov, Lev A.—(4-5-83: France)  
 Churyanov, Yuriy D.—(4-5-83: France)  
 Chusovitin, Valeriy—(6-22-71: Great Britain)  
 Daranov, Viktor—(9-12-85: Great Britain)  
 Dementev, Aleksandr V.—(1-28-77: Norway)  
 Diakonov, Dimitry—(3-21-77: Mexico; 63: Brazil; 59: Argentina)  
 Didov, Aleksey—(12-29-83: Bangladesh)  
 Dimitriyev, Nikolay M.—(11-77: France)  
 Dokudovskiy, Oleg D.—(2-5-82: Norway)  
 Druzhinin, Vadim—(6-76: Bangladesh)  
 Dubas, Oleg K.—(3-4-82: Portugal)  
 Dumov, Aleksey N.—(4-29-83: Switzerland)  
 Enger, Valdik A.—(5-20-78: United States)  
 Ejov, Yuriy—(9-12-85: Great Britain)  
 Fadayev, Yuriy A.—(79: Uganda)  
 Fedorin, Vasily N.—(4-28-82: Spain)  
 Fedotov, Vasily—(10-21-86: United States)  
 Filipenko, Anatoliy—(7-18-85: Liberia)  
 Filipov, Boris A.—(6-78: France)  
 Finenko, Aleksandr P.—(2-13-82: Indonesia)  
 Frolov, Vyacheslav I.—(2-28-80: France)  
 Gadzhiev, Abdulkhalik H.—(6-28-75: United States)  
 Galkin, Vladimir—(6-23-86: Portugal)  
 Galuzin, I.E.—(12-29-83: Bangladesh)  
 Gerasimov, Gennadiy B.—(4-5-83: France)  
 Geyvandov, Konstantin—(1-74: Canada)  
 Golobov, Nikolay—(2-84: India)  
 Golovanov, Vladimir—(6-30-80: Iran)  
 Goloviatenko, Yuriy—(3-6-81: Spain)  
 Gordeyev, Vladimir A.—(3-4-82: Portugal)  
 Goryachev, Yuriy V.—(4-5-83: France)  
 Gouk, Arkadiy—(5-14-84: Great Britain)  
 Govorukin, Yuriy N.—(4-5-83: France)  
 Granov, Igor—(2-10-84: Norway)  
 Grenkov, Vladimir F.—(4-5-83: France)  
 Grigorov, Vyacheslav—(4-18-85: Great Britain)  
 Grigoryev, Anatoliy P.—(5-78: Finland)  
 Grisenko, Viktor N.—(5-27-82: Netherlands)  
 Gromov, Sergey Z.—(1-77: Norway)  
 Grushin, Vyacheslav M.—(8-11-83: Belgium)  
 Grushity, Georgiy—(12-29-83: Bangladesh)  
 Guliyev, Guseyn A.—(5-7-83: Iran)  
 Gundarev, Ivan Y.—(12-80: Austria)  
 Illarionov, Anatoliy N.—(4-7-72: Denmark)  
 Ionov, Vasily V.—(9-29-83: Great Britain)  
 Isayev, Yuriy N.—(4-17-78: Spain)  
 Istomin, Vladislav A.—(6-30-83: Switzerland)  
 Ivanenko, Sergey V.—(11-5-83: Brazil)  
 Ivanov, Igor A.—(12-16-74: United States)  
 Ivanov, Sergey V.—(3-31-83: Great Britain)  
 Ivanov, Stanislav M.—(7-76: Sudan)  
 Ivanov, Valeriy N.—(4-22-83: Australia)  
 Ivanov, Yevgeniy F.—(3-9-76: France; 78: Portugal)  
 Ivashkevich, Gennadiy V.—(2-9-78: Canada)  
 Izachtirinsky, Igor—(1-28-77: Norway)  
 Izmaylov, Vladimir M.—(6-20-86: United States)  
 Kabalev, Vladimir—(5-7-83: Iran)  
 Kablov, Yevgeniy—(2-9-78: Canada)  
 Kachekov, Anatoliy—(5-7-83: Iran)  
 Kakorin, Boris N.—(6-83: Japan)  
 Kalitin, Vyacheslav—(9-12-85: Great Britain)  
 Kamenskiy, Aleksandr V.—(4-5-83: France)  
 Kanvasky—(2-75: India)  
 Kapba, Envar—(9-3-77: Sri Lanka)  
 Karpov, Yevgeniy P.—(2-6-77: United States)  
 Kartavtsev, Valeriy V.—(4-5-83: France)  
 Kedrov, Viktor N.—(8-75: Denmark)  
 Khamidulin, Zardat L.—(7-13-81: Malaysia)  
 Khasanov, Mansur I.—(12-29-83: Bangladesh)  
 Khatamov, Oman M.—(12-29-83: Bangladesh)  
 Kheliag, Ivan—(12-17-82: Italy)  
 Khlebnikov, S.L.—(2-85: India)  
 Khlystov, Vladimir T.—(3-30-78: Netherlands)  
 Khvostantsev, Lev G.—(2-77: Canada)  
 Kinyapin, Andrey L.—(5-80: Italy)  
 Kirichuk, Bogdan—(4-8-82: Bangladesh)  
 Kiselev, Anatoliy A.—(7-75: Netherlands)  
 Kiselev, Viktor—(5-7-83: Iran)  
 Kiselev, Yuriy—(2-80: Equatorial Guinea)  
 Klimonov, Yevgeniy A.—(1-28-77: Norway)  
 Knyazev, Oleg—(6-82: Algeria)  
 Koblov, Yevgeniy K.—(2-78: Canada)  
 Kochev, Anatoliy K.—(12-82: Sweden)  
 Kokadrov—(10-6-80: Egypt)  
 Kokovin, Nikolay—(10-21-86: United States)  
 Kolesnikov, Yuriy—(1-10-85: Spain)  
 Kolosov, A.—(1-19-74: China)  
 Kondratiyev, Aleksandr M.—(10-22-83: Belgium)  
 Konoval, Aleksandr—(2-13-83: Netherlands)  
 Konstantinov, Oleg V.—(4-21-83: United States)  
 Konyayev, Viktor—(2-24-83: Italy)  
 Konyayev, Vladimir V.—(8-20-80: Portugal)  
 Kopytin, Viktor—(1-86: Italy)  
 Korchagin, Boris—(9-12-85: Great Britain)  
 Korepanov, Gennadiy V.—(4-5-83: France)  
 Kotov, Yuri M.—(4-5-83: France)  
 Kotyev, Anatoliy—(12-23-82: Sweden)  
 Kovalev, Vladimir—(5-7-83: Iran)  
 Kozyrev, Nikolay I.—(5-7-83: Iran)  
 Kozyrev, Vitaliy S.—(4-5-83: France)  
 Krasilnikov, Anatoliy I.—(2-16-80: Spain)  
 Krepkorskiy, Valeriy V.—(4-5-83: France)  
 Krivagouz, Ivan—(12-29-83: Bangladesh)  
 Krivtsov, Yuriy I.—(4-5-83: France)  
 Krylov, B.G.—(2-85: India)  
 Krylovich, Aleksandr E.—(1-78: Liberia)  
 Kryuchkov, Sergey V.—(4-5-83: France)  
 Kukhar, Aleksandr A.—(10-08-78: United States)  
 Kulagin, Aleksandr S.—(8-20-80: Portugal)  
 Kulemukov, Vladimir I.—(11-81: France)  
 Kulik, Vladimir Y.—(10-79: France)  
 Kulikovskikh, Vladimir K.—(4-5-83: France)  
 Kurchakov, Andrey—(7-18-85: Liberia)  
 Kurilov, N.D.—(12-29-83: Bangladesh)  
 Kurnosov, Vladimir S.—(7-81: Rhodesia)  
 Kushkin, Aleksandr V.—(8-79: Philippines)  
 Kuvazhin, Yuriy A.—(6-80: United States)  
 Lapashin, Anatoliy K.—(5-7-83: Iran)  
 Laptiyev, Vitaliy K.—(77: Norway)  
 Larkin, Anatoliy A.—(2-22-82: Singapore)  
 Latchev, Vladimir—(5-21-84: Belgium)  
 Lazarev, Vladimir V.—(8-81: Bangladesh)  
 Lazin, Viktor—(8-4-81: Great Britain)  
 Lellenrum, Pyotr R.—(2-9-78: Canada)  
 Leonov, Vadim V.—(4-15-81: Netherlands)  
 Leonov, Yuriy—(8-19-83: United States)  
 Lilepa, Albert A.—(4-82: Sweden)  
 Likhachev, Oleg—(10-21-86: United States)  
 Lipasov, Irona—(9-9-83: Ireland)  
 Lipasov, Viktor—(9-9-83: Ireland)  
 Litovchenko, Eduard A.—(8-76: Costa Rica)  
 Lobanov, Anatoliy—(4-7-72: Denmark)  
 Lomovsky, Vladimir V.—(4-8-82: Bangladesh)  
 Lopatin, Aleksandr—(2-1-84: Norway)  
 Lopukhov, Roman M.—(3-30-78: Netherlands)  
 Los, Oleg—(4-18-85: Great Britain)  
 Lovchikov, Vasily D.—(4-79: Switzerland)  
 Lugovoy, Vladimir V.—(3-3-83: Switzerland)  
 Lychak, Nikolay V.—(12-29-83: Bangladesh)  
 Machekhin, Aleksandr Y.—(5-76: Japan)  
 Machkov, Yevgeniy A.—(7-78: France)  
 Makarov, Leonid—(2-1-84: Norway)  
 Makarov, Mikhail—(4-7-72: Denmark)  
 Makeyev, Vladimir—(7-19-85: Belgium)  
 Malov, Oleg K.—(11-1-83: Jamaica)  
 Malukhin, Boris V.—(3-83: Italy)  
 Mamontov, Yuriy—(11-7-70: Argentina)  
 Mantyonkov, Boris—(8-82: Colombia)  
 Manyukan, Achot B.—(4-5-83: France)  
 Marakhovskiy, Yuriy N.—(10-03-81: United States)  
 Marchenko, V.—(1-19-74: China)



Marchenko, Yuriy F.—(81: Egypt)  
 Mari, Vladimir V.—(12-29-83: Bangladesh)  
 Markelov, Valeriy I.—(12-14-72: United States)  
 Markov, Valeriy A.—(5-7-83: Iran)  
 Materi, I.B.—(12-29-83: Bangladesh)  
 Matveyev, Albert A.—(8-20-80: Portugal)  
 Matveyev, Yuriy G.—(4-5-83: France)  
 Mayorov, Vladimir M.—(4-5-83: France)  
 Meretnikov, Anatoliy—(9-12-85: Great Britain)  
 Merkulov, Vladimir—(10-81: Denmark)  
 Meshcheryakov, Vladimir F.—(10-12-83: Turkey)  
 Mesropov, Valeriy—(9-19-70: Norway)  
 Metelkin, Aleksandr—(10-21-86: United States)  
 Mikhailov, Yevgeniy—(5-13-83: Belgium)  
 Mikhailin, Anatoliy—(2-9-78: Canada)  
 Mikhailin, Anatoliy A.—(2-78: Canada)  
 Mikhayev, Aleksandr N.—(4-21-83: United States)  
 Mironenko, Yevgeniy S.—(4-1-81: Norway)  
 Mishin, Viktor—(9-12-85: Great Britain)  
 Mizin, Viktor V.—(3-76: India)  
 Mordovyets, Aleksandr L.—(8-19-79: Costa Rica)  
 Morozov, Mikhail M.—(1-22-82: Portugal)  
 Motorov, Yevgeniy L.—(2-10-83: Denmark)  
 Mukhin, Yevgeniy N.—(4-5-83: France)  
 Muravyev, Aleksey A.—(4-5-83: France)  
 Musiyko, Yevgeniy V.—(79: Uganda)  
 Muzykin, Ivan I.—(3-18-81: Liberia)  
 Myagkov, Gregoriy P.—(6-26-78: Switzerland)  
 Nagorniy, Yevgeniy D.—(4-5-83: France)  
 Nasibov, Israfil—(10-9-80: Turkey)  
 Naumov, Pyotr—(5-84: Denmark)  
 Nefedov, Yuriy V.—(3-4-77: India)  
 Nesterov, Aleksandr I.—(4-5-83: France)  
 Netrebtskiy, Boris—(5-6-70: Netherlands)  
 Nikoforev, Andrey A.—(11-1-83: Jamaica)  
 Nilov, Viktor P.—(8-78: Ghana)  
 Novikov, Lev A.—(8-75: Argentina)  
 Novikov, Viktor N.—(6-82: Netherlands)  
 Novokhatskiy, Vladimir—(3-4-82: Portugal)  
 Nuritdinov, Baktyar S.—(4-5-83: France)  
 Obidin, Vyacheslav A.—(3-4-82: Portugal)  
 Odariouk, Gregor—(2-13-82: Indonesia)  
 Ogarev, Yuriy—(5-7-83: Iran)  
 Ogurtsev, Aleksandr V.—(4-5-83: France)  
 Orlov, Makhail—(8-2-71: Sudan)  
 Oshkaderov, Vladimir I.—(2-9-78: Canada)  
 Oshpov, Aleksey N.—(9-75: Denmark)  
 Ovchinnikov, Leonid—(4-27-83: Switzerland)  
 Pankratov, Dimitry—(6-19-83: Japan)  
 Pantelev, Aleksandr L.—(5-7-83: Iran)  
 Pappé, Andrey A.—(4-5-83: France)  
 Pashukov, Aleksandr A.—(11-77: Denmark)  
 Penkov, Viktor A.—(7-1-78: France)  
 Petrakov, Igor V.—(9-81: Egypt)  
 Petrosyan, Petros A.—(6-28-75: United States)  
 Petrov, Georgiy G.—(4-1-81: Norway)  
 Petrov, Valentin M.—(4-2-81: Liberia)  
 Pismeniy, Anatoliy T.—(9-81: Egypt)  
 Piven, Aleksandr I.—(12-29-83: Bangladesh)  
 Pivovarov, Yuriy S.—(3-77: Spain)  
 Plakhtin, Vladimir V.—(5-7-83: Iran)  
 Pogonets, Anatoliy I.—(4-5-83: France)  
 Poleshchuk, A.—(3-30-78: Netherlands)  
 Polyakov, Vladimir D.—(9-15-81: Egypt)  
 Polyushkin, Yuriy—(4-11-73: Norway)  
 Poperechniy, Vladimir—(4-79: Liberia)  
 Popov, Nadim V.—(10-9-80: Turkey)  
 Popov, Vladimir V.—(5-20-80: United States)  
 Popov, Yuriy—(5-78: Spain)  
 Portonov, —(2-85 India)

Prelin, Igor N.—(78: Senegal)  
 Primakov, Gennadiy A.—(3-31-83: Great Britain)  
 Printsipalov, Aleksandr K.—(1-28-77: Norway)  
 Prokoviev, Yuriy A.—(10-9-80: Turkey)  
 Pronin, Viktor—(2-14-83: Italy)  
 Pugin, Sergey Y.—(4-5-83: France)  
 Rapota, Grigoriy—(12-20-83: Sweden)  
 Razhivin, Yuriy A.—(1-20-79: India)  
 Reztsov, Oleg D.—(2-9-78: Canada)  
 Reztsov, Vera—(2-9-78: Canada)  
 Rishkov, Sergey N.—(9-83: Egypt)  
 Riyabiv, Sergey—(3-4-82: Portugal)  
 Romanov, Vadim P.—(7-13-81: Malaysia)  
 Romashkin, Viktor I.—(12-29-83: Bangladesh)  
 Rostovskiy, Grigoriy G.—(3-76: France)  
 Rudnev, G.N.—(2-85: India)  
 Rybachenkov, Vladimir I.—(2-77: France)  
 Rybchak, Vyacheslav—(3-4-82: Portugal)  
 Rykalin, Valentin P.—(8-76: Turkey)  
 Safranov, Yevgeniy Ilich—(9-12-85: Great Britain)  
 Sakaloukas, Vatslovas—(79: Uganda)  
 Salin, Gennadiy—(9-9-83: Ireland)  
 Samanyan, Valeriy I.—(5-7-83: Iran)  
 Samyulenko, Nikolay A.—(6-77: Denmark)  
 Savin, Nikolay—(2-12-70: Switzerland)  
 Savoshchenko, Nikolay—(79: Uganda)  
 Semelenikov, O.P.—(12-85: India)  
 Semenov, U.—(1-19-74: China)  
 Semenov, Yuriy A.—(78: Portugal)  
 Semenychev, Yuriy K.—(8-20-80: Portugal)  
 Sepelev, Yuriy F.—(3-76: Yugoslavia)  
 Sharov, Anatoliy V.—(8-75: Denmark)  
 Sharov, Mikhail—(5-7-83: Iran)  
 Sharovats, Vladimir—(5-6-70: Netherlands)  
 Shashkov, Vasilii D.—(78: Switzerland)  
 Shchukin, Eduard M.—(12-29-83: Bangladesh)  
 Shebanov, Yuriy K.—(9-81: Egypt)  
 Shelenkov, Aleksandr I.—(10-78: Egypt)  
 Shelepin, Vladimir L.—(10-80: Egypt)  
 Shelukin, Andrey—(1-86: Italy)  
 Sherippanov, Yevgeniy—(5-7-83: Iran)  
 Sherstnev, Lev—(6-22-71: Great Britain)  
 Shipilov, Viktor D.—(4-5-83: France)  
 Shirokov, Oleg A.—(4-5-83: France)  
 Shishkov, Viktor I.—(4-5-83: France)  
 Shmagin, Yevgeniy—(5-17-83: West Germany)  
 Shtinov, Yuriy N.—(10-22-83: Belgium)  
 Shtykov, Nikolay I.—(10-79: Uganda)  
 Shuranov, Oleg V.—(2-16-80: Spain)  
 Sidak, Valentin A.—(4-5-83: France)  
 Sikachev, Yakov—(7-18-83: Liberia)  
 Skirokiy, Pyotr I.—(12-23-82: Sweden)  
 Skripok, Anatoliy Y.—(8-17-83: United States)  
 Smirnov, Igor P.—(2-81: Switzerland)  
 Smirnov, Valeriy—(7-77: Canada)  
 Smolin, Aleksandr M.—(6-82: Belgium)  
 Sofinsky, Vsevolod—(1-24-80: New Zealand)  
 Sokolov, Eduard A.—(4-5-83: France)  
 Sokolov, Vladimir I.—(1-21-80: Canada)  
 Solousov, Anatoliy S.—(9-12-83: Canada)  
 Solovoyev, Mikhail M.—(10-16-76: France)  
 Stankevich, Nikolay V.—(11-77: Denmark)  
 Stepanov, Andrey—(10-6-80: Egypt)  
 Stepanov, Gennadiy I.—(7-13-81: Malaysia)  
 Stepanov, Svyatoslav A.—(9-76: United States)  
 Stepanuk, Anatoliy N.—(79: Uganda)  
 Sterlikov, Aleksey—(2-12-70: Switzerland)  
 Studenikin, Yuriy—(11-83: Italy)  
 Sturua, Melor G.—(8-82: United States)  
 Suchkov, Vitaliy I.—(5-81: Spain)  
 Suntsov, Vladimir G.—(1-81: Egypt)  
 Suranov, Oleg—(2-14-80: Spain)

Suvorov, Vladimir L.—(2-9-78: Canada)  
 Sveshnikov, Gennadiy V.—(7-4-77: Spain)  
 Syzdykov, Assad—(9-81: Egypt)  
 Talanov, Nikolay M.—(2-9-78: Canada)  
 Tchebotok, Stanislav—(2-1-84: Norway)  
 Telezhnikov, Viktor A.—(5-76: Egypt)  
 Tikhomorov, Aleksandr—(2-17-70: United States)  
 Timofayev, Vyacheslav—(12-20-83: Sweden)  
 Timoshkin, Mikhail—(4-79: Liberia)  
 Tirtishnikov, Vladimir L.—(4-28-82: Spain)  
 Titov, Gennadiy F.—(2-7-77: Norway; 2-1-84: Norway)  
 Titov, Igor V.—(3-31-83: Great Britain)  
 Titov, Sergey N.—(3-76: India)  
 Tokar, Valeriy—(9-12-85: Great Britain)  
 Travkov, Gennadiy Y.—(2-9-80: France)  
 Trekhlebov, Igor—(4-79: Liberia)  
 Trofimov, Vitaliy—(2-7-80: Canada)  
 Troshenko, Yuriy—(1-81: Egypt)  
 Tsekovskiy, Viktor V.—(9-12-83: Canada)  
 Tuzikov, Konstantin—(9-3-77: Sri Lanka)  
 Tyurenkov, Aleksandr I.—(1-81: Switzerland)  
 Ulanov, Anatoliy A.—(11-22-83: Liberia; formerly Soviet Ambassador in Monrovia)  
 Unidentified (4)—(1-86: France)  
 Unidentified—(7-1-85: Switzerland)  
 Unidentified—(7-86: Switzerland)  
 Utkin, Mikhail—(2-1-84: Norway)  
 Vanagel, Viktor I.—(9-78: France)  
 Vartanyan, Igor P.—(2-9-78: Canada)  
 Vasilyev, Dimitry—(9-12-85: Great Britain)  
 Vasilyev, Vladimir M.—(12-10-76: Canada)  
 Verbenko, Andrey—(5-7-83: Iran)  
 Vidrovich, Paris P.—(7-76: Egypt)  
 Vikulov, Ivan Ivanovich—(9-12-85: Great Britain)  
 Vinogradov, Arkadiy A.—(6-19-83: Japan)  
 Vitebskiy, Viktor V.—(4-5-83: France)  
 Vlasov, Valeriy P.—(9-81: Egypt)  
 Voinov, Sergey M.—(3-79: Italy)  
 Volovets, Sergey—(9-12-85: Great Britain)  
 Vopilovskiy, Yevgeniy K.—(2-5-82: Norway)  
 Vorontsov, Oleg S.—(4-5-83: France)  
 Voynov, Sergey M.—(3-79: Italy)  
 Vroublevskiy, Vitaliy—(79: Uganda)  
 Yabov, Yuriy—(11-7-70: Argentina)  
 Yakubenko, Stanislav A.—(4-5-83: France)  
 Yastrebov, Yuriy—(12-20-83: Sweden)  
 Yefremenko, Vladimir I.—(3-6-81: Spain)  
 Yefremov, Albert D.—(8-78: Ghana)  
 Yegorov, Sergey P.—(2-6-82: Indonesia)  
 Yerdokimov, Aleksandr—(2-82: Norway)  
 Yermakov, Oleg V.—(9-75: Denmark)  
 Yerokhin, Aleksandr—(9-12-85: Great Britain)  
 Yerofeyev, Valeriy N.—(4-78: Ghana; 4-11-73: Norway)  
 Yerokhin, Vyacheslav I.—(6-82: Belgium)  
 Tsayev, Yuriy—(4-78: Spain)  
 Yudenkov, Vitaliy S.—(4-5-83: France)  
 Zadneprovskiy, Vadim F.—(2-27-82: Great Britain)  
 Zagrebnev, Vladimir F.—(6-22-83: Norway)  
 Zaikin, Viktor—(4-22-85: Great Britain)  
 Zakharov, Gennadiy—(9-30-86: United States)  
 Zamoisky, Lolli—(2-13-70: Italy)  
 Zaryia, Vyacheslav I.—(5-7-83: Iran)  
 Zaytsev, Aleksandr F.—(4-5-83: France)  
 Zaytsev, Lev—(10-21-86: United States)  
 Zazulin, Anatoliy—(1-7-81: Italy)  
 Zevakin, Yuriy F.—(4-5-83: France)  
 Zhadin, Boris V.—(4-5-83: France)  
 Zharov, Mikhail—(5-83: Iran)  
 Zhernov, Leonid A.—(1-79: India)  
 Zhizhin, Vladimir—(2-1-84: Norway)  
 Zhoglo, Aleksandr—(9-83: Italy)

Zinyakin, Vladimir P.—(5-20-78: United States)  
 Zolotukhin, Aleksey N.—(8-81: Bangladesh)  
 Zotin, Yesgeniy—(1-28-77: Norway)  
 Zotov, Anatoliy P.—(12-5-82: Great Britain)

#### EXPULSIONS OF SOVIET AGENTS: THE RAMIFICATIONS

The expulsion of a Soviet official on espionage charges may result in long-term career damage and diminish or even destroy his effectiveness as an intelligence officer. According to defector testimony, if the circumstances surrounding the expulsion—the agent's illegal activities, identity, and KGB/GRU affiliation, for example—are made public, the damage can be exacerbated. The expulsion's impact also can affect operations at both the residencies and at headquarters.

**Impact on the Agent:** When a Soviet intelligence officer is expelled without publicity, his career need not be seriously disturbed, and the KGB/GRU may be able to assign him abroad again in the future. A publicized expulsion, however, is likely to lead to visa denials from all but those countries allied with the U.S.S.R. The agent involved thus can no longer serve in countries which afford the best opportunity for gaining experience and credit for effective work. Instead, he may face relegation to a less active role in "socialist" countries or at KGB/GRU headquarters and, in the process, lose the personal and financial amenities that accompany an overseas assignment in the West.

**Impact on the Residency:** The Soviet ambassador and the local *resident* try to restrict the news of any expulsion, but it usually spreads rapidly through the embassy and affects the morale of other intelligence agents. An overall standdown of intelligence operations may result, depending upon the size of the expulsion action. If relations between the ambassador and the local intelligence chief are strained (as is often the case), the ambassador unilaterally may report the expulsion to the Soviet Foreign Ministry and portray the incident in terms damaging to the *resident*.

**Impact on the KGB/GRU:** In the event of publicized expulsions and subsequent visa denials, the KGB/GRU will be obliged to keep exposed agents at headquarters or assign them to "socialist" countries or to countries under Soviet influence. As a result, the Soviet intelligence service can find itself short of experienced officers in certain regions of the world and is obliged to assign inexperienced, first-tour personnel to these areas. Furthermore, the publicized expulsion of an intelligence officer often means the loss of a cover post within the Embassy, thus reducing the overall level of Soviet representation—and intelligence collection capability—in the host country.

#### A REPORT ON FOREIGN ESPIONAGE IN THE UNITED STATES

##### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On July 29, 1986 the Director of Central Intelligence sent an unclassified assessment of the hostile intelligence threat—updated through July 22, 1986—to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. The information in that assessment, a copy of which is attached, remains current and will not be reproduced in this report.

Rather, in the spirit of the legislation this assessment focuses on hostile intelligence services' use of travel by their official per-

sonnel in the United States, the advantages travel provides to them, and the effectiveness of our travel countermeasures. We address generally the Soviet use of surrogate services for intelligence collection in the United States and whether the differentiation which exists between the travel regulations for Soviet officials and officials of allied countries has resulted in increased use as surrogates of allied services' personnel who operate under less stringent controls.

The main hostile intelligence threat is posed by the Soviet. Security countermeasures taken by the U.S. government over the past year—reduction of the number of personnel at the Soviet embassy, the Soviet consulate in San Francisco, and the Soviet mission to the United Nations as well as the imposition of controls on the travel of Soviet and certain allied personnel employed at the U.N. Secretariat—have impaired Soviet intelligence operations, but it is too early to make any definitive assessment of the impact of these and earlier travel controls.

Although the Soviet—here as elsewhere—use their allies for intelligence purposes, by preference they rely mainly on their own resources and they will retain substantial capabilities even after the imposition of the recent and planned personnel reductions and travel controls. They have resources to which they can turn for use to replace assets lost before allies need be employed as gap-fillers.

Soviet bloc officials have for years travelled often for intelligence purposes, some of which doubtless has been for the Soviets. There is no indication that this use has increased since the personnel cuts and the imposition of travel restrictions.

The principle of reciprocity is in full force regarding travel by U.S. diplomatic and consular personnel in Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, and Romania, which do not maintain areas closed to travel by U.S. personnel apart from military sites and small areas contiguous to borders and which amount to one to five percent of their land area. The U.S. closes comparable sites to travel by bloc diplomats.

Since January 6, 1986 all diplomatic, consular, commercial and UN mission personnel as well as other officials of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Poland stationed in the United States have been required to use the Office of Foreign Missions (OFM) to book commercial transportation and public accommodations in the U.S. Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland responded by imposing reciprocal restrictions on the travel of U.S. personnel. East Germany did not.

The Secretary of State determined that similar restrictions not be imposed on the officials of Hungary and Romania.

Bulgaria currently closes approximately twenty percent of its territory—contiguous to three of its borders—to travel by all foreign missions. Consequently, the United States has informed Bulgaria that continuation of the practice could lead us to imposing reciprocal controls on official Bulgarian personnel in this country.

Cuba places no security restrictions on diplomatic and consular travel except that overnight lodgings be booked through a centralized office and certain military facilities are permanently closed to foreigners. In turn we require the Cuban interests section in Washington to arrange all public accommodations and travel by common carrier through the Department of State Office of Foreign Missions (OFM).

The ability of U.S. officials stationed in Eastern Europe to travel freely in most of the countries to which they are assigned is valued and stands out in marked contrast to the situation in the Soviet Union, where travel is severely restricted. In Eastern Europe, moreover, our representatives are far more dependent upon travel to understand the situation than are Eastern European officials in the United States where information is readily available. The imposition of Soviet-style restrictions by Eastern European governments inevitably would impair our understanding of these societies and make it more difficult to assist our citizens.

Travel restrictions and the value of free travel to our own officials in Eastern Europe and Cuba are discussed and it is noted that the principle of diplomatic reciprocity is fully in force in each of these countries except in Bulgaria. Restrictions imposed by the United States stimulate retaliatory restrictions there.

#### INTRODUCTION

The Soviet Union, its Warsaw Pact and Cuban surrogates, the People's Republic of China and other countries conduct massive and highly organized intelligence operations against our installations, activities, information and people. The full dimensions of the foreign intelligence threat are elaborated and prioritized in national assessments prepared annually for the National Security Council and made available to the Intelligence Committees of the Congress. As the most recent report was submitted in September of 1986, it remains current and will not be duplicated here.

#### SOVIET THREAT

Among foreign intelligence services, the Soviet services, the KGB and GRU, represent by far the most formidable threat to U.S. interests. The Soviet threat is both the largest and, in terms of ability and intent of the Soviets to act against U.S. interests, the most important. The activities of the Warsaw Pact and Cuban intelligence services are primarily significant to the extent which they support the objectives of the Soviets.

The principal elements and spearhead of the Soviet intelligence services (SIS) assigned to the United States operate under "official" cover. As of December 1986 there were 1,344 Soviet diplomats, commercial officials, and other representatives in the United States, many of whom are known or suspected intelligence officers. These figures reflect the October 1986 expulsions. Within the Soviet services, GRU personnel are targeted primarily against strategy military intelligence while KGB personnel are assigned to one of four operational components or "lines"—Political (PR), Counterintelligence (KR), Scientific and Technical (X), or Illegals Support (N). KGB Line PR personnel target government policy information and frequently seek to advance Soviet objectives via contacts with persons of influence or through covert disinformation and influence operations. KGB Line KR personnel are responsible for the security of the Soviet colony overseas and for the penetration of foreign intelligence services. Line X officers are specifically responsible for the collection of S & T information and advanced technology. Line N officers, or Illegal Support personnel, comprise a small group involved in the operations of illegals, that is, intelligence officers and agents infiltrated into a foreign country under false cir-



cumstances for clandestine intelligence purposes.

The highest Soviet collection priority is accorded to policy and actions associated with U.S. strategic nuclear forces. Other high priority subjects are key foreign policy matters. Congressional intentions, defense information, advanced dual-use technology, and U.S. intelligence sources and methods. The Soviet also target NATO intensively, partly as a means of obtaining U.S. military and foreign policy information.

The open U.S. society permits the Soviets to acquire much of the information they require through non-clandestine means. This collection is carried out through diplomatic facilities, trade organizations, visitors, students, and through the open exploitation of readily available sources of desired information, such as public libraries and technical data banks.

Soviet operations in the United States are, of course, not confined to their officers serving under official cover on long-term tours.

The Soviet Union uses the United Nations (UN) organization, particularly the UN Secretariat, as a cover for the activities of its intelligence officers and co-optees. The Soviets currently have about 300 of their nationals assigned to the UN Secretariat as "International Civil Servants." A significant percentage of these are considered to be intelligence officers while others have been enlisted as co-optees by the KGB and GRU. Some KGB officers have reached positions of authority in the UN bureaucracy.

The Soviet Intelligence services also use their developed agents in the UN to collect information on UN activities; to spot, assess, and recruit Americans and foreign nationals; to support worldwide intelligence operations; and, to collect S&T information.

The Soviets also depend to an extent on illegals in the United States for intelligence operations.

The Soviets also use the opportunities for intelligence collection provided them by East-West exchange programs (EWEP). Soviet EWEP participants generally fall into two categories:

(1) Soviet Exchange Scholars (SES) studying or conducting research at American colleges and universities; and 2) Soviet delegations, including Soviet scientists, businessmen, and scholars/academics temporarily visiting the United States to attend various scientific, academic, business and cultural symposiums. In 1986, approximately 5000 Soviet EWEP participants visited the United States, including 90 SES, 27 of which were fulltime students.

Information developed to date indicates that Soviet intelligence, notably the KGB, has made extensive use of the EWEP in their intelligence collection efforts against the United States. In this effort the Soviets integrate the expertise of the KGB and GRU with the resources of other Soviet Government agencies, including the prestigious Soviet Academy of Sciences (USSRAS) and the State Committee for Science and Technology (GKNT).

Estimates vary as to the number of Soviet scholars and scientists in the EWEP who are co-opted by Soviet intelligence to perform intelligence gathering functions, but it appears to be considerable.

Tasking generally includes gathering scientific and technological information as well as spotting and assessing potential recruits among American scientists and Soviet emigres. The Soviet scientist, technician, or student visiting the United States is often in the best position to serve SIS interests

simply by virtue of his or her expertise in a given field, and the freedom of movement and accessibility to information on American technology and technical personnel.

While Soviet Intelligence co-opts a significant number of legitimate scholars to act in an intelligence gathering capacity, the KGB and GRU also fill a number of these positions with its own personnel.

We believe Soviet students and intelligence officers have been posted here under exchange programs for training and familiarization tours in preparation for future assignments in the United States and other Western countries. They also serve to monitor the activities of other Soviet exchange students.

Soviet-bloc intelligence services on occasion also use students in intelligence collection. Currently there are over 1500 students from Soviet Bloc countries studying in the United States.

And finally there are their American agents, who can provide access to classified national security information, which is not accessible by the Soviets themselves.

The primary Soviet intelligence goal worldwide continues to be the recruitment of agents targeted against Americans, particularly those with access to classified and sensitive national security information. Recent espionage cases have demonstrated that a broad spectrum of U.S. Government agencies and military components as well as private industry are vulnerable to Soviet intelligence penetration operations. One of the gravest threats to U.S. national security is the KGB's efforts to recruit American citizens holding sensitive positions in government, the military, and the U.S. Intelligence Community.

The John Walker case was one of the most damaging espionage cases in recent history.

Another serious espionage case involved the recent compromise of some significant CIA operations. Edward Lee Howard, a KGB agent, was employed by the CIA from 1980-83 and is believed to have compromised sensitive CIA operations in Moscow and elsewhere. He is currently a fugitive from American justice, residing in the Soviet Union, where he was recently granted asylum.

In November 1985, the FBI identified another penetration of the U.S. Intelligence Community. Ronald William Pelton, a former NSA employee who walked into the Soviet Embassy in Washington in January 1980 and offered to sell the Soviets sensitive NSA documents. Among other things, Pelton compromised, a sensitive NSA project.

The FBI is also a prime target of the Soviet intelligence services, as witnessed by the recent recruitment efforts of Richard Miller, the first FBI Special Agent to be charged with espionage. Fortunately, Miller was detected and arrested within months of this initial contact with Soviet intelligence, before he could inflict serious damage to FBI operations or U.S. national security interests.

Most recent Soviet intelligence successes in penetrating the U.S. government and the Intelligence Community appear to originate from "volunteers," i.e., Americans who contact Soviet establishments or intelligence officers to "volunteer" their services. Nevertheless, Soviet Intelligence continues to expend considerable manpower, time, and resources to spot, cultivate, and recruit Americans with access to classified or sensitive information—particularly overseas.

This assessment will focus on hostile intelligence services use of travel by their official personnel in the United States and address Soviet intelligence use of surrogate services for intelligence collection within the United States.

It should be stated at the outset that as a result of the countermeasures taken by the U.S. Government over the last year Soviet intelligence operations have been impaired. With reductions of personnel at the Soviet Embassy, Consulate and Soviet Mission to the United Nations to scope of their operations will be further constrained. In addition, the travel controls imposed on Soviet personnel, as well as the nationals of East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria employed at the U.N. Secretariat have closed an avenue for exploitation by hostile services.

It is too early to make any definitive assessment of the impact of these countermeasures. Soviet capability even after full reductions are implemented remains substantial. It is our judgment that prior to any increased use of surrogate services, Soviet intelligence will use other Soviet resources.

#### TRAVEL IN HUMINT COLLECTION OPERATIONS

Intelligence officers use both official and personal travel for their intelligence activities—both covert and overt.

Present travel restrictions on Soviet officials, which require approval for travel outside of a 25-mile area of their city of assignment and all booking of common carriers and public accommodations through OFM, provide adequate prior notice and specific travel information to U.S. counterintelligence to closely monitor such travel. It should be noted that while such controls do not prevent agent contacts in the U.S., they do increase the risk of such contacts.

Information available to the public is, of course, readily available to even low level or marginal value American agents and can be collected easily.

Consequently, while travel restrictions both impose restraints on hostile intelligence activity and enhance counterintelligence effectiveness, they cannot prevent such activities and their effectiveness is clearly proportionate to the counterintelligence resources available for effective surveillance.

#### SOVIET USE OF SURROGATE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES

Eastern bloc services are tasked to collect for the USSR. Such shared collection tasking on military intelligence targets of all kinds is inherent in the Warsaw Pact military relationship. Thus, travel of Eastern bloc intelligence personnel is often clearly related to Soviet intelligence objectives.

#### BULGARIA

Bulgarian representation in the United States numbered 84 in December 1985. Of this total 59 are assigned to four establishments in New York City and 25 are assigned to the Bulgarian Embassy in Washington, D.C. Overall, these numbers include a substantial percentage of officials who are considered to be known or suspected of affiliation with the Bulgarian intelligence services (BIS).

In addition to the official presence, roughly 1,000 Bulgarians visited the United States during 1986. The BIS utilize visitors and students to further Bulgarian collection requirements.

The BIS have long been considered to be responsive to the Soviets.

Through 1986, the principal Bulgarian target has been embargoed technology.

Bulgarian IOs frequently exploit their travel privileges for intelligence purposes throughout the United States.

#### CUBA

The government of Cuba (GOC) is represented in the United States by the Permanent Mission of Cuba to the United Nations in New York City and the Cuban Interests Section in Washington, D.C. Including working wives, the GOC official presence totals 127. This includes a significant percentage of officials with known or suspected affiliation with the Cuban intelligence services (CuIS).

Cuban IOs operating under diplomatic cover in the United States are in frequent contact with a wide range of U.S. citizens, mainly to lobby against the U.S. trade embargo against Cuba and U.S. policies vis-à-vis Latin America.

Concerning travel by Cuban IOs assigned to the United States, we have found little evidence of their travel for the purpose of conducting espionage activities. Cuban officials assigned to the United Nations in New York City are subject to travel restrictions which require prior notice on approval by the U.S. Department of State. Reporting from reliable sources indicates that these restrictions are effective in curbing intelligence activities which require the travel of an IO either to collect intelligence or to meet or recruit an agent.

Officials assigned to the Cuban Interests Section in Washington, D.C., are not subject to travel restrictions.

#### CZECHOSLOVAKIA

The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic currently has a total of 144 officials assigned to diplomatic and commercial establishments in four cities in the United States. Of this total, 73 are assigned to various establishments in New York City. There are 34 officials assigned to the Czechoslovak Embassy in Washington, D.C. The remaining seven officials are stationed in Charlotte, North Carolina, and New Orleans, Louisiana. A significant percentage of these officials are considered to be known or suspected of affiliation with the Czechoslovak intelligence services (CIS).

The CIS have been aggressive in conducting intelligence operations in the United States, particularly in making contacts with U.S. citizens, with special emphasis being placed on U.S. government employees.

In intelligence collection efforts, priorities of the CIS continues to be the acquisition of S&T material and is military-related intelligence, much of which is of obvious interest to the Soviet Union.

#### GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (GDR)

The East German intelligence services (EGIS) historically have used illegals in executing its intelligence operations.

The number of GDR visitors to the United States remains roughly constant each year. During 1986, there were approximately 800 East German visitors to the United States, many of whom were businessmen. As of October 1986, there were approximately 53 GDR students/scholars in the United States.

Overall, the central focus of the EGIS collection continues to be the acquisition of a broad variety of S&T intelligence.

Some East German officials' travel appears to be for Soviet purposes.

#### HUNGARY

As of October 1986, there were 110 Hungarian officials stationed in the United

States. Of this total, 67 were assigned to establishments in New York and 28 were assigned to the Hungarian embassy in Washington, D.C. The Hungarians also maintain small commercial offices in Chicago, Columbus, Ohio, Los Angeles, and Newark. A significant percentage of these officials are considered known or suspected of being affiliated with the Hungarian intelligence services (HIS).

HIS intelligence operations in the United States continue to concentrate on the scientific and political fields.

#### POLAND

The Polish intelligence services (PIS) continue to maintain the largest presence of the Soviet-bloc countries in the United States. A significant percentage of the approximately 300 Polish officials currently assigned in the United States have been identified as known or suspected IOs. The PIS, composed of the Polish civilian service, the Ministry of the Interior (MSW), and its military counterpart, the Polish Military Intelligence Service (Z-11), gear their intelligence efforts primarily to the collection of the political, economic and S&T information.

In conducting their intelligence operations, the PIS have unquestionably used and exploited the freedom to travel within the United States to engage in espionage activities against this country.

#### ROMANIA

There are 72 officials Romanian representatives in the United States, located predominantly in New York City. Some of these 72 officials have known or suspected affiliation with the Romanian intelligence services (RIS).

In contrast with the intelligence services of the other Warsaw Pact nations, the Romanians here tend to concentrate on gathering political and economic information rather than on highly sensitive S&T collection.

Romanian IOs travel within the United States for intelligence purposes.

#### THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF THE PRINCIPLES OF DIPLOMATIC RECIPROCITY AND CONSEQUENCES OF SUCH RECIPROCITY FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES

##### *Current Applicability of Principles of Diplomatic Reciprocity in U.S. Relations With Soviet Bloc Countries*

The principle of reciprocity is in full force regarding travel by U.S. diplomatic and consular personnel in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, East Germany, and Romania. These countries do not maintain areas closed to travel by U.S. personnel, apart from military sites and small land areas contiguous to borders, which are closed to their own citizens and amount to about one to five percent of their total land area. The United States closes roughly comparable sites to travel by diplomats from bloc countries, i.e., primarily military reservations.

Effective January 6, 1986, all diplomatic, consular, commercial, and UN mission personnel, as well as other officials of East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Bulgaria stationed in the United States have been required to use the Office of Foreign Missions (OFM) to book commercial transportation and public accommodations in the United States. Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Bulgaria have imposed reciprocal restrictions upon travel by U.S. personnel. East Germany, however, did not impose such restrictions.

The Secretary of State determined that mandatory use of OFM travel services ini-

tially would not be imposed upon officials of Hungary and Romania.

Bulgaria currently closes approximately 20 percent of its territory (contiguous to its southern and western borders and along the Black Sea coast) to travel by all foreign missions. Although all diplomats, not merely those from the United States, formally are excluded from these areas, the United States considers this practice a violation of the principle of reciprocity. The Bulgarians have not modified these controls despite notification that the practice could lead to the imposition of similar controls by the United States.

As noted above, East Germany does not maintain areas closed to U.S. diplomatic and consular personnel, apart from sites and territories similar to those closed to East German officials in the U.S. This is not the case, however, for members of the U.S. Military Liaison Mission (USMLM), for whom about 40 percent of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) is off-limits. The USMLM, however, is a function of post-war accords on Germany, and is not associated with our Embassy to the GDR. There is no military representation in either our Embassy in Berlin or the GDR Embassy in Washington. Because of the USMLM's presence there, reciprocity works to the advantage of the remainder of our personnel.

Cuba places no restrictions on diplomatic or consular travel except the de facto requirement that overnight lodgings be booked through a centralized government office and paid in hard currency. Day trips are not subject to prior notification. In turn, we require that the Cuban Interests Section in Washington arrange all public accommodations and travel by common carrier through State (M/OFM).

There are no permanent closed areas for foreigners in Cuba, except military reservations and bases. Other possible exceptions to this may be areas for which Cuban citizens themselves need special permission to visit, such as immediately adjacent to our Guantanamo base and the Cabo San Antonio area at the westernmost tip of the island. The percentage of Cuban territory off-limits to U.S. diplomats is probably less than 1 percent of the island.

#### ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF CURRENT APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF DIPLOMATIC RECIPROCITY

##### *General Assessment*

The ability of U.S. diplomatic and consular personnel to travel freely in the Soviet bloc countries of Eastern Europe stands in sharp contrast to the severe travel restrictions imposed by the Soviet Union. The two most important distinctions are that, with the exceptions noted above, U.S. officials are able to travel to all parts of the countries to which they are assigned, and that travel does not require host government permission. This freedom to travel is valued as it enables our official to better understand these societies and to assist our citizens in these countries.

As the governments of Eastern Europe and Cuba in most particulars strongly adhere to the principle of diplomatic reciprocity, it is probable that restrictions on their officials in the United States would be responded to by similar restrictions on our officials in those countries.

The requirement that East European officials book were imposed in response to, those the U.S. imposed in January, 1986. There have been instances in the past, however, when Czechoslovak authorities have



"temporarily" closed areas formally open to diplomatic travel by posting notices on roads, which American officials discovered only en route.

Under these circumstances, Embassy officers have been and remain able to travel extensively and frequently. The Embassy's ability to overnight in the former Consulate building in Bratislava (owned by the U.S.), in Austria, or in vehicles, effectively nullified the Czechoslovak commercial booking requirements. Officers from the Political/Economic section and Defense Attache Office have traveled to every district of the country during the past year; the latter has devoted 120 man-days to travel and has transited nearly every sub-region.

**Poland.**—As with Czechoslovakia, diplomatic travel arrangements with Poland are reciprocal and involve the closure of travel only to military sites. Requirements to book accommodations through official agencies are essentially the same as those imposed by the U.S. They are not, however, an exact mirror image of U.S. requirements. Notification is required for all travel by U.S. personnel outside the district where they are stationed, including cities to be visited and places of lodging. Polish notification procedures have proven to be an annoyance, since Polish Government permission to travel is not required.

**Hungary.**—Full reciprocity applies with respect to diplomatic travel. Apart from military installations, Hungary has no closed areas and places no restrictions on Embassy travel. As noted above, The Secretary initially exempted Hungary from OFM travel service requirements.

**Romania.**—Like Hungary, Romania places no restrictions on Embassy travel apart from defense installations and some production facilities. As noted above, The Secretary initially exempted Romania from OFM travel service requirements.

The Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs formally advised Embassy Bucharest on January 14, 1986 that any travel restrictions imposed upon Romanian diplomatic personnel in the United States would cause the same restrictions to be imposed on U.S. official personnel in Romania on the basis of strict reciprocity. Romania already imposes travel controls upon Soviet and Turkish diplomats in response to travel restrictions those countries impose upon all diplomats.

**Cuba.**—Apart from the requirement to book commercial transportation and hotel accommodations through state agencies, Cuba currently imposes no travel restrictions upon USINT personnel. The exchange of notes in 1977 which established the two interests sections provides that "Members of the Interests Sections shall have freedom to travel throughout the territory of the host country in accordance with the established international practise commonly accepted for Embassy personnel."

#### 1986 ANNUAL REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FOREIGN MISSIONS ACT OF 1982, AS AMENDED (P.L. 97-241), APRIL 1987

##### COUNTRIES SUBJECT TO OFM TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS

###### Embassies and Consulates

Afghanistan  
Bulgaria  
Cuban Interests Section  
Czechoslovakia  
German Democratic Republic  
Poland  
USSR

##### UN Missions and Secretariat Officials

Afghanistan  
Bulgaria  
Byelorussia  
Cuba  
Czechoslovakia  
German Democratic Republic  
Iran\*  
Libya\*  
Mongolia\*  
North Korea\*  
Palestine Liberation Organization\*  
Poland  
Ukraine  
USSR  
Vietnam

\*UN Missions (including Observer Missions)

##### Miscellaneous

Bulgarian Office of Commercial Counselor  
Bulgarian Travel Office in New York  
Czechoslovak Tourist Office in New York (CEDOK)  
Czechoslovak Financial Office in New York (OMNITRADE)  
Czechoslovak Commercial Section in New York  
German Democratic Republic Commercial Affairs Office  
Polish Tourist Office in New York (ORBS)  
Polish Office of Commercial Counselor in New York  
USSR International Cotton Advisory Board  
Soviet news media personnel

##### THE KGB: THE EYES OF RUSSIA

(By Harry Rositzke)

##### X. PLAYGROUND U.S.A.

From the days of Chambers, Bentley, and the Rosenbergs New York City, not Washington, has been the principal center for the KGB's American operations. It is the largest residency in the capitalist world. During the past ten years, there have been at any one time from two hundred to two hundred and fifty Soviet intelligence officers on its staff (out of a total, now, of less than eight hundred Soviet diplomats). The GRU residency ranges in size between fifty and seventy-five officers.

Moscow's ability to supply official cover for these men is almost unlimited: the Soviet consulate, the trade mission (Amtorg) and news agencies, the Soviet quota of permanent employees in the United Nations, and the Soviet mission to the United States.

There is a special bonus for KGB operators in New York. Not only do they have secure cover positions within the United Nations itself, but the more than one hundred permanent missions to the U.N. contain innumerable third-world diplomats of interest to the KGB, especially young African and Latin American diplomats. Here, in the daily workings of the U.N. and during the sessions of its General Assembly, the enterprising KGB officer can spot and study prospect with ease. He can develop a colleague into a friend and pass on the contact to a Soviet colleague in Accra or Rio when the young diplomat finishes his U.N. tour.

African and Spanish specialists in the KGB residency are also available to pick up contacts with diplomats already recruited as agents in their home countries for whatever information they can report on the business before the U.N. or in their own delegations. KGB agent contacts have been noted in the

U.N. corridors and, in one case, in a stairwell.

For three years, in the late sixties, I had the opportunity to see their work close up. As chief of the newly formed U.S. station, my principal concern was the recruitment of Soviet and East European diplomats in New York and Washington. Up to 1963 the intelligence officers among these diplomats were of greatest concern and the main FBI mission was to uncover and neutralize their work against American targets. Finally, in 1963, the CIA was authorized to carry out intelligence operations designed to recruit them an intelligence agent for use abroad—either after they transferred to another foreign post or to their own headquarters. Our recruitment efforts required the closest coordination with the FBI's counterespionage effort, for the same man—a Soviet or Czech intelligence officer—could now have a double interest as a security for the FBI or as a prospective intelligence agent for the CIA. We were at last able to exploit the advantage of operating on our own home ground—as the KGB had been for fifty years in their operations against Western diplomats in Moscow.

For the KGB, Manhattan is an easy, inviting playground. With its big banks, its big corporations, its stock exchange and commodity markets, it is the power center of American capitalism. It is the residence of diplomats from over a hundred countries assigned to the United Nations. It has close ties to Washington, where the secrets are.

Manhattan and its environs are a picnic spot for open and secret meetings. It is congested, exuberant, and fast-moving. Its congestion is more attractive than that of Calcutta or Tokyo, where a white face stands out. Its inhabitants offer a smorgasbord of faces and accents. A Slavic face, a Russian or Polish accent, a tweed suit with broad lapels are lost in the crowd.

There are thousands of spots in close range where one can post a signal for a meeting: subway entrances, street-level billboards, sidewalk construction tunnels. There are thousands of places for a brush-contact or the exchange of a few words: street corners, crowded restaurants, buses, ferries, subways.

It is an ideal locale for throwing off a surveillance: office buildings with scores of floors and banks of elevators, department stores with innumerable entrances and exits. There are narrow cross-town streets with loading bays, takeout food shops, and office-building lobbies from which one can watch for suspected tails.

There are also the neighboring boroughs, above all, Brooklyn and Queens, easily accessible, more remote from the vigilant eyes in midtown. Here the secret trysts can take place in open spaces. They almost always take place in open spaces, for the KGB has an instinctive claustrophobia. It does not like inside meetings, nor does it ever employ the "safe houses" favored by Western services. There is Prospect Park, or the Bay Ridge waterfront, or the deserted streets around the cemeteries in Queens.

And beyond the city are the suburbs.

Since the late fifties the KGB has joined the flight to the suburbs—and to the countryside of New York, Connecticut, and New Jersey. During thirty miles along a limited access highway it is not difficult to detect and throw off a tailing car. Getting off the highway, winding around a few country roads, the KGB man can be assured his meeting will be secret, whether it is at a

crossroads or at a picnic table on a bluff over the Hudson.

And if he wants congestion, he can meet his man on the parking plaza of a huge shopping center in New Jersey or Long Island.

In New York it is the already recruited agent who must be given the most careful handling—someone, most likely, recruited abroad and transferred to local handlers on return to the United States. The transfer of an agent, say, in Europe or Japan to the KGB residency in New York is carried out with the greatest caution. Only after he has been thoroughly tested for discipline and competence in his overseas work will the Center authorize his transfer—and always with the usual tradecraft. In dozens of cases on record the instructions for an agent to meet his first New York contact follow a simple pattern. "Ten a.m. on June 4 at the corner of Madison and 48th. You will have a pipe in your mouth and a copy of Time under your left arm. A man will come up to you and ask: where do I get the train to Hoboken? You will reply: there is no train to Hoboken." If the KGB officer notes anything suspicious, he will not make the contact, and the agent must come to a prearranged second meeting site.

Agents met in this way have ranged from a small-time theatrical producer or a New York municipal employee to direct penetrations of the Pentagon.

The main KGB job in New York is to recruit new agents, and here Manhattan offers a rich variety of ordinary people easily met in bars, night spots, student unions, theater lobbies. The KGB follows a simple rule: one man can lead to another. Only against this rationale can one begin to understand why the KGB makes so many apparently random and valueless contacts and has so many low-level spotters in the various segments of New York's population—low-income Americans, resident aliens, recent immigrants. It is not who they are that counts, or what access they have to classified documents, but whether they can become a link to a person of greater interest. Here is a sampling of ordinary people who have led to bigger game:

—a young Ukrainian to his uncle in Washington (any relative of any federal government official is of interest);

—a taxi driver to a daily pickup fare on Park Avenue (Who is he? When does he go to what office?);

—an IBM secretary to her technician boyfriend;

—a homosexual picked up at random in Greenwich Village who has a "friend" in the United Nations;

—a bartender on Third Avenue to a steady customer from the Chase Manhattan Bank ("I'd like to meet him").

The list could go on for pages: they are all grist to the KGB mill. They may someday pay off.

And, in greater depth, the KGB runs a more broadly ranging support structure characteristic of every residency in a major Western Capital: agents who are in a position to report on other men in their circle who might make productive agents. These spotters are easily recruited (they violate no laws), and they save time and reduce the exposure of the KGB officer. Five spotters can come up with a dozen leads a year. Screened by the case officer, checked out with Moscow Center, some will become targets for professional development. The residency will pursue:

—any journalist, however low level. He meets people, picks up personal gossip, can

bring along a contact to have a drink with his Russian friend.

—a first-generation American of Russian extraction who moves in émigré circles and can report on the activities and attitudes of recent Soviet immigrants;

—any laboratory technician, or any employee of a research firm, chemical, medical, or pharmaceutical;

—any employee of a defense plant.

And sex can be exploited in New York as well as in Moscow, though without the elaborate scenarios of bugged and televised hotel rooms and apartments. One handsome and debonair KGB bachelor had the not unpleasant assignment of meeting, wooing, and bedding as many female secretaries as he could find time and energy for. United Nations and large-corporation employees stood at the head of his list.

#### *The New York Residency*

All these operations, secret and open, are run out of the various branches of the residency whose chief, or resident, is housed with his front office within the headquarters of the Soviet Permanent Mission to the United Nations. Here, sealed off from the rest of the mission, with their own independent communications to Moscow, their files immune from search, the branch chiefs and their most active case officers go about their daily business in and out of the office.

The main branches of the residency are the scientific and technical, émigré, counterintelligence, and illegals. Its officers are distributed among the United Nations itself, the Soviet Permanent Mission to the U.N., the Soviet trade mission, and the official Soviet news agencies.

These officers must, for the most part, carry out their cover duties with reasonable efficiency. A U.N. official or a Tass correspondent has a job to do, and he cannot spend all his time away from his normal work. At one time in the fifties the chief of Amtorg, the trade mission, became fed up with the general sloppiness of his KGB officers. They were out of the office too much of the time, did not return their telephone calls, and failed to make meetings with American businessmen. One Amtorg chief got in a fight with the KGB resident on the issue and took his case to Moscow, where he won: Soviet-American trade is a serious matter and cannot be sacrificed for the benefit of a few spies. The new rule for the KGB officers under Amtorg cover: do your spying on your own time.

These KGB officers under official cover are readily identifiable—in New York, as in New Delhi or Bonn. Except for those on their first assignment abroad, most KGB officers have been tagged by the Western services from a wide variety of sources: from Western citizens who have been approached by a Soviet official; from Soviet agents who have turned themselves in to Western security services; from doubled Soviet agents; from the hundreds of KGB officers who have been caught in the act; from KGB defectors in the past thirty years, each of whom has identified scores or hundreds of his colleagues. Western files accumulate each year: age, grade, specialty, personality and private habits, favored methods of approach, etc.

Yet the identification of a KGB officer in the field does not curtail his secret actions. His job is not to hide himself, but to hide the identity of his agents. He is equipped by his training and experience to elude any kind of surveillance when he makes a personal meeting with his agent and to make air-tight arrangements for communicating

with him indirectly through dead drops. His challenge is: catch me at it.

The men operating out of the New York residency are, for the most part, highly competent professionals, often with previous assignments in English-speaking countries.

The KGB officer at his best is a cautious and well-trained expert in studying people and arranging the mechanics of secret communications with his agents. He is himself almost immune to the normal investigative methods employed against him: physical surveillance and electronic interception.

The talent for countersurveillance is naturally at a premium in Manhattan, where he anticipates intense, if sporadic, FBI surveillance. He will take the most elaborate precautions to make certain no one is following him, and if he fails to elude his tail, he will simply skip the meeting. Only rarely has he been traced to a secret rendezvous, unless the agent he meets has been doubled against him.

He may take hours to reach a Manhattan rendezvous: changing subways, buses, walking in and out of drug and department stores. He often plays subway tag. One man approached his meeting in Chelsea by going uptown on the subway, changing at an express stop to catch a downtown train, again going uptown and downtown once again to throw off a tail. He may drive around the deserted Bowery on a Sunday afternoon making quick turns to throw off the tailing car. When he feels free, he stops off at a telephone kiosk to make his call. He may drive out on Long Island or up along the Hudson in the daytime or at night watching his mirror. He may go on a Sunday picnic with his family and meet a "friend" in a nearby wooded area. His ingenuity in countering surveillance is his prime asset.

His telephone security is absolute. It is almost instinctive, a built-in caution that does not permit slips. Years ago I patiently read through two years of telephone intercepts of the Soviet Embassy in Havana under Batista. Not a single hint of an agent contact was detectable in the steady stream of calls to and from caterers, laundymen, and travel agents. A counterintelligence colleague whose dull fate it was to screen thousands of such transcriptions found only a single case in which an outside caller implied an agent relationship—and he, of course, was not identifiable.

He is close-mouthed even in his own living room and in the company of his colleagues outside the office. He keeps his professional life strictly within the confines of his own "clean" premises. There is never a hint, in those conversations we have overheard, of shoptalk. And with the agents he runs there is no professional chitchat that might give away any of his other activities. When a self-confessed Soviet agent seeks to ingratiate himself with us by reporting the "secrets" his case officer has been chatting about, we know he is lying. It is a simple litmus test.

Lest he be looked upon as a paragon of perfection, it is worth noting that, being human, he can make mistakes.

An otherwise competent case officer, who consistently eluded surveillance in making his meetings in the metropolitan area, went out of town to meet an agent in upstate New York. Before the set time of his rendezvous he went to a village bar, got drunk, had a fight, and was picked up by the police. He had given away at least the approximate location of one of his agents.



Another officer, assigned to make a meeting on the West Coast, took a bus to Philadelphia and there boarded a plane for San Francisco under an assumed name. When he reached his destination, however, he used his own credit card to identify himself to the hotel registry clerk. With his true name on record, his further movements could again be investigated.

Office accidents can intervene. A senior officer, quiet and imperturbable in his demeanor, normally took three or four hours to get to his meet, but one afternoon he was detained in his cover office by a series of telephone calls. He came dashing out of the U.N. mission and rushed straight to his meeting on the west side of Central Park.

The KGB officer in the field is under constant pressure to produce—and this pressure can sometimes lead to error. Since his performance is measured by the number of contacts he makes, and the number of agents he recruits, he can become too busy. He is not assigned a specific quota (an unrealistic myth), but his fitness reports depend on the amount of his activity outside his office (a pressure not common among the Western services I am acquainted with).

One overzealous KGB officer in New York, clearly a man of energy and ambition, behaved like a jitterbug making over a dozen "secret" contacts almost every week. Not as careful as he might have been in judging the value or reliability of his agents, it was relatively easy for the FBI to feed a few controlled agents into his net. Their subsequent exposure diminished his reputation and slowed down his antics.

The pressure to produce can also breed abuses, but not for long. One inept case officer who needed some recruits simply visited a local bar, struck up conversations with the barflies, and got their names. Paraded as suitable candidates for "study," they would not have fooled the boss for very long.

There are also, of course, some lemons in any elite bureaucracy open to privilege. A notorious case in New York was the nephew of a Soviet Cabinet minister whose stupidity was a free topic of conversation among his colleagues. There are also men who do not have the requisite guts: an officer who has to get drunk before he musters the courage to make an approach, or falsifies his contact report to describe a social contact as a recruited agent.

Although the KGB has a few stupid or obtuse officers who are professionals only by dint of having learned the techniques of clandestine tradecraft, Moscow sends its best men to New York (and Washington) to avoid the kind of foul-ups they have run into in less politically sensitive capitals. Some of their brightest recruits come out of the Soviet-American student exchange program. Some of the Soviet students are already marked for future KGB employment, others are assessed on their return. The most qualified, with excellent English, sure-footed in the American environment, with a circle of acquaintances on and off campus, are occasionally assigned to the New York residency on their first foreign tour.

#### *The Technical Target*

The largest section of the New York residency is its Scientific and Technical Branch. It is the key collector of both open and secret information on American technology, a top KGB priority for the past thirty years. It is a fair though rough estimate that 80-90 percent of the KGB's budget and manpower spent on American targets has been devoted to scientific and technical intelligence, both industrial and military.

The job of the S&T branch of the New York residency is to fill this maw of requirements from any available sources.

Much of the take comes from completely open sources. Trade and technical magazines are shipped to Moscow by the thousands. Technical developments reported in the press are clipped.

Soviet officials attending industrial fairs and exhibitions come back with shopping bags full of sales brochures, photographs of exhibits, technical layouts. When instructed, they buy pieces of equipment that Moscow wants.

S&T experts visit the many factories, laboratories, and research institutes that are open to them. They develop and maintain personal relationships with professors at Columbia and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. They attend, and give, lectures to specialized academic audiences.

All of this activity is quite public and proper. No one needs KGB training to be affable, curious, and knowledgeable in his field. All the while, however, the trained S&T officer is mixing with the right people, making friends, sizing up the men he meets. Here are some scenarios:

—A young corporation executive likes his Soviet friend and is happy to invite him to dinner, introduce him to his circle of acquaintance, and do him a favor now and then by opening doors otherwise closed to him. One man leads to another.

—A laboratory assistant is pleased to be invited to dinner by a visiting Russian, talks freely of his work and his boss, and agrees to meet him next time he is the neighborhood. The blueprints are within reach.

—A professor of biochemistry meets a knowledgeable Soviet "fellow scientist," invites him for a weekend, discusses the literature in his field, professes interest in a visit to the Soviet Union.

—The salesman for an instruments firm with a booth at a scientific conference chats with a Russian who gives him his card. Six months later he received a call from the Russian, who invites him to lunch.

Multiplied a thousand times, these carefully reported contacts place the Center in a position to select the right man in the right spot for what it wants and to instruct the residency to "study" him.

Recruited agents carry out a wide variety of missions.

They have been useful in circumventing the restrictions of the strategic embargo list on exports to the Soviet Union. In one case a KGB officer cultivated the acquaintance of a shady businessman in Queens, New York, and asked him to buy a computer tube for \$50,000. They met, both using station wagons, in the far corner of a parking plaza for a shopping center in northern New Jersey. They parked their station wagons back to back and lifted the bulky wooden crate from one car to the other.

Scores of items on the strategic list have been sent over the years by American businessmen to individual addresses in Western Europe supplied by their KGB contacts. These transshipment operations are relatively easy for the KGB to arrange, for they involve no open violation of federal law.

Recruited agents range from an amateur sewer expert who studied sewers all his life and had a firsthand acquaintance with all the sewage systems of California, to an engineer with an American oil company who passed on the technical information available to him.

The richest haul of classified data has come from factory and laboratory research

workers in the more than ten thousand companies and plants that have access to defense information ranging up to top secret. Now that Congress had directed the publication of the names of firms that have classified defense contracts, zeroing in on valuable targets has become simpler. The S&T desk men in New York check over the list for firms and locations: whom do we have in the Minneapolis area? Any lead to the Bridgeport area? However long it might take, some laborers, technicians, or engineers will be recruited for what they know or can learn.

Other branches of the residency carry out equally specialized tasks but with fewer men. The KR, or counterintelligence branch, focuses not only on the penetration of the FBI and the CIA, but the old-line federal agencies like State and Defense. It is also responsible for monitoring the security of the "Soviet colony," running informants and checking the contacts of all Soviet officials from the ambassador to the Tass journalist.

The illegals branch does not run illegals, but provides the Center with the material required to dispatch illegals to the United States. It keeps the Center up-to-date on changes in the immigration laws and procedures for getting a social security number or driver's license. It supplies birth certificates and passports when it can, and probes for vital statistics when requested by the Center.

The residency also has a steadily dwindling émigré branch.

#### *Émigrés*

It may appear curious that at this late date the KGB still maintains an émigré directorate in its Moscow headquarters and sends our émigré specialists to its major residencies. Most of the wartime Soviet émigrés have died, and nowhere is the emigration an organized group of any consequence. Moscow's forty-year pathological concern with the political and security threat they posed has clearly died down, if not out. What has taken its place is a sensible and businesslike view of their usefulness as agents in their countries of residence.

These émigrés, in New York or San Francisco, many of them second-generation Russians, Ukrainians, or Lithuanians, offer the KGB a pool for possible leads to émigrés in government, industry, or commerce. KGB officers handling support agents in these groups constantly talk about people—about friends, relatives, American acquaintances. Who does what where? Their émigré contacts may be of no use whatever for espionage purposes—clerks, shopkeepers, door-men—but on the solid thesis that one man can lead to another, they might come up with a name (and an introduction) of value to the KGB. Many of these "agents" are short-term: if they can supply nothing useful, they are simply discarded, and new ones found in their place.

Some émigrés, of course, have made it in American society. The émigré section in the San Francisco consulate pays considerable attention to the large White Russian colony on the West Coast, many of whom have done well in business and have good connections with locally prominent Americans. The KGB émigré specialists know the names and backgrounds of the most recent émigré and they can meet and choose the ones that might be useful. They are, of course, useful as support agents, but some eventually reach positions in which they

have access to the kind of information the KGB wants.

An Armenian Sahag K. Dedeyan, worked for a defense research organization and brought out classified documents on NATO and U.S. defense matters and delivered them to his cousin, S.O. Paskalian, a diamond cutter. Paskalian photographed the documents and passed them to two Soviet United Nations officials. Both were arrested in 1975.

Two years later Ivan N. Rogalsky, a resident alien living in a Soviet émigré community in Jackson Township, New Jersey, was also arrested for espionage. He had recruited another émigré, an engineer by the name of Nekrasov, who supplied him with classified documents on satellite communications from the RCA Space Center in Princeton, New Jersey. Fortunately, Nekrasov had not been "recruited" but had reported the approach to the FBI. Rogalsky was caught in the act of passing his photographs to his case officer in the Soviet Mission to the United Nations.

Thousands of Soviet émigrés are still coming in to the United States. Many of them are educated in special fields and can hope to get responsible jobs. A handful are well-known intellectuals, both writers and artists, and make high-level contacts on their arrival.

The KGB has a threshold interest in these more recent arrivals: the nature and consent of the interrogations they are subject to by American intelligence; monitoring their eventual location and jobs; and making support agents out of the more useful ones. Some, again, may eventually get jobs of interest to the KGB.

It also goes without saying that the KGB in Moscow makes every effort to recruit some of these emigrants before they leave the Soviet Union. Some have been groomed to become agents: in one case a young Central Asian Jew was trained for two years before he was granted an exit visa. Any emigration—Soviet, Polish, Czech, or Cuban—is normally exploited by the home service for the legal entry of a trained agent into a target country.

#### *The Washington Residency*

The GRU manual quoted before gives a (1961) operator's view of the nation's capital: "... the organization and utilization of agent communications in Washington are full of difficulties because of the city's small size, its limited number of public places, lack of subways, and inadequate public transportation system, especially in the suburbs." Though much changed in the following twenty years, Washington is in many ways still a large small town, not a metropolis.

The KGB residency in Washington, DC, is by contrast with New York City modest in size (probably fewer than fifty officers) and, again probably, less active in the recruitment of government servants than the GRU residency within the Office of the Military, Air, and Naval attaches whose cover gives them ready access to their colleagues in the Department of Defense.

Operating conditions, as the manual points out, are not healthy. Washington's white residential neighborhoods are small and compact, their streets (in Georgetown, Cleveland Park, and Wesley Heights) sparsely populated at night. The Federal Triangle is densely packed with government officials who, for the most part, live in the suburbs. There is both static and mobile surveillance by the FBI.

The biggest obstacle is the high security consciousness of government employees in

the Pentagon and State Department. Built-in caution is even higher among CIA and NSA employees (both located just outside Washington).

For the most part the KGB arranges its agent meetings not in the District, but in the suburbs (as in New York), in places like Shirlington or Springfield on the Virginia side of the Potomac. Philby, for example, apparently never met his handler in the District itself. Stretches of highway ensure effective countersurveillance by both case officer and agent. Meetings in the open air permit a critical survey of the surrounding terrain.

Yet the KGB residency appears to be reasonably active in recruiting and handling agents on the local scene. A Soviet attaché managed to meet a CIA employee in Washington who still had relatives in the Soviet Union. After threats against his relatives failed to pressure him into cooperation, the KGB brought his brother from the Soviet Union to Washington to help in his recruitment.

Both the KGB and Czech intelligence have worked on desk officers and clerks in the Department of State. Nor are the old-line agencies the only focus. The KGB has gone after employees of the General Accounting Office, since its files include budgets for all government projects—and the budget for a major classified project involving military research, development, or production can provide a compact answer to the most precise questions. It has attempted to recruit employees of the Department of Transportation. Why is not clear.

Yet intelligence agents are not the KGB's main concern in Washington.

A poor area for recruiting or handling secret agents, Washington is ideal for making social contacts. Its concentrated schedule of "official" dinner parties and receptions offers easy opportunities for Soviet (or Polish or Czech) officials to meet top-level government employees, senators and congressmen, foreign diplomats, the cream of American journalists. But they act in a fishbowl, a small-town assembly of people who know and recognize each other. To extract an agent from this assemblage of attractive intelligence targets is a daunting professional task. To make friends is a simpler one.

#### *Agents of Influence*

New York and Washington are the power centers of the American establishment. Their elites, corporate, governmental, and political, make the decisions that directly affect the Soviet interest in dealing with the Main Enemy. It is a crucial part of the KGB mission, second only to its espionage function, to influence these decisions.

It is a solid fact that many of the KGB officers in the New York and Washington residencies are not engaged in espionage. A large fraction of these legals—it is impossible to fix the fraction—do not recruit secret meetings, do not collect classified documents. Their task is simply to make friends and influence people.

The term "agent of influence," a literal translation of the Russian term *agent vliyaniya*, is both elastic and misleading. Many so-called KGB agents of influence are by no means "agents" in the conventional sense: men hired to carry out work assigned them by a case officer. Many are not aware that the Soviet diplomat they are in touch with is a KGB officer. Many have no notion that their Soviet contact is anything more than a proper diplomat. Only a few ever become "agents."

These agents of influence cover a broad spectrum of social relationships from casual luncheon partners to close personal friendships. They may be politicians, government servants, industrialists and bankers, journalists, and professors. Their only claim to be singled out by the KGB for personal cultivation is the fact that, in one way or another, they can exert some influence in their own societies.

The KGB has been assigned this essentially diplomatic function for the simple reason that the Soviet Foreign Ministry is not up to the task. For twenty years the KGB has recruited the brightest young men, given them the most intensive language and area training, and converted them into "specialists" (American, German, Latin American, even Turkish) by appropriate field assignments. Meanwhile, the Soviet Foreign Service languished during the Cold War (it did not have much to do) and is only now being built up in size and quality. Among the KGB ranks today are men as fluent, sophisticated, and knowledgeable as any foreign diplomat. KGB careerists have become ambassadors, senior U.N. officials, and top Soviet negotiators.

In Washington, the KGB men about town focus on meeting the right people: government officials, legislators, journalists, and lobbyists.

An increasingly active circle of Soviet interest is the growing array of congressional staffers. In the past few years the Soviet Embassy has taken to lobbying on the Hill, a legitimate enterprise for any foreign diplomat. The purpose is not, as often suggested, to recruit congressmen or their committee staffers because Capitol Hill is off limits to the FBI, but to put forth the Soviet point of view on pending legislation from trade agreements to SALT treaties. They also get to know the staffers and develop social relations off the Hill: a lunch at the Hay-Adams, a drink at a downtown bar. They are not recruiting spies but influential contacts. One staffer regularly consulted his Soviet friend on Moscow's point of view on pieces of upcoming legislation.

They are, of course, more active in New York City (as they are in espionage work), where they have a far larger official representation and where the density of "influential people" in the American corporate, financial, and media world is higher. Even in the late sixties the KGB officers' social calendars featured people from bank vice-presidents and senior corporate officials to influential journalists, professors in New York and Cambridge, stock brokers, and (from what emerged later) grain dealers. Each KGB officer moves in his own proper circle determined by his personality and his cover job: the U.S. diplomat, the member of the Soviet Mission to the U.N., the consular or trade representatives, the scientific and technical specialists, the Tass man. Each meets and cultivates compatible New Yorkers. Each has the job of making friends and exerting influence on them.

During the late sixties, for example, the KGB line to their bankers and businessmen friends in New York was a simple one. The Europeans are getting ahead of you in trade and investment in the Soviet Union. If you do not get moving, the Europeans will monopolize the rich opportunities available.

The KGB conversational line shifts as Moscow's interests shift: on SALT, the Jackson Amendment, troops in Cuba, Afghanistan, Poland.

This kind of routine work simply reinforces the official Soviet line carried out by



the ambassador and his legitimate staff. Yet it can be far more effective when it is articulated by a fluent, knowledgeable, and sophisticated Soviet officer at a private lunch or dinner party of people who count. It is most effective when it appeals to the self-interest of the men around the table.

The KGB man about town always has his eye on the main chance: he is a diplomat-plus. His job is to spot, and study, his acquaintances, to keep an eye out for any influential friend who can be recruited as a proper agent. He writes up in detail all his contacts and sends them to Moscow. He assesses the men he deals with: their character, capacities, interests. He can have them invited to the Soviet Union, or facilitate their introduction to Soviet trade official with whom they would like to do business. Those who go to Moscow can be assessed by KGB officers under suitable guise.

In these personal contacts the KGB does not exceed the limits of diplomatic propriety, but its officers can quickly size up and exploit any one man's susceptibility to a more confidential relationship. How willing is he to export items on the strategic list? How eager is he to get in on a specific contract? How open is he to bribery?

The KGB seeks to establish influential contacts not only in New York and Washington, but in all the major capitals of the West. It has been particularly active in Bonn, Paris, Rome, and, up to 1973, when the British threw out more than a hundred KGB officers, in London.

These contacts cannot be tabulated any more precisely than those of any active Western diplomat: it would take a questionnaire addressed to thousands of influential New Yorkers or Washingtonians to determine their nature and range. Since these contacts are normal and legal, it is not the business of the government to question them.

The simple educational value of the KGB's corporate contacts should not be discounted. For a regime that lived in almost total ignorance of the capitalist world for forty years, Western business methods, corporate structures, commercial communications, and government regulations are matters that have to be learned, and they can best be learned from its business and banking practitioners.

Further, Moscow has great respect for the power of the large American corporations, and as seats of power they demand attention. In developing social contacts even with junior employees, KGB officers not only learn about the strange ways of corporate life, but they may be in touch with a man who will grow into an executive position in later years. One mid-level corporate executive had been in steady contact with a series of KGB officers for over six years—at no time was he asked to do anything improper.

It is difficult to nail down a true "agent" of influence, a man recruited and paid (in one way or another) who will carry out Soviet instructions. Those who have come to light include such varied types as a British businessman helpful in evading export restrictions, one of the German negotiators on a truck-plant deal with the Russians, a New Zealand Cabinet minister, an Italian TV director, the wife of a West European Prime Minister. The French ambassador Dejean, whose story I have told earlier, was not the target for espionage but for an influence operation. What the KGB wanted was a sympathetic voice in President De Gaulle's entourage, not a pilferer of documents.

The only case I know of a Soviet agent of influence's being arrested and convicted of a

felony was that of Pierre-Charles Pathé, a seventy-year-old French journalist who had acted as a KGB agent for twenty years before his arrest in 1980. His work for the KGB included printing KGB articles in his confidential political newsletter, reporting on the personalities of French journalists and politicians, and analyzing French political developments. His main job clearly was to influence the climate of enlightened French opinion in the Soviet interest. He received a hundred thousand francs and five years in prison for his services.

The run-of-the-mill influence agents recruited by the KGB in the capitalist world must by now run into the hundreds. Most of those we know about are in the world of commerce and trade, sectors of ever-increasing importance to Moscow. It is difficult to determine in many cases the variety of motivations that induce them to "cooperate" with their Soviet friends. Political and commercial opportunities plays a part. Some may have genuine political sympathies with the Soviet side of the Cold War confrontation that remains under détente. Some no doubt have been blackmailed.

#### *Telephone Espionage*

The location of Soviet official installations and apartment houses in New York and Washington places the KGB in an ideal position to monitor both private and government telephone conversations. More than half the long-distance calls within the United States and from the United States overseas are made by microwave. These radio signals can be intercepted by antennas located on or in the Soviet Embassy in Washington, the Soviet Permanent Mission to the United Nations, or the Soviet apartment house in the Bronx.

Interception is a simple matter. The selection of calls from or to a specific telephone is far more complex, but recent computer technology has made it possible for the Russians to select from these microwave circuits individual calls that match a list stored in the computer. These calls are automatically taped.

The KGB is interested in both military information from government calls and economic information that can be gleaned from monitoring calls made by corporations, banks, and businessmen.

After the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, Khrushchev complimented the GRU for having provided him with information from telephone intercepts in Washington clarifying the events and discussions in official circles that led to the final resolution of the crisis. Always the creative imitator, the KGB instituted its own monitoring equipment and went heavily into the intercept business. It was, for example, in a position to monitor Pentagon circuits to its overseas commands, including operational instructions to Saigon during the war in Vietnam.

Perhaps the most lucrative contribution in the economic field was its monitoring of telephone calls into and out of the Department of Agriculture in the early seventies. The KGB did a great deal of spade work (mostly involving perfectly legal contacts) in preparing Soviet negotiators to pull off the "Great Grain Robbery" of 1972, but the KGB coverage of telephonic reports by the grain dealers to the Department of Agriculture clearly helped Moscow time its purchases before the full extent of U.S. grain requirements became apparent in Washington. As a colleague of mine put it, "The Russians knew more about events in the American grain market than the White House did."

The grain deal is an excellent example of the KGB's cash value to Moscow. Without secret agents, through legitimate contacts and telephonic intercepts, the KGB helped Moscow get the data required on grain crops, grain dealers, and government reporting requirements that made it possible for its negotiators to carry off this well-coordinated purchase mission. A KGB officer appeared at the final negotiating session in New York, but he was thrown out by the Moscow team on the grounds that grain-buying was none of his business.

Only in the late seventies did Washington take steps to seal off this economical and useful source of both classified and commercial information: sensitive telephone circuits within the United States to be carried by underground cable; the use of ciphers in the traffic of defense contractors; the addition of scrambler devices to render unintelligible more and more official and private circuits in the air—these and other devices costing millions will slowly, but only slowly, cut down the semi-open information available to the KGB.

#### *The Land of Opportunity*

The American target can be attacked not only from within, from New York, Washington, and (since 1975) San Francisco, but from outside as well. The United States as a piece of operating terrain is wide open to Soviet intelligence.

With its two long, poorly policed frontiers in the north and the south, illegal entry from Canada or Mexico is child's play. A native Canadian or Mexican national (never a KGB officer) can cross the frontier, have a meeting with an American, and return safely to his case officer.

More than forty American ports are open to Soviet ships, each with a KGB security officer aboard. In New Orleans or San Francisco he can go ashore, service a designated dead drop, and return safely to his ship within a few hours. Any one man among the tens of thousands of Soviet and East European officials and tourist visitors who come to the United States each year can perform the same simple task without imperiling a member of the KGB residencies.

The United States is also a natural target for so-called third-country operations run by the KGB residencies in Ottawa and Mexico City.

These third-country operations (Treppe working in Belgium against Germany) help protect an agent or case officer from the security services in their country of residence. It is common practice in Europe, where the narrow geographic range makes servicing an agent in another country convenient as well as safe. A KGB officer stationed in Copenhagen, for example, made periodic visits to various European capitals to meet George Blake, then working in British intelligence headquarters in London. One of the KGB tasks in New Delhi was to meet agents working in Pakistan. These are common practices, though the notion that legals only operate agents in other countries is far off the mark.

Canada is of major interest to the KGB in its own right, though the Ottawa residency has occasionally served as a support point for operations in the United States. Although the wartime GRU residency in Ottawa was originally set up by a GRU officer coming up from New York, and Colonel Zabolot's agent network included sources with contacts in the United States, in the following years the connections with the United States thinned out. There are cases

where an agent of the New York residency traveled to Canada to make contact, but the growing alertness of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police apparently reduced the value of this practice.

Canada has also been a convenient staging area for illegals destined for assignments in the United States. Almost one third of the present Canadian population, French and English, are not native-born but immigrants from all quarters of Europe: French-speaking Rumanians, English-speaking Poles and Czechs. They provide excellent cover for East European illegals like Colonel Abel transiting Canada for an American assignment.

The exposure of Colonel Zabolot's net in 1945 probably still reverberates at the Center, but its main concern is the competence of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police who wrapped up an uncomfortably large number of Soviet agents in the sixties. In the mid-sixties more than fifty KGB officers in Ottawa in support of Canadian operations (more than a score were caught in a ten-year period) and of Cuban operations (the shipping of matériel from Moscow to Cuba and of Cuban trainees to Moscow). In 1978 eleven Soviet diplomats and officials were expelled from Canada for plotting to penetrate the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. One of its officers was offered "unlimited funds" to work for the KGB. Large cash offers are not limited to CIA officers.

Mexico, not Canada, is the principal base for third-country operations against the United States.

In Mexico the operating atmosphere is much more permissive, and from the late forties on, the Mexico City residency has always been staffed by a large quota of American specialists who eye the North. Communications across the northern border are easily carried out by legal or illegal border crossers and by crew members of airlines flying to U.S. cities. These men can act as couriers or pick up material from dead drops at their various destinations. The Mexican police have never gone out of their way to irritate the Russians—or Cubans. In addition, Mexico City is a safe and accessible place to meet sensitive Americans or agents who have hot documents to turn over.

When Sergeant Rhodes, who had been recruited by the Russians in Moscow, came to the end of his tour, the KGB, instructed him to send anti-Soviet newspaper clippings to the Soviet Embassy in Washington as a signal for a meeting with his new Soviet contact in front of a theater in Mexico City.

In 1977 an agent from Washington, D.C., took a week's leave for a Mexican vacation, and handed over his material to a Mexican intermediary at a prearranged meeting. Since Mexican espionage laws do not concern themselves with classified American documents, neither of the two men were committing even a misdemeanor.

Some years before an aide to Senator James Eastland who had been developed and recruited by the Washington residency managed to get his hands on a number of CIA documents from a friend in the Agency. He was instructed to take a vacation in Mexico City and there handed them over to a Soviet case officer. Later, after the operation broke off and the KGB decided to reactivate him, it arranged a meeting in Mexico City which he did not attend.

Air Force Master Sergeant Perkins, whom I mentioned in the previous chapter, was arrested at the Panama City, Florida, airport with a satchel of documents he had been instructed to take to Mexico City for delivery.

Mexico is also a convenient escape hatch for Soviet agents on the run in the States. Julius Rosenberg's escape plans called for an exit to Europe via Mexico City. His agent got as far as Mexico City before he was caught. Had Rosenberg not dallied in New York, he would probably have made it all the way to Moscow.

The main task of the Mexico City residency is to recruit agents in Mexico against domestic American targets. The field is a fertile one and includes American students and (earlier) oil company employees, technicians and engineers on vacation from West Coast laboratory and production jobs; Germans and other Europeans already recruited abroad or developed and recruited in Mexico City; and bright Mexican students, especially graduate students who are encouraged and helped to pursue their education across the border and get a job with an American firm at home or in Mexico.

Its main target is close at hand: the heart of American research and development country in California, the back door into classified government secrets. It has worked against the scientific and technical target since the early fifties: electronic and air research laboratories, defense production firms, not to speak of key Navy installations and aircraft production centers (the latter a low priority since the Soviet aircraft industry is highly advanced).

Mexico City now supplements the work of the Soviet consulate in San Francisco, about a third of whose forty-odd officers in 1978 were attested Soviet intelligence personnel, most of them S&T specialists. They are a new breed of highly educated young men with good manners, excellent English, and specialized competence. They carry on an active public routine, visiting industrial installations and laboratories, attending scientific conferences, and meeting men in their own field of expertise. They are prospecting for recruits. Mexico City's job is to recruit agents outside to work inside the United States. Its success in the past thirty years can with few exceptions only be guessed at.

The Soviet Embassy in Mexico City is easily accessible for Americans who want to get a Soviet visa inconspicuously (like Lee Harvey Oswald) or who want to make a buck by selling the Russians the secrets they have or think they have. At various times in the past ten years, several military personnel, including a retired colonel, have walked in to the embassy to sell their wares.

Every service treasures a legitimate walk-in. He must have some samples of what he has to offer, prove his bona fides, and be persuasive about his access to the secrets he wants to sell.

Sergeant Robert Johnson's penetration of the vault at the Armed Forces Courier Station at Orly was, as we have seen, a technical operation of the highest order. The Mexico City residency penetrated the vault of a top-secret communications center on the West Coast without effort. It started, as the Johnson operation did, with a walk-in.

#### *Assault on the Black Vault*

In the first week of April 1975, Andrew Daulton Lee, scion of a well-off family living in a Los Angeles suburb—drug addict, pusher, and smuggler—walked into the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City with information about "spy satellites" from a "friend." He brought some samples: computer programming cards and a piece of paper tape from two cryptographic machines. Vice Consul Vasily Okana, the KGB officer who interviewed him, was of course interested and had nothing to lose by exploring this

odd walk-in further. No harm could come to him in Mexico's permissive atmosphere—in New York or Washington Lee would probably have been thrown out as an FBI provocation.

Lee had six more contacts with KGB officers until the end of 1976, bringing with him a vast treasure of highly classified information from the communications vault of the TRW Systems Group, working on classified defense and space projects for the CIA and the Pentagon.

His friend, Christopher Boyce, a college dropout, got a job at TRW through a friend of his father's, and at the age of twenty-one in July 1974 was cleared for "Special Projects," which included a CIA-funded electronic surveillance satellite, the monitoring of Soviet and Chinese telecommunications, and of Soviet missile tests and radar systems.

Boyce became one of six people cleared to work in the Black Vault, the code and communications room linking TRW with CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia, and ground stations in Australia. The vault was "impenetrable," with a steel bank-style door with a three-number combination and an inside door with a key lock. It was heavily guarded with sign-up sheets for entries and exits.

Boyce had become an alienated son of the middle class. At sixteen he had lost his faith in God and country. He had been turned off by the war in Vietnam, by the hypocrisy he saw in his own bourgeois society, by the actions of his government in Chile. He spent much of his time in an alcoholic haze. He got back by selling its secrets.

The KGB take from this simple operation was enormous. Boyce was a crucial node in CIA communications, operating two cryptographic systems between TRW and Langley, and via Langley to Australia. Fifty to sixty messages a day came in and out, and the decoded messages were kept on file for a year. They flowed into Mexico City. The computerized teleprinter and voice scramblers depended on machine settings changed each day. Computer cards for each day's setting went to Mexico City. The KGB wanted the frequencies on which these machines operated, but never got them.

The heart of the KGB take was detailed information on two top-secret American reconnaissance satellites, the Rhyolite and Argus, several specimens of advanced hardware, and the data from the satellites that passed through the vault. Among the thousands of messages Boyce turned over was one that gave the performance capabilities of most of our intelligence satellites. One of his last deliveries was some 450 frames of microfilm of the Pyramider project, a thirty-volume report on a CIA satellite communications system for global use by secret CIA agents equipped with a portable transceiver. The project, started in February 1973, had been shelved and conveniently placed on the top of a file cabinet in the vault.

Precisely how profitable this intelligence was to Moscow's scientific-technical experts cannot be assessed. It cannot have been invaluable, for in the KGB's last meeting with Boyce (Lee had finally been pressured to bring his "friend" down to Mexico City), he was instructed to give up his job at TRW and go back to college. The deal was the conventional one: the KGB would put up the \$40,000 required for college and graduate school, Boyce would become a Russian or Chinese specialist, and eventually seek a job in the State Department or Central In-



telligence Agency. Boyce accepted and applied for college admission in October 1976. In the KGB's eyes, "growing" another agent into place must have taken priority over continued access to the Black Vault.

Lee was obviously a weak link for the KGB. Impulsive, undisciplined, high most of the time, he persistently violated KGB instructions on the Mexico City meetings. To enforce some socialist discipline on this maverick capitalist, his handler, Boris, on one forbidden visit to the Soviet Embassy packed Lee into the back of a car and threw him out on the road with the car still in motion. Once the KGB met Boyce, of course, Lee was expendable.

Lee's final stupidity led to his arrest and the exposure of Boyce, who had already resigned from TRW. On January 6, 1977, impatient to get some money to buy drugs from his Mexican supplier, Lee tried to get Boris' attention in the embassy by throwing a Spanish-American dictionary (on which he had marked "KGB") through the fence onto the embassy grounds. Arrested by a Mexican policeman, he was later searched and a sealed envelope with microfilm strips inside was discovered.

The two were tried a few months later.

The Mexican authorities refused to let the Mexican police testify at the trials, clearly for fear of offending the Russians. Even President Carter's personal request to the Mexican president for his cooperation in the trial was turned down.

Boyce, tried in April 1977, got forty years and Lee life.\*

Boyce escaped from prison on January 22, 1980, apparently through his own endeavors, and is on the loose. Had Lee not been so stupid, Boyce now could very well be on his way to becoming a Soviet specialist in Washington, another mini-Philby grown into place.

#### Illegals in the United States

A standing puzzle of the twenty years since Colonel Abel's arrest—and probably for the next twenty—is: How many Soviet illegals are operating in the United States? In what communities and under what guise are KGB or GRU officers living as American citizens or resident aliens? Are they active (running agents) or sleepers waiting for an assignment? Will they be activated only in the event of a rupture of diplomatic relations and the withdrawal of the legats? Are some in place only for wartime contingency plans?

None of these questions can be answered, not even how many. In the late sixties, estimates ran as high as eight hundred to a thousand in Europe and North America. They were based on information supplied by Soviet defectors (who themselves had to guess), by captured illegals who reported the numbers of their "class-mates," by Soviet agents who participated in their instruction or dispatch, and on estimates of the facilities available in Moscow for training illegals. These estimates are probably much too high.

Illegals now in the United States are more likely to be counted by the score and not by the hundreds. Even the professional can only guess, for successful illegals are literally buried in a society like ours, rich in immigrants and ethnic groups.

The great value of an illegal resident to the KGB lies in his total insulation from the legal residency: ideally, the two net-

works act in parallel and the exposure of a KGB officer under legal cover in, say, New York or Washington cannot lead to the exposure of an illegal. Yet this classic textbook insulation of illegals from official Soviet installations cannot always be maintained. Even Trepper used the Soviet legal residency in Vichy as a means of forwarding some of his reports, and Sorge secretly met a GRU officer from the Soviet Embassy in Tokyo on several occasions.

Today the division is not always practical, for if the illegal has information of importance and has not been authorized to use a radio transmitter, he must pass it on to an embassy officer for immediate transmission to Moscow. At least one illegal on Long Island recently had several meetings with a Soviet official a few blocks from his house in the distant suburbs. Others have been contacted by officers in the scientific and technical branch when the information they secured required expert evaluation.

The most recent illegal caught in this fashion surfaced in early 1980. Colonel Rudolph Albert Herrmann had followed Colonel Abel's route to New York by crossing into West Germany under his new identity and emigrating to Canada. He arrived in the United States in 1968, settled in a New York Suburb, and became a free-lance photographer.

During his eleven-year career Herrmann did not recruit agents or go after classified information of any sort. He was basically a support agent whose main chore was servicing dead drops and transmitting their contents to Moscow via accommodation addresses in Europe. He received his instructions each weekend through coded radio messages from Moscow. He occasionally visited his "homeland" Germany with his family, and went on to Moscow for sessions with his headquarters desk.

Though his duties were limited to support work, his cover was excellent. Had he not been observed servicing a dead drop already visited by a New York legal, he would have remained in place and been available for more serious work in the event of a break in Soviet-American diplomatic relations.

How useful are such active illegals in the United States to Moscow in peacetime?

We do not know, for the few illegals who have been caught are no index to the illegals still quietly active. I would assume, however that if the KGB has a high-level mole in Washington, he would probably be serviced by an anonymous suburbanite who pays his taxes.

#### ON CAPITALIST FLESHPOTS

There is a long-standing myth that Soviet officials stationed in bourgeois capitals are bound to succumb to the temptations of material comforts and joys not available at home. Give them a chance—and they'll choose our side. A congressman in the late 1960s could not be convinced that \$100,000 on the table and the assurance of a prosperous life in the West was not a ready formula for inducing them to defect: "What's wrong with these guys anyway?"

The KGB man stationed in the West today has a good life. No jump in the Soviet standard of living during the last thirty years has been greater than that of the KGB official assigned to New York, London, or Bonn.

In the late forties most Soviet officials in European capitals led a compound or barracks life. They lived and worked in tightly controlled premises. Each was required to sign out and in for any outside foray. Even a KGB officer had to account for his actions

whenever he left the "office." Officials went out to shop only in groups of at least three or more, with one man responsible for their proper conduct and safe return.

With few exceptions up to Stalin's death, the family of each official was kept in Moscow as hostage for his good behavior. Yet even the KGB man was required to be celibate. No in-house adultery or affairs within the Soviet community were tolerated. They were puritanical in the narrowest sense and were required to set an example of good Bolshevik behavior: scandals were out.

Sexual liaisons outside the community were forbidden, not so much for fear of blackmail (sexual entrapment in London or New York, Moscow knew, was not a common practice as in Moscow), but for fear of being compromised. Girls in bars or brothels were, in the KGB view, agents of the British or American security services, and could easily rifle the pockets of their coats, identify them, and trap them into indiscreet behavior on future visits.

The first Soviet wives who came out after the war had a sorry lot: they served as cleaning women, cooks and waitresses in a strictly self-sufficient community. A notorious fight among the wives took place in New York many years ago on the issue of who would clean up after the October Revolution celebration.

All that has changed.

Today the private life of a KGB officer in New York is like that of a middle-class American. He can eat out at a good local restaurant, see movies and plays, rent a summer cottage in Long Beach, go on picnics in the parks or the countryside, spend the day at Coney Island—and he can shop.

The Soviet official in bourgeois capitals is an inveterate bargain shopper. He scours the retail stores and makes friends with shopkeepers. He sometimes takes along a bottle of vodka as a present, and expects a *quid pro quo*: a five to ten per cent discount. He favors electronic items, hardware, shirts, and records, sometimes buying thirty or forty records at a clip. An indispensable item for his wife is a fur coat to take home to Moscow.

There is at least one case a year in Manhattan in which a Soviet official is caught shoplifting—and almost always at low-price stores.

There are no import restrictions on Soviet officials returning home on leave or permanent change of assignment. They are a major source of scarce goods for the black market, though some have become record collectors for their own pleasure.

Only a negligible number of Soviet officers have any serious interest in the arts (in contrast to their Polish and Czech colleagues). Most of them are heavy eaters and drinkers, and New York is a good place for both. Most excursions to New York restaurants are made by paired couples, congenial and Russian-speaking foursomes in which all can relax. They favor medium-priced restaurants—even when they are taking along a "foreigner" on the KGB expense account. Many reportedly are reluctant to go home after their tours, but they do—with full trunks.

Reports on their sex life are hard to come by, for the least that can be expected from an operations officer is to keep secret his own love affairs. From what we have learned around the globe, they are not restrained by a puritan sexual ethic only recently dissolving in Western society, but their fornications and adulteries are, for the

\*A detailed recital of this operation can be found in Robert Lindsey, *The Falcon and the Snowman* (New York, 1979).

most part, confined to the Soviet colony. A man can sleep with his colleague's wife much more securely than he can have an affair with an outside woman, yet most affairs on record are with single women. Some overt homosexuals are kept on the KGB payroll for their obvious operational attractions. Being overt, they cannot be blackmailed for their homosexuality.

Sex and money are the main handles for the KGB's recruitment of foreigners. Neither is an effective weapon against it.

There is a relevant footnote to this failure to be sucked in by the fleshpots.

One notable trait of the ethnic *Russian* case officer in New York I had already been impressed with in New Delhi: he takes enormous pride in being a *Russian* (not simply a Soviet citizen). There is in him a powerful and deep ethnic, almost religious faith that lies deeper than the patriotic loyalty to a state. The Russian is a man neither of the West nor of the East: Russia lies uniquely between the two, and it is to this narrower nationalism that many Russians, most of them only one or two generations removed from their villages, are instinctively bound. There is a broader sense of pride: *his* society is working, for it is making its mark in the world; and *his* service is working, the best service in the world (now that KGB officers no longer come to a lethal end, as under Stalin).

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. SWINDALL], as modified.

The amendment, as modified, was agreed to.

#### AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. DORNAN OF CALIFORNIA

Mr. DORNAN of California. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. DORNAN of California: Page 55, after line 25, add the following new section:

#### SEC. 192. MEMBERSHIP OF BYELORUSSIA AND THE UKRAINE IN THE UNITED NATIONS.

The President shall instruct the United States Ambassador to the United Nations to introduce in the General Assembly of the United Nations a resolution to cease the recognition of Byelorussia and the Ukraine as members of the United Nations.

Mr. DORNAN of California (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the RECORD.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

There was no objection.

#### MODIFICATION OF AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. DORNAN OF CALIFORNIA

Mr. DORNAN of California. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to modify the amendment as agreed to previously with the majority side of the aisle.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the modification?

There was no objection.

The text of the amendment, as modified, is as follows:

Amendment, as modified, offered by Mr. DORNAN of California: Page 55 after line 25, add the following new section:

#### SEC. 192. MEMBERSHIP OF BYELORUSSIA AND THE UKRAINE IN THE UNITED NATIONS.

The President shall conduct a review of whether the United States should introduce in the General Assembly of the United Nations a resolution to cease the recognition of Byelorussia and the Ukraine as members of the United Nations, and shall, within 90 days of enactment of this Act, report his recommendation thereon to the Congress.

Mr. MICA. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DORNAN of California. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from Florida.

Mr. MICA. Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out that the gentleman has an amendment that would require certain actions of the General Assembly of the U.N. or the U.S. Government to take in that General Assembly. The amendment has been modified to create a report that would come to the Congress to give us information on this action, and we do accept that modification.

Mr. DORNAN of California. Mr. Chairman, just briefly, for the edification of my colleagues, and for anyone who may be following the proceedings on the House floor today I want to explain how this originated. In 1945 the United Nations was first formed out of the meetings in San Francisco. The term "United Nations" had been used all during the war in a less formal way to mean united nations of the world banded together for freedom against the Axis powers. When the 51 original nations were finally brought together in this great dream of hope, lo and behold, as a 12-year-old child I discover that the Soviet Union had three votes in the General Assembly. Suddenly there are these 2 so-called republics out of the 15 provinces in the Soviet Union—actually there were 16 then. Finland had not yet managed to escape to a state of freedom and autonomy. But here we have in the U.N. Byelorussia, sometimes called White Russia, and the Ukraine, which had been terribly crushed with purges in the 1930's where millions upon millions of Ukraine farmers were deliberately starved, two countries as that really deserved to be independent. The Ukraine, the breadbasket of Europe, was instead crushed inside the Communist organization of socialists, so-called republics, and suddenly the Soviet Union had not only its permanent seat along with four other nations, and all of them freedom loving because Communist China had yet not taken a seat from free China but not only did they have a seat on the permanent Council, but they had three votes in the General Assembly. To this day that entitles them to far beyond their geographic rights.

I just got the population statistics for both countries. We have had 484 Americans every day, when you take away the deaths in our country and you add the birth rate, and emigra-

tion, because most people still want to come here over any other place in the world, and we are now 243,990,800 Americans. The Soviet Union, with some mothers averaging 10 abortions, is kind of static now and we are catching them, and they are 277 million, and they are dwarfed to India which is twice as big, and China is five times as big. Why do they get three seats in the General Assembly?

So I appreciate very much the majority going along with a boyhood dream of mine that we would at least address this problem some day. It has taken 42 years, but I know that Vernon Walters would like to address this on the floor of the General Assembly of the United Nations up in New York. Through two amendments the President is asked in 90 days to come back with a recommendation from the executive branch of our Government what we are going to do about the Ukraine and about Byelorussia, two parts of the Soviet Union that live under Communist domination having these votes in the General Assembly. Their delegates sit right by the Soviet representatives, they live in the same compound at 67th Street on the East Side of New York. The spies that were all discussed at great length in the preceding amendment here today, all those spies are triplicated by what they are able to do in the UN with obligated quotas for employees and everything.

So let us face up to the reality of the real world and give the Soviet Union what the United States, Great Britain, France, and every nation in the world has in the General Assembly: One vote, not the three that they were given to woo Joseph Stalin to come in.

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DORNAN of California. I gladly yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, I just want to commend the gentleman. When I first came to this Congress 10 years ago, the gentleman brought this to my attention. I was not aware of it.

I had the opportunity to serve as a delegate to the United Nations during the 40th session, and to see those puppet governments stand up and belittle the rest of the free world, and then not even pay their dues. Let me just read to the gentleman the dues structure right now of the arrearages of those countries. The Soviet Union is 196.66 percent in arrears in paying their dues. The Ukraine is 193.30 percent in arrears, and Byelorussia is 199 percent in arrearage. Here they do not even pay their dues; yet they have these four floor votes on the floor of the General Assembly of the U.N., and it is outrageous. I commend the gentleman.



Mr. DORNAN of California. Even as deadbeats they operate in unison. Notice how close all of those arrearage figures are. So even as debtors in paying their bills. They stick together. They talked that over at the breakfast table up at East 67th Street, and they operate as one unit.

Just think, it would be as if, let me take the Republican Party here, suppose we had two extra fake, shadow parties that could demand equal time. We would get three to one on every single movement of debate on this floor.

Again, I thank the majority for going along with the amendment language here.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from California [Mr. DORNAN], as modified.

The amendment, as modified, was agreed to.

□ 1135

Mr. DORNAN of California. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

Mr. Chairman, this would have been a very controversial discussion on the House floor if I had insisted upon my amendment to take away the money from the State Department to fund an embassy in Nicaragua. I would have been going against the wishes of the executive branch and, probably, at this point in time, the majority of Members of this Congress. But the reason I wanted to do it was because the debate over the insurrection in Nicaragua has brought much confusion to the American people and to all of our friends throughout the world. If the establishment of a Soviet colony, a Soviet base on the soil of North America, there is truly threatening to the vital security interests of the United States, then have we really served ourselves well by mounting a covert operation? Why do we engage in these discussions on this floor as to whether the Contras are freedom fighters, the moral equivalent of our Founding Fathers, or thugs, rapists, and murderers? Why have we not had an open debate that has brought together a consensus in this country as to whether or not, Nicaragua, under its Communist government in Managua, is truly a threat to the peace of all of its surrounding smaller countries, or peace in South America or peace in North America? I believe that if the President had not only cut off trade but if he had said 2 years ago, "I have had it with this Communist government in Managua. I am ordering them to leave our country. I am breaking off diplomatic relations. I am asking not only our ambassador to come home but to pull out the whole Embassy down there." Yes, we would have lost that tool of American diplomacy and intelligence that you have in every

country in which you have a diplomatic presence through the eyes and ears of your representatives in the country. And yes the Nicaraguans would have marched across the street here, almost across the street to the OAS Building. But the statement to the world, would have given a message to the world that we consider this a brigand government, the Sandinistas; that they have sold out their bona fide legitimate revolution against the obligarchy that was making the lives of the people miserable in Nicaragua.

The reason I am not offering this amendment is because the President is not ready to go this route although he previously told me it is a good option and he is thinking about it. And I have another solution that I will present later in another title of this finely crafted bill which is before our colleagues from my Foreign Affairs Committee today. And that is to recognize a state of belligerency in the nation of Nicaragua.

Now our good Members from the Deep South in this country look back upon their cause with some fond memories. We think it was a wrong cause. We think it ended slavery. But a lot of it was brought on by economic problems between the North and the South. Southerners prefer to call it the War Between the States instead of the Civil War. But remember what Great Britain did. They declared a state of belligerency in the United States at that time and that enabled them to trade with the South and still trade with us. All this does in a civilized world is say there is a legitimate civil war here and there certainly is a legitimate civil war in Angola and there certainly is a legitimate civil war going on in Nicaragua.

To declare a state of belligerency does not mean we have to do one thing beyond recognizing the reality of what is going on down there. No longer can people call the Contras criminals, if there is a legitimate state of belligerency and then you move forward with, hopefully, diplomatic means to get the peace. Or if the fighting continues and there are young men and women and some of them are teenage boys and girls ready to die for freedom in Nicaragua, then at least this Nation and the world will say, "We recognize there is some status for the belligerents down there." That may be the proper first step to take before this House votes in its wisdom to cut off money to an embassy in a Communist country that is using our embassy indirectly to have thousands of Americans go down and naively work for a Communist cause. Nicaragua endangers the democratically elected governments that are emerging democracies and endangers this whole hemisphere. With Soviet helicopters flown mostly by Cubans, an operation was mounted against the

Contra freedom fighters last month that involved 30 Soviet HIND and HIP helicopters, please tell me that is not a belligerency situation that is supported by Cuban proxies and Soviet war material. The Soviets have cut the Sandinistas' throat this week by cutting off their oil. Things are happening down there. But let us recognize the state of belligerency. That is why I withdrew my amendment on funding the Embassy in Nicaragua.

Mr. CROCKETT. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, it is very, very infrequent that I have occasion to agree with the distinguished Member from California, who happens to be a member of my subcommittee on Western Hemisphere. But on this occasion I would like to compliment him on his good judgment in withdrawing the proposed amendment to mandate the closing of our Embassy in Nicaragua. Indeed, when I first read his proposed amendment, I wondered if he was not out of tune with the administration and with his party.

One of the key foreign policy planks of the Republican Party has been that we, here in the Congress, attempt to interfere too frequently in the conduct of foreign policy. And to think that one of the leading proponents of Republican foreign policy would get on the floor and offer an amendment to mandate the State Department to close an embassy in Nicaragua was, in my humble opinion, a complete reversal of the position of the Republican Party.

So I compliment my fellow member of the subcommittee on Western Hemisphere.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any other amendments to title I?

If not, the Clerk will designate title II.

The text of title II is as follows:

#### TITLE II—UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

##### SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATIONS OF APPROPRIATIONS.

The following amounts are authorized to be appropriated for the United States Information Agency (other than for the Voice of America) to carry out international information, educational, cultural, and exchange programs under the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948, the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961, Reorganization Plan Number 2 of 1977, and other purposes authorized by law:

(1) SALARIES AND EXPENSES.—For "Salaries and Expenses", \$409,194,000 for the fiscal year 1988 and \$425,762,000 for the fiscal year 1989.

(2) EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE PROGRAMS.—For "Educational and Cultural Exchange Program", \$149,700,000 for the fiscal year 1988 and \$155,688,000 for the fiscal year 1989.

(3) TELEVISION AND FILM SERVICE.—For "Television and Film Service", \$31,306,000

for the fiscal year 1988 and \$32,558,000 for the fiscal year 1989.

(4) NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY.—For "National Endowment for Democracy" \$17,500,000 for the fiscal year 1988 and \$18,100,000 for the fiscal year 1989.

(5) CENTER FOR CULTURAL AND TECHNICAL INTERCHANGE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST.—For "Center for Cultural and Technical Interchange between East and West", \$20,000,000 for the fiscal year 1988 and \$20,800,000 for the fiscal year 1989.

SEC. 202. REPROGRAMMING OF FUNDS APPROPRIATED FOR THE UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY.

(a) NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT BEFORE AWARDED PROGRAM GRANTS.—

(1) Section 705(b) of the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (22 U.S.C. 1477c) is amended by striking out "for the fiscal years 1986 and 1987".

(2) The amendment made by paragraph (1) shall take effect October 1, 1987.

(b) PROHIBITION ON CERTAIN REPROGRAMMING.—Section 705 of the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (22 U.S.C. 1477c) is amended by adding at the end the following:

"(c) Funds appropriated for the United States Information Agency may not be available for obligation or expenditure through any reprogramming described in subsection (a) during the period which is the last 15 days in which such funds are available unless notice of such reprogramming is made before such period."

SEC. 203. FUNDS FOR EXCHANGE ACTIVITIES ASSOCIATED WITH THE 1990 GOODWILL GAMES.

Of the amounts authorized to be appropriated for the fiscal years 1988 and 1989 by section 201 for the purposes specified in paragraphs (2) through (5) of that section, not less than \$500,000 for each such fiscal year shall be available only to the Seattle Goodwill Games Organizing Committee for cultural exchanges of persons and other exchange related activities associated with the 1990 Goodwill Games to be held in Seattle, Washington.

SEC. 204. AVAILABILITY OF CERTAIN USIA PHOTOGRAPHS FOR DISTRIBUTION WITHIN THE UNITED STATES BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.

Notwithstanding section 208 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987 (22 U.S.C. 1461-1a) and the second sentence of section 501 of the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (22 U.S.C. 1461), the Director of the United States Information Agency shall make available, upon request, to the Secretary of Defense and the Secretaries of the military departments concerned photographs of military operations and military related activities that occurred in the Republic of Vietnam for the purpose of developing and publishing military histories by those departments. The Secretary of Defense, or the Secretary of the military department concerned, as appropriate, shall reimburse the Director for any expenses involved in making such photographs available. Any reimbursement to the Director pursuant to this section shall be credited to the applicable appropriation of the United States Information Agency.

SEC. 205. USIA UNDERGRADUATE SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM.

(a) INCREASED FUNDING FOR CARIBBEAN REGION.—It is the sense of the Congress that the United States Information Agency should provide increased funding for students in the Caribbean region under the

scholarship program for developing countries established by title VI of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987.

(b) DEFINITION.—

(1) As used in this section, the term "Caribbean region" means—

(A) Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Cuba, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Haiti, Jamaica, St. Christopher and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, St. Lucia, Trinidad and Tobago, Belize, Guyana;

(B) Anguilla, Cayman Islands, Montserrat, Netherlands Antilles, Turks and Caicos Islands, British Virgin Islands; and

(C) French Guiana, Guadeloupe, and Martinique.

(2) Nothing in this subsection may be construed to encourage or authorize scholarships for students from any country which is a Communist country.

SEC. 206. TELEVISION SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY.

Title V of the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (22 U.S.C. 1461 et seq.) is amended by adding after section 504 (as added by section 302 of this Act) the following new section:

"SEC. 505. TELEVISION SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY.

"The long-range interests of the United States are served by communicating directly with the peoples of the world by television. To be effective, WORLDNET (the television service of the United States Information Agency) must win the attention and respect of viewers. The following principles shall therefore govern WORLDNET broadcasts:

"(1) WORLDNET will serve as a consistently reliable and authoritative source of news. WORLDNET news will be accurate, objective, and comprehensive.

"(2) WORLDNET will represent America, not any single segment of American society, and will therefore present a balanced and comprehensive projection of significant American thought and institutions.

"(3) WORLDNET will present the policies of the United States clearly and effectively, and will also present responsible discussions and opinion on these policies."

SEC. 207. LIMITATION ON WORLDNET FUNDING.

Funds may not be reprogrammed in fiscal years 1988 and 1989 from any program, project, or activity for WORLDNET. Funds may not be transferred in fiscal years 1988 and 1989 from any other account for WORLDNET.

SEC. 208. SEPARATE ACCOUNTS FOR NED GRANTEES.

Section 504(h) of the National Endowment for Democracy Act (22 U.S.C. 4413(h)) is amended by inserting "separate accounts with respect to such assistance and" after "keeps".

SEC. 209. NED TREATMENT OF INDEPENDENT LABOR UNIONS.

Section 503 of the National Endowment for Democracy Act (22 U.S.C. 4412) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:

"(f) Nothing in this title shall preclude the Endowment from making grants to independent labor unions."

SEC. 210. PROFESSORSHIP ON CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY.

(a) FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR PROFESSORSHIP.—The President, in support of the statutory program of American studies abroad, is directed to foster studies in constitutional democracy at the Santo Tomas University in the Republic of the Philippines by supporting at such university under section

102(b)(4) of the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2452(b)(4)) a professorship on the subject of constitutional democracy, if such professorship is established by such university.

(b) FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR THE PROFESSORSHIP.—If the professorship referred to in subsection (a) is established by the Santo Tomas University in the Republic of the Philippines, veterans of the Pacific theater in World War II and veterans of the Korean conflict and Vietnam era are encouraged to contribute funds under section 105(f) of the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2455(f)) to support such professorship.

(c) EFFECTIVE DATE.—This section shall take effect on October 1, 1987.

MODIFICATION OFFERED BY MR. MICA TO THE AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. LEVINE OF CALIFORNIA

Mr. MICA. Mr. Chairman, I am going to make a unanimous-consent request, which has been cleared with the minority, to correct a minor technical problem. During the consideration of this bill, H.R. 1777, the Committee of the Whole has agreed to three amendments each of which amends the authorization figures on lines 12 and 13 of page 4. As part of the en bloc amendments which I offered on June 16, we had an amendment relating to the Latin America and Caribbean Data Bank and an amendment relating to the Bureau of International Communications and Information Policy. Subsequently on June 16, we had an amendment offered by Mr. LEVINE of California relating to the funding level for the Pan-American Health Organization. Each of these amendments was drafted to change the authorization figures printed in the bill. They did not take into account the changes made in those figures by previously adopted amendments. In order to ensure that the final text of the bill accurately reflect the changes made by all three amendments, I ask unanimous consent that the Levine amendment, which was the last amendment adopted, be modified so that dollar amount inserted on line 12 of page 4 is \$1,373,024,000 and the dollar amount inserted on line 13 of page 4 is \$1,428,063,000.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Florida?

There was no objection.

The text of the amendment offered by the gentleman from California [Mr. LEVINE] as modified by the gentleman from Florida [Mr. MICA] is as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. LEVINE of California, as modified: Page 4, line 12, strike "\$1,373,024,000" and insert in lieu thereof "\$1,371,474,000".

Page 4, line 13, strike "\$1,428,063,000" and insert in lieu thereof "\$1,425,513,000".

Page 9, line 5, strike "\$32,691,000" and insert in lieu thereof "\$37,191,000".

Page 9, line 6, strike "\$33,999,000" and insert in lieu thereof "\$38,499,000".



Mr. DORNAN of California. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, in the full committee unanimously with a great deal of enthusiasm we passed an amendment that is now in the language of the bill recognizing the suffering of the Hungarian minority in that part of Rumania called Transylvania. However, some Hungarian-Americans, including several who serve in this House who were born in Hungary came to me and said, "We don't want Rumania using the words self-determination in the strictest sense to mean that by any manner of means we are claiming that Transylvania should be a separate country." We are not supporting a separatist movement.

Next year I will change, and I do not want to burden the House with the language at this moment—we will let the language stand—but I want to clarify in the legislative record what all of us meant by those words "self-determination." I will have it in the amendment if things do not change and we will have to do it next year.

Therefore, Mr. Chairman, I will add next year and add to the legislative record right now that in this amendment in section 190, the words "self-determination" is in the sense of the people being entitled to freely pursue their unique national, cultural and religious identity. That is what it means. I thank the Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any amendments to title II?

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. HERGER

Mr. HERGER. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. HERGER: Page 58, strike out lines 3 through 12 (section 203), and redesignate succeeding sections accordingly.

Mr. HERGER. Mr. Chairman, this is a very simple amendment. Its purpose is to eliminate the earmarking of a total of \$1,000,000 or \$500,000 during fiscal year 1988 and \$500,000 during fiscal year 1989 for cultural exchanges associated with the staging of Goodwill Games in Seattle in 1990. The designee of this earmark is the Seattle Goodwill Games Organizing Committee. This group is one of four cosponsors of the Goodwill Games, the other three being Ted Turner's Turner Broadcasting Systems, Goskomsport, the Soviet Union's Sports Ministry, and Gosteleradio, the Soviet Government's television and radio network.

Mr. Chairman, there are many reasons why inclusion of this earmark in H.R. 1777 is inappropriate. First of all, the Department of State as well as the U.S. Information Agency's oppose direct Federal funding of the Goodwill Games.

Second, this money would be used to subsidize activities promoting a commercial enterprise created by Ted

Turner. Turner launched these games last year in part as a means of generating advertising revenue for the Turner Broadcasting System's cable television empire. With a projected Federal deficit of more than \$169 billion for next year, or more than \$61 billion over the Gramm-Rudman deficit target for 1988, we cannot afford even half a million dollars of unnecessary spending. Let's not forget that the Department of Defense barred the participation of Army athletes in the 1986 Goodwill Games because they were a commercial endeavor.

Additional, we must note that organizers of the 1984 summer Olympic games held in Los Angeles received no direct Federal authorization. This is a precedent we should not seek to reverse.

Mr. Chairman, I think it is important to remind by colleagues that the Goodwill Games held in Moscow did not achieve their objective of divorcing politics from international sporting events. Indeed, the Goodwill Games were themselves political in nature, seeking to advance one man's viewpoint about United States-Soviet relations.

Indeed, the politicization of the 1986 Goodwill Games was distasteful to many Americans, who were shocked at Mr. Turner's acquiescence to the Soviet Government's demands that Israeli and South Korean athletes be barred from participation. That action alone stripped away whatever veneer of international goodwill the games might have achieved.

I also wish to point out that these games are to be held in a city which is closed to Soviet diplomats posted in the United States. Thus, the games offer Soviet intelligence operatives visiting Seattle on exchanges associated with them a unique opportunity to gain access to a region chock full of sensitive high technology operations and military installations.

Some may argue the funds earmarked in section 203 annually do not subsidize the games, since they are targeted for cultural exchanges such as art exhibits and ballet performances which will be conducted in association with these games. I strongly dispute this notion, since any taxpayer money granted to the Seattle Organizing Committee for these activities frees up other private Ted Turner funds for the games.

□ 1150

Moreover, these cultural exchanges should properly be viewed as advertising for the Goodwill Games. These exchanges are certainly expected to heighten interest and increase attention for the games, which should increase their viewing audience. Thus, they directly enhance the value of Ted Turner's investment in those games, and further promote his profitmaking

enterprise. Such expenses should be shouldered by those who expect to turn a profit from them—Ted Turner and not by the American taxpayer.

Mr. Chairman, the list of reasons why this earmarking of some \$1 million in taxpayer money is inappropriate goes on and on. But let me close with this one thought. Ted Turner's company lost \$26 million on the Moscow Games, because they couldn't command an audience of American sports fans large enough to attract sufficient commercial advertising.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. SWIFT). The time of the gentleman from California [Mr. HERGER] has expired.

(On request of Ms. SNOWE, and by unanimous consent, Mr. HERGER was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

Mr. HERGER. Let us not open the door today to a future tax bailout of Ted Turner's personal olympics. If we do not adopt my amendment, the hand will enter the cookie jar, and we may not be able to extract it later.

I urge the adoption of my amendment.

Ms. SNOWE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HERGER. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentlewoman from Maine.

Ms. SNOWE. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I want to thank the gentleman for the amendment.

Am I to understand that the United States has no guarantee, as it currently stands, that the United States would receive a reimbursement in the event that this became a successful operation for Ted Turner, am I correct?

Mr. HERGER. That is my understanding.

Ms. SNOWE. This is a joint commercial enterprise between Ted Turner and the Soviet Government on a for-profit basis?

Mr. HERGER. That is correct.

Ms. SNOWE. Mr. Chairman, I think that Members of the Committee should know that this is a precedent we do not want to establish.

In addition, as I understand it, at the Goodwill Games in Moscow last year Soviets, and Ted Turner agreed, prevented Israel and South Korea from participating in the Goodwill Games, is that correct?

Mr. HERGER. That is absolutely correct.

Ms. SNOWE. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for offering this amendment.

I do not think we want to engage in support of commercial enterprises for profit making. It is for Ted Turner; and once we begin to engage in support of this undertakings with taxpayer's money it will lead to others.

I also would remind my colleagues that the Goodwill Games in Moscow

precluded two of our allies, Israel and South Korea, from participating in these events. So I thank the gentleman for the amendment, and I urge its adoption.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HERGER. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I want to commend the gentleman for the gentleman's amendment.

I think it is appropriate for this House to adopt it; and very simply, briefly I want to remind the Members that we did not participate in the 1980 Olympics because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, an invasion that to date has killed 1 million Afghans, mostly civilians, mostly women and children.

It sent 4 million, Afghans, to the refugee camps around the world, but primarily in the Pakistan area.

In 1984 the Soviets responded to that refusal of ours in 1980 by not participating.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The time of the gentleman from California [Mr. HERGER] has expired.

(On request of Mr. HUNTER, and by unanimous consent, Mr. HERGER was allowed to proceed for 3 additional minutes.)

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield further?

Mr. HERGER. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

The Soviets did not participate in 1984, and very clearly the Goodwill Games had the purpose of substituting for the Olympic Games in 1984 that the Soviets refused to participate in.

I simply want to remind the Members that we attempted to make a moral point in 1980, and that point was that the Soviet Union was brutally oppressing the people of Afghanistan.

The Members of this House floor watched a small Afghan child walk out on the floor a couple of days ago. He was crippled. He talked with a number of Members on the Democrat and Republican sides.

He had been crippled by Soviet attack helicopters that strafed him when he went to school one day.

I have also seen small exploding dolls, dolls that are sprinkled in the Afghan-inhabited areas in Afghanistan for the purpose of exploding, and blowing off the fingers and hands of the children who touch them.

I would suggest that that moral situation has not changed, and I think that Ted Turner's attempt to portray the Soviet Union in a different light than their own actions have proven

them to be, has not accrued to the benefit of this country.

I also do not like Mr. Turner's constant thrashing of the President of the United States with regard to foreign policy, and I think the gentleman from California has made an excellent point when the gentleman has reminded the Members that this is a money-making project of Ted Turner's.

It is not an appropriate government activity, and I commend the gentleman from California for his amendment. I hope it passes unanimously.

Mr. BONKER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I think this matter is being grossly misrepresented by the sponsor of the amendment, and those that have spoken on the other side.

This is not a Ted Turner operation. The only involvement of Ted Turner is through the purchasing of television rights, and he will probably lose a great deal of money over it. This is also not a joint United States-Soviet sponsored activity.

The 1990 Goodwill Games are under the direction of a nonprofit organization chaired by the Reverend William Sullivan, the president of the Seattle University, an organization made up of business leaders, civic leaders. There are no direct ties to Ted Turner.

I think what the gentlemen on the other side are talking about is the Goodwill Games in the U.S.S.R.

I would also point out that the money involved, \$500,000, out of a \$600 million category, is simply an earmark. It is similar to the present authorization of \$1.5 million that is earmarked under this account for the Pan-American Games held in Indiana.

Section 203 is consistent with the President's 1985 General Agreement on Cultural and Scientific Exchange.

Nothing in this amount will go to support the games in any direct fashion. The money will go to support cultural exchange before the 1990 games.

I might also add that the city of Seattle is inviting 60 countries to participate, of which the Soviet Union will be one.

Eligibility for the sporting events will be determined by the United States Sports Federation, and it is unlikely that any country teams will be denied, except for those like South Africa which are banned by the International Sports Federation. Since the U.S. Sports Federation will do the inviting, not the Soviet Union, the United States will decide which country teams may participate.

This is an opportunity to bring about an international event in Seattle, WA, that will help bring about greater cultural activities among nations.

It is a lot less costly than the \$1.5 million that was in the previous authorization bill that goes to support

Pan Am Games. That money went for the games. This money will not support in any direct fashion the games themselves but only the cultural exchanges that will occur beforehand. So I think, given the precedent that exists in the current authorization bill, and given the fact that the U.S. Sports Federation will direct and invite country teams to participate, and given it is being run by the Seattle Goodwill Games Committee of Seattle, I cannot see any reason why we should oppose it or support the gentleman's amendment.

Mr. HERGER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BONKER. I am glad to yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. HERGER. Mr. Chairman, I would like to quote now, if I could, from the factsheet of the Goodwill Games of Seattle, 1990, and I would just read this, if I may. It is under "who are the 1990 Goodwill Games organizers?"

"The 1990 Goodwill Games are co-sponsored by the Seattle organization, TBS, Turner Broadcasting System, and the U.S.S.R. State Committee on Physical Culture and Sports, and the U.S.S.R. State Committee on Television and Radio."

The fact is that these games are being sponsored by all four, including the Seattle organizing committee. Therefore, any money that goes into the Seattle organizing committee is that much less money that Turner Broadcasting has to put up in order to promote their games. So, therefore, one assists the other. They are the same.

Mr. BONKER. Mr. Chairman, I do not know the document to which the gentleman refers. I have here a letter from the director of the Seattle organizing committee, and he has assured me that the money involved in this \$500,000 earmarking will go for cultural exchanges, that Turner's only participation will be the purchase of the television rights.

Mr. HERGER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BONKER. I yield further to the gentleman from California.

Mr. HERGER. Since they are both associated, since all four are together, any money that goes into one in promoting the games, whether it be culturally or whatever, is dollars that helps in promoting the games and, therefore, helps in a profitmaking venture by Ted Turner. At a time when we are running \$710 billion deficits, I do not feel it is appropriate for taxpayer dollars to be used in that way.

Mr. MICA. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I will not take all of my time, but before I even talk about the amendment, let me just state something in the kindest, gentlest



way. I am being prompted and the minority is being prompted by our leadership on both sides to keep things moving. Most of the amendments that we are debating, including one that we debated for over a half hour, we all agreed on. So I would just ask Members, with no gag rule being applied, to say what they have to say in as short a time possible, and hold any additional comments for publication in the *RECORD*. I will do my best to get us out of here by 4 o'clock today if we can keep things moving.

With regard to this particular amendment simply stated, the money in this section of the bill is to be used for the purposes of cultural exchange. It will be used, whether it is for the Seattle games or not, for these purposes. We have joint U.S. cultural activities with other nations. We have Soviet and Pan-American and other bilateral cultural efforts funded by the United States Information Agency. This grant would represent a very small fraction of the overall budget of that Agency, and it is an infinitesimal part of the budget of the United States.

These activities are something that the present administration and former administrations have always felt should be supported. The argument really is: Do we want to support them in Seattle, or do we want to allow these funds to be earmarked by the Agency somewhere else?

I am willing to abide by the results of the vote here. I think there has been a little misunderstanding that this is some new money set aside for a new purpose. If we eliminate this earmark, in fact the money could still go to support these games. There is nothing here that would stop that. The Agency has that authority.

Mr. HERGER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BONKER. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. HERGER. Mr. Chairman, my concern is twofold. No. 1, we are spending \$500,000 that is going into an area specifically. The gentleman mentioned that it could be spent anywhere.

Mr. BONKER. If this amendment is agreed to, it may very well still go there. We are just taking a chunk of money here that has been set aside for these purposes, a larger pot, and saying that this portion will go here. If we remove the earmark, this portion can go anywhere, and maybe even there. It is kind of an intellectual debate on the site, but it does not change the facts on the approach in the bill. I think that is where there is a little bit of a misunderstanding.

Mr. HERGER. If my amendment does not go through, this money will automatically go there to promote a game which is a portion of the cultural exchange, and it cannot help but be

used to a great extent as advertising for a game that is for profit. As the gentleman mentioned, the money may be used, and it may be used somewhere else.

Mr. BONKER. There is no money used in this for advertising. This is not for the games again. That has been stated.

Mr. Chairman, I do not want to restate everything that has been stated before and counter what I just asked my colleagues to do, so, therefore, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. DORNAN of California. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I heard loud and clear the general admonition of my good friend, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Mica], to try to move swiftly today because it is a getaway Thursday. I am not getting away myself, but I do not want to be selfish to those who are heading home.

However, I come here not to bury Ted Turner but, rather, to praise him. He is a friend, and I do not think anybody in this Chamber could turn on that 24-hour news that is available daily in their offices and then think ill of Ted Turner. That was a gift to this House years ago. Mayor Barry and the administration of this city still does not have a single home in the District wired for cable, but our Hill is wired, thanks to Ted.

Whose heart did not swell with pride 8 years ago when he captured America's Cup, that handsome, young Georgian with that engineer's-billed hat on, when Captain Outrageous was throwing all his crewmen into the briny, celebrating the America's Cup victory for this common man and great entrepreneur?

Ted and I used to agree on everything. I sponsored him here in the Cannon Caucus Room to discuss the egregious violence and promiscuous sex-pushing that was being shown on on all the major networks in this country.

□ 1205

Most of them still are errant in this area, and Ted made this a cause. He came up here and lectured us severely saying that the coverage in our country in the mass media was doing the work of 15 Soviet divisions tearing our country apart, and he was right.

Then came the Goodwill Games and Ted went over to Russia 10 or 15 times. Why, they might as well have brought back the Minister Potempkin from the grave, put Ted in drag in those gowns of Katherine the Great that are in the museum at the west end of Red Square and taken him for a tour down the Volga and the Don, because everything he saw when he came back he had fallen for. He got the major Potempkin tour of this century.

The Goodwill Games were not goodwill for Israel or for South Korea. Israel was scapegoated and blackballed from those games, and so was the nation of South Korea. As a result, the U.S. Air Force, Army, Navy, Coast Guard, and Marine Corps, all of them said these are not games of goodwill for us. They are games of ill-will, and our great military athletes were not allowed to participate.

The Goodwill Games went in the red deeply. As it was said of Julius Caesar: "The mistakes that men make live after them, the good and their debts are often interred with IRS books and their bones."

Ted Turner is never going to be able to recoup his losses from the Goodwill Games; so like my friend, the excellent mayor of Los Angeles, Tom Bradley, Ted comes here with his hand out asking for money. Tom Bradley was told no by most of the California delegation back in 1981 and by a majority of the House and the Senate. Tom went back. He went to work with the excellent Peter Ueberroth and the Los Angeles Games had money to spare left over. It was a massive commercial and private sector success.

Poor Canada, because the government got involved, is still paying off its debts for the Montreal Games.

So what I would say to my good friend Ted Turner, and he is a friend, all kidding aside, "Ted, I told you before and you used to agree with me, don't get involved with the Federal Government. Do it on your own. Make it work this time."

"The great Pacific Northwest is one of the most beautiful parts of not only America, but the world. Make the Goodwill Games a part of the private sector. Put Peter Ueberroth on retainer. Call my friend, Tom Bradley, and ask him how to make it work and make sure, Ted, because you are still the main entrepreneur, you're the major domo. Make sure Israel and South Korea come to these games. Don't blackball anybody."

Mr. WEISS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DORNAN of California. I am glad to yield to my distinguished friend, the gentleman from New York.

Mr. WEISS. Mr. Chairman, I am a little confused as the gentleman was speaking. Does he or does he not consider Ted Turner to be a Russian dupe?

Mr. DORNAN of California. Pardon?

Mr. WEISS. Does the gentleman or does he not consider Ted Turner to be a Russian dupe?

Mr. DORNAN of California. Not in my book, but I wish you would take off that gown of Katherine the Great and stop letting them fool him.

Mr. WEISS. Well, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the clarification.

Mr. MILLER of Washington. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, also heeding the admonition of the distinguished gentleman from Florida to move swiftly in this debate, I would like to turn to my colleagues and address what I think are some of the concerns here and hopefully try to persuade you that this is not such a bad thing.

What we have here is a proposal for cultural exchange that goes along with an athletic event. As you surmise, this is in an area from which I come, OK; but because of that I put some time into this.

Now, when the promoters of the Goodwill Games came to me and they said, "We would like to have some cultural exchange events along with this, artistic events, whatever."

I said, "Speaking as one Congressman, cultural exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union is fine as long as it is real cultural exchange, as long as real problems are discussed, as long as issues like human rights don't get swept aside."

I had more than one conversation with those involved. In fact, I went out to the district and had a whole meeting on this subject.

I am glad to say that the board that is running the Goodwill Games understands what real cultural exchange is about. As part of these events, there are going to be seminars in which issues like human rights in the Soviet Union are discussed and in which those who are most aggrieved by the denial of human rights will have the opportunity to exchange views with the Soviets. The sponsors and promoters of these games have advised the Soviets, in fact in anticipation of the games, whenever a Soviet official comes to Seattle to talk about the games that Soviet official meets with members of Seattle's Jewish community, meets with Jews who have left the Soviet Union, meets with me to discuss human rights and other concerns in the Soviet Union.

I go into this at length because we are looking at a cultural exchange program. The issue is not whether the Goodwill Games are good or bad. The issue is, is this a good occasion to have some meaningful cultural exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union? I think it is and I think the sponsors and promoters have shown that.

Now, it is true that Ted Turner bought the broadcasting rights for this \$26 million. That is the way any athletic games go in this country. If it is not Ted Turner, it is CBS or NBC or ABC. When a station buys the TV rights, it is also true that it's crucial to putting the games on. Most of the sports events that go on today, the big ones, do not go on without a broadcasting station buying some of those

rights; but the fact that CBS or NBC or Ted Turner has bought rights to an athletic game is not a reason for this Congress to turn around and say, "No, you shall not have these cultural exchange events."

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MILLER of Washington. Yes, I am happy to yield to the gentleman from Washington.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I want to compliment the gentleman on his statement. I want to make sure that our colleagues here in the committee recognize that this thing has been totally removed from Ted Turner's control. There is a nonprofit entity that has been created in the State of Washington, led by the Reverend Father William Sullivan, the president of Seattle University, that will control these funds and how they are used as part of this cultural exchange.

It has nothing to do with Ted Turner. The whole thing has been separated from Ted Turner.

Now, yes, the gentleman is correct, Ted Turner is going to broadcast the games, but that is all he is going to do, and he is paying a fee to do that.

Now, is that not correct?

Mr. MILLER of Washington. That is my understanding, and he has nothing to do with these cultural exchange events.

Mr. DICKS. So I would hope that the House would take a look at this.

I would also point out that the House just a few years ago appropriated \$35 million for the Pan-American Games.

Now, what we are asking for in this very important cultural exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union, which will be much broader than just sports, is \$500,000 this year and \$500,000 the next year.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Washington has expired.

(At the request of Mr. DICKS, and by unanimous consent, Mr. MILLER of Washington was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield further?

Mr. MILLER of Washington. I am happy to yield to my colleague, the gentleman from Washington.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I would hope that the committee would stay with the recommendations of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Congressman BONKER was one of the originators of this amendment. I think this is a very important activity. I think the more exchange we can have with the Soviet Union, the better we are as a country.

The gentleman from Washington [Mr. MILLER] has made a very appropriate point in our State, that human rights must be dealt with. I certainly support him in that respect.

So I think this is a prudent amount of money. It is not an additional amount, I might point out. It is earmarked out of existing USIA funds, so we are not adding money to the budget. We are just saying that out of the money that is being authorized for this, \$500,000 will be available for these important activities.

Mr. Chairman, I just want to urge my colleagues to support this.

Mr. BONKER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MILLER of Washington. I yield to my colleague, the gentleman from Washington.

Mr. BONKER. Mr. Chairman, I value the comments of both my colleagues from the State of Washington.

Obviously, we have an interest in this matter, since it is in Seattle; but I think we also have the opportunity for an ongoing goodwill event that is going to occur in other parts of the country. It is not just the Soviet Union. I want to be explicit about that. Over 60 countries will be invited to participate. We ought to do all we can to enhance these goodwill exchanges and the cultural opportunities that exist.

The final point I want to make is that this money, which is a very small amount of earmarked money, will be administered by the USIA, no real friend or supporter of the Soviet Union; so I think they will institute the proper controls both in terms of accounting and policy to insure that this money will be going for the kind of cultural opportunities that we here in the House envision.

Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words. I will not take all the 5 minutes.

Mr. Chairman, I want to compliment some of the speakers who are attempting to bring some rational discussion to this issue. We are not talking about Ted Turner.

Member of the House, we spend \$300 billion a year to protect us from the so-called Bug Bear that exists out there, called the Soviet Union. We are here today discussing attitude and how the Members of the House will view our positions and assess our policies in trying to come to some reasonable terms with the Soviet Union.

Now, there are two ways we can proceed down the path. One way is that we continue to build missiles, expend \$300 billion a year and keep escalating, while the red ink keeps rising.

The other way is we could develop some dialog and some communication in an attempt to bring the two nations somewhat closer together to mitigate some of these problems.

Now, we are either going to do that through cultural terms, social activities, political activities, or we are going to meet in a back alley and that back



alley is not going to be settled with fists anymore or handguns. It is going to be a nuclear shooting gallery at some point.

So we are now setting the course for the future. I listened to some of the speakers on the other side and I have great respect for those speakers, but I just feel this is not about Ted Turner. I think Ted Turner may be telling us what we should be doing here today.

We are either going to try to resolve this thing with communication and dialog or we are going to meet on the real playing field, and it is for keeps.

I think this is a very reasonable cost item and I believe it sets the tone of what Congress should be attempting to do. We should be the leaders in this field. It should not be coming from without. So let us get off that business.

I believe Ted Turner lost money. I do not get any money in my district from this. I think this is an issue for the Nation.

I commend those efforts and gestures. I think for Congress to strike that half million dollars is very, very economically foolish here. I think that is exactly the way we should look at it today.

So I say, "Cheers, Ted. Keep it up." Maybe with Father Sullivan we can get something done that Congress has failed to do. If Congress wants to stand around here and talk about all this big confrontation with the Soviet Union, I think that we should be looking and pushing all the buttons and all options to try to reduce the conflict that may someday arise.

I do not think this is a very costly way of going about it. I think it makes some sense. I commend the committee for having it in. I hope the Members of the House, and this probably should not be the amendment that holds us back today, we should come in here today and discuss attitude and vote attitude and that attitude is that we are willing to negotiate and work things out. We are not just willing to drop bombs.

Mr. WALKER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, let me ask the sponsor of the amendment a couple questions about the amendment, if I could, the gentleman from California.

I have listened to this debate now, and in all honesty, I do not care about Ted Turner. I do not think that the \$500,000 has anything to do with nuclear shooting galleries or anything else, and I am not certain that we ought to be subsidizing the city of Seattle for something which is going to bring a lot of people into the city.

□ 1220

Let me try to understand here. We are talking \$500,000 of taxpayers' money; is that correct?

Mr. HERGER. If the gentleman will yield, that is correct, for 2 years running, so a total of \$1 million.

Mr. WALKER. A total of \$1 million. So we are talking about fairly significant amounts of money. Let us understand, \$500,000 if not minor money, it is over 100 American taxpaying families working the entire year to pay the taxes to have that amount of money spent. So we are not talking about a little bit of money. When those people sat down on April 15, 100 families, and wrote their checks, we would spend it all in one fell swoop right here.

Let me ask the gentleman something else.

Mr. MILLER of Washington. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield for a question?

Mr. WALKER. I am glad to yield to the gentleman from Washington.

Mr. MILLER of Washington. Since we are not talking about the overall level here, and there is no motion to cut the overall level, and the same number of taxpayers' dollars are going to be spent, does the gentleman support any taxpayers' dollars for cultural exchange?

Mr. WALKER. I would say to the gentleman that at times of making tough priority decisions that that is one area that needs to be looked at for some cuts. I would have to tell the gentleman that we might not want to "X" it out, but we might want to look at how much money we are spending in that area.

I want to ask a couple more questions here. In this particular arena, Goodwill Games, are they going to sell tickets?

Mr. HERGER. If the gentleman will continue to yield, absolutely.

Mr. WALKER. So in other words, it is partially one of those ventures where they are going to try to make some money by selling tickets; is that correct?

Mr. HERGER. Correct.

Mr. WALKER. And this whole thing is going to be on television, and there is going to be advertising money for it, is there not?

Mr. HERGER. That is right.

Mr. WALKER. So in other words, what we have here is we have a commercial enterprise that may be very worthwhile, and the exchange may be very good, but as I recall, the Olympics made money.

Now why should we have the American taxpayers funding at the cost of \$500,000 a year something which is actually going to be a moneymaking enterprise? All I am saying to my colleagues in the House is, "Isn't this something where we can save some money and have that money for other priorities that we may want to spend it on?"

Sure, the gentleman does not take the money out completely, but we have real tough priority decisions to

make around here, and where you have this kind of decision, it seems to me that we can eliminate the money, put the money somewhere else, and ultimately save the taxpayers some of that deficit that we are now spending away.

This is a money issue. In Washington parlance, \$500,000 is said by some not to be a lot of money. I am sick and tired of hearing about these things not being a lot of money. I think that it is a lot of money, and I congratulate the gentleman for trying to save some money.

Mr. BONKER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WALKER. I am glad to yield to the gentleman from Washington.

Mr. BONKER. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, just to keep the record straight, because we are meandering around this issue, funds from the USIA will not be spent for any of the sporting events whatsoever. The sports program in 1990 will be paid for by broadcast rights paid by the Turner Broadcasting System—that is his participation in this thing. Sponsorship from corporations like Boeing and Weyerhaeuser and many of them throughout the country are sponsoring the event, and ticket sales. That is how they plan to pay for the whole event. The \$500,000 to which the gentleman refers, the earmarked amount, will only go for cultural exchanges which precede the sporting events in 1990.

Mr. WALKER. I thank the gentleman, but what I am saying to the gentleman is that the whole event is organized as a commercial enterprise. If we want to have some cultural activities connected with it, why do we not just build that into the overall program? Why are the taxpayers all of a sudden having to come up with these amounts of money?

Mr. MICA. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WALKER. I am glad to yield to the gentleman from Florida.

Mr. MICA. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, the gentleman makes an excellent argument for the need for this House to cut frivolous spending. We as a body and I have supported cut after cut, I must say, be it the military budget with the military bands and their exchanges and so on, or the State Department budget.

I want to remind my colleague in good faith, my ranking minority member and I went through a tumultuous session. This bill is \$1 billion below—below—what the State Department requested, and the administration. I do not know of a bill that has come on the floor of the House that a Republican administration is opposing because there is not enough money in

it. It is the only one that I am aware of. We have worked long and hard to reach this level.

Now certainly we are going to go back and probably next year make some more adjustments and more adjustments, but the point is, and I have made it before, there is a small amount in this. It is not small by my daily standards or the gentleman's daily standards or any individual taxpayer, but it is small in comparison to the Federal budget.

So the argument is, now will it or will it not be spent, but do we earmark it for this particular purpose.

Mr. WALKER. Let me say to the gentleman that he does not hear this gentleman at all complaining about what the committee did in terms of cuts. I think that it did make some tough decisions, and I congratulate it for that. I congratulate the gentleman and the ranking Republican member. But I am also one who believes that no given bill coming out of committee is a complete work of art, that in fact there are things that can be done on the floor that improve bills. This is one improvement that we can make. It is one place where maybe the gentleman had some difficulty within the internal structure of the committee getting an agreement on this. Fine. We on the floor can do something to help cut further. If the Republican administration does not like it, fine. I do not care about that. Let us still save the money.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WALKER. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.

Mr. DICKS. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I want to make sure that the gentleman understands what we are talking here is not earmarked.

Mr. WALKER. I understand. I made that point myself.

Mr. DICKS. The USIA is going to get the \$500,000 one way or the other. There is not a cent, a nickel being saved by this. The gentleman from Washington is totally correct. This has nothing to do with the sporting event.

Mr. WALKER. If the gentleman will allow me to reclaim my time, I made that point myself here just a minute ago. It is a matter of setting priorities. There are some things that are higher priority. Sure, ultimately you save money. If you allow priority decisions to be made that give money to higher priorities because you have eliminated lesser priorities, that in fact saves money.

Ms. SNOWE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WALKER. I yield to the gentleman from Maine.

Ms. SNOWE. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I support the gentleman's comments. The point is that we

have a principle here. That principle is applying money for a commercial venture, because Ted Turner will get the broadcasting rights of the Goodwill Games and the cultural exchanges, which he will then be able to sell. So it is done on a for-profit basis. This is a policy and a precedent that I do not think that we want to adopt here in the House.

I commend the gentleman for his comments. We have to understand what we are dealing with here, and it is a commercial enterprise.

Mr. WALKER. I could not have said it better, and I thank the gentleman.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. BONKER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DICKS. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.

Mr. BONKER. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to comment that this is not a profit venture. The consortium that has been put together in the State of Washington is nonprofit.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I have just received a letter from the people who are sponsoring these games, and I want to make sure that my colleagues understand just what we are talking about in terms of these funds.

"In order to have a major cultural program in 1990, intensive work needs to take place over the next 2 years. It is this work to which the USIA funds will be applied. In the performing arts we need to have representatives of arts organizations in the Pacific Northwest and from elsewhere in the United States meet with their Soviet counterparts to prepare a major international performing arts festival in 1990. For example, a theater director will travel to Moscow in 1988 and 1989 to identify and begin working with a number of Soviet actors who will then be part of the major performing arts festival. This same needs to be done in opera, music, and dance. Seattle officials have already made one trip to the Soviet Union to begin work on a publication that will put together the teams of United States and Soviet writers and photographers to capture the spirit of the Goodwill Games. The United States members of the team will work in the Soviet Union as well as in the 1990 event itself."

So I want to point out that we are talking about two distinct things here. We are talking about cultural exchange in the arts, which I think is an important priority, and that is separate from the sporting activities in most respects. So I think that you can make a very good case that these kinds of cultural exchanges are valid, and I want to reiterate what my friend from Washington said, this is a nonprofit

entity that has been created. Some of the finest people in our State are serving on that nonprofit entity. It was done, frankly, to separate this from Ted Turner's operation, so that there would not be any question about who in fact is running it.

I hope that the committee will support what the Committee on Foreign Affairs has brought to the floor.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I would direct my remarks to my distinguished colleague from California, in the genuine and sincere hope that he would withdraw this amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I am in the State with my distinguished colleague, so I have no parochial interest in this matter whatsoever.

□ 1230

Second, I am not a member of this committee, so there are no loyalties to committee print.

But I have sat here diligently, listened with rapt attention to this debate. I would make the following observation: Incredible amount of sound and fury, signifying virtually nothing.

I understand how after 16½ years as a Member of this body that my colleagues and I from time to time can engage in extraordinarily creative, fanciful judgments. There are times when I believe that politicians are perhaps the most creative thinkers on the face of this Earth. This debate is a classic case in point.

One of the arguments in support of this amendment is that it is profit oriented; yet, my colleagues have time after time, on both sides of the aisle, stated clearly and without equivocation that this is nonprofit.

Some of my colleagues support the amendment because they would suggest that this cuts \$500,000 in fiscal 1988, and \$500,000 in fiscal 1989, for a total of \$1 million in a megabillion dollar budget. But the fact of the matter is the gentleman's amendment does not cut. All the gentleman's amendment does is say let us not earmark funds.

My colleagues on both sides of the aisle have stated clearly, with efficacy, with voracity, with clarity, and articulately stating to my colleagues that even if the gentleman's amendment were to prevail that would not in any way stop the funds from going for this purpose.

The third reason why my colleague stated that we should support the amendment, that in some way this is a Ted Turner venture, yet my colleagues again, without challenge, have stated clearly and without equivocation that this is not about Ted Turner.



But I would say to my colleagues that this is America, that what we are all about in this country is any human being, even my distinguished colleague from California, and this gentleman from California's right to take a stand, whatever the stand may be, that is the beauty, that is the power, that is the gift of democracy.

So even if my colleague wanted to challenge Ted Turner, then he could do so. This amendment is inappropriate. If my colleague has a problem with Ted Turner's politics, debate Ted Turner. This is inappropriate.

The next point, this is in some way a subsidy for sports. My colleagues on both sides of the aisle have stated again, without equivocation, and without challenge, that this money is not going for sports. For cultural exchanges.

Now to the last comment. I have sat here, we have debated this matter for nearly 45 minutes on an amendment that would not even cut the \$500,000 from the megabillion-dollar budget. This gentleman from California a few weeks ago offered an amendment on the floor of this body to cut over \$2.5 billion, not earmark it, but cut it from what we euphemistically refer to as the star wars program. Does my colleague know what the rule allowed? A 20-minute debate on a \$2.5 billion amendment that my colleague did not join me in. Yet we spend 45 minutes engaging in a debate about taxpayers' dollars, \$500,000, that is not even being cut.

To summarize, let me suggest to my colleague that he withdrew this amendment. This is an absurdity. This is an amendment that has no place in a significant debate.

This is not about profit. That has been stated; the gentleman has not challenged that. This is not about cutting. That has been stated; the gentleman has not challenged that. This is not about Ted Turner; the gentleman has not challenged that. This is not about sports; the gentleman has not challenged that.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS] has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. DELLUMS was allowed to proceed for 1 additional minute.)

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, we have spent a tremendous amount of time here. If we continue along this line, given the electricity, the amount of staff, we will spend \$500,000 in man and woman hours covering this debate, and at the cost that it would cost to print this debate in the RECORD it will more than likely grossly exceed the \$500,000 that the gentleman from California is not even cutting from the budget.

So let me suggest to my distinguished colleague that I respect, reverse, embrace, love to death, that he

withdraw this amendment because it serves no useful purpose. If we are going to go forward in communication with the world as a great power, let it be understood that we have the capacity to engage in cultural exchange, and that we as a great Nation have the capacity to love the Dornans of the world, the Dellumses of the country and the Ted Turners of the Nation, because in this country we can indeed tolerate difference.

I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. HASTERT. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, certainly the gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS] is very eloquent, and he certainly puts forth his view and his ideas very well.

But I think sometimes it comes that we must stand up and we must talk about what the issue really is. If we talk about in this Congress and in this body balancing a budget and being responsible and watching how we spend taxpayers' dollars, it is hard for me to go home and say, Mr. Chairman, yes, I spent \$500,000 this year and \$500,000 next year to bring over the Russian chess team for cultural exchange. Why can the Russians not send their own chess team over? This is exactly what this is for.

This is not athletics, it is not Ted Turner, it is not TV. It is common sense, Mr. Chairman. We should not in this body be entering into programs of cultural exchange when we are subsidizing other countries to bring their organizations over here.

Fine, send our teams abroad, send our teams to foreign countries, show people what the American culture is about. But I think it behooves the Russians to send their own people over here. That is what it is about, and it is talking about common sense, it is talking about making bright decisions, and good decisions, being frugal when we spend that 10-families' dollars, tax dollars that they worked long hours, and how we spend those dollars.

I yield back the balance of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from California [Mr. HERGER].

The question was taken; and on a division (demanded by Ms. SNOWE) there were—ayes 9, noes 10.

#### RECORDED VOTE

Mr. HERGER. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.

A recorded vote was ordered.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—ayes 203, noes 201, not voting 29, as follows:

#### (Roll No. 193)

#### AYES—203

Andrews  
Anthony  
Archer  
Armey  
Badham  
Baker

Ballenger  
Bartlett  
Barton  
Bateman  
Bentley  
Bevill

Billirakis  
Bliley  
Boehlert  
Boulter  
Broomfield  
Brown (CO)

Bryant  
Buechner  
Bunning  
Burton  
Byron  
Callahan  
Campbell  
Chapman  
Cheney  
Clinger  
Coats  
Coble  
Coleman (MO)  
Combest  
Conte  
Coughlin  
Courter  
Craig  
Crane  
Daub  
Davis (IL)  
de la Garza  
DeLay  
Derrick  
DeWine  
Dickinson  
DioGuardi  
Dornan (CA)  
Dreier  
Duncan  
Dyren  
Dyson  
Early  
Eckart  
Edwards (OK)  
Emerson  
English  
Erdreich  
Fawell  
Fields  
Filippo  
Frenzel  
Gallegly  
Gallo  
Gekas  
Gingrich  
Goodling  
Gradison  
Grandy  
Gregg  
Gunderson  
Hall (TX)  
Hammerschmidt  
Hansen  
Harris  
Hastert  
Hefley  
Hefner  
Henry  
Herger  
Hiler  
Holloway  
Hopkins

Houghton  
Hubbard  
Huckaby  
Hunter  
Hutto  
Hyde  
Inhofe  
Ireland  
Johnson (CT)  
Johnson (SD)  
Jones (TN)  
Kaptur  
Kasich  
Kemp  
Kolbe  
Konnyu  
Kyl  
Lagomarsino  
Lancaster  
Latta  
Leach (IA)  
Leath (TX)  
Lent  
Lewis (CA)  
Lightfoot  
Lipinski  
Lott  
Lowery (CA)  
Lujan  
Lungren  
Mack  
MacKay  
Madigan  
Marlenee  
Martin (IL)  
Martin (NY)  
Martinez  
McCandless  
McCollum  
McCurdy  
McDade  
McEwen  
McGrath  
McMillan (NC)  
Meyers  
Michel  
Miller (OH)  
Molinar  
Montgomery  
Moorhead  
Murphy  
Myers  
Nichols  
Nielson  
Olin  
Ortiz  
Oxley  
Packard  
Patterson  
Petri  
Pickett  
Pickle  
Porter

#### NOES—201

Ackerman  
Akaka  
Alexander  
Anderson  
Annunzio  
Applegate  
Aspin  
AuCoin  
Barnard  
Bates  
Beilenson  
Bennett  
Bereuter  
Berman  
Biaggi  
Bilbray  
Boggs  
Bonker  
Borski  
Bosco  
Boucher  
Boxer  
Brennan  
Brooks  
Brown (CA)  
Bruce  
Bustamante  
Cardin  
Carper  
Chandler

Chappell  
Clarke  
Clay  
Coelho  
Coleman (TX)  
Collins  
Conyers  
Cooper  
Coyne  
Crockett  
Darden  
Davis (MI)  
DeFazio  
Dellums  
Dicks  
Dingell  
Dixon  
Dorgan (ND)  
Downey  
Dymally  
Edwards (CA)  
Espy  
Evans  
Fascell  
Fazio  
Feighan  
Fish  
Florio  
Foglietta

Foley  
Ford (MI)  
Ford (TN)  
Frank  
Frost  
Garcia  
Gaydos  
Gejdenson  
Gibbons  
Glickman  
Gonzalez  
Gordon  
Grant  
Gray (IL)  
Guarini  
Hall (OH)  
Hamilton  
Hatcher  
Hawkins  
Hayes (IL)  
Hayes (LA)  
Hertel  
Hochbruckner  
Horton  
Howard  
Hoyer  
Hughes  
Jacobs  
Jeffords  
Jones (NC)

Jontz	Murtha	Smith (FL)
Kanjorski	Nagle	Smith, Robert
Kastenmeier	Natcher	(OR)
Kennedy	Neal	Solarz
Kildee	Nelson	Spratt
Klecicka	Nowak	St Germain
Kolter	Oakar	Staggers
LaFalce	Oberstar	Stallings
Lantos	Obey	Stangeland
Lehman (CA)	Owens (NY)	Stark
Lehman (FL)	Owens (UT)	Stokes
Leland	Panetta	Stratton
Levin (MI)	Parris	Studds
Levine (CA)	Pashayan	Swift
Lewis (GA)	Pease	Thomas (GA)
Lloyd	Pelosi	Torres
Lowry (WA)	Penny	Torricelli
Lukens, Thomas	Pepper	Towns
Manton	Perkins	Traffant
Markey	Price (IL)	Traxler
Matsui	Rahall	Udall
Mavroules	Richardson	Vento
Mazzoli	Rodino	Visclosky
McCloskey	Roe	Volkmer
McHugh	Rose	Walgren
McMillen (MD)	Rowland (GA)	Waxman
Mfume	Russo	Weiss
Mica	Sabo	Wheat
Miller (CA)	Savage	Williams
Miller (WA)	Sawyer	Wilson
Mineta	Scheuer	Wise
Moakley	Schroeder	Wolpe
Mollohan	Sharp	Wyden
Moody	Sikorski	Yates
Morella	Sisisky	Yatron
Morrison (CT)	Skaggs	Young (AK)
Morrison (WA)	Skelton	
Mrazek	Slattery	

## NOT VOTING—29

Atkins	Gephardt	Rangel
Boland	Gilman	Ray
Boner (TN)	Gray (PA)	Regula
Bonior (MI)	Green	Roemer
Carr	Jenkins	Rostenkowski
Daniel	Kennelly	Roybal
Dannemeyer	Kostmayer	Schulze
Donnelly	Lewis (FL)	Schumer
Dwyer	Livingston	Tauzin
Flake	Lukens, Donald	

□ 1300

The Clerk announced the following pairs:

On this vote:

Mr. Roemer for, with Mr. Roybal against.  
Mr. Lewis of Florida for, with Mr. Rangel against.

Messrs. SPRATT, PRICE of Illinois, APPELGATE, MFUNE, and BARNARD, Mrs. LLOYD, and Messrs. SLATTERY, HAYES of Louisiana, and BOSCO changed their votes from "aye" to "no."

Ms. KAPTUR and Mr. CONTE changed their votes from "no" to "aye."

So the amendment was agreed to.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

Mr. Chairman, while we are considering this bill to fund U.S. foreign affairs activities, I want to bring to the attention of the House recent action by the New Zealand Parliament that terminates that country's special security relationship with the United States.

Since February 1985, New Zealand policy has prohibited entry into New Zealand ports of the United States Navy ships, because they might carry nuclear weapons.

That policy breached New Zealand's alliance obligations under the Anzus Treaty of 1951, and in response in August 1986 the United States suspended its security obligations to New Zealand.

Two weeks ago, the New Zealand Parliament enacted the "Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Act" which places the ship ban policy into law.

By enacting this law, New Zealand made its final national decision to shift its security relationship with the United States from one of close alliance to one of mere friendship.

I have introduced H.R. 85, the New Zealand Military Preference Elimination Act, to strike New Zealand from the list of allies—NATO countries, Japan, Australia, New Zealand—entitled to preferential treatment under various United States security assistance laws. The bill leaves New Zealand under the provisions that apply to friendly, but nonallied, countries.

My bill is a measured and proportionate response to New Zealand's enactment into law its U.S. ship ban. It adjusts the security relationship, but does not impose economic or other sanctions on New Zealand. The two countries should continue to enjoy close economic, political, and cultural ties, even though close security cooperation has ended by New Zealand's choice.

I should add that the administration supports my legislation.

The United States greatly regrets the choice New Zealand has made to leave the group of America's security allies, but New Zealand has made its choice, and United States law should be adjusted accordingly by enactment of H.R. 85.

Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from New York [Mr. SOLARZ], the chairman of the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I share the concerns which the gentleman from Michigan has very eloquently expressed.

The adoption of this legislation by the New Zealand Parliament has further complicated the task of reestablishing the kind of close and cooperative defense relationship which we had with New Zealand when ANZUS was a fully functioning tripartite alliance.

As the gentleman knows, after the adoption of this policy by New Zealand, but prior to the enactment of the legislation, we suspended our cooperation with New Zealand within the framework of ANZUS, and we made it very clear to the New Zealand Government that the adoption of this legislation was incompatible with the resumption of that cooperation.

I think the legislative response to this development proposed by the gentleman from Michigan makes a lot of

sense. If New Zealand has adopted legislation which makes the implementation of our ANZUS commitments to them literally impossible, and their ANZUS requirement for cooperation with us impossible as well, it is difficult to see how we can continue justifying categorizing New Zealand as an allied nation for the purpose of the Arms Export Control Act.

I think, however, that this is the kind of issue which does need to be thoroughly aired. I want to say to the gentleman from Michigan, my friend, it would be my intention to hold a hearing before the subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs for the precise purpose of considering your legislation, and to solicit the views of the administration with respect to it.

It would also be my intention to try to move forward with that legislation at an appropriate time a little bit later in the session, after we have had an opportunity to consider the implications of it in more depth and detail.

I say to the gentleman from Michigan, I think the gentleman is moving in the right direction. Some sort of response to the New Zealand action is required.

We just want to make sure that whatever we do contributes to a resolution of this problem in a way which over time will facilitate a resumption of the kind of close cooperation we have had in the past.

Whatever New Zealand does or does not do with respect to its ANZUS commitments, we all, I think, recognize the New Zealand people are good friends of the United States. They have sacrificed much over the years in behalf of our common interests.

We want to maintain good relations with New Zealand in the future. It is a democracy, and we have so much in common; but if they want the benefits of the American defense commitment, they have to be prepared to accept the obligations that go with it.

## AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. CONYERS

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. CONYERS: On page 56, strike out lines 23 through line 2 on page 57.

On page 61, strike lines 16 through line 2 on page 62 and on line 3 on page 62 redesignate "Sec. 210" as "Sec. 208".

On page 62, following line 22, insert the following new section:

## SEC. 209. REPEAL OF THE NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY ACT.

The National Endowment for Democracy Act is hereby repealed.

Redesignate all sections, subsections, and the table of contents accordingly.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I bring to my colleagues' attention an amendment that was introduced last year, and I hope that we will be able to gain the support of all of the Members who thought it very important on



the last vote to save \$500,000. This amendment would save \$20 million, and I would argue that eliminating the National Endowment for Democracy would be a very important step in terms of balancing our economic priorities, where we have so many shortages in the domestic programs and such a shortfall in the money, considering our deficit.

So my first but not final point about the National Endowment for Democracy is that we need the \$20 million, but the real consideration, Mr. Chairman, is that we need now to bring an end to the privatization of foreign policy because it is a prescription for confusion and failure. The National Endowment for Democracy takes upon itself to fund foreign political groups, foreign organizations, organizations for which we have little or no information, and groups that could embarrass our Government and have embarrassed our Government and made it the subject of puzzlement and ridicule.

This is the danger of the National Endowment for Democracy, and we come now in a completely different environment from last year. We now have a constitutional crisis in which we have a privatization of foreign policy being at the heart of indeed an intricate and complex amount of activity that is now under investigation by several committees.

So I ask all the Members here to join me in restricting the foreign policy-making ability of a totally private organization. I was just going over the oversight report that was put together by the chairman of the subcommittee last year, and we find that among our Board of Directors of the National Endowment for Democracy is our leader and friend, the honorable gentleman from Florida, Mr. DANTE FASCELL, who chairs the full committee on this very important subject. And it seems to me that we are presented with some difficult problems, some conflict problems, in which we have now the Democratic Party, the Republican Party, the Chamber of Commerce, and the AFL-CIO all very busy taking care of the business of deciding who and which organization shall promote democracy.

I see this as a very serious problem. When we look at the track record of the National Endowment for Democracy, we find in the headlines even now that the military-backed candidate in Panama in 1984 is the source of the great turmoil and rioting that is going on presently. We determined unilaterally, without the Congress ever taking part in it, without the State Department ever taking a position on it, to back the military-supported candidate in Panama, and we have a really critical situation going on there now.

France is another area that was a point of great embarrassment, where

we found that we were supporting two organizations in France with taxpayer money without the knowledge or approval of Congress and perhaps without the knowledge of the Department of State, in which we were supporting organizations that were opposed to the democratic government then of Francois Mitterand. We had the internationally embarrassing situation of Prodemca, an apparently pro-Contra funding organization, that determined that because they were keeping the NED funds separate, they would have the audacity to take out full-page ads out of their other funding to advise the American people and the Congress itself through the Washington Post and the New York Times how the Congress ought to behave in deciding this incredibly complex and emotional problem of how we deal with Nicaragua and the Contras.

We have a problem revealed in the oversight hearings of the chairman of the subcommittee—and I want to commend him on his fairness in our attempts to meet and discuss this problem—that at the time of those hearings 88 percent of the grants from the National Endowment for Democracy was going to the organization who were represented on its board.

So I would urge my colleagues to give very close attention to this amendment, because as a result again of the oversight hearings we were able to find much of this information.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. CONYERS] has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. CONYERS was allowed to proceed for 5 additional minutes.)

□ 1315

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I would like for us to consider that in addition to funding the activities of political parties abroad, of operating in democracies, such as Portugal and Spain, that we now also have grantees who are covert. We have a covert division of NED in which we have secret grantees that cannot even be revealed to the Oversight Committee for audit; so this is an incredible circumstance that the Congress, I hope, will no longer tolerate, that we will not move to eliminate this provision which is under USIA and therefore not very carefully controlled, from the authorization that is before this body.

It is a continuing embarrassment. It is one in which a number of distinguished conservative writers and spokesmen have agreed that the National Endowment for Democracy has no place in a democratic system performing our foreign policy.

We cannot allow a \$20-million-a-year private organization determine which political organizations in the world will get taxpayer money.

Now, there are some good things that NED is doing and I want to be the first to concede that where there are projects, I saw the Council for Negro Women have a project, they have a few projects in South Africa trying to build up good will. Of course, nothing is all bad.

Those projects can be funded through the public and private foundations that exist in this country that are already funding worthy causes, to the tune of \$1½ billion.

We do not need this kind of an organization to be assisting in that character. It is completely, totally out of order, for this committee to allow this to continue in our foreign policy negotiations. It is an embarrassment to the Nation. It should be an embarrassment to the Congress and it is about time that we took it out once and for all and got rid of it.

We have heard economic arguments for amounts of money as little as \$50,000 a year. I am talking about \$20 million a year, and we can save that money.

The programs that are valuable can go through AID. They can go through USIA. They can go through private and charitable foundations and we will not have to continue to come to this subcommittee and ask them to oversight what is, in fact, a minuscule part of their jurisdiction and their responsibilities. They have important work to do in monitoring many of the State Department agencies. This is among the smallest of their responsibilities, and yet the most controversial and the most unacceptable.

I ask the Members of Congress to carefully examine as to whether you want the National Endowment for Democracy, a private organization, funded with taxpayers' money, that then sends moneys out to grantees that they choose, 88 percent of whom are funded from members of their core group. We have Members of Congress sitting on the executive board of the organization. It absolutely defeats the purpose of a legitimate and a logical way to proceed in establishing foreign policy, training people about democratic actions around this country.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CONYERS. Of course, I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding. I have asked the gentleman to yield for the purpose of asking if the gentleman would correct a statement he made. I think twice the gentleman said that the authorization in the bill was \$20 million. The figure I have, and the documents show, it is \$17.5 million, although the administration asked for \$25 million and it was more than that last year; but I hope the

gentleman will correct that. It is \$17.5 million, not \$20 million.

Mr. CONYERS. Yes. I think it started off at a higher figure. It is down to \$17 million, which is about a million or so less than it was the year before. I stand corrected.

Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words and I rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I am sorry to have to oppose the amendment of my friend. I have not had to do this on many occasions in the past in this body, but I do think this is a case of trying to eliminate a congressional creation that symbolizes and typifies what can be the best of American foreign policy. The debate that is frequently undertaken on the floor of the Congress and in the country between an isolationist or a noninterventionist viewpoint and an interventionist viewpoint is frequently a very sterile one. If there is one thing that I think can bind this country from a range of ideological views, from the left to the right, it is the notion that democratic institutions and efforts by this country to promote democratic institutions around the world, not through military intervention, not automatically and unnecessarily through economic sanctions where they are not designed to work, but through the kind of day-to-day work in funding and working with people who want to be educated about democracy and democratic institutions and who want to move in that direction in their own countries, is the best kind of action we can take.

I think the conceptual framework for the National Endowment for Democracy is very long overdue. Franklin Roosevelt's top adviser, Harry Hopkins, pointed out a long time ago that our country should not be diffident and apologetic and unimaginative about promoting democratic processes throughout the world.

Countries like West Germany, Venezuela, Sweden, and Costa Rica, exemplars of democratic values in this world where those valued frequently are ignored, have been funding this kind of activity for many years. The West German Parliament alone allocated \$220 million each year to its party foundations for political development work; so I think that the conceptual framework for which we have adopted the National Endowment for Democracy makes tremendous sense and it will be a tragedy to eliminate it at this point in its early life.

Second, the specific programs that the National Endowment for Democracy have taken, while in a couple cases controversial, have for the most part been both successful and very well received by people of a wide range of views within this country.

Corazon Aquino herself noted the work of the National Endowment for

Democracy in her own recent election struggle, where she said:

It is for this reason that we shall always remember in gratitude and appreciation the Endowment's important assistance to the democratic struggle of our country. Such contribution and commitment to the hopes and ideals of democracy is the Endowment's greatest legacy, not only to the Filipino people, but to the rest of humanity.

If you look at their programs in South Africa or in South Korea, the many programs they are involved with in Chile, to try to reverse the direction of what has become truly a totalitarian state, around the world they are working to promote the values that all of us, Democrat and Republican, liberal and conservative, claim to hold.

It would be a grave mistake to take a very prudent budget which has been allotted for this particular function, significantly less than the administration has requested, too small in my opinion, less than last year, and to eliminate it.

I would urge a no vote.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in very strong opposition to the amendment by the gentleman from Michigan.

You know, there are those in this Chamber and around this country who are always saying of President Reagan that the only policy he has is one of military adventurism. The subject that we are debating today proves that just is not true. Here is an effort made to involve all kind of different bodies and organizations in diplomacy and negotiations and in the promotion of democracy.

This body has debated the merits of the National Endowment for Democracy ever since its founding 4 years ago. I would have thought that NED would have convinced its critics by now with its praiseworthy and creative support of democracy throughout the world.

The endowment received strong public praise for its effort in observing the elections in the Philippines last year, which resulted in the departure of President Marcos and the swearing in of President Aquino.

Most recently, the National Endowment for Democracy sponsored a conference on "The Challenge of Democracy" which focused on efforts now underway to advance the cause of democracy throughout the world. I had the privilege of participating on a panel with the topic of "Supporting Democratic Transitions." The conference brought together individuals from Chile, Paraguay, Haiti, the Philippines, Argentina, Portugal, and a number of other countries which are in varying stages of transition to democracy. In some cases, there were doubts whether there will be a transition or not, but the conference offered

a useful opportunity to share the experiences of a number of emerging democracies.

Without the National Endowment for Democracy and the related private institutes of the AFL-CIO, the Chamber of Commerce, and the Democratic and Republican Parties, the opportunities and resources for advancing the cause of democracy would be severely limited.

I urge my colleagues to defeat this ill-advised amendment and demonstrate their strong support for the cause of democracy and the National Endowment for Democracy.

Mr. SHUMWAY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. SHUMWAY. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, the road to democracy is not easy or short. Democracy does not come with a single election. What happens between elections is crucial. It is essential that the means exist for the full participation of ordinary citizens in the life of society. The National Endowment for Democracy is working to build to infrastructure for democracy to ensure this participation.

While I initially had misgivings about the Endowment, I have had an opportunity to see what grass roots efforts can do. NED supports programs designed to build strong, stable political parties committed to the democratic process; independent private-sector institutions, such as trade unions and business associations; civic organizations, women and youth groups.

At a time when Central America has been inundated with Marxist literature from Havana and Managua, Libro Libre with support from NED has made available to the entire region a literature of democracy.

NED is also involved in telling the tragic story of thousands of political prisoners in Castro's Cuba through an organization led by Armando Valladares, the well-known author of "Against All Hope."

By supporting the National Endowment for Democracy we are helping to promote and ensure the future of democracy in countries around the world.

I urge defeat of the amendment.

Mr. MICA. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I, too, rise in opposition to the gentleman's amendment. But I want to assure the gentleman and my colleagues in the Chamber that I have done and will continue to try to do everything I can to address any legitimate concerns that are addressed to NED.

A number of controversies have been raised with regard to this organization. Almost every one of those were prob-



lems that we addressed 2 and 3 years ago. I will submit for the RECORD a comment on each of those problems. I think that suffices to say that I oppose the amendment.

I will just add that I know the gentleman who offered the amendment suspects that there may be some improper or illegal use of the NED funds.

I would just assure the gentleman and my colleagues that if any of the suspicions or any of the concerns are true, or we find any new information that proves that such activities are taking place, then I, too, will throw my support to an amendment that would eliminate this organization from the budget. I do not want to be involved in supporting any project or governmental entity that knowingly spends money improperly. But I must say, we have required a GAO investigation, and audits by the USIA inspector general. Audits are ongoing right now. So far, we have not found one single case of illegal use of funds.

#### RESPONSES TO CHARGES MADE AGAINST NED

**Charge:** That NED allows the United States to meddle in foreign elections and domestic politics of other countries. NED moneys supported a military-backed candidate in the 1984 presidential elections in Panama.

**Response:** In 1984, the Free Trade Union Institute supported a project to increase worker participation in the 1984 presidential election in Panama. As part of this project, support was provided for a rally organized in competition with a Communist May Day rally. The candidate referred to spoke at this rally. The Congress has subsequently enacted legislation to ensure that NED consult with the Department of State on its programs, and to ensure that NED use no funds to support any political candidates. The Endowment has been active in Panama since then with a program with the YMCA for a youth education project.

**Charge:** NED supports organizations which are represented on the NED Board.

**Response:** As a result of congressional earmarking of funds, about 80 percent of NED's funds went to the Free Trade Union Institute and the Center for International Private Enterprise represented on the NED Board. Now that the earmarks have been removed, the proportion of funds awarded to these organizations has decreased dramatically. In addition, the Congress has mandated that the directors or employees affiliated with the party national committees step off the Republican and Democratic Institute Boards. The institutes have complied.

**Charge:** That NED funded the Nicaraguan opposition newspaper, *La Prensa*, and thus intervened in an internal political dispute.

**Response:** The Endowment funded a grant to Prodemca to provide newsprint to the Nicaraguan paper, *La*

*Prensa*. The Endowment was supporting freedom of information, a basic human right.

**Charge:** NED supported a Philippine labor union created by the deposed dictator, Ferdinand Marcos.

**Response:** The Trade Union Congress of the Philippines was founded in 1975 following discussion among the leaders of virtually every trade union organization in that country whose leaders had widely ranging political views—including those allied with the Communist insurgency.

The union's general secretary helped investigate the murder of Benigno Aquino.

The union provided much of the manpower for the private organization (Namfrel) which monitored the February 1986 elections, widely viewed as unsupportive of Marcos.

President Aquino invited the union's general secretary, Ernesto Herrera, to become a candidate for the Senate on the Aquino slate of candidates, and he was subsequently elected.

**Charge:** NED funded such organizations as Prodemca which have been tied to the Contras and whose efforts resulted in the closing of the Nicaraguan newspaper, *La Prensa*.

**Response:** Chairman Mica mandated an audit of NED funds going to Prodemca by the USIA inspector general. The audit clearly found that no funds were used by Prodemca for purposes other than those intended by the grant—to provide newsprint for the Nicaraguan newspaper and to support the Human Rights Committee in Nicaragua. No funds were used to support Prodemca's pro-Contra advertising. NED can't prevent any grantee organization from engaging in other activities. However, NED has ended its grant relationship with Prodemca.

**Charge:** NED supports international organizations with very ideological and political agendas—the ADN Party in Bolivia, the Conservative Party in Colombia, the Center for Political Studies in Guatemala.

**Response:**

First, Bolivia: NED does not support the ADN Party. The National Republican Institute for International Affairs has a program of assistance to Fundemos—a private, nonprofit public policy research institute devoted to democratic development of Bolivia, which has had affiliations with ADN.

Second, Colombia: NED does not support the Conservative Party in Colombia. The National Republican Institute had worked with FEPEP, which conducted a study of voting patterns in that country—focusing on high rate of abstention—and is affiliated with the conservative party—one of the oldest democratic institutions in the hemisphere.

Third, Guatemala: This charge refers to a NED grant to CEDEP in Nicaragua which funded a civic educa-

tion project prior to the last election. Committee staff was able to view filmed advertisements made with the support of the NED grant. In these ads, prominent Guatemalans—ranging from Miss Guatemala, sports stars, and a member of the clergy—urged Guatemalans to get out and vote.

**Charge:** NED supported a paramilitary subversive group that was trying to overthrow the Government of France.

**Response:** In 1985, NED was criticized for funding two labor groups which were in opposition to the French Government.

UNI is a group of professors and students founded in 1969 as an alternative to leftist organizations. It was charged that this organization had historical ties to a Gaullist group—"rightwing paramilitary organization"—founded to protect DeGaulle from coups. However, this organization no longer exists and UNI denies any affiliation to it. NED grants to UNI were used to fund publications on systems of justice, civil liberties, and the Gorbachev visit to France. Yves Durand, vice president of UNI, was appointed Counselor for Education and Research to Prime Minister Jacques Chirac.

FO [Force Ouvriere] is the largest non-Communist French trade union organization. NED funded programs in democratic education for the union rank and file, assisted trade union exiles residing in France—from Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Czechoslovakia—and aided Vietnamese, Cambodian, and Afghan refugees. Other FO programs include: support for Solidarity, aid for Ethiopian famine victims.

**Charge:** GAO found that violated congressional mandates by adjusting earmarks for the core grantees.

**Response:** Earmarks constituted 91 percent of NED funding in 1984; \$16.3 million was earmarked out of an appropriation of \$18 million. In seeking to reconcile the earmarks and the low appropriation, NED allotted only \$12.7 in earmarked funds to FTUI and CIPE. GAO reviewed this Board decision to grant two grantees less than the full amount specified by the earmarks. GAO found that the Board's actions were "understandable in light of the legislative background," but ruled that an agency must comply with the guidelines in the authorizing legislation. The Board complied and awarded the full earmarks for fiscal 1985.

**Charge:** GAO funded the National Political Party Institutes in violation of congressional law.

**Response:** Congress barred the Endowment from granting fiscal year 1985 funds to the party institutes. However, in December 1985, the Congress allowed the Endowment to grant fiscal year 1986 funds to NDI and NRI

if they divested their boards of individuals employed by or on the boards of the Democratic and Republican National Committees.

**Charge:** That the National Endowment for Democracy was the "overt side" of the administration's covert foreign policy initiative called Project Democracy.

**Response:** On April 28, Representative CONYERS submitted for the RECORD the February 15 New York Times article regarding Project Democracy. This article describes the program as the administration's clandestine operation to deal with Iran and the Nicaraguan rebels, and to carry out foreign policy initiatives that other Government agencies were unable to pursue. The article cites NED as the public arm of this covert operation. USIA's IG is looking into this question as did the Tower Commission. The IG has discovered no relationship between the two and will issue the subcommittee a report on its findings. A subsequent New York Times editorial entitled "The Good Project Democracy"—March 13, 1987—clarified the confusion over "Project Democracy" and the NED.

**Charge:** That NED supports activities of the Contras.

**Response:** Chairman MICA has directed the USIA inspector general to certify that no NED funds were being used to fund the Contras.

USIA audit of Caribbean grants: It has been a NED policy to fund organizations through U.S. based groups. One of these "pass-through" organizations, the Institute for North-South Issues [INSI], a NED grantee, has been linked in the press with Lieutenant Colonel North's support to the Contras. The Endowment has terminated its relationship with INSI in order to shield the subgrantees from controversy. The USIA IG is looking at INSI's books to ensure that NED funds have been used solely for the purposes described in the grant agreements.

INSI administered four grants in the Caribbean, two in Haiti, and one each in Barbados and Guyana. The audit focus is on the proper use of funds and whether the grants are properly managed.

□ 1330

**Ms. SNOWE.** Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

**Mr. Chairman,** I will be very brief, but I would like to express my opposition to the amendment that has been offered by the gentleman, because I think that the work that the National Endowment for Democracy does is very important. It is important for establishing democratic roots in other countries. It is the only organization whose sole purpose is to promote democratic values and democratic in-

stitutions and to establish democratic links with other groups within individual countries.

I know that there have been problems with the National Endowment for Democracy in the past, and I originally opposed its formation several years ago, but I have had the opportunity to learn about the good work of the National Endowment, and I believe that it does perform work around the world in the advancement of the United States' interests.

We have attempted in the subcommittee over the last few years to make changes in that program to address some of the problems that the gentleman from Michigan has mentioned this afternoon concerning some of the controversial grants. The accounting procedures were lax in the past when it was originally formed, but over the past 2 years we have made substantive changes which I think are important to raise.

We first of all made a change that requires funds not to be expended to finance the campaigns of candidates for political office. Funds may not be expended to finance the Republican or Democratic National Committees. No funds may be expended for partisan activities on behalf of either the Republican or Democratic National Committees for any candidates for public office or on behalf of any political party.

NED must consult with the Department of State in any overseas program before the program begins. NED is the subject of the Freedom of Information Act with USIA to handle any of these requests, contrary to what the gentleman indicated in suggesting that all their activities are not open for public review and audit. The U.S. Information Agency can audit the National Endowment for Democracy as well as the grantees and all activities of the National Endowment.

So I think that we have taken a number of important steps to improve the National Endowment and provide the kind of legislative guidance that is necessary to this program, particularly because of the nature of its work it can create controversy in its attempt to foster democracy in countries that are dictatorships or are totalitarian in nature.

So I would hope that the members of this committee would oppose the gentleman's amendment. We want to support American interests in other countries, and NED grantees only work in countries at the request of other groups within those countries who are seeking to establish democracy.

**Mr. LEWIS of California.** Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

**Ms. SNOWE.** I yield to the gentleman from California.

**Mr. LEWIS of California.** I thank the gentleman for yielding.

**Mr. Chairman,** I want to associate myself with the gentleman's remarks. Clearly one of the stories to be told is the story of the rise of democracy, particularly in the developing part of the world. Significant progress has been made in places like Costa Rica and Guatemala. Evidence of unrest in Poland, concern about freedom, that voice that says that there is a chance for humankind besides dictatorship. It is critical to the world.

America ought to be standing for freedom in the world. This is one voice that is attempting to play a role in that.

The gentleman has addressed herself to some of the difficulties that all of us shared regarding this organization early on, and I think significant progress has been made. We certainly should not turn off this opportunity at this moment.

**Ms. SNOWE.** I thank the gentleman for his contribution, and I would urge Members to vote against this amendment.

**Mr. HAYES of Illinois.** Mr. Speaker, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

**Mr. Speaker,** I would like to speak in support of the amendment offered by the gentleman from Michigan. I have always thought that it is the State Department's responsibility to develop friends around the world. They do not always do it, but I think that that is their responsibility.

**Mr. CONYERS.** Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

**Mr. HAYES of Illinois.** I yield to the gentleman from Michigan.

**Mr. CONYERS.** I thank the gentleman for yielding.

**Mr. Chairman,** I want to first of all express my appreciation for the cooperation that I have received from the chairman of this subcommittee, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. MICA]. I appreciate the work that the gentleman from Maine [Ms. SNOWE], the ranking minority member, has contributed to improving the National Endowment for Democracy to the best of her ability. I remember reading some very critical questions and points that she made at earlier times during that juncture.

Let us be honest, Mr. Chairman, it is pretty hard for anybody on this committee to be opposed to an organization when the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs is a member of the Executive Board. I respect the problem that they have, regardless of how they may feel about this program, but as long as my good friend and longtime colleague, the gentleman from Florida, Mr. DANTE FASCELL, serves on this Board, it is pretty impossible for us to actually think that this committee by itself is going to take this step. It just will not happen. They know it and I know it.



The one way that it will happen is that every Member of this Congress who is not a part of this distinguished committee of ladies and gentlemen will take the step for it and separate it for us.

It is nice to come out here and talk about, "Let's promote democracy all over the place," and we just voted against a puny amendment that would help intercultural relations by a very close vote, and it only cost \$500,000.

I heard Members complaining about the crunch that we are in economywise, the deficit. Nobody mentioned Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, but I will mention it now, if it is necessary.

It should be made clear to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. MICA] that there is secret funding going on in NED. That is not an emotional subject that I am raising or an irrelevant subject that I am raising, and having just come out of the Iran-Contra hearings it would seem to me that somebody besides myself in the Congress, maybe even on the Committee on Foreign Affairs, might be slightly concerned about a private organization whose secret funding it would not even submit to the audit of the GAO.

Now where did I get that? Well, I got it out of the oversight report of the good work that was done by this subcommittee and its chairman and ranking leader, and I refer to page 273.

When responding to the president of the National Endowment for Democracy, he made it clear to you that you could not find out in an audit about several of their funding operations because of the sensitive nature of their program. There is a covert operation going on in the National Endowment for Democracy. The president of the organization said so. That is how I know.

I have not been able to find out much else. It is a pretty tight ship that they run over there. But the subcommittee chairman has been cooperative. We are trying to find out where we are going, but it just does not play for the American people to think that a \$20 million program with core grantees receiving 88 percent of the funds are necessary for us to promote good will and democratic practices around the world and the United States of America. It is not necessary.

I would like the subcommittee chairman to at least make some kind of response about what I consider to be a fairly serious charge.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. HAYES] has expired.

(On request of Mr. MICA and by unanimous consent, Mr. HAYES was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman continue to yield?

Mr. HAYES of Illinois. I yield to the gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. CONYERS. Let me just read what Mr. Gersham said on page 273: "Clearly it is impractical to audit several NED subgrantees due to the sensitive nature of their program."

Well, there are two kinds of programs. There are covert programs, and then there are sensitive programs. There are some that are not as secret as others.

Mr. MICA. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HAYES of Illinois. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.

Mr. MICA. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I have tried to keep the rhetoric as low as I can in this debate. What the gentleman is reading refers to a situation in which we were asked not to give the names of some individuals or groups which had received NED money because it might be dangerous to the grantee. This is not covert funding. As a result of those hearings and that oversight, however, we have made NED subject to freedom of information provisions. We instituted auditing procedures, and so far, we can assure you none of that exists.

The subcommittee was informed of the grants, but they did not put the names in the report, the names of individuals who in a Communist country or an East-bloc nation received some grants and, if their names had been put in the record, could have had their lives in danger.

□ 1340

We have now changed the law to say that there is freedom of information and there are audits. In fact, as a result of our hearings, we have audits going on.

I must just say as carefully and as clearly as I can, I know the gentleman suspects that there is a major covert operation going on, but we have found nothing, no evidence in auditing reports, in GAO reports, from committee investigations. But we will continue, and if I find anything, NED will lose my support also.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HAYES of Illinois. I am glad to yield to the gentleman from Michigan.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. HAYES] has expired.

(On request of Mr. CONYERS and by unanimous consent, Mr. HAYES of Illinois was allowed to proceed for 3 additional minutes.)

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, may I say to the gentleman from Florida that I am totally convinced of his sincerity and the conviction with which he has pursued the questions I have raised on this subject. I want to make that very clear, and I appreciate his cooperation.

But the only thing I say to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. MICA] is the

oversight hearings that I was privileged to participate in and that he conducted last year, I cannot tell the gentleman what has happened since the oversight hearings because we did not have any this year. The gentleman was quite busy getting the authorization bill out. But as of that time, there were secret audits that could not be gone into. What the reasons were, I have not the vaguest idea.

Mr. MICA. I think there is a misunderstanding. It is just simply not correct to say that there was no additional information. Since that report came out and since the legislation 2 years ago, all of that information is covered by FOIA.

I recall some years ago, before I was chairman of this subcommittee, I think the gentleman and some on the other side sought information from NED and could not get it. We changed the law so that any request under FOIA would have had to have been complied with.

Mr. CONYERS. Let me tell my colleague that there are some requests even under FOIA that are not opened up, and FOIA does not open up all of the reports in the world, which the gentleman knows. FOIA opens up what might be opened up according to the way the law was drafted to cover it. It does not make anything that is agreed not to be revealed. There are certain things that even FOIA will not reach.

I am glad to know that that has happened, but the gentleman has talked about oversight hearings again, and I am convinced that he will come to them as soon as he can. But we still have the question of privatizing American foreign policy into a group that has absolutely no business in countries, some of which are already democracies, others of which their work is highly questionable. We have foundations, we have the USIA, which is doing this work and clearly then for us to come up here and piously talk about what a few hundred grants are doing to make American good will relationships better it seems to me misses the mark.

We are now in an era that revealed that the privatization of American foreign policy has created a crisis in constitutional government. Ladies and gentlemen, we are here today in the shadow of crisis determining to allow a group of people in the private sector to continue to give money to political parties, foreign political parties. It seems to me to be patently outrageous.

Mr. MILLER of Washington. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the Conyers amendment to repeal funding for the National Endowment for Democracy.

One of the central questions before Congress is our role in the world. Too often, we hear that the United States relies too heavily on military means to influence international politics. The National Endowment for Democracy is one of the most effective nonmilitary tools we have. From seeking compliance to the Helsinki accords by the Soviets to ending military rule in Chile, NED is helping open the closed societies of the world. From the Philippines to Argentina, NED is helping strengthen new democracies.

I know that the author of this amendment is deeply concerned about ending apartheid in South Africa. One of the key groups helping build a democratic black alternative to the white minority government in South Africa is the National Endowment for Democracy. Last month, at a conference sponsored by NED, two frontline opponents of apartheid, Mr. Percy Qoboza, the editor of City Press and Mr. Alex Boraine, the cofounder of the Institute for a Democratic Alternative for South Africa spoke highly of NED's work to build a multiracial democracy in South Africa.

My message, Mr. Chairman, should be clear. We need the good work of the National Endowment for Democracy all around the world.

I urge my colleagues to vote no on this amendment.

Mr. ATKINS. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to voice my opposition to the Conyers amendment—which if approved would disband the National Endowment for Democracy.

The American scholar Robert Maynard Hutchins once wrote that "the death of democracy is not likely to be an assassination from ambush. It will be a slow extinction from apathy, indifference, and undernourishment."

Since its inception in 1983, the National Endowment for Democracy has done all that it can to prevent the indifference and apathy that Mr. Hutchins spoke of from endangering global democracy. Through the use of various grass roots strategies and in the spirit of bipartisanship, the Endowment has creatively and enthusiastically broadened the U.S. commitment to democracy and strengthened many of our allies worldwide.

The NED's list of accomplishments over the past 4 years is wide ranging and highly commendable. The NED helped to fund poll watching during the February 1986 Philippine elections. In South America, it helped to develop the first ever labor-business conference in Paraguay. At the same time that the Endowment was assisting the solidarity movement in Poland, it was helping to create the first democratic study center in Haiti.

As you can see, Mr. Chairman, the NED has been far from unproductive in its brief history. This year's State Department authorization bill calls for a funding level for the NED of \$17.5 million—\$7.5 million less than the administration's original request.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. CONYERS].

The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes appeared to have it.

## RECORDED VOTE

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.

A recorded vote was ordered.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—ayes 91, noes 310, not voting 32, as follows:

## [Roll No. 194]

## AYES—91

Akaka	Evans	Olin
Applegate	Flake	Owens (NY)
Barnard	Florio	Panetta
Bates	Ford (MI)	Patterson
Beilenson	Ford (TN)	Pease
Bosco	Frank	Price (IL)
Boucher	Frenzel	Rahall
Boxer	Gekas	Savage
Brennan	Gonzalez	Schroeder
Brown (CA)	Gray (IL)	Sensenbrenner
Brown (CO)	Hall (OH)	Sisisky
Carr	Hughes	Spratt
Clay	Jacobs	Stark
Clinger	Jontz	Stenholm
Collins	Kanjorski	Studds
Conyers	Kastenmeier	Sundquist
Crockett	Leach (IA)	Synar
Daub	Leath (TX)	Tauke
DeFazio	Leland	Towns
Dellums	Lowry (WA)	Trafficant
Derrick	Luken, Thomas	Vento
Dingell	Markley	Volkmmer
Dorgan (ND)	Martin (IL)	Walgren
Durbin	Mazzoli	Wheat
Dymally	McGrath	Whitten
Dyson	Miller (CA)	Wise
Early	Moody	Wolpe
Eckart	Morrison (CT)	Wyden
Edwards (CA)	Murphy	Yates
Espy	Oaker	
	Obey	

## NOES—310

Ackerman	Coats	Gibbons
Alexander	Coble	Gingrich
Anderson	Coelho	Glickman
Andrews	Coleman (MO)	Goodling
Annunzio	Coleman (TX)	Gordon
Anthony	Combest	Gradison
Archer	Conte	Grandy
Armey	Cooper	Grant
Aspin	Coughlin	Green
Atkins	Courter	Gregg
AuCoin	Coyne	Guarini
Badham	Craig	Gunderson
Baker	Darden	Hall (TX)
Ballenger	Davis (IL)	Hamilton
Bartlett	Davis (MI)	Hammerschmidt
Barton	de la Garza	Hansen
Bennett	DeLay	Harris
Bentley	DeWine	Hastert
Bereuter	Dickinson	Hatcher
Berman	Dicks	Hawkins
Bevill	DioGuardi	Hayes (IL)
Billbray	Dixon	Hayes (LA)
Billrakis	Dornan (CA)	Hefley
Bliley	Dowdy	Hefner
Boehlert	Downey	Henry
Boggs	Dreier	Hergert
Bonker	Duncan	Hertel
Borski	Edwards (OK)	Hiler
Boulter	Emerson	Hochbrueckner
Brooks	English	Holloway
Broomfield	Erdreich	Hopkins
Bruce	Fascell	Houghton
Bryant	Fawell	Howard
Buechner	Fazio	Hoyer
Bunning	Feighan	Hubbard
Burton	Fields	Huckaby
Bustamante	Fish	Hunter
Byron	Flippo	Hutto
Callahan	Foglietta	Hyde
Campbell	Foley	Inhofe
Cardin	Frost	Ireland
Carper	Galleghy	Jeffords
Chandler	Gallo	Jenkins
Chapman	Garcia	Johnson (CT)
Cheney	Gaydos	Johnson (SD)
Clarke	Gejdenson	Jones (NC)

Jones (TN)	Mrazek	Skeen
Kaptur	Murtha	Skelton
Kasich	Myers	Slattery
Kemp	Nagle	Slaughter (NY)
Kennedy	Natcher	Slaughter (VA)
Kildee	Neal	Smith (FL)
Kleczka	Nelson	Smith (NE)
Kolbe	Nichols	Smith (NJ)
Kolter	Nielson	Smith (TX)
Konnyu	Nowak	Smith, Denny
Kyl	Oberstar	(OR)
LaFalce	Ortiz	Smith, Robert
Lagomarsino	Owens (UT)	(NH)
Lancaster	Oxley	Smith, Robert
Lantos	Packard	(OR)
Latta	Parris	Snowe
Lehman (CA)	Pashayan	Solarz
Lehman (FL)	Pelosi	Solomon
Lent	Penny	Spence
Levin (MI)	Pepper	St Germain
Levine (CA)	Perkins	Staggers
Lewis (CA)	Petri	Stallings
Lewis (GA)	Pickett	Stangeland
Lightfoot	Pickle	Stokes
Lipinski	Porter	Stratton
Lloyd	Price (NC)	Stump
Lott	Quillen	Sweeney
Lowery (CA)	Ravenel	Swift
Lujan	Regula	Swindall
Lungren	Rhodes	Tallon
Mack	Richardson	Taylor
Madigan	Ridge	Thomas (CA)
Manton	Rinaldo	Thomas (GA)
Marlenee	Ritter	Torres
Martin (NY)	Roberts	Torricelli
Matsui	Robinson	Traxler
Mavroules	Rodino	Udall
McCandless	Roe	Upton
McCollum	Rogers	Valentine
McCurdy	Rose	Vander Jagt
McDade	Roth	Visclosky
McEwen	Roukema	Vucanovich
McHugh	Rowland (CT)	Walker
McMillan (NC)	Rowland (GA)	Watkins
McMillen (MD)	Russo	Waxman
Meyers	Sabo	Weber
Mfume	Saiki	Weiss
Mica	Sawyer	Weldon
Michel	Saxton	Whittaker
Miller (OH)	Schaefer	Williams
Miller (WA)	Scheuer	Wilson
Mineta	Schneider	Wolf
Moakley	Schuetter	Wortley
Molinar	Schumer	Wylie
Mollohan	Sharp	Yatron
Montgomery	Shumway	Young (AK)
Moorhead	Shuster	Young (FL)
Morella	Sikorski	
Morrison (WA)	Skaggs	

## NOT VOTING—32

Bateman	Gilman	Pursell
Biaggi	Gray (PA)	Rangel
Boland	Horton	Ray
Boner (TN)	Kennelly	Roemer
Bonior (MI)	Kostmayer	Rostenkowski
Chappell	Lewis (FL)	Roybal
Daniel	Livingston	Schulze
Dannemeyer	Lukens, Donald	Shaw
Donnelly	MacKay	Smith (IA)
Dwyer	Martinez	Tauzin
Gephardt	McCloskey	

## □ 1355

Messrs. WEBER, PARRIS, MFUME, MARTIN of New York, DIXON, and HOLLOWAY changed their votes from "aye" to "no."

Messrs. SPRATT, VENTO, APPLE-GATE, and DELLUMS changed their votes from "no" to "aye."

So the amendment was rejected.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

Mr. LEACH of Iowa. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

I rise simply to enter into a very brief colloquy with the chairman of the subcommittee of jurisdiction.



Mr. Chairman, it is my understanding that section 24(b) of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 authorizes the appropriation of whatever funds are necessary to offset currency fluctuations in order to maintain congressionally authorized levels of activity.

Is it your understanding that the authority of this section is available for funding for the American Institute in Taiwan [AIT]?

Mr. MICA. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. LEACH of Iowa. I yield to the chairman of the subcommittee, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. MICA].

Mr. MICA. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, yes, it is.

Mr. LEACH of Iowa. I thank the gentleman and I yield back the balance of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any other amendments to title II?

If not, the Clerk will designate title III.

The text of title III is as follows:

#### TITLE III—VOICE OF AMERICA

##### SEC. 301. AUTHORIZATIONS OF APPROPRIATIONS.

(a) AUTHORIZATIONS.—In addition to the amounts authorized to be appropriated under title II, the following amounts are authorized to be appropriated for the Voice of America for carrying out title V of the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 and the Radio Broadcasting to Cuba Act:

(1) SALARIES AND EXPENSES.—For "Salaries and Expenses", \$177,200,000 for the fiscal year 1988 and \$184,288,000 for the fiscal year 1989.

(2) ACQUISITION AND CONSTRUCTION OF RADIO FACILITIES.—For "Acquisition and Construction of Radio Facilities", \$66,000,000 for the fiscal year 1989.

(3) VOICE OF AMERICA/EUROPE.—For "Voice of America/Europe", \$3,000,000 for the fiscal year 1988 and \$3,120,000 for the fiscal year 1989.

(4) RADIO BROADCASTING TO CUBA.—For "Radio Broadcasting to Cuba", \$12,652,000 for the fiscal year 1988 and \$13,158,000 for the fiscal year 1989.

(b) EFFECTIVE DATE; PROHIBITION ON CERTAIN REPROGRAMMING.—

(1) Subsection (a) shall take effect October 1, 1987.

(2) Amounts appropriated pursuant to subsection (a) shall not be available for obligation or expenditure through any reprogramming of funds for any purpose other than the Voice of America.

##### SEC. 302. VOICE OF AMERICA/EUROPE.

Title V of the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (22 U.S.C. 1461 et seq.) is amended by adding after section 503 the following new section: "SEC. 504. VOICE OF AMERICA/EUROPE.

"As part of its duties and programs under title V of the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (22 U.S.C. 1461 et seq.), Voice of America/Europe shall—

"(1) target news and features in accordance with the findings and recommendations of the Young European Survey;

"(2) conduct periodic audience evaluations and measurements; and

"(3) promote and advertise Voice of America/Europe."

##### SEC. 303. CONTRACTOR REQUIREMENTS.

(a) FINDINGS.—The Congress finds that the overriding national security aspects of the \$1,300,000,000 facilities modernization program of the Voice of America require the assurance of uninterrupted United States logistic support under all circumstances for the program.

(b) PREFERENCE FOR UNITED STATES CONTRACTORS.—(1) Where adequate United States competition exists, only United States persons and qualified United States joint venture persons may bid on projects of the facilities modernization program of the Voice of America, including design and construction projects and projects with respect to transmitters, antennas, spare parts, and other technical equipment which is available in the United States.

(2) In any case where two or more qualified bidders, only one of whom is a United States person or qualified United States joint venture person, submit responsive bids, for purposes of awarding a contract the bid of that United States person or qualified United States joint venture person shall be considered to be reduced by 10 percent.

(c) EXCEPTION.—

(1) Subsection (b) shall not apply with respect to any project of the facilities modernization program of the Voice of America in a foreign country when—

(A) precluded by the terms of an international agreement with a foreign country, or

(B) the statutes of a foreign country prohibit the use of United States contractors on such projects.

(2) An exception under paragraph (1)(B) shall only become effective with respect to a foreign country 30 days after the Secretary of state certifies to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate what specific actions the Secretary has taken to urge the foreign country to permit the use of United States contractors on such projects.

(d) DEFINITIONS.—For the purpose of this section—

(1) the term "adequate United States competition" means with respect to a facility modernization project of the Voice of America, the presence of two or more qualified bidders who are United States persons or qualified United States joint venture persons submitting responsive bids for that project;

(2) the term "United States person" means a person which—

(A) is incorporated or legally organized under the laws of the United States, including any State (and any political subdivision thereof) and the District of Columbia;

(B) has its principal place of business in the United States;

(C) has been incorporated or legally organized in the United States—

(i) for more than 5 years before the issuance date of the invitation for bids or request for proposals with respect to a modernization project under subsection (b); and

(ii) for more than 2 years before the issuance date of the invitation for bids or request for proposals with respect to a modernization project under subsection (b) which involves physical or technical security;

(D) with respect to a modernization project under subsection (b), has achieved

total business volume equal to or greater than the value of the project being bid in 3 years of the 5-year period before the date specified in subparagraph (C)(i);

(E)(i) employs United States citizens in at least 80 percent of its principal management positions in the United States;

(ii) employs United States citizens in more than half of its permanent, full-time positions in the United States; and

(iii) will employ United States citizens in at least 80 percent of the supervisory positions on the modernization project site; and

(F) has the existing technical and financial resources in the United States to perform the contract; and

(3) the term "qualified United States joint venture person" means a joint venture in which a United States person or persons own at least 51 percent of the assets of the joint venture.

(e) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The provisions of this section shall apply to any project with respect to which the request for proposals (commonly referred to as "RFP") was issued after December 28, 1986.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there amendments to title III?

##### AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. FRENZEL

Mr. FRENZEL. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. FRENZEL: Page 65, line 26, insert the following after the comma: "or inconsistent with United States international obligations with respect to government procurement from a foreign country."

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. FRENZEL] is recognized for 5 minutes in support of his amendment.

Mr. MICA. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield a moment?

Mr. FRENZEL. I yield to the distinguished gentleman from Florida.

Mr. MICA. Mr. Chairman, I asked the gentleman to yield for a purpose different than the amendment.

I would like to seek, if this is appropriate, a unanimous-consent request on a time limitation that we worked out with the minority. May this be done, Mr. Chairman, at this time?

The CHAIRMAN. On this amendment or on all amendments to the bill?

Mr. MICA. On all amendments.

The CHAIRMAN. It might be wise to dispose of this amendment first and then make such a request.

##### PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY

Mr. FRENZEL. Mr. Chairman, I have a parliamentary inquiry.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state it.

Mr. FRENZEL. Mr. Chairman, may I not yield to the distinguished subcommittee chairman for a unanimous-consent request that would cover the balance of the day's work?

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman may do that.

Mr. FRENZEL. I so yield to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. MICA].

Mr. MICA. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, at this time I am seeking a unanimous-consent request that debate on this and all amendments cease at 5 o'clock and that all time be equally divided on the amendments that are remaining; I believe the number is six or maybe seven. We will check the record. And that we stop all debate at 5 o'clock, and equally divide the time.

□ 1410

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, reserving the right to object, and I may not object, but there is some word going around that may be a separate vote called on the so-called Herger amendment when we rise back into the full House.

There is no one that wants to go home more than I do. I need to catch a 4:20 plane to make a speech there this afternoon, and I would certainly like not to object; but I think we need some kind of assurances that the minority is not going to get sandbagged on this side of the aisle on issues of asking for separate votes at the last minute.

Does the gentleman have any comment on that, continuing my reservation?

Mr. MICA. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Florida.

Mr. MICA. Mr. Chairman, there has been no decision made on a request for a separate vote at this time.

It is being discussed, but the understanding that I have is that any one of the Members could say that we will not call for it; but any other Member could call for it.

Mr. SOLOMON. Continuing my reservation, Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Washington, the majority leader [Mr. FOLEY].

Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Chairman, any Member of the House has a right to make such a request, and no leadership on either side can give assurances which block the rights of any Member under the rule.

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, continuing the reservation then, I certainly respect the answer from the gentleman from Washington [Mr. FOLEY], the majority leader; but we are under the impression that there is a movement by leadership on that side of the aisle to bring that amendment back on the floor for a vote.

If that were the case, and if it were leadership doing this, then I would be constrained to object. I hate to do that.

Mr. MICA. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Florida.

Mr. MICA. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

If I could respond to the Member, I would tell the Member at least a sub-

committee chairman is attempting to work this out in a way that it will not require another vote; but I cannot say at this time whether we will be successful.

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, continuing my reservation, and I do not want to hold up the House, but we all know what happened on the Herger amendment. We know rollcall was kept open for almost 20 minutes in order to change that around, and we think that is unfair to a freshman minority Member on this side of the aisle.

I have to forewarn Members that if a separate vote is going to be called on that particular amendment, we intend to ask for rollcalls on every single amendment when the Committee rises.

We do not want to do that, but we would like some assurances from the leadership on that side of the aisle that the leadership is not attempting to reverse this after stalling the vote for so long.

I would object at this time until we can have some conversation on the matter.

The CHAIRMAN. Objection is heard.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. FRENZEL was allowed to proceed for 5 additional minutes.)

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. FRENZEL] is recognized in support of his amendment.

Mr. Chairman, the amendment which I have just introduced is introduced on behalf of the gentleman from Florida [Mr. GIBBONS] and myself.

On page 65 of the bill is where the amendments takes place. That amendment allows foreign firms to bid on certain elements of work for VOA if bilateral agreements exists; and it defines American firms which may bid on the work.

My amendment would provide that all nations who have signed the Government Procurement Code of GATT would be also allowed to bid, and that is in keeping without obligation under the GATT, and this amendment is requested by the administration as being necessary to our GATT negotiations and to honor our commitment.

I believe that it follows the desires of the House as expressed in the Brooks amendment on the trade bill where the Procurement Code signatories were given the right to bid, as long as we had rights to bid, on certain projects in their country.

Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FRENZEL. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. BARTLETT].

Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

The gentleman and I have discussed this difficulty which is a preference

that is in the bill which we all deplore. I know the gentleman has a way of solving that preference, and perhaps the subcommittee chairman may have some other ways.

I would suggest to the gentleman, and inquire as to whether the gentleman would be agreeable to an approach to the gentleman's amendment that would take the words in the legislation on page 66 that say, "The statutes of a foreign country prohibit the use of United States contractors," and accept the gentleman's amendment, but adding the words, "the statutes or practices of a foreign country that prohibit the use of United States contractors," and so forth.

By adding those words "or practices," I would say to the gentleman, we would then be able to include within the scope of our meaning of this amendment the concept that if a foreign country does not permit a U.S. company to bid on similar facilities in their country, then they would not be eligible to bid which, I believe, is the gentleman's intent on this particular VOA transmitter.

It seems to me that would solve the problem. I am preparing a substitute for the gentleman's amendment at the present time, and if the gentleman would comment on that approach?

Mr. FRENZEL. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for his contribution.

The gentleman's amendment in my judgment would protect the American company which the gentleman seeks to protect by making it impossible for certain European countries to bid.

Unfortunately, it would result in a violation of the GATT agreement.

The gentleman has correctly perceived that the countries that have signed the Procurement Code often have reservations. The United States has some. Germany has some. Each nation that has signed may have one or more. I do not know all of that.

The countries in question in this case, I believe, are Germany and France, which have telecommunications exceptions to the Procurement Code.

As every Member here knows, through our various Buy America laws, we have many exceptions to the Procurement Code too, and the gentleman's amendment would put the purchase of telecommunications on a direct sectoral basis, saying that if we could not buy one thing from them, they could not buy the exact same thing.

If they would not allow us to bid on this work of an exact certain type, they would not be allowed to bid on ours either.

Unfortunately, the reservations have been built up by the countries to be of maximum effect. They are not always



harmonious, good by good, commodity by commodity, and sector by sector.

The gentleman may, of course, offer his amendment. I believe it would frustrate what I am trying to do, and that is to make us fulfill our GATT obligations.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. MICA TO THE  
AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. FRENZEL

Mr. MICA. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment to the amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. MICA to the amendment offered by Mr. FRENZEL: In the text proposed to be inserted by the amendment, insert "so long as such international obligations are honored by such foreign country (as certified to the Congress by the United States Trade Representative prior to the awarding of each contract for that project)" after "foreign country".

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Florida [Mr. MICA] is recognized for 5 minutes in support of his amendment.

Mr. FRENZEL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MICA. I yield to the gentleman from Minnesota.

Mr. FRENZEL. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, the gentleman's amendment is a good amendment. I hope the House will accept it. What the gentleman's amendment does, as I understand it, is to make sure that the countries are living up to their obligations under the Procurement Code by having the USTR sign off and so state before any contract can be issued. It seems to me that that simply strengthens the bill.

I understand, too, that there would have to be a different sign-off in every case. You could not simply sign off for a country; you would have to take up the bid in its turn and sign off on some sort of general statement that the country was in fact living up to its obligations.

Mr. MICA. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Minnesota.

If I may continue on my time, I might say that we have attempted to fashion this amendment to the amendment in a way that really would give some teeth to the American concerns that we have been shut out in allowing foreign companies to bid on these contracts.

I would hope that the gentleman would agree with this interpretation, that when the USTR makes a determination that another country is not violating GATT, they take into consideration what their actual practices are as a part of that determination. So if we have a country that may not have a law that we can specifically interpret as protectionist or prohibiting U.S. action, but all of their pattern and practice is such that we cannot compete, we would hope that they would take that into consideration.

Now obviously that is a difficult legal determination to make, but certainly when they make this determination, they should take practice into consideration.

So by fashioning the language we have here, I think perhaps we satisfy not only the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. FRENZEL] but also the gentleman from Texas [Mr. BARTLETT], who wants to have some assurance that the practices are looked at, as well as the laws and procedures.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to take a minute to attempt to put the facts on the record as to where we are on this amendment and on this entire situation. The subcommittee chairman is attempting to unravel the situation, and I believe that he is almost there in good faith, and I might in a moment suggest a way that is a much more straightforward way to insist that we end up with a reciprocity kind of provision in this bill.

Mr. Chairman, the facts are as follows: the bill currently has a U.S. preference for the purchase of this VOA transmission facility, and the reason for the U.S. preference was because U.S. companies have been historically prohibited from bidding on similar facilities in other countries. The gentleman from Minnesota has suggested that we should not have a U.S. preference but instead we should say that those other countries are required to comply with their international obligations or else they are prohibited from bidding on the transmitter.

That is fine as far as it goes. The difficulty with that and with the amendment as it is proposed to be amended is that there are several countries that have made reservations under GATT in which they are, under their international obligations, legally obligated to prohibit a U.S. company from bidding on that transmission equipment. If we pass the amendment, as amended, then the United States will be in the awkward and, I think, untenable position of permitting foreign countries to bid on VOA transmission equipment when those foreign countries specifically prohibit our companies from bidding on similar projects in their own countries.

So I would propose a substitute and will shortly have a substitute, if it is permitted to be offered, providing that we include this prohibition along with the language of the gentleman from Minnesota and the subcommittee chairman in those cases in which the foreign country prohibits the use of United States contractors on similar types of projects.

I think that is clear, Mr. Chairman. I think it clearly gives those foreign countries the right and the obligation

to then remove their prohibitions against U.S. companies from bidding on their jobs.

I would say to both gentlemen that if we do not do this, if we do not adopt this type of substitute, the unintended but perhaps clear result will be that the United States companies will continue to not be permitted to bid on transmission equipment in foreign countries, but some of those foreign countries will be bidding specifically on this \$1.5 billion U.S. Federal procurement project.

It is a very, very serious situation, and I think it is time for the United States to begin, in all bills that come before us, to say what we mean, which is reciprocity. We do not want preference; we want no less than being able to bid on our own part under the same terms and conditions that other countries are allowed to bid on our purchases.

□ 1425

I think that is clear. There are other issues involved, Mr. Chairman, but that is the principal one. It does seem to me that the committee has made a good beginning toward resolving this rather sticky problem. The gentleman from Minnesota in good faith is attempting to resolve it even more clearly, but if the amendment of the gentleman from Minnesota is accepted as it is now being presented, it will not resolve the problem and the result will be the perversity of a U.S. company not being allowed to bid on foreign acquisitions, but having to bid against those same foreign companies against the U.S. Government.

Ms. SNOWE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BARTLETT. I yield to the gentleman from Maine.

Ms. SNOWE. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the gentleman for his addition to this issue. One of the discoveries the subcommittee made in the course of the VOA modernization program was that the United States was the only Western country that allowed foreign companies to make bids on transmitters. Interestingly enough, in one case that developed, it was only when the chairman offered the language, and it was included in the authorization, did this country begin to pay attention to the fact that there were American firms manufacturing transmitters and should be allowed into the bidding process.

In Germany, there was a case, for example, where they were leasing facilities to the VOA as part of the modernization program, but the United States was successful in including a clause in that agreement that said:

To the extent permitted by the laws and regulations of the Federal Republic of Germany . . . United States firms shall be permitted to compete for the provision of services and/or equipment in carrying out the

modernization and expansion program hereunder.

But when the actual contracts were issued, the German Government sourced that bid to a German firm. There was never even a competitive bid; so it disallowed any American firm from participating in that bidding process, and therefore we were prohibited from offering a bid.

In April, the German Government recognized that it had violated that agreement with the United States and said that American firms could compete in the future. Unfortunately, the German Government has no current plans for any additional transmitter bids, so therefore American firms are still effectively excluded from that process. So there is an example of what the gentleman is trying to address with his amendment, and I commend him for it.

Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman for her support.

Mr. BRYANT. Mr. Chairman, the United States Trade Representative asserts that the language in H.R. 1777, proposed by Mr. MICA during Appropriations Committee consideration, would violate U.S. obligations under the Government Procurement Code and leave the U.S. vulnerable to retaliation on the order of a billion dollars in sales opportunities in other countries.

It is important for us to take into account the implications of the Mica provision under our international agreements but the Mica language does that with the exemption for such agreements.

First, the provision provides for only 10 percent preference for U.S. bidders, and may not even result in the choice of an American company over a foreign bidder. By contrast, what our companies face in Europe and elsewhere is the outright exclusion from even the right to bid for procurement by foreign owned and subsidized broadcasting companies. Any bidder who can show his country does not discriminate against U.S. contractors and suppliers will not be adversely affected by this provision.

Second, this provision should not even be seen as a preference, but rather as an offset to the advantage that foreign companies enjoy by being able to foreclose United States and other companies from their markets. Just recently, we had to stand by and watch as the British and Germans accepted bids for major procurements of transmission equipment in which United States companies were not even allowed to bid. The cost advantages those foreign companies enjoy by virtue of their captive market is more than the 10 percent provided in this legislation.

Third, I do not see where the enactment of this provision will lead to the retaliation which the USTR is so concerned about. We would have to wait and see what practical impact the provision might have on procurement by the USIA. Only then could we be subject to a dispute settlement action not immediate retaliation.

Why do we need to take this kind of action?

The reality is simple. Five years ago we had eight companies that make the kind of transmission equipment that Voice of America will be procuring, now there is only one left and that company is effectively precluded from even bidding in the home countries of its major foreign competitors. If we are not prepared to insist on reciprocity, we are not going to have anything to negotiate for when we sit down with our trading partners to negotiate for access to their markets.

The real irony here is that when the Voice of America broadcasts from overseas, it is forced to use the very broadcasting facilities that have been procured under regulations that exclude U.S. companies from bidding. Voice of America is forced to be a party to the discriminatory practices of our trading partners. If anything, that is—or should be—a violation of the U.S. Government Procurement Code. I would like to ask the USTR if they have ever raised that problem in negotiations with our trading partners.

The basic point here is that the United States cannot expect to get reciprocity from other countries unless it insists on reciprocity in return. If we want to truly aid the process, why don't we insist that the Europeans telecommunications market be included under the Government Procurement Code in the first place. By enacting the Mica provision, I believe we bring Europeans closer to opening their markets than if we simply do nothing or adopt the proposed Frenzel amendment.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. BARTLETT AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR THE AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. FRENZEL

Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment as a substitute for the amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. BARTLETT as a substitute for the amendment offered by Mr. FRENZEL: Page 65, line 26, after "foreign country," insert the following: "or inconsistent with United States international obligations with respect to government procurement from a foreign country so long as (i) such international obligations are honored by such foreign country (as certificate to the Congress by the United States Trade Representative prior to the awarding of each contract for that project) and (ii) the foreign country does not prohibit the use of United States contractors on similar types of projects that it carries out".

Mr. Chairman, it is my judgment that this substitute may well solve the problem as best we can solve it on the House floor today. The information I have indicates that similar types of reciprocity language is included in the trade bill that is being considered imminently by the other body, so it is likely that before this bill were to become law, this language may or may not be necessary and that we may more globally enforce reciprocity. I hope so. If that is the case, then this language would at that point become redundant, but I do believe that including explicit reciprocity language on a \$1½ billion U.S. Government-funded procurement item is clearly in

order. We are not asking for U.S. preference. We are only asking that U.S. companies have the same reciprocal rights to bid on similar projects in other countries as other countries have to bid on ours.

It is my judgment that this is one of the clearest cases of the need for reciprocity. This House should in no case let this bill go through with this \$1½ billion new authorization unless we enforce reciprocity into this legislation.

It does seem to me that this enforcement will in fact cause a much more serious look by our trading partners and by our own conference committee of the House and the Senate in considering reciprocity on other items; but regardless of what happens with global reciprocity, reciprocity on a \$1½ billion new procurement by the U.S. Government for the Voice of America transmission facility, ought to be enforced strictly.

This substitute amendment will accomplish that and I think it is clearly in order.

Mr. FRENZEL. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, the amendment of the gentleman from Texas does exactly I think what the gentleman would like it to do, that is, it does furnish strong protection for the firm in question.

What it does, however, is revert to the language of the original bill, whose force and effect was to cause the United States to violate its obligations in the GATT. Under the GATT there is a procurement code which has been signed by many of the contracting parties, including I believe all the States that have been mentioned here as being part of the problem. Some of those States have certain exclusions from the procurement code which date back many years, a kind of a grandfathered set of exclusions; so does the United States. Every time we pass a buy America bill, we produce an exclusion from the GATT.

Now, if we accept the substitute, we will violate our obligation by not living up to our signing of the procurement code because we will deny to somebody who has at least under international law the right to sign it, to bid on our equipment, will not have that. Therefore, the Bartlett amendment simply obviates the force and intent of the Frenzel amendment. Both of them are modified with the Mica amendment.

The problem here is that we are trying to negotiate a new round of GATT. We are trying to encourage more countries to sign the procurement code. If we violate that code ourselves, there will be no incentive for foreigners to sign it. We will have much greater difficulty opening up foreign markets for American products exactly of the kind and type that the company the gentleman seeks to



help wants to sell to the Voice of America in this particular instance.

Mr. Chairman, I am really sorry that the debate has become so extended on a late afternoon.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Florida [Mr. MICA] to the amendment offered by the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. FRENZEL].

The amendment to the amendment was agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Texas [Mr. BARTLETT] as a substitute for the amendment offered by the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. FRENZEL], as amended.

The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes appeared to have it.

Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote, and pending that, I make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The CHAIRMAN. Evidently a quorum is not present. Pursuant to the provisions of clause 2, rule XXIII, the Chair announces that he will reduce to a minimum of 5 minutes the period of time within which a vote by electronic device, if ordered, will be taken on the pending question following the quorum call. Members will record their presence by electronic device.

The call was taken by electronic device.

The following Members responded to their names:

## [Roll No. 195]

## ANSWERED "PRESENT"—398

Ackerman	Broomfield	Davis (MI)
Akaka	Brown (CA)	de la Garza
Alexander	Brown (CO)	DeFazio
Anderson	Bruce	DeLay
Andrews	Bryant	Dellums
Annunzio	Buechner	Derrick
Anthony	Bunning	DeWine
Applegate	Burton	Dickinson
Archer	Bustamante	Dicks
Armey	Byron	Dingell
Aspin	Callahan	DioGuardi
Atkins	Campbell	Dixon
AuCoin	Cardin	Dorgan (ND)
Badham	Carper	Dornan (CA)
Baker	Carr	Dowdy
Ballenger	Chandler	Downey
Barnard	Chapman	Dreier
Bartlett	Chappell	Duncan
Barton	Cheney	Durbin
Bateman	Clarke	Dymally
Bates	Clay	Dyson
Beilenson	Clinger	Early
Bennett	Coats	Eckart
Bentley	Coble	Edwards (CA)
Bereuter	Coelho	Edwards (OK)
Berman	Coleman (MO)	Emerson
Bevill	Coleman (TX)	English
Biaggi	Collins	Erdreich
Bilbray	Combest	Espy
Bilirakis	Conte	Evans
Bliley	Conyers	Fascell
Boehrlert	Cooper	Fawell
Boggs	Coughlin	Fazio
Bonker	Courter	Feighan
Borski	Coyne	Fields
Bosco	Craig	Fish
Boucher	Crane	Flake
Boulter	Crockett	Flippo
Boxer	Darden	Foglietta
Brennan	Daub	Foley
Brooks	Davis (IL)	Ford (MI)

Frenzel	Lungren	Sabo
Frost	Mack	Salki
Galleghy	MacKay	Savage
Gallo	Madigan	Sawyer
Garcia	Manton	Saxton
Gaydos	Markey	Schaefer
Gejdenson	Marlenee	Scheuer
Gekas	Martin (IL)	Schneider
Gibbons	Martinez	Schroeder
Gingrich	Matsui	Schuetter
Glickman	Mavroules	Schulze
Gonzalez	Mazzoli	Schumer
Goodling	McCandless	Sensenbrenner
Gordon	McCloskey	Sharp
Gradison	McCollum	Shumway
Grandy	McCurdy	Shuster
Grant	McDade	Sikorski
Gray (IL)	McEwen	Siskis
Green	McGrath	Skaggs
Gregg	McHugh	Skeen
Guarini	McMillan (NC)	Skelton
Gunderson	McMillen (MD)	Slattery
Hall (OH)	Meyers	Slaughter (NY)
Hall (TX)	Mfume	Slaughter (VA)
Hamilton	Mica	Smith (FL)
Hammerschmidt	Michel	Smith (NE)
Hansen	Miller (CA)	Smith (NJ)
Harris	Miller (OH)	Smith (TX)
Hastert	Miller (WA)	Smith, Denny
Hatcher	Mineta	(OR)
Hawkins	Moakley	Smith, Robert
Hayes (IL)	Molinari	(NH)
Hayes (LA)	Mollohan	Smith, Robert
Hefley	Montgomery	(OR)
Hefner	Moody	Snowe
Henry	Moorhead	Solarz
Herger	Morella	Solomon
Hertel	Morrison (CT)	Spence
Hiler	Morrison (WA)	Spratt
Hochbrueckner	Mrazek	St Germain
Holloway	Murphy	Staggers
Hopkins	Murtha	Stallings
Horton	Myers	Stangeland
Houghton	Nagle	Stark
Howard	Natcher	Stenholm
Hubbard	Neal	Stokes
Huckaby	Nelson	Stratton
Hughes	Nichols	Studds
Hunter	Nielson	Stump
Hutto	Nowak	Sundquist
Hyde	Oakar	Sweeney
Inhofe	Oberstar	Swift
Jacobs	Obey	Swindall
Jeffords	Olin	Synar
Jenkins	Ortiz	Tallon
Johnson (CT)	Owens (NY)	Tauke
Johnson (SD)	Owens (UT)	Taylor
Jones (NC)	Oxley	Thomas (CA)
Jones (TN)	Packard	Thomas (GA)
Jontz	Panetta	Torres
Kanjorski	Parris	Torricelli
Kaptur	Pashayan	Towns
Kasich	Patterson	Trafficant
Kastenmeier	Pelosi	Traxler
Kennedy	Penny	Udall
Kildee	Pepper	Upton
Kleczka	Perkins	Valentine
Kolbe	Petri	Vander Jagt
Kolter	Pickett	Vento
Kornyu	Pickle	Visclosky
Kyl	Porter	Volkmer
LaFalce	Price (IL)	Vucanovich
Lagomarsino	Price (NC)	Walgren
Lancaster	Quillen	Walker
Lantos	Rahall	Watkins
Latta	Ravenel	Weber
Leach (IA)	Regula	Weiss
Lehman (CA)	Rhodes	Weldon
Lehman (FL)	Richardson	Wheat
Leland	Ridge	Whittaker
Lent	Rinaldo	Whitten
Levin (MI)	Ritter	Wilson
Levine (CA)	Roberts	Wise
Lewis (CA)	Robinson	Wolf
Lewis (GA)	Rodino	Wolpe
Lightfoot	Roe	Wortley
Lipinski	Rogers	Wyden
Lloyd	Rose	Wylie
Lott	Roth	Yates
Lowery (CA)	Roukema	Yatron
Lowry (WA)	Rowland (CT)	Young (AK)
Lujan	Rowland (GA)	Young (FL)
Luken, Thomas	Russo	

□ 1450

The CHAIRMAN. Three hundred ninety-eight Members have answered to their names, a quorum is present, and the Committee will resume its business.

## RECORDED VOTE

The CHAIRMAN. The pending business is the demand of the gentleman from Texas [Mr. BARTLETT] for a recorded vote.

A recorded vote was ordered.

The CHAIRMAN. This will be a 5-minute vote.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—ayes 334, noes 70, not voting 29, as follows:

## [Roll No. 196]

## AYES—334

Ackerman	DeFazio	Huckaby
Akaka	DeLay	Hughes
Alexander	Derrick	Hunter
Anderson	DeWine	Hutto
Andrews	Dickinson	Hyde
Annunzio	Dingell	Inhofe
Anthony	DioGuardi	Jacobs
Applegate	Dixon	Jenkins
Archer	Dorgan (ND)	Johnson (CT)
Aspin	Dornan (CA)	Johnson (SD)
Badham	Dowdy	Jones (NC)
Baker	Duncan	Jones (TN)
Ballenger	Durbin	Jontz
Barnard	Dyson	Kanjorski
Bartlett	Eckart	Kaptur
Barton	Edwards (OK)	Kasich
Bateman	Emerson	Kennedy
Bennett	English	Kildee
Bentley	Erdreich	Kolbe
Bereuter	Espy	Kolter
Berman	Evans	LaFalce
Bevill	Fascell	Lagomarsino
Biaggi	Fazio	Lancaster
Bilbray	Feighan	Lantos
Bilirakis	Fields	Latta
Bliley	Fish	Leach (IA)
Boehrlert	Flake	Lehman (CA)
Boggs	Flippo	Leland
Borski	Foglietta	Levin (MI)
Boucher	Ford (MI)	Levine (CA)
Boulter	Ford (TN)	Lewis (CA)
Boxer	Frank	Lewis (GA)
Brennan	Frost	Lightfoot
Brooks	Galleghy	Lipinski
Broomfield	Gallo	Lloyd
Brown (CO)	Garcia	Lott
Bruce	Gaydos	Lowery (CA)
Bryant	Gekas	Lujan
Buechner	Gingrich	Madigan
Bunning	Glickman	Manton
Burton	Goodling	Markey
Bustamante	Gordon	Marlenee
Byron	Grandy	Martin (IL)
Callahan	Grant	Martinez
Campbell	Gray (IL)	Mavroules
Carr	Gregg	Mazzoli
Chapman	Guarini	McCandless
Chappell	Gunderson	McCloskey
Cheney	Hall (OH)	McCollum
Clarke	Hall (TX)	McCurdy
Clay	Hamilton	McDade
Clinger	Hammerschmidt	McEwen
Coats	Hansen	McGrath
Coble	Harris	McHugh
Coelho	Hastert	McMillan (NC)
Coleman (MO)	Hatcher	McMillen (MD)
Coleman (TX)	Hayes (IL)	Meyers
Combest	Hayes (LA)	Mfume
Conte	Hefley	Mica
Conyers	Hefner	Michel
Cooper	Henry	Miller (OH)
Coughlin	Herger	Mineta
Courter	Hertel	Moakley
Coyne	Hiler	Molinari
Craig	Hochbrueckner	Mollohan
Crane	Holloway	Montgomery
Crockett	Hopkins	Moody
Darden	Horton	Moorhead
Daub	Howard	Morrison (CT)
Davis (IL)	Hubbard	Murphy
Davis (MI)		
de la Garza		

Murtha  
Myers  
Nagle  
Natcher  
Neal  
Nelson  
Nichols  
Nowak  
Oakar  
Oberstar  
Obey  
Ortiz  
Owens (UT)  
Oxley  
Packard  
Parris  
Pashayan  
Patterson  
Pelosi  
Pepper  
Perkins  
Pickett  
Pickle  
Porter  
Price (IL)  
Price (NC)  
Pursell  
Quillen  
Rahall  
Ravenel  
Regula  
Rhodes  
Richardson  
Ridge  
Rinaldo  
Ritter  
Roberts  
Robinson  
Rodino  
Roe  
Rogers  
Rose  
Roth

Roukema  
Rowland (CT)  
Rowland (GA)  
Russo  
Sabo  
Saiki  
Sawyer  
Saxton  
Schaefer  
Schneider  
Schroeder  
Schuette  
Schulze  
Schumer  
Sensenbrenner  
Sharp  
Shuster  
Sikorski  
Slitsky  
Skaggs  
Skeen  
Skelton  
Slattery  
Slaughter (NY)  
Slaughter (VA)  
Smith (FL)  
Smith (NE)  
Smith (NJ)  
Smith (TX)  
Smith, Denny  
(OR)  
Smith, Robert  
(NH)  
Smith, Robert  
(OR)  
Snowe  
Solarz  
Solomon  
Spence  
Spratt  
St Germain  
Staggers  
Stallings

Stenholm  
Stratton  
Studds  
Sundquist  
Sweeney  
Swindall  
Synar  
Tallon  
Tauke  
Taylor  
Thomas (CA)  
Thomas (GA)  
Torres  
Torrice  
Traxler  
Udall  
Upton  
Valentine  
Vander Jagt  
Vento  
Visclosky  
Volkmer  
Vucanovich  
Walker  
Watkins  
Weiss  
Weldon  
Wheat  
Whittaker  
Whitten  
Williams  
Wilson  
Wise  
Wolf  
Wolpe  
Wortley  
Wylie  
Yatron  
Young (AK)  
Young (FL)

## NOES—70

Armye  
Atkins  
AuCoin  
Bates  
Bellenson  
Bonker  
Bosco  
Brown (CA)  
Cardin  
Carper  
Chandler  
Collins  
Crane  
Crockett  
Dellums  
Dicks  
Downey  
Dreier  
Dymally  
Early  
Edwards (CA)  
Fawell  
Foley  
Frenzel

Gedjenson  
Gibbons  
Gonzalez  
Gradison  
Green  
Hawkins  
Houghton  
Jeffords  
Kastenmeier  
Kemp  
Kleczka  
Konnyu  
Kyl  
Lehman (FL)  
Dellums  
Lowry (WA)  
Luken, Thomas  
Lungren  
Mack  
MacKay  
Matsui  
Miller (CA)  
Miller (WA)  
Morella  
Morrison (WA)

Mrazek  
Nielson  
Olin  
Owens (NY)  
Panetta  
Pease  
Penny  
Petri  
Savage  
Scheuer  
Shumway  
Stangeland  
Stark  
Stokes  
Stump  
Swift  
Towns  
Walgren  
Waxman  
Weber  
Wyden  
Yates

## NOT VOTING—29

Boland  
Boner (TN)  
Bonior (MI)  
Daniel  
Dannemeyer  
Donnelly  
Dwyer  
Florio  
Gephardt  
Gilman

Gray (PA)  
Hoyer  
Ireland  
Kennelly  
Kostmayer  
Leath (TX)  
Lent  
Lewis (FL)  
Livingston  
Lukens, Donald

Martin (NY)  
Rangel  
Ray  
Roemer  
Rostenkowski  
Roybal  
Shaw  
Smith (IA)  
Tauzin

Mr. STUMP and Mr. DICKS changed their votes from "aye" to "no."

Messrs. PERKINS, MFUME, and RODINO changed their votes from "no" to "aye."

So the amendment offered as a substitute for the amendment as amended, was agreed to.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

□ 1505

## PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY

Mr. MICA. Mr. Chairman, I have a parliamentary inquiry.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state it.

Mr. MICA. Mr. Chairman, I think there is a question in the minds of some Members about the procedure here.

Mr. Chairman, is it not correct that a "no" vote now would bring us right back to the original committee position?

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman is correct.

Mr. MICA. I thank the Chair.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. FRENZEL], as amended.

The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the ayes appeared to have it.

## RECORDED VOTE

Mr. BRYANT. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.

A recorded vote was ordered.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were— ayes 167, noes 237, not voting 29, as follows

[Roll No. 197]

## AYES—167

Archer  
Armye  
AuCoin  
Badham  
Baker  
Ballenger  
Barnard  
Bartlett  
Barton  
Bateman  
Bellenson  
Bereuter  
Berman  
Bevill  
Bilirakis  
Bliley  
Boggs  
Bonker  
Boulter  
Broomfield  
Brown (CO)  
Buechner  
Bunning  
Burton  
Cardin  
Carper  
Chandler  
Chappell  
Cheney  
Coats  
Combust  
Craig  
Crane  
Daub  
Davis (IL)  
DeLay  
Derrick  
DeWine  
Dicks  
DioGuardi  
Dornan (CA)  
Downey  
Dreier  
Early  
Edwards (OK)  
Fawell  
Fie' is  
Fish  
Foley  
Frenzel  
Frost  
Gallegly

Gedjenson  
Gekas  
Gibbons  
Gingrich  
Goodling  
Gradison  
Grandy  
Green  
Gregg  
Gunderson  
Hall (TX)  
Hamilton  
Hammerschmidt  
Hansen  
Hastert  
Hefley  
Herger  
Hiler  
Hopkins  
Houghton  
Hutto  
Hyde  
Inhofe  
Jeffords  
Johnson (CT)  
Kasich  
Kastenmeier  
Kemp  
Kolbe  
LaFalce  
Lagomarsino  
Leach (IA)  
Lent  
Levine (CA)  
Lewis (CA)  
Lightfoot  
Lowry (WA)  
Lujan  
Luken, Thomas  
Lungren  
Mack  
MacKay  
Madigan  
Marlenee  
Martin (NY)  
McCandless  
McCollum  
McCurdy  
McEwen  
McGrath  
McHugh  
McMillen (MD)

Meyers  
Michel  
Miller (WA)  
Molinar  
Moorhead  
Morella  
Morrison (WA)  
Mrazek  
Myers  
Nielsen  
Oxley  
Packard  
Parris  
Pease  
Penny  
Petri  
Pickle  
Porter  
Pursell  
Ravenel  
Rhodes  
Roberts  
Robinson  
Rowland (CT)  
Saiki  
Saxton  
Schaefer  
Scheuer  
Schroeder  
Espy  
Evans  
Fascell  
Fazio  
Feighan  
Flake  
Flippo  
Foglietta  
Ford (MI)  
Ford (TN)  
Frank  
Gallo  
Garcia  
Gaydos

Taylor  
Upton  
Vander Jagt  
Vucanovich  
Walker

Ackerman  
Akaka  
Alexander  
Anderson  
Andrews  
Annunzio  
Anthony  
Applegate  
Aspin  
Atkins  
Bates  
Bennett  
Bentley  
Biaggi  
Bilbray  
Boehlert  
Borski  
Bosco  
Boucher  
Boxer  
Brennan  
Brooks  
Brown (CA)  
Bruce  
Bryant  
Bustamante  
Byron  
Callahan  
Campbell  
Carr  
Chapman  
Clarke  
Clay  
Clinger  
Coble  
Coelho  
Coleman (MO)  
Coleman (TX)  
Collins  
Conte  
Conyers  
Cooper  
Coughlin  
Courter  
Coyne  
Crockett  
Darden  
Davis (MI)  
de la Garza  
DeFazio  
Dellums  
Dickinson  
Dingell  
Dixon  
Dorgan (ND)  
Dowdy  
Duncan  
Durbin  
Dymally  
Dyson  
Eckart  
Edwards (CA)  
Emerson  
English  
Erdreich  
Espy  
Evans  
Fascell  
Fazio  
Feighan  
Flake  
Flippo  
Foglietta  
Ford (MI)  
Ford (TN)  
Frank  
Gallo  
Garcia  
Gaydos

Waxman  
Weber  
Weiss  
Whittaker  
Wolf

## NOES—237

Glickman  
Gonzalez  
Gordon  
Grant  
Gray (IL)  
Guarini  
Hall (OH)  
Harris  
Hatcher  
Hawkins  
Hayes (IL)  
Hayes (LA)  
Hefner  
Henry  
Hertel  
Hochbrueckner  
Holloway  
Horton  
Howard  
Hoyer  
Hubbard  
Huckaby  
Hughes  
Hunter  
Jacobs  
Jenkins  
Johnson (SD)  
Jones (NC)  
Jones (TN)  
Jontz  
Kanjorski  
Kaptur  
Kennedy  
Kildee  
Kleczka  
Kolter  
Konnyu  
Kostmayer  
Kyl  
Lancaster  
Lantos  
Lehman (CA)  
Lehman (FL)  
Leland  
Levin (MI)  
Lewis (GA)  
Lipinski  
Lloyd  
Lott  
Lowery (CA)  
Manton  
Markey  
Martin (IL)  
Martinez  
Matsui  
Mavroules  
Mazzoli  
McCloskey  
McDade  
McMillan (NC)  
Mfume  
Mica  
Miller (OH)  
Mineta  
Moakley  
Mollohan  
Montgomery  
Moody  
Morrison (CT)  
Murphy  
Murtha  
Nagle  
Natcher  
Neal  
Nelson  
Nichols  
Nowak  
Oakar

Oberstar  
Obey  
Olin  
Ortiz  
Owens (NY)  
Owens (UT)  
Panetta  
Pashayan  
Patterson  
Pelosi  
Pepper  
Perkins  
Pickett  
Price (IL)  
Price (NC)  
Quillen  
Rahall  
Regula  
Richardson  
Ridge  
Rinaldo  
Ritter  
Rodino  
Roe  
Rogers  
Rose  
Roth  
Roukema  
Rowland (GA)  
Russo  
Sabo  
Sawyer  
Schneider  
Schuette  
Sharp  
Shuster  
Sikorski  
Slitsky  
Skelton  
Slattery  
Slaughter (NY)  
Smith (FL)  
Smith (NJ)  
Snowe  
Solarz  
Spratt  
St Germain  
Staggers  
Stallings  
Stark  
Stokes  
Studds  
Stump  
Sundquist  
Synar  
Tallon  
Thomas (CA)  
Thomas (GA)  
Torres  
Torrice  
Towns  
Traficant  
Traxler  
Udall  
Valentine  
Vento  
Visclosky  
Volkmer  
Walgren  
Watkins  
Wheat  
Whitten  
Williams  
Wilson  
Wise  
Wolpe  
Yates  
Yatron  
Young (AK)

## NOT VOTING—29

Boland  
Boner (TN)  
Bonior (MI)  
Daniel  
Dannemeyer  
Donnelly  
Dwyer  
Florio  
Gephardt  
Gilman

Gray (PA)  
Ireland  
Kennelly  
Leath (TX)  
Lewis (FL)  
Livingston  
Lukens, Donald  
Miller (CA)  
Rangel  
Ray

Roemer  
Rostenkowski  
Roybal  
Savage  
Shaw  
Smith (IA)  
Stratton  
Tauzin  
Weldon



□ 1520

The Clerk announced the following pair:

On this vote:

Mr. Lewis of Florida for, with Mr. Bonior of Michigan against.

Mr. YATES, Mr. JACOBS, Miss SCHNEIDER, and Mr. KYL changed their votes from "aye" to "no."

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma changed his vote from "no" to "aye."

So the amendment, as amended, was rejected.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

Mr. KONNYU. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to engage in a colloquy to pose a few questions to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. MICA], the chairman of the Subcommittee on International Operations, pertaining to section 303 of the authorization bill.

Mr. Chairman, some interest, and certainly concern, has been expressed to me regarding the perceived negative impact the current definition of "United States person" will have on competition for various contracts to be awarded by the Voice of America under its modernization program.

As I interpret this provision, a U.S. contractor can be considered for award of a contract under this program only if it has achieved a total business equal to or greater than the value of the project being bid in 3 years of the 5-year period prior to the issuance of the RFP or IFB.

While I support the intent of the provision to ensure that proposals from only qualified contractors be considered, I am concerned that a number of qualified U.S. contractors, particularly in the high-technology areas such as radio transmission and antenna manufacturing, would be deprived from competing for these contracts because they do not meet the extreme size standards of this provision. I also understand that the USIA, which oversees the VOA Modernization Program, also shares these concerns and believes that in some instances, the language will exempt any U.S. manufacturer from competing.

My questions are, is the chairman aware of the possible negative impact this language will have on competition for these contracts, and can I have the assurances of the chairman that these concerns are adequately addressed when the House goes to conference with the Senate on this bill?

Mr. MICA. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. KONNYU. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.

Mr. MICA. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, the intent of section 303 of the bill is to allow competent and financially sound U.S. manufac-

turers the opportunity to compete for contracts to be awarded under the VOA Modernization Program; a program of unprecedented size and expense. This provision also is designed to grant those U.S. contractors a preference in competing with certain foreign manufacturers due to the national security implications of this program.

In the event of a world crisis, U.S. national security interests will be enhanced by having U.S. manufactured components in place at the various VOA facilities throughout the world. This provision is also designed to insure that an uninterrupted supply of equipment and spare parts exists for these facilities in the event such a crisis occurs.

It was not the intent of the committee to exclude any competent U.S. manufacturers from competing for contracts under this program. The gentleman from California has my assurances that the committee will address this situation in conference with the Senate.

Mr. KONNYU. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Florida for his assurances.

Mr. SCHEUER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

Mr. Chairman, yesterday the House passed an amendment offered by the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. OBERSTAR] to authorize \$3.1 million funding for fiscal years 1988 and 1989 for consulates scheduled to be closed by the State Department this year in Germany, Sweden, Italy, France, and Austria.

I supported that amendment with particular concern for the U.S. consulate in Strasbourg, France. It is the understanding of the gentleman from Florida that the Oberstar amendment will keep the U.S. consulate in Strasbourg open?

Mr. MICA. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SCHEUER. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Florida.

Mr. MICA. Mr. Chairman, absolutely that is the understanding of the U.S. consulate in Strasbourg, France. It is covered by the Oberstar amendment.

If it had not been the Oberstar amendment, it would have been the Scheuer amendment. The gentleman has explained and expressed his concern time and again over this very important issue.

It is of great personal interest to the gentleman.

Mr. SCHEUER. As the gentleman from Florida is aware, Strasbourg is where the Council of Europe sits, along with the European Court, and the European Commission of Human Rights. Does the gentleman from Florida agree that the Strasbourg consulate plays an important role for the United States in Europe, and should not be closed.

Mr. MICA. Yes. The Strasbourg consulate provides the United States with valuable opportunities for formal and informal contact with the European institutions located in Strasbourg, and should not be closed.

Mr. SCHEUER. It has been suggested by some that the United States might continue its relationship with the Council of Europe from its mission in Brussels. Would the gentleman agree that such a long distance relationship with the council, which has no activities in Brussels, place in jeopardy the very close relations we now enjoy.

Mr. MICA. Yes. In fact, removal of the consulate from Strasbourg may be taken as a sign that the United States no longer maintains the level of interest in the Council of Europe it has expressed in the past.

Mr. SCHEUER. There would be great angst in Strasbourg, compounded by bewilderment and resentment if we were to close that consulate. Indeed, citizens of Strasbourg have picketed our consulate relative to our presence there. However, contrary to the usual "Yanks, go home" message, the concerned citizens of Strasbourg have sent us a contrary and welcome signal: Their placard read—"Yanks, stay!" We should value and cherish that kind of picketing, and act on it by determining to keep that consular window open on these three great European organizations, as well as a myriad of other important matters.

I thank the gentleman for his time, and look forward to working with him to ensure acceptance of this provision in conference with the other body.

Mr. HERTEL. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word. Mr. Chairman, I was greatly disturbed and angered to learn that the State Department has recommended that the special immigration status of some 10,000 Polish nationals that are currently residing in this country be revoked.

Since Poland declared martial law in 1981, these people have resided here under voluntary departure status in order to preserve their freedom, and in some cases, their lives. As we all know, the Polish Government declared martial law to crush the Solidarity labor movement and deny the Polish people the right to protest unfair actions of their government. The United States viewed that action most seriously, downgraded the diplomatic relations between our country and Poland, and imposed sanctions as an indication of our disgust with the Communist government's denial of the Polish people's basic human rights.

My first reaction to this news was to question if this was really the U.S. Department of State proposing this action. The United States should not be in the practice of deporting good and honest people who seek freedom

to Communist countries. Clearly, many of these people will be torn away from relatives and possibly children who are American citizens, and we will fear for their safety at the hands of their government.

Mr. Chairman, I think we ought to take serious note of and condemn these actions by our Department of State, and I would recommend that the Congress both look into this matter and take a firm stand on behalf of the Polish people seeking to remain free of Communist dictatorship.

In this regard, Mr. Chairman, I am introducing a resolution at this time expressing our concern in this matter, urging the Secretary of State to recommend the continued extension of voluntary departure status for the nationals of Poland in the United States, and urging the Attorney General to agree to the extension.

Mr. MICA. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HERTEL. I yield to the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Mica.

Mr. MICA. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I thank the gentleman for his comments on this most important matter and wish to state that I share his concerns. The gentleman raises serious issues that should be addressed and I would like to assure him that we are ready to work with him in resolving this problem as expeditiously as possible.

Mr. HERTEL. I thank the chairman for his concern for the Polish people.

Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

Mr. Chairman, I will not offer an amendment that was printed in the RECORD, because it is my understanding that there would be a point of order made against it; but I would like to discuss the amendment briefly, so that the Members will support it on a later bill.

What the amendment would do is remove the most-favored-nation trade status from those nations that sponsor state terrorism.

The State Department at this date maintains a list of those nations that condone and sponsor terrorism. Syria is on that list. Libya is on that list. Iran is on that list, but even though these nations are listed as sponsoring terrorism, they continue to have most-favored-nation status.

I think this is inexcusable, and I think that that most-favored-nation trade status should be removed.

□ 1535

My amendment has been sponsored by a broad cross-section of the House of Representatives. The distinguished Congressman from Arizona [Mr. UDALL] is my original sponsor on the Democratic side of the aisle. We have in the neighborhood of 70 to 80 co-

sponsors of both parties, moderates, liberals, and conservatives. It is an excellent amendment. I am hopeful that at some point in time we can bring it on the floor, debate it and pass it, because there is a situation before this body that is inexcusable, that we allow nations that sponsor terrorism to continue to receive most-favored-nation trade status. I hope that at some point in the future we do something about that.

Mr. CHAIRMAN. Are there any further amendments to title III?

If not, the Clerk will designate title IV.

The text of title IV is as follows:

#### TITLE IV—BOARD FOR INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING

##### SEC. 401. AUTHORIZATIONS OF APPROPRIATIONS.

(a) FISCAL YEARS 1988 AND 1989.—Subparagraph (A) of section 8(a)(1) of the Board of International Broadcasting Act of 1973 (22 U.S.C. 2877(a)(1)(A)) is amended to read as follows:

“(A) \$170,600,000 for the fiscal year 1988 and \$219,424,000 for the fiscal year 1989; and”.

(b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by subsection (a) shall take effect October 1, 1987.

##### SEC. 402. RESERVE FOR OFFSETTING DOWNWARD FLUCTUATIONS IN OVERSEAS RATES.

Section 8(b) of the Board of International Broadcasting Act of 1973 (22 U.S.C. 2877(b)) is amended by inserting after “RFE/RL, Incorporated,” the following: “shall be certified to the Congress by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget and placed in reserve in a separate account in the Treasury only for the purpose of offsetting future downward fluctuations in foreign currency exchange rates in order to maintain the level of operations authorized for each fiscal year. Any such amount”.

##### SEC. 403. CERTIFICATION OF CERTAIN CREDITABLE SERVICE.

The third to last sentence of section 8332(b) of title 5, United States Code, is amended by inserting “, and the Secretary of State with respect to the Asia Foundation and the Secretary of Defense with respect to the Armed Forces Network, Europe (AFN-E),” after “Board for International Broadcasting”.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any amendments to title IV?

If not, the Clerk will designate title V.

The text of title V is as follows:

#### TITLE V—ASIA FOUNDATION

##### SEC. 501. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

(a) FISCAL YEARS 1988 AND 1989.—Section 404 of the Asia Foundation Act (22 U.S.C. 4401 et seq.) is amended to read as follows: “SEC. 404. FUNDING.

“There is authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of State \$13,700,000 for the fiscal year 1988 and \$14,148,000 for the fiscal year 1989 for grants to The Asia Foundation pursuant to this title.”.

(b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by subsection (a) shall take effect October 1, 1987.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any amendments to title V?

If not, the Clerk will designate title VI.

The text of title VI is as follows:

#### TITLE VI—MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS.

##### SEC. 601. EFFECTIVE DATE.

Except as otherwise provided in this Act, this Act shall take effect on the date of its enactment.

Amend the title so as to read: “A bill to authorize appropriations for fiscal years 1988 and 1989 for the Department of State, the United States Information Agency, the Voice of America, the Board for International Broadcasting, and for other purposes.”.

##### AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. HUNTER

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk reads as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. HUNTER: Page 70, after line 16, add the following:

#### TITLE VII—TREATY OF MUTUAL COOPERATION AND SECURITY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN

##### SEC. 701. UNITED STATES EXPENDITURES IN CARRYING OUT THE TREATY OF MUTUAL COOPERATION AND SECURITY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN.

(a) FINDINGS.—The Congress finds that—

(1) Japan has prospered greatly under the security umbrella provided by the United States, rising from devastation to an economic superpower with the third largest gross national product in the world;

(2) the security of Asia and the free world is critical to the continued prosperity of Japan;

(3) Japan contributes proportionately less to defense than any other major industrialized nation;

(4) Japan is limited to how much it can increase its own defense program by political, and psychological constraints;

(5) Japan enjoys a \$58,600,000,000 balance of trade surplus with the United States;

(6) the United States taxpayer cannot be expected to indefinitely shoulder a disproportionate share of the burden of defending Japan and the free world;

(7) the current inequitable financial commitment by Japan to its defense and that of the free world threatens to undermine its relations with the United States;

(8) continued good relations between the United States and Japan are mutually beneficial and critical to the security and economic well-being of the free world;

(9) it would be unwise for Japan to dramatically increase the level of its own defense forces to meet modern security needs and commitments; and

(10) the people of Japan would undoubtedly welcome the opportunity to pay a fair share for the defense of their country.

JAPANESE DEFENSE SPENDING.—Within 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall seek to enter into negotiations with the Government of Japan for the purpose of increasing the amount spent in any year by the Government of Japan for defense to at least 3 percent of the gross national product of Japan for that year.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I have talked with the gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. NEAL] who is handling the matter on the other side of the aisle. We are going to ask unanimous consent that his amendment be offered first.



For that reason, I ask unanimous consent to withdraw my amendment at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. Could the Chair inquire as to whether the gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. NEAL] is offering his amendment as a substitute for the amendment offered by the gentleman from California [Mr. HUNTER]?

Mr. NEAL. Mr. Chairman, my intent is to offer my amendment. It is an amendment that was printed in the RECORD. It goes to the same subject matter as that of the gentleman from California [Mr. HUNTER].

The gentleman from California [Mr. HUNTER] and I do not agree totally on our amendments. It is my understanding that he will offer his as a substitute for mine.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California [Mr. HUNTER]?

There was no objection.

The CHAIRMAN. The amendment offered by the gentleman from California [Mr. HUNTER] is withdrawn.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. NEAL

Mr. NEAL. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. NEAL: Page 70, after line 16, add the following:

**TITLE VII—TREATY OF MUTUAL COOPERATION AND SECURITY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN**

SEC. 701. UNITED STATES EXPENDITURES IN CARRYING OUT THE TREATY OF MUTUAL COOPERATION AND SECURITY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN.

(a) FINDINGS.—The Congress finds that—

(1) Japan has prospered greatly under the security umbrella provided by the United States, rising from devastation to an economic superpower with the third largest gross national product in the world;

(2) the security of Asia and the free world is critical to the continued prosperity of Japan;

(3) Japan contributes proportionately less to defense than any other major industrialized nation;

(4) Japan is limited to how much it can increase its own defense program by political, and psychological constraints;

(5) Japan enjoys a \$58,600,000,000 balance of trade surplus with the United States;

(6) the United States taxpayer cannot be expected to indefinitely shoulder a disproportionate share of the burden of defending Japan and the free world;

(7) the current inequitable financial commitment by Japan to its defense and that of the free world threatens to undermine its relations with the United States;

(8) continued good relations between the United States and Japan are mutually beneficial and critical to the security and economic well-being of the free world;

(9) it would be unwise for Japan to dramatically increase the level of its own defense forces to meet modern security needs and commitments; and

(10) the people of Japan would undoubtedly welcome the opportunity to pay a fair share for the defense of their country.

(b) ANNUAL SECURITY FEE PAID TO UNITED STATES.—The President of the United States

should seek to negotiate an agreement with the Government of Japan, whereby that nation would pay an annual security fee to the United States Government equal to 2 percent of Japan's annual gross national product, to more equitably compensate the United States for expenditures related to carrying out the provisions of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan, and for the security of the free world.

Mr. NEAL (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the RECORD.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from North Carolina?

There was no objection.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. NEAL] is recognized for 5 minutes in support of his amendment.

Mr. MICA. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. NEAL. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from Florida.

Mr. MICA. Mr. Chairman, is it my understanding that we have an agreement between the gentleman to close off debate on these amendments in 30 minutes?

Mr. HUNTER. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. NEAL. Mr. Chairman, it was our understanding that I would have 15 minutes and the gentleman from California [Mr. HUNTER] would have 15 minutes and we would limit debate to that period of time.

Mr. HUNTER. That is my understanding.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman from North Carolina have a request?

Mr. NEAL. Mr. Chairman, I would make that unanimous-consent request, that we be allotted a half hour, 15 minutes to be controlled by me and 15 minutes to be controlled by the gentleman from California [Mr. HUNTER].

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from North Carolina?

Mr. SOLARZ. Reserving the right to object, Mr. Chairman, inasmuch as the authors of these two separate amendments are each trying to extract more from the Japanese, one in the form of a payment to us, the other in the form of more defense expenditures by them, and there are at least some around here who view both amendments as being ultimately not helpful to the very cause they seek to promote, could we have some assurances that the gentleman who will be controlling the time in this debate will relinquish at least a small portion of it to those who might have a contrary perspective on these proposals?

Mr. NEAL. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield, I will be delighted to yield a very small, a little tiny portion of time—no, I would be happy to yield to the gentleman an adequate amount of time.

Mr. SOLARZ. I deeply appreciate the gentleman's offer.

Mr. NEAL. Does 5 minutes seem reasonable?

Mr. SOLARZ. Which I must say is worth much more than the sinking value of the dollar these days.

Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my reservation of objection.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from North Carolina?

Mr. MICA. Reserving the right to object, Mr. Chairman, would the gentleman be considering modifying his request to make it 10, 10, and 10?

Mr. NEAL. Ten for the gentleman from California [Mr. HUNTER], 10 for me, and 10 for who?

Mr. MICA. The gentleman can give it to the chairman or to the gentleman from New York [Mr. SOLARZ]. I just ask this in an effort to be fair.

Mr. NEAL. Certainly, I will be delighted to yield that much.

Mr. MICA. Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my reservation of objection.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from North Carolina?

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Reserving the right to object, Mr. Chairman, let me ask the gentleman from California, who was in a private colloquy, did the gentleman hear the agreement that was just made?

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield, I heard the previous agreement for the 30-minute division of time between myself and the gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. NEAL].

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. No, it has been changed now. There are three parties involved. Does the gentleman have any problem with that?

Mr. HUNTER. I would have to ask the gentleman from New York [Mr. SOLARZ], if the gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. NEAL] will yield to the gentleman from New York [Mr. SOLARZ] and how much time the gentleman would take out of our 30 minutes?

Mr. SOLARZ. Under this proposal, Mr. Chairman, I would be given 10 minutes. I do not need all of it myself. I do not know if there is anybody else brave enough to speak up against either of these amendments. If they are, I do not want to preclude them from participating.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I thank my friend for asking me.

I know the gentleman from New York [Mr. SOLARZ] is opposed to both amendments. That really restricts the amount of time that the gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. NEAL] and I have to explain our amendments to a point where I think we could not adequately do that job.

I cannot agree to the unanimous-consent request, unless we can get some more time.

Mr. NEAL. Mr. Chairman, since we cannot have agreement, I would be happy to yield at least 5 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. SOLARZ].

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate that, and since I have no desire to be an obstructionist with respect to proposals that I suspect will be adopted in spite of my eloquent pleas to reject them, I will be happy to go along.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Further reserving the right to object, Mr. Chairman, I just want to make sure I understand. This time sequence we are talking about now applies only to this amendment?

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will state the unanimous consent request as the Chair understands it and ask if there are any objections.

The unanimous-consent request is that 30 minutes be devoted to the Neal amendment and all amendments thereto, to be divided equally between the gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. NEAL] and the gentleman from California [Mr. HUNTER].

Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from North Carolina?

There was no objection.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. NEAL] is recognized for 15 minutes.

Mr. NEAL. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, it is clear to all of us that Japan has prospered greatly over the years under the security umbrella provided by the United States. At the end of the Second World War Japan was devastated. Now it is one of the world's great superpowers.

It is clear that the security of Japan depends on the security of all of Asia.

Japan is prosperous. They are running enormous trade surpluses. It is clear that they could help a little bit with paying the bills for this defense umbrella.

I think it is also clear that the United States taxpayer cannot be expected to indefinitely shoulder a disproportionate share of the burden of defending Japan and the rest of the free world.

So my resolution urges that the President of the United States seek to negotiate with the Government of Japan an agreement whereby Japan would help pay to the United States part of this burden. We suggest 2 percent of the gross national product, a modest fee.

By the way, when I first introduced this proposal back in 1981, a number of the members of the Japanese media contacted me. They could see that it was a perfectly fair and reasonable idea. In fact, one of them asked me, he said, "We understand that this will be

seen as fair. Do you think it could be a little less than 2 percent?"

I said, "Well, I suggest 2 percent, but let's talk about it a little bit. I am sure we could reduce that a little bit if necessary."

The whole point is to try to get Japan to help shoulder a bit of this burden.

The gentleman from California [Mr. HUNTER] has proposed or will be proposing an amendment to mine, but he would have Japan rearm.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I think that would be a very dangerous situation for the free world. Japan at one time or another in its history occupied part of Korea, the Philippines, Taiwan, part of China, and I think a major rearmament on the part of Japan would scare the life out of the people of those Asian countries and be very counterproductive; so there is a very essential difference between these two approaches.

My approach urges that Japan help shoulder some of the burden. The approach by the gentleman from California urges Japan to rearm.

Mr. SCHEUER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. NEAL. I would be glad to yield for about a minute. We are operating under a time limitation, but I will yield to my friend the gentleman from New York [Mr. SCHEUER].

Mr. SCHEUER. Mr. Chairman, just to underscore the point the gentleman is making about the gross undesirability of requiring Japan to rearm, does not her constitution, which we in effect wrote for her under the MacArthur regime prevent her from rearming and becoming a major military power in the Pacific Rim?

Mr. NEAL. The distinguished gentleman is absolutely correct.

Mr. SCHEUER. I think they would have to change their constitution even to exceed 1 percent.

Mr. NEAL. Yes, that is my understanding also. I thank the gentleman, and I reserve the balance of my time.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. HUNTER AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR THE AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. NEAL

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment as a substitute for the amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. HUNTER as a substitute for the amendment offered by Mr. NEAL: Page 70, after line 16, add the following:

TITLE VII—TREATY OF MUTUAL COOPERATION AND SECURITY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN

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(a) FINDINGS.—The Congress finds that—

(1) Japan has prospered greatly under the security umbrella provided by the United States, rising from devastation to an eco-

nomie superpower with the third largest gross national product in the world;

(2) the security of Asia and the free world is critical to the continued prosperity of Japan;

(3) Japan contributes proportionately less to defense than any other major industrialized nation;

(4) Japan is limited to how much it can increase its own defense program by political, and psychological constraints;

(5) Japan enjoys a \$58,600,000,000 balance of trade surplus with the United States;

(6) the United States taxpayer cannot be expected to indefinitely shoulder a disproportionate share of the burden of defending Japan and the free world;

(7) the current inequitable financial commitment by Japan to its defense and that of the free world threatens to undermine its relations with the United States;

(8) continued good relations between the United States and Japan are mutually beneficial and critical to the security and economic well-being of the free world;

(9) it would be unwise for Japan to dramatically increase the level of its own defense forces to meet modern security needs and commitments; and

(10) the people of Japan would undoubtedly welcome the opportunity to pay a fair share for the defense of their country.

(b) JAPANESE DEFENSE SPENDING.—Within 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall seek to enter into negotiations with the Government of Japan for the purpose of increasing the amount spent in any year by the Government of Japan for defense to at least 3 percent of the gross national product of Japan for that year.

□ 1550

Mr. HUNTER (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the substitute amendment be considered as read and printed in the RECORD.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

There was no objection.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 3 minutes.

Mr. Chairman, this amendment is very similar to the amendment offered by the gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. NEAL], and in fact it includes and incorporates his findings to the effect that the United States has largely borne the burden of the defense of the free world disproportionate to our share of the free world's gross national product, to our share of the world's commerce, to our own productivity and commerce, and that Japan has not borne its fair share of the defense of the free world.

Very specifically, Mr. Chairman, the gross national product of Japan if Japan spent as much of its GNP on defense as we spent, about 6 percent, they would have spent for the defense of the free world this year \$110 billion. They saved \$110 billion by not bearing their fair share of the defense of the free world.

I think what has happened in the Middle East has very clearly pointed



out to us and to them that we are inextricably intertwined and interdependent on the sea lanes of the free world. Japan takes some 60 percent of its petroleum through the Straits of Hormuz, which we are presently protecting. We take about 10 percent of our petroleum through those straits, and yet we are required to be the world's policeman in that area and they are allowed to be the world's salesman without the burden of defending their sea lanes or our sea lanes.

This amendment says that we ask the Secretary of State to enter negotiations with Japan for the purpose of enlarging their defense burden or their expenditures on the defense of the free world. Right now they are spending right at 1 percent of their GNP, and let me say to my colleagues, the Constitution of Japan does not say that they can only spend 1 percent. That is a myth. Nowhere in the Constitution of Japan does it say, "We can only spend 1 percent of our GNP on national defense." That is a policy that was adopted by a recent Japanese administration, but that is not the content of the constitution.

They do say that they will not engage in aggressive warfare, that they want to renounce war. Yet they do acknowledge the fact that they have to be engaged in the defense of their country.

There are a lot of things that they could do to support the defense of the free world. They could build defenses against the SS-21 and -23 missiles that the Soviet Union will be emplacing in positions closer and closer to the Japanese mainland. They could build hospitals for service people. They could engage in military construction. They could provide defense moneys to areas of the world, such as the Middle East, where we are basically shouldering the entire burden of the expenditures that go to countries like Israel and Egypt. There are many areas where the Japanese could contribute, and all that this does is request the Secretary to engage in negotiations with the Japanese for the purpose of bringing their defense level up to half of what ours is in relation to its GNP. We spend 6 percent of our GNP on defense, about 7, they spend 3 percent of their GNP on defense. And that is the essence of the Hunter substitute.

The Hunter substitute gives the Japanese or gives our Secretary of State the requirement of negotiating with the Japanese for purposes of raising their defense spending.

Mr. McMILLAN of North Carolina. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Hunter amendment.

Three percent may not be the right amount for Japan to contribute—maybe it should be 6 percent—but I support this amendment as it does take a significant step toward addressing this vital issue.

Japan, with a GNP of \$1,116 trillion, one of the strongest growth economies, spends just 1 percent of this GNP on defense—\$12 billion in contrast to our \$290 billion.

Japan has a trade surplus of \$50 billion with the United States.

It is clear that the United States can no longer continue to bear the lion's share of the free world's defense and it is time for Japan to recognize this and to increase their defense commitments accordingly. Japan is no longer the war-devastated country it was in 1945 and, given its low defense commitments relative to GNP, the size and strength of its economy, and its annual trade surplus, and its enjoyment of peace and security in the Pacific, this amendment is a step in the right direction.

The time has come for the United States to enter into sincere, focused negotiations designed to encourage our great ally, Japan, to increase its defense expenditures.

The resulting increase would significantly reduce the pressure on the United States to finance the defense of the free world.

I urge my colleagues to support the Hunter amendment.

Mr. Chairman, This amendment is consistent with my sense of Congress resolution described as follows:

#### ANALYSIS OF McMILLAN DEFENSE ALLIANCE PROPOSAL

The purpose of this legislation is to establish the "sense of Congress" that the United States should enter into negotiations with countries which participate in a common defense alliance with the U.S. for the purpose of establishing a more equitable apportionment of the burden of financial support for the alliance, particularly NATO and our defense agreement with Japan.

Though it is clearly an insufficient means of measuring commitment to an alliance, many of our major allies spend considerably less than 4 percent of their GDP on defense while the U.S. is spending approximately 6.7 percent. Japan represents the most severe instance, spending just 1.004 percent of its very healthy GDP on defense. It is clear from the attached figures that Japan's low defense spending significantly lowers the overall allied defense spending as a percentage of GDP.

This is a solid effort to bring this critical issue to the forefront of our treaty relationships. Even taking into consideration the very real growth in defense expenditures by the NATO countries during the 1970's, the reliance on conscript manpower for military personnel which results in lower manpower costs than would an all volunteer force, and other relevant allied economic burdens such as the loss of relatively greater rent and tax revenue due to the large amount of real estate devoted to defense purposes, it is obvious that some NATO countries and Japan are making financial contributions below their fair share.

This amendment does not mandate any punitive, unilateral action on the part of the U.S. if immediate progress is not made on this issue because negotiation must be the focal point. Unilateral pronouncements by the United States on the extent to which our allies are or are not sharing the burden are not an effective formula for encouraging improved allied efforts.

A more equitable apportionment of the common defense burden can be realized if the countries currently underfinancing the common defense effort were to increase

their respective defense budgets. The resulting increase would allow these countries either (1) to increase the overall level of their military commitments to the alliance, commensurate with the level and quality of the forces the United States would then be able to withdraw, or (2) to enter into a system of direct payments to the U.S. in order to offset the cost of the U.S. commitment of forces.

A point of reference would be for our allies to achieve a net shift of \$60 billion over five years as a minimum commitment in support of common treaty objectives. This would represent a 1.5% increase in defense spending relative to the aggregate NATO and Japanese GDP.

Development of a negotiating strategy should take into account foreign assistance in support of common treaty goals.

#### GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, DEFENSE EXPENDITURES AND U.S. TRADE BALANCES

[1984 constant dollars in billions]

Country	GDP	Defense budget	Defense spending as percent of GDP	Trade balance
United States	3,635	231.46	6.5	NA
Japan	1,166	11.69	1.0	-49.8
West Germany	613	20.12	3.3	-15.6
France	489	20.21	4.1	-3.4
United Kingdom	425	23.40	5.3	-4.6
Italy	348	9.35	2.7	-6.5
Canada	332	7.53	2.2	-23.3
Spain	161	4.67	2.9	-0.3
Netherlands	123	3.98	3.2	+3.5
Belgium	76	2.45	3.2	+1.2
Norway	55	1.55	2.8	-0.2
Denmark	55	1.26	2.3	-1.1
Turkey	50	2.19	4.4	+0.5
Greece	33	2.41	7.2	NA
Portugal	19	.63	3.3	NA
Luxembourg	3	.04	1.2	NA
Non-U.S. NATO	2,783	99.80	3.5	-49.8
Non-U.S. NATO plus Japan	3,950	111.49	2.8	-106.6
Total NATO	6,418	331.26	5.2	NA
Total NATO plus Japan	7,584	342.95	4.6	NA

\* 1986 Department of Commerce figures.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. RITTER TO THE AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. HUNTER AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR THE AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. NEAL

Mr. RITTER. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment to the amendment offered as a substitute for the amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. RITTER to the amendment offered by Mr. HUNTER as a substitute for the amendment offered by Mr. NEAL: Strike out the final period of subsection (b) and insert in lieu thereof: ", or of obtaining payment by Japan to the United States of this amount by which such percentage amount exceeds the amount spent by Japan for defense in such year."

Mr. RITTER (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the RECORD.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Pennsylvania?

There was no objection.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. RITTER].

Mr. RITTER. Mr. Chairman, what my amendment does, very simply, is give Japan the alternative of either increasing their defense expenditures to 3 percent of their gross national product, or paying a fee in the same sense that the Neal amendment seeks a fee, for the difference between 3 percent and 1 percent.

We have already heard that our GNP percentage for defense is 7 percent.

Mr. Chairman, this issue goes to the heart of U.S. industrial and technological competitiveness. We are talking about an extraordinary burden placed on the United States that is not placed on our key competitors. If 3 percent of GNP would have been spent by the Japanese on average over the last 5 years, an additional \$239 billion would have been put toward the defense of freedom, democracy, open trade routes, and capitalism.

Mr. Chairman, the cost of protecting open markets in the free world should be borne more evenly and more proportionately by those who benefit. We had a \$58 billion trade deficit with Japan in 1986. While we invent the next set of avionics for a fighter aircraft, the Japanese build high-definition television. They build VCR's and compact disks and we promote guidance systems for nuclear missiles out of our economy.

Keeping the Panama Canal, Suez Canal, Indian Ocean, and so many other strategic shipping lanes open is as much or more in Japan's interest than it is in ours. An open and expanding world economy protected from our adversaries is as much or more in Japan's interest than it is in ours. Our budget deficit would have disappeared long ago if we spent the same proportion of GNP on defense that Japan does.

Japan has the second largest economy in the world. They had a \$1.963 trillion economy in 1986. They had an inflation rate of 1 percent and an unemployment rate of 2.8 percent in the same period. Our trade deficit in 1986 was \$166 billion. It is \$50 billion in the first 3 months of 1987.

What we are asking for is modest, it is simple, we are asking them to spend half of what we spend on defense as a share of GNP. And, in the event that the Japanese political system does not allow the expenditures of 3 percent of gross national product, all we are asking is that they contribute to the defense of the free world, which is so important to their global exporting economy, by compensating the United States for doing it for them.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. RITTER. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to say that I agree with the gentleman's amendment to my amendment. Basically the amendment of the gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. NEAL] asks the Japanese to pay the difference between 3 percent that they should be spending on defense and the 1 percent of their gross national product that they in reality are spending on defense.

My amendment asks them to spend that money, to spend that 2 percent on defense, and what the amendment of the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. RITTER] says is that they have the option. It says that the Japanese can either increase defense spending to 3 percent or they can pay that difference to the United States if we are going to provide the fleet protection, the power projection, and the protection of sea lanes around the world that Japan depends upon, that they can pay and help us to bring some of that budget deficit that Mr. Nakasone was complaining to Mr. Reagan about in a recent meeting.

So I commend the gentleman, and I think that it is a good amendment, and I think that it incorporates the best of the Neal amendment in my amendment.

Mr. RITTER. Mr. Chairman, I think that we are quite close with the Neal amendment. The Neal amendment asks for a 2-percent fee, and we are giving the Japanese the alternative of either spending 3 percent of GNP on defense or helping the United States to pay for its defense burden between whatever they do spend on defense and the 3-percent level.

Mr. NEAL. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 30 seconds.

Mr. Chairman, I just want to say that I appreciate that there is a great similarity between the two approaches now, but I want to say how strongly I feel that we should not in any way encourage Japan to rearm. I think that if we were to do that and in fact if Japan were to rearm significantly that it would put fear in the hearts of the residents of most of Asia and would not serve our interests at all.

So the real difference between the two amendments now is whether or not we want to urge Japan to rearm itself or whether we want to bear some of the burden that we have been bearing all of these years in protecting, as the gentleman pointed out, the sea lanes, the chokepoints of the world.

I would hope that we would adopt the fee provision and not the rearmament.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. SOLARZ].

Mr. SOLARZ. I thank the gentleman for yielding time to me.

Mr. Chairman, there is nobody in the House for whom I have greater affection than the gentleman from North Carolina. I wish that I could say the same about his amendment, but unfortunately, I cannot.

I do not think there is anybody here who would dispute that Japan could contribute more to its own defense. I do not think there is anybody here who would dispute the desirability of persuading Japan to contribute more to its own defense. That would be beneficial to them and it would clearly be beneficial to us.

I must say, however, I have the greatest reservations about the efficacy of the approach which has been adopted by the gentlemen whose amendments are before us at this time. I support their ends but I deplore their means, because I think the means they have chosen are likely to be entirely counterproductive.

Take the first of all of the amendments offered by my very dear friend, the gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. NEAL], which calls for the negotiation of a security fee which Japan would have to pay to the United States equivalent to 2 percent of their GNP. That comes, by the way, to approximately \$50 billion. That is what we would be asking the Japanese to pay us. I fear that if the Neal amendment were to be adopted, it would put the United States in the business of running the international equivalent of a protection racket.

We are not in Japan as a favor to the Japanese, we are in Japan as a favor to ourselves because we believe the defense of Japan serves the best interest of the United States. If we want the Japanese to spend more, the way to get them to spend more on defense is not to adopt resolutions, in effect, imposing fixed fees on them, but rather to have the kind of candid and hopefully constructive dialog which one has with one's allies rather than the kind of preemptory negotiations which one may have with one's colonies. Japan is not a colony of the United States. It is a friend and an ally.

May I say that when it comes to defense spending, while there is, obviously, room for a significant increase in Japanese defense spending, we often underestimate the extent to which they are contributing to their defense and to our common security interests in the region. For example, it has been said they are spending 1 percent of GNP on defense. It is true, that is what they say. But by NATO accounting standards, which is what we apply to ourselves and to all of our European allies, they are spending 1½ percent of GNP.

We have bases in Japan. We are not paying them rent for those bases. They are contributing \$1.5 billion to



the upkeep of those facilities. They are spending more on foreign aid, much of it at our request, than any other country in the world other than the United States.

So there are many ways in which they are contributing not only to their defense but to our mutual security. Over the course of the last decade, in fact, Japan has increased its defense spending on an annual basis by an average of 5.4 percent a year in real terms, which is a higher steady and sustained percentage increase than all of our other allies.

Let me point out to my friend from North Carolina that if Japan is spending 1½ percent of its GNP on defense, and the gentleman is asking for a 2-percent fee, that means they would be spending the rough equivalent of 3½ percent of their GNP on security related matters.

The gentleman may be interested to know that by that standard if we were going to be consistent we would have to impose security fees on Canada, which is spending 2.3 percent of GNP on defense, Italy, which only is spending 2.8 percent of its GNP on defense, on Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, Belgium, and other countries as well. What kind of an alliance would we end up with if we went to every nation with which we are allied and if we said if your total spending on defense is less than 3½ percent of GNP we are going to send you a fee for the difference?

It might be nice, and it would be wonderful if they gave us money. But my friends, they are not going to do it. You know it and I know it.

The real question is, Does the adoption of this resolution result in a greater propensity on the part of Japan to spend more on defense? I would submit that we would have a better chance of getting them to spend more on defense if we dropped talk about fees, if we dropped talk about fixed percentages.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from New York [Mr. SOLARZ] has expired.

Mr. NEAL. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for his generosity in yielding. I only hope that the President is equally accommodating with the Japanese when he gets into negotiations pursuant to the adoption of one of these amendments. I labor under no illusion that my plea for prudence will prevail, but I do say in all sincerity if we had dropped references to specific fees or specific amounts and instead called for friendly discussions on this issue, I think we would have a better chance of encouraging the Japanese to spend somewhat more on defense than they are now.

This kind of approach is not compatible with the approach one takes to a country that has cooperated with us in so many different ways.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 1 minute for a brief rejoinder to the gentleman from New York concerning the thrust of any amendment and the amendment of the gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. NEAL].

No. 1, all this legislation does is to direct the Secretary of State to enter negotiations, to talk with the Japanese about the possibility of raising their defense spending.

It does mention for the first time a figure, and the point is the Japanese are experts at the bottom line. Of course they would like to discuss the subject very generally, but then with the calculations that the gentleman from New York made saying they really spend 1½ percent of GNP on defense, that means they got a free ride last year to the tune of \$100 billion. With \$100 billion we could have an 800-ship Navy, we could match the Soviets in armor on the western front, we could have enormous seafight and airlift increases, and the West would be much more secure.

The point is the gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. NEAL], the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. RITTER] and I have simply directed the Secretary to enter negotiations, and again, once again the amendment as amended by the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. RITTER] gives them a choice. It says they can either increase their defense spending to 3 percent or pay us for the increased defense spending that we have had to undertake.

I simply say to the gentleman the time has come at least for Secretary Shultz to sit down and talk to the Japanese about specific figures. They are partners in world trade, they are a mature, sophisticated nation, and we want to keep them as partners in helping to defend the free world.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. RITTER].

Mr. RITTER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from California for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I want to point out that I have great respect for the achievements of the Japanese. They have led the world in manufacturing, led the world in bringing new commercial products into the consumer marketplace, led the world in consumer electronics. In fact, I have such great respect for the Japanese that I see that with the United States focusing its cutting edge technology efforts in the arena of defense, which I sense is very important for the defense of freedom and our way of life in this world. But, with us doing it and the Japanese not doing it, over time, cumulatively, year after year, the \$50 billion adds up to hundreds of billions of dollars, but primarily into consumer oriented world export industry, while we, the United States of America, supports free passage, supports the freedom of

peoples to conduct open market economies throughout the world. At that time, at that point, we are at a serious disadvantage.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New York [Mr. SOLOMON].

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, let me just say if my colleagues want a good reason to support either the Neal, Hunter, or Ritter amendments, let me just read from an article from the Wall Street Journal just the other day.

The article states:

[From the Wall Street Journal, June 12, 1987]

**JAPAN GAINS FROM AMERICAN EMBARGO AGAINST NICARAGUA**  
(By Clifford Krauss)

MANAGUA, NICARAGUA.—After the Reagan administration slapped a trade embargo on Nicaragua in May 1985, Xerox Corp.'s Nicaraguan unit couldn't get spare parts from the U.S. So Nicaraguan businessmen and government officials turned to Japanese-made Canon Inc. copiers.

Xerox lost contracts to service 800 copiers, more than half the number of such machines in the country. In the year before the embargo, Xerox de Nicaragua generated profit of \$2.1 million on revenue of \$8.6 million; last year, it incurred a loss of \$740,000 on revenue of \$2.2 million.

"I'm trying to tell the American Embassy that we're losing the market and the Japanese couldn't be happier," says Verona Gurdian de Somarriba, director-general of the Xerox unit. "Before the revolution, you used to see American cars on Nicaraguan streets; now all you see are Toyotas and Datsuns."

**BEST TRADING PARTNER**

Japan hasn't become a political ally of Managua. But since the U.S. embargo, Japan has become, with little effort, Nicaragua's best trading partner outside the Soviet bloc. And while Japanese trade with Nicaragua has slipped along with the war-strained economy here, representatives of U.S. corporations that still do business in the country say they lose \$40 million in annual sales to the Japanese.

(Dozens of American corporations continue to operate in Nicaragua, including Exxon Corp., International Business Machines Corp. and Colgate-Palmolive Co. They sometimes can get around the embargo by using subsidiaries based in other countries; although it's an expensive way to do business.)

Nicaraguan officials contend that U.S. companies have suffered more than the Sandinista government from the embargo. "We've become dependent of Japanese technology the way we used to be dependent on American technology," says Foreign Commerce Minister Alejandro Martinez Cuenca. Mr. Martinez Cuenca gestures to the Sanyo personal computer, purchased last year, that sits beside his desk.

Japanese diplomats stationed here are critical of the ruling Sandinistas, but they stress their nation's nonideological trade policy. "We live in a world with many ideologies, and we try to get along," says Japanese attache Takashi Tanaka.

**AID PROGRAM STOPPED**

Reagan administration officials, including Secretary of State George Shultz, have re-

peatedly urged Japan to downgrade its ties with Managua. Washington has even asked Tokyo not to invite top Sandinista officials to Japan. Such efforts apparently have had some success: Japan ended its small aid program here four years ago.

Washington has even less clout over Japanese trade, in large part because many Japanese products are brought into Nicaragua by the Sandinistas themselves. The Heroes & Martyrs Corp., a private trading company owned by Sandinista party officials, imports Japanese cars and Cannon copiers, mostly through Panama and other third countries. Komatsu Ltd. machinery, which was once marketed by the dictator Anastasio Somoza, is now imported by a holding company linked to Nicaragua's Construction Ministry.

Ricardo Mendoza Miranda, the local representative of Deere & Co. and Caterpillar Inc., says he's lost \$10 million in sales to Komatsu since the embargo began. "The Japanese don't even have to make an effort. The U.S. embargo opened the door for them," he says.

While giving a boost to Japanese-Nicaraguan trade and damaging Nicaraguan private enterprise, the embargo has failed to bring the Sandinistas to their knees. Western diplomats here estimate that the embargo caused a mere \$30 million in damages to the Nicaraguan economy between May 1985, when it was declared, through 1986.

When asked why the Japanese do not support our embargo against Nicaragua they say, "We don't let ideology interfere with our trade policy."

We, the United States, are forced to bear more than our fair share of the defense of the free world while the Japanese take advantage of it time and time again around the world. It is time that this stopped. They can well afford it. Let us pass any of these amendments, but let us pass them and get on with it.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. BURTON].

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, 60 percent of the oil that Japan gets comes through the Persian Gulf. They ought to be helping support the defense of the Straits of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf.

They are getting about a \$110 billion free ride, as I understand it, just last year, because of our providing for their defense needs. We have a \$58 billion trade deficit with them, and Toshiba, a Japanese company, just sold impellers to the Soviet Navy, which puts the United States at risk. It is going to translate into billions of dollars of additional defense expenditures for this country.

This should not go unnoticed, and I think it is absolutely imperative that the United States of America extract some quid pro quo from the Japanese, our good friends overseas.

For that reason, I think it is absolutely essential that one of these three pieces of legislation be passed today. I would prefer that they be in reverse order, but I urge the House of Repre-

sentatives to support this legislation 100 percent.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, how much time do we have remaining?

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from California [Mr. HUNTER] has 2½ minutes remaining and the gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. NEAL] has 4½ minutes remaining.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. EMERSON].

Mr. EMERSON. Mr. Chairman, I want to associate myself with the remarks of the gentleman from California [Mr. HUNTER] and the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. RITTER]. I think the arguments that have been made here today about not wanting Japan itself to rearm have a great deal of validity, but I certainly do not see any reason why Japan could not bear more of the burden of expense of helping to defend the West. I think they could do more than they are now doing in terms of promoting stability in the Mideast and in keeping the sear lanes of the world open.

So I think what is being asked by these gentlemen here, the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. RITTER] and the gentleman from California [Mr. HUNTER] is eminently fair. If anything, I think they probably do not go far enough. But I think what they have asked for is a good starting point.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. NEAL] indicates he has only one speaker and would like to close debate. Therefore, the Chair would ask the gentleman from California [Mr. HUNTER] to proceed to use his time.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. BARTON].

Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I would like to support the Hunter amendment and point out that the Japanese now spend in the neighborhood of \$22 billion per year on defense. If the Hunter amendment were passed and the Japanese did increase their defense spending by 3 percent, they would be spending \$66 billion. The United States today is spending \$280 billion.

If there is an example of why the Japanese need to spend more on defense, one only has to look to the Persian Gulf. I am sure many of the speakers have pointed that out in the debate.

There is not a prohibition in the Japanese Constitution against their spending more than 1 percent. There is a policy of the Japanese Government against their spending more than 1 percent. So if we as a nation, as our official policy were to go to them and ask them to increase defense spending in a very serious way and a systematic way, I think there is every likelihood that they would do so.

For all of these reasons, I urge adoption of the Hunter amendment.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from California [Mr. DORNAN].

Mr. DORNAN of California. Mr. Chairman, this has been an excellent debate. The problem is one can feel the heaviness in the air here, that this is a get-away afternoon. This should be debated on a Wednesday when we are all full of vigor, because this is one of the most important and constructive things we can do in this House, and I feel the bipartisanship here. I feel a consensus, and we do not have to bash the Japanese. We have to show them a way to burden share the defense of the free world.

I just wish this debate could take place next week at a more propitious time where it gets more focus, more press attention and the attention of all of our colleagues.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. McCOLLUM].

Mr. McCOLLUM. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I think this is simple. I rise to support the Ritter-Hunter-Neal effort today to get some commonsense discussions going between the Japanese and us. There is nothing here in any of this that is going to put any undue burden on the Japanese, there is going to be no restrictions or special hardships to them that are going to befall this. This is simply an effort to have negotiations on their participation in the common defense of our countries. I think it is long past overdue. Let us make this simple amendment get into the law. It is time to go vote for Ritter-Hunter-Neal.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from California [Mr. HUNTER] has 15 seconds remaining.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, this is a very moderate, sensible action. It calls for Secretary Shultz to negotiate with the Japanese, only to negotiate, to try to start bringing them up to the level of responsibility they should be at. It is reasonable.

I would urge passage of the Hunter-Ritter-Neal language that is before you now.

I yield back the balance of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. NEAL] is recognized for 4½ minutes to close debate.

Mr. NEAL. Mr. Chairman, I am in great sympathy with much of what I have heard here today. In fact, I do not see there is a lot of disagreement except on one point. I must say I feel strongly about this one point. The emphasis of the Hunter amendment, the heart of the Hunter amendment is to urge Japan to rearm, to rearm to the extent of 3 percent of its gross national product. That is about \$75 billion I



believe. It is a matter of judgment, as I said earlier, but I believe that anyone who spends time of foreign policy in that part of the world would tell you that that would be a very dangerous situation. It would strike fear in the hearts of our Asian friends and allies and simply would not begin to accomplish what we want. The Hunter amendment would urge Japan to rearm. Our amendment, on the other hand, urges that they spend more on the common defense. It says let us urge them to continue spending their 1 percent, we do not interfere, we do not think it is our business to interfere into the internal affairs of a good friend and partner, but we say, in addition to that, contribute a bit to the common defense for all reasons that have been mentioned here earlier, protecting the sealanes, protecting the flow of oil and so on.

So we urge negotiations to get them to spend some more on the common defense.

My good friend from New York talked about how much some of the other countries spend on defense. The fact of the matter is that Japan spends less of its GNP on defense than any developed country in the world. The closest to it, as my friend mentioned, were Canada at 2.2 percent, Denmark at 2.3 percent; even Belgium spends 3 percent, France 4 percent, Greece 7 percent, Netherlands 3.3, Norway 3.5, Portugal 3.5, Turkey 5 percent, United Kingdom, 5.5 percent.

So it is not unreasonable at all to ask Japan to contribute some more to the common defense of the free world. As I say, let us do it this way instead of urging Japan to rearm and scare their friends.

Mr. Chairman, it is time to send a clear signal to Japan that it must accept a much larger share of the cost for the regional security of Pacific Asia. My amendment to H.R. 1777, the State Department authorization bill, calls for negotiations aimed at persuading Japan to pay the United States a security fee equivalent to 2 percent of Japan's gross national product.

Mr. Chairman, the United States annually spends about 7 percent of its GNP on national defense, while Japan spends about 1 percent. In fact, Japan will exceed 1 percent for the first time this year. The average American taxpayer spends about \$759 a year on defense; the average Japanese, \$98.

The Japanese compete with us in markets throughout the world, using trade routes protected by an overworked and beleaguered United States Navy. Japan relies totally on the United States for the protection of Persian Gulf oil supplies, which provide about 60 percent of its petroleum needs and only about 7 percent of our own.

Free from the economic burden of defending its shores and sealanes, both near and far, Japan has been able to devote its resources to the quest for economic power—and now ranks second only to the United States in the world economy. When I first introduced this legislation to correct the situation in 1981, Japan enjoyed roughly a \$19 billion edge in trade with the United States; that figure has now almost tripled.

Mr. Chairman, West Germany, by comparison, stands third in the world economy behind Japan, whose GNP last year was twice as large as Germany's. Clearly less able than Japan to afford a deep military commitment, Germany nonetheless spent an amount equal to about 3½ percent of its GNP for defense last year. The Japanese security fee would raise Japan's contribution for its defense to a level almost as much as Germany's. My proposal is not intended to punish the Japanese for their economic success. In fact, the amount I am suggesting is trivial relative to the size of the Japanese economy.

If you agree that Japan has benefited from the security blanket provided, virtually cost-free, by the United States and should assume a more equitable share of the cost of this protection, please support my amendment.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. NEAL. I yield to my friend from New York [Mr. SOLARZ].

Mr. SOLARZ. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, would it be fair to characterize the amendment of the gentleman as a legislative version of Elliott Abrams' mission to Brunei?

Mr. NEAL. Well, that is not exactly the way I would characterize it, no. I would say the gentleman's earlier comment that if Japan were to pay a security fee that we somehow would be buccaneers, I cannot remember the language.

Mr. SOLARZ. The national equivalent of a protection racket.

Mr. NEAL. My response to that would be it seems to me that what we are doing now, for free, is protecting the freedom of the world and I would just urge that Japan help out a little bit.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. NEAL. I yield to the gentleman from California [Mr. HUNTER].

Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for his generosity and his courtesy. I just wanted to make one point that with Mr. RITTER's amendment the Hunter amendment does offer the Japanese the option of rebuilding national defense or paying the United States for the protection we have been providing.

Mr. NEAL. Yes, I understand. But the amendment of the gentleman from California urges them to rearm, that is a first priority. Then the gentleman says if they do not want to rearm, then chip in a little bit, as I have suggested. I really think that is the heart of the difference. Ours says, "We do not want you to rearm." That is not our business. In fact we do not want to encourage that at all. Let us not encourage Japan to rearm. Let us urge them to contribute to the common defense. I believe that is at the heart of the difference between us. I thank the gentleman and I yield back the balance of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. All time has expired.

The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. RITTER] to the amendment offered by the gentleman from California [Mr. HUNTER] as a substitute for the amendment offered by the gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. NEAL].

The amendment to the amendment offered as a substitute for the amendment was agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from California [Mr. HUNTER], as amended, as a substitute for the amendment offered by the gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. NEAL].

The amendment, offered as a substitute for the amendment, as amended, was agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. NEAL], as amended.

The amendment, as amended, was agreed to.

Mr. DORNAN of California. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

Mr. Chairman and my colleagues, just as I said in the last debate that you can feel this like a deadly autumn summer torpor, descending on this Chamber, when we are trying to discuss very, very serious issues that involve life and death, peace and freedom in our hemisphere. Just as with this last issue, I wish we were discussing this around noon on a Wednesday.

I am trying to accommodate my colleagues and expedite the time. So rather than offer an amendment that I consider to be very, very critical and serious to peace in this hemisphere, I will merely speak to the amendment, not offer it and then tell some of my colleagues why I am not offering it.

The amendment was to declare in international legal language a state of belligerency in that part of Africa that we call Angola. I am not going to offer this amendment, although I think it had an excellent chance of passing here not because the quality of the

debate would be so excellent but, to be very truthful, it seems like more people are left on our side than on the liberal side of some of these issues. I do not want to take unfair advantage of that, even on an issue where lives are involved. But because the Angolan Government, the Communist government which was so designated a Communist government a few weeks ago by unanimous vote in the Foreign Affairs Committee, the Communist Government in Angola is at this moment in delicate negotiations on a human rights issue involving a case which I was able to pursue a few years ago with success with two other Americans and I do not want to do anything that could be misconstrued by the Government of Angola as bashing them when they are trying to be accommodating on the importance of one human life.

But let me take the remainder of this 5 minutes to explain very simply what this state of belligerency would mean, what it would do with international law and why I am going to offer an amendment in a few moments to declare a state of belligerency in the nation of Nicaragua. Now back to Angola.

To declare a nation and a conflict in a nation a state of belligerency would involve a couple of hours of good serious debate on this House floor and it would elevate the whole African insurgency situation and the resistance in Nicaragua to the proper overt, open, robust, hard-fought debate in this House that I have always wanted. Maybe it would help to do away with covert/overt policies that have caused all of the acrimony, rotating week after week, back and forth between the Senate and the House in what is called Iranmock, Irangate or the Iran-Contra hearings. Now, the Iran-Contra hearings have been generating a very unexpected byproduct across this country. In 6 weeks the testimony given in those hearings has been able to convey a message to the American people that 6 years—and keep in mind I am a Reaganaut, not a Reaganite, someone who sailed with President Reagan in the primaries of 1980 and 4 years before that and all the way back to Miami in 1968—but in 6 weeks of lukewarm propagandizing, the Reagan administration has conclusively failed to do what 6 weeks of these Iran-Contra hearings are doing. And that is this simple message that a Cuban-Soviet subversive aggression in Central America is quite simply a politico-military fact of life. Somebody in this hemisphere has got to do something about it and most probably not alone. That has obviously got to be the leading nation in the free world and we have got to do it overtly because covert policies should not exist on the massive scale of the aid that we are giving to Angola, in the form of Stinger missiles, \$15 million last year, an-

other \$15 million, and another \$15 million. Most of these figures are supposed to be covert but what I am doing is quoting out of the general press, the New York Times to the L.A. Times. Now, this awareness that there is a Soviet-Cuban military operation taking place on the soil of North America, that there is a conflict now raging in Nicaragua that involves these foreign belligerents, they are the paid professional mercenaries, not Nicaraguans fighting on Nicaraguan soil, or Angolans fighting on Angolan soil under the command of General Savimbi out of Jamba.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California [Mr. DORNAN] has expired.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. DORNAN OF CALIFORNIA

Mr. DORNAN of California. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. DORNAN of California: Add the following new title at the end of the bill:

TITLE VII—NICARAGUA

SEC. 701. RECOGNIZING A STATE OF BELLIGERENCY IN THE REPUBLIC OF NICARAGUA.

(a) FINDINGS.—The Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The Marxist government of the Republic of Nicaragua has not adhered to its 1979 commitments to the Organization of American States to implement a representative democracy, to respect human rights, and to pursue a policy of nonalignment.

(1) The Fifth Assembly of the United Nicaraguan Opposition met in Miami, Florida, in May 1987 in order to achieve greater unification among all segments of Nicaraguan society opposed to the Sandinista regime, and at that meeting the United Nicaraguan Opposition agreed to reorganize as the "Nicaraguan Resistance".

(3) The Nicaraguan Resistance is composed of 54 representatives, comprising all political groups opposed to the Sandinista regime, without excluding any ideological movement.

(4) The Nicaraguan Resistance is dedicated to fostering a national reconciliation in the Republic of Nicaragua with a genuinely representative form of government that is respectful of human rights and is truly non-aligned.

(5) The Nicaraguan Resistance is a legitimate political contestant to the Soviet-Cuban-backed Sandinista regime in the Republic of Nicaragua.

(6) When a country recognizes insurgents as a belligerent power in another country, the insurgents are not considered to be criminal, such recognition presupposes the existence of civil war in the country of the insurgency, and the belligerent community (including the geographic area under the control of the insurgents and the population supporting the insurgents) resembles a state under international law.

(b) SENSE OF THE CONGRESS.—It is the sense of the Congress that—

(1) the President should consider recognizing the Nicaraguan Resistance in the Republic of Nicaragua as a belligerent power which legitimately challenges the Sandinista regime; and

(2) genuine national reconciliation cannot occur in the Republic of Nicaragua without

the full participation of the Nicaraguan Resistance.

Mr. DORNAN of California (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the RECORD.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

There was no objection.

Mr. DORNAN of California. Mr. Chairman, the Congress of the United States, this Congress by unanimous vote has provided aid to the Nicaraguan resistance in both overt and covert manners. We have done the same thing with the resistance movement in Angola despite the congressional allocation of millions in humanitarian and military, sometimes called lethal assistance.

Mr. MICA. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DORNAN of California. Yes, I yield to my friend, the gentleman from Florida.

Mr. MICA. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I believe we have agreement in this. I would like to ask unanimous consent that all debate on the pending amendment and all amendments thereto end in 20 minutes, and that that time be equally divided and controlled by myself and the gentleman from California [Mr. DORNAN].

Mr. DORNAN of California. Yes, I gladly accede to those suggestions.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Reserving the right to object, Mr. Chairman, this is just on the amendments pertaining to the subject matter we are discussing right now.

Mr. DORNAN of California. Yes; this amendment, yes.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my reservation of objection.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Florida?

There was no objection.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Florida [Mr. MICA] will be recognized for 10 minutes, and the gentleman from California [Mr. DORNAN] will be recognized for 10 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California [Mr. DORNAN].

Mr. DORNAN of California. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume, since I am controlling the time.

Now we have given both overt and covert assistance to both the resistance in Angola and Nicaragua and despite this congressional allocation of millions in both lethal and humanitarian aid to both these belligerencies, we have never formally made any effort to recognize either movement as a legitimate political contestant.



Hence, we continue to fight, those of us who support these resistance movements, those of us who call them freedom fighters, are always fighting from a defensive position; one, that we are backing criminals; or, two, that the United States is the source of conflict in both areas. And thirdly that no constituency exists which would be called legally, if this amendment is passed, the belligerent community.

This supports the efforts of the insurgents. The most logical step to put this circular debate to rest once and for all is my amendment, through a sense of the Congress resolution to recognize the facts of life that a state of belligerency exists.

□ 1630

I have put Angola aside. I will wait to see what develops there because of this very sensitive human rights negotiation going on at this time, so let us focus on the southern tip of our North American continent, the nation of Nicaragua.

There are legitimate political contestants down there. The boys and young girls, their infirmaries, their small hospitals on the border of Honduras, are Nicaraguans, and they die on Nicaraguan soil.

The paid professional mercenaries are the Cubans and all the other Eastern-bloc countries involved in this apparatus, the PLO's that I have caught coming through the airport, the Libyans that have been reported to me by people in our Embassy whom I trust and believe, the Bulgarians. I have said many times in this well that Nicaragua is like the bar scene in star wars, the watering hole, the R&R area for every leftist thug and guerrilla in this world.

If you have got some gelignite, you want to blow up people, you find out how to do it in Leon in Nicaragua, the capital city itself.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DORNAN of California. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding. I want to commend the gentleman as one of the real stars in this House, and as one Member who is very, very interested in conveying to the American people the true picture of what is going on in this hemisphere, so we can in this democratic society make the right decision.

I am reminded when I listened to the gentleman talk about the article on the front page of the New York Post that talked about the political prisoners in some of the seven new political prisons that the Sandinistas have installed in Nicaragua where young women are sexually molested and beaten, forced to drink from toilets, I am reminded of Bishop Carbal-

lo's humiliation being stripped naked by the Sandinistas, thrown out in the streets in front of national television cameras which happened to be passing by, so that the Catholic Church could be discredited.

Mr. DORNAN of California. That was Monsignor Bismarck Carballo.

Mr. HUNTER. I am reminded of Mr. Qadhafi holding press conferences in Nicaragua, and pursuing a policy with the Nicaraguans that is absolutely anti-Semitic.

The only synagogue in Nicaragua has been gutted and burned, and I share the gentleman's concern that the American people are not seeing the true picture of what is going on down there.

There are so many conflicting reports that the American people think we are on the side of the Sandinistas.

The fact that we had a debate the other week about whether or not we should remove our diplomatic recognition and leave our facility down there; and the debate was, there are some valuable things to be gained from having that location, but I am afraid that the war for democrats and freedom in Central America is going to be lost in the United States, because people do not know what is happening.

Mr. DORNAN of California. Reclaiming my time, I want to ask the gentleman a question.

Is the gentleman willing to debate robustly, vigorously on this House floor whether or not we are going to fight communism in Central America? Are we willing to accept the will of the majority if we lose until we fight next year, to fight again and again and do it openly, and declare the facts of life, that there is a state of belligerency down there Nicaraguan young men and women are dying to bring freedom down there. Let's tell the Elliott Abramses of the world to get behind us, let us go overt with this.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DORNAN of California. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I think the gentleman has put the question precisely, that the American people have to know what is happening.

Congress has to accept the reality of what is happening there, and we have to make decisions as to whether or not we are going to allow the Soviet Union to establish a presence, a beachhead in Central America with submarines and attack warship bases in Corinto and El Butte, and bomber bases in Punta Huete; and the gentleman, by offering the gentleman's amendment, that would recognize that there is a state of belligerency, a resistance in Nicaragua that is dedicated to democracy, that is

fighting the Stalinistas down there, and that is a true conflict.

That has to paint a clear picture of what is really happening, and I agree with the gentleman's amendment.

Mr. DORNAN of California. I will touch on the legal points and state emphatically that if I do not win this amendment tonight, it will be for one reason, and one reason only, that the majority of the Members that would be with me simply did not have the time to digest the legal language of what a state of belligerency really means.

If we had the time in this debate, and I am trying to be accommodating, because we are working on this in a great bipartisan way, I would win this debate, given a good thorough hour of debate, on what this is, because this House is sick to death of all of the circular, namby-pamby jockeying around, and we want an up-or-down vote on what we are doing here. We want to know whether or not we are going to support these people or not.

This will be framed in the criticism of my own administration. This is about whether we are serious on our side about this issue.

Item: The second leading source of economic aid to the Nicaraguan dictatorship is the combined efforts of Western Europe and Japan, who are receiving \$120 to \$150 billion in military aid, real and other, from us.

Item two: This spring the U.S. Information Agency informed the Board of Foreign Scholarships, I just checked this out, and it is confirmed, Mr. Mauricio O. Rivas of Managua has been awarded a Fulbright Scholarship to study "industrial management" in the United States.

I wonder if he will demonstrate for his Communist government on whatever campus he goes.

He holds a degree in engineering, and since 1984 has been the budget and computer coordinator for an oil-refining facility to support the gas for the armored personnel carriers going up into the north and killing people, and for the Soviet HIND and HIP helicopters.

Last year, 1986, a knowledgeable observer said that the U.S. Agency for International Development assisted Sandinista Communist officials eager to obtain sophisticated D-base 111-Lotus software, he assisted them to get it from us.

When I called the State Department, they say yes, that is substantially correct.

Item: Proposals for an embargo of Nicaraguan bananas, the country's major export, were delayed in 1983 and 1984, giving the Sandinistas badly-needed time to prepare for a possible embargo. Why?

Because our close friend, Michael Deaver, a top Reagan aide now under

indictment, went to the National Security Council several times and set up meetings for his friend, who was a major banana exporter, and bought time for the Communist government in Managua.

A final item: Western businesses are doing their part to help the Communists, too. Xerox, IBM, Colgate-Palmolive, all these multinationals—so writes Clifford Crouse of the Wall Street Journal—are responsible for about 15 percent of Nicaragua's \$2.5 billion output in goods and services.

Working with Leninism evidently does not trouble America's corporate executives. Take General Mills. They cannot bring their profits back to the United States from Nicaragua, so they donate the money to a Sandinista Communist approved charity—some charity that must be—and then they deduct that total from their U.S. taxes, causing other Americans to step forward and make up for General Mills' clever little tax dodge.

The point is, are we serious or are we not? Is there a state of belligerency? Are we fighting a war down there and, as we did at the Bay of Pigs, clothing these people in different uniforms and different insignias, recognizing them as legitimate young freedom fighters, again of both genders? I have seen them with my own eyes. I have told them that President Reagan stood behind them. Congressman VIN WEBER was an eye witness. They began to cry in this infirmary. This was 2 years ago. "Reagan is behind us," they said. "We will fight to the death for freedom."

And then all this nonsense goes on. If we declare a state of belligerency, then next year if things do not turn in Angola, we will win that, too, and then we will be able to clarify the debate and get serious and not tell people that we are mixed up or inconclusive or that we want this done secretly because we cannot convince the American people that our cause is just.

Mr. Chairman, I realize that I obviously am not going to get the last word, but I shall return at another date. I would ask the Members to pick my arguments apart if they will, and if I had more time, I would convince every one of them.

Mr. LEVINE of California. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. FRANK].

Mr. FRANK. Mr. Chairman, apparently micromanagement of foreign policy is alive and well on the Republican side of the aisle.

I do not like the amendment. I do not think the gentleman from California needs a declaration of a state of belligerency since, when we debate foreign policy, he is in a permanent state of one. But what we have here is an effort again on the Republican side of

the aisle to tie the hands of the President, to undercut and to interfere.

I have never been much of a one for these procedural arguments on foreign policy, but if you go back to the debate on arms control, if you go back to some of those other debates and you go to that side of the aisle and you dig out the arguments on interfering and undercutting and taking away the President's prerogatives, they all describe this amendment.

What the gentleman says is that Ronald Reagan does not know how to conduct foreign policy, that Ronald Reagan does not know how to confront whoever we are speaking to on that side in Nicaragua, and, therefore, Congress has got to intervene, take the initiative away, and tell the President what to do. He says that the President should consider it. It is presumably something that he could have considered.

So this is an example, I think, of the kind of interference that we have been told we should stay away from.

Mr. LEVINE of California. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. MILLER].

Mr. MILLER of California. Mr. Chairman, I oppose the amendment offered by the gentleman from California [Mr. DORNAN], but I do find it interesting to this extent: that I think it starts to strip away some of the veneer that has gone on around this debate on Nicaragua in this Congress. I only wish that the gentleman had maybe gone one step further and asked for a declaration of war so that people could really put their feelings down on whether or not they want to engage in the killing by the Government of the United States, with the money and the troops of the United States, of the Nicaraguan people. The fact of the matter is that that is what we have been conducting in Nicaragua, and there is a state of belligerency. The state of belligerency is there because we engage in the ill-thought-of policy of supporting the Contras.

Those people on the northern border and those people in the interior of Nicaragua were not being killed by the Nicaraguan Government, but they started being killed by the Contras and by the supporters of the Contras and by the money and the arms and support of the United States of America. That is the tragedy of this policy.

I would hope that at some point we would call an end to the ill-considered and very, very deadly policy for the Nicaraguan peasants who are caught up in the war between the Sandinistas and the Contras.

Hopefully this will show the American people the duplicity in the statements of the White House where they have suggested they want to negotiate on one hand and yet they engage in the secret, illegal, and unethical activi-

ties of supporting the Contras on the other hand.

The gentleman from California [Mr. DORNAN] is quite right, that they have clearly misled the American people. That is why the American people are not clear, because they do not know which side we are on, because they constantly say one time that they want to negotiate with the Sandinista people and at the same time they are sending hundreds of millions of dollars into the same region to kill the very same people they say they want to negotiate with.

I do not think we should accept this amendment, but I think it starts to clear the air in the debate because there are a lot of people who are hiding behind false arguments about what is happening in the country of Nicaragua. They have hidden behind the duplicity and the false statements and the lies of this administration so they could dictate a vote for aid to the Contras but not engage in realizing the realities of what that aid was doing to the Nicaraguan people and the numbers of people who are being killed as a result of that aid.

Mr. Chairman, I commend the gentleman for clearing the atmosphere, but I think the amendment is a bad one.

Mr. LEVINE of California. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. FASCELL].

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment as a Member who supports aid to the Contras.

I do not believe that a sense-of-Congress resolution is going to establish a thing or do a thing. We can hardly muster the votes for getting U.S. assistance for the Contras, much less try to pass a resolution that establishes a state of belligerency without, first, the support of the President of the United States, and, second, without the support of the unified command of the resistance itself. For us to try to compound confusion by passing a sense-of-the-Congress resolution would not accomplish the purpose, because it does not help them one iota. It is simply a political statement. The best approach is to take this issue up in such a way as to come to an arrangement that will allow us to get long-term resolution to that problem which is in our national interest.

Mr. LEVINE of California. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, this amendment is an unnecessary amendment, as has been indicated by several of my colleagues. It simply suggests to the President of the United States that he should consider an action which he certainly has the ability and the power at this point



in time to consider and to pursue to his own. But I do think that it is appropriate to recognize precisely what this amendment does, and we should look at it frankly in the context of the next two amendments that are being considered as well.

We have before us an amendment now, and two amendments which are about to be offered, which are frankly some of the most extreme amendments that have been offered on this subject at any time that the Congress has been considering this issue of Central America. I think that it is accurate to say that this amendment is to a certain extent a more honest portrayal of the administration's agenda in Nicaragua than we have sometimes seen from the administration itself.

I share with my friend, the gentleman from California [Mr. MILLER], the commendation of my other friend and colleague from California, the gentleman from California [Mr. DORNAN], for stripping away some of the veneer of the administration's argument, because in fact this amendment comes very, very close to an agenda that many people in the administration have led for some time, an agenda of pursuing actual belligerency against the Government of Nicaragua.

That is unnecessary, it is inappropriate, it is counterproductive, and it flies in the face of the policy that this Nation ought to be pursuing in Central America. This is a Nation that ought to be pursuing a policy of diplomacy and not a policy of military activity. Yet this amendment would strip away whatever veneer continues to exist of the appearance of diplomacy in administration policy.

I think that we have generally abandoned diplomacy and have looked to a military solution rather than a diplomatic solution in the region, and that is a tragedy. It is a tragedy we have compounded time and time again and one which we have pursued in regard to our policy in Central America.

At least this amendment would recognize that reality, but it is a reality that would undermine American participation in the region, it would undermine the opportunity to achieve a diplomatic solution in the region, it would also undermine any opportunity for peace in the region, and it would clearly undermine the courageous efforts being pursued at this time by President Arias of Costa Rica to achieve a diplomatic and peaceful solution in Central America.

So, Mr. Chairman, I think that this amendment helps to spell out the type of ideological zeal and the type of ideological purity that we have heard discussed during the Iran-Contra hearings, and that has motivated people such as Oliver North in their policies with regard to the region.

□ 1645

It is a bad policy. It is a bad suggestion and it is one that would simply get us mired further in a direction that we should do everything we can to reverse.

I would like for one moment to address the next two amendments as well. We will be talking about them when they are raised; but the policy of taking names, attempting to identify individual American citizens who are traveling into the region again moves us into this ideological mindset, a mindset of extremism, a mindset of rigidity that would simply drag the United States further into an East-West conflict and make it less likely, rather than more likely, that we can achieve the type of diplomatic solution that is so urgently required.

Mr. Chairman, I hope that on a bipartisan basis the membership will reject this amendment and the two amendments to follow and that we will return to the business of the State Department authorization and hopefully give us greater leeway in moving toward a diplomatic, rather than a military solution in Central America.

Mr. DORNAN of California. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. LEVINE of California. I am happy to yield to my colleague, the gentleman from California.

Mr. DORNAN of California. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I just want to clarify one point. This is not the United States saying that we are belligerent. It is the United States saying that we recognize that fighting is going on down there between two groups in Nicaragua, that a state of belligerency exists, and then maybe a Teddy Roosevelt comes forward to win a Nobel Prize.

I should have asked Arias this yesterday. I am sorry I did not. He might want the formal recognition of a civil war, because it is going on next to his country and he does not even have an army.

I just think it would clarify everything in the debate. If the other side wins in a majority vote, we have to accept it and say, well, what other way do we approach the situation of the reality of two belligerents going at one another and not be tempted to do all this covert stuff by an administration that I believe had the facts and that went underground, when they should have gone overground.

Mr. LEVINE of California. Well, Mr. Chairman, I commend the gentleman for his criticism of the administration's policy in this area. I think the criticism is well-founded.

I do commend the gentleman for his willingness to be more candid about the policy that this administration has been pursuing than the administration itself has been.

At the same time, I think it does not take a sense-of-the-Congress resolution to understand that fighting is going on in Nicaragua and to understand that we are in a situation in the region which has deteriorated in the fashion that it has.

I simply would resubmit that we should not be moving in the direction of abandoning diplomatic solutions and simply retreating to an exclusively military approach to the problems in the region.

Mr. WALKER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. LEVINE of California. Mr. Chairman, I yield 7 of my 15 remaining seconds to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. WALKER. Mr. Chairman, I just was interested in finding out, the gentleman described the next two amendments as extreme. My particular amendment says only that Americans ought not to be helping the Communists in Central America. I wondered what the gentleman thought was extreme about that?

Mr. LEVINE of California. Well, I would be more than happy during the time that is reserved to the amendment of the gentleman from Pennsylvania to discuss that, I say to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. WALKER]. I think we will have a full exposition of that debate when it comes up.

Mr. Chairman, I urge a no vote on this amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from California [Mr. DORNAN].

The question was taken; and on a division (demanded by Mr. DORNAN of California) there were—ayes 17, noes 9.

## RECORDED VOTE

Mr. DORNAN of California. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.

A recorded vote was ordered.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—ayes 137, noes 243, not voting 53, as follows:

[Roll No. 198]

AYES—137

Archer	Daub	Hefley
Armey	Davis (IL)	Herger
Ballenger	DeLay	Hiler
Bartlett	DeWine	Holloway
Barton	Dickinson	Hopkins
Bentley	DioGuardi	Hunter
Bereuter	Dornan (CA)	Hyde
Billirakis	Dreier	Inhofe
Bliley	Duncan	Kasich
Boulter	Edwards (OK)	Kemp
Broomfield	Emerson	Kolbe
Brown (CO)	Fawell	Kyl
Bunning	Fields	Lagomarsino
Burton	Galleghy	Latta
Byron	Gallo	Lent
Callahan	Gekas	Lewis (CA)
Chandler	Gingrich	Lightfoot
Cheney	Goodling	Lott
Coble	Gradison	Lowery (CA)
Coleman (MO)	Gregg	Lujan
Combest	Hall (TX)	Lunnen
Courter	Hammerschmidt	Mack
Craig	Hansen	Madigan
Crane	Hastert	Marlenee

Martin (IL) Rhodes  
 Martin (NY) Rinaldo  
 McCandless Ritter  
 McCollum Robinson  
 McDade Rogers  
 McGrath Roth  
 McMillan (NC) Rowland (CT)  
 Michel Schaefer  
 Miller (OH) Schuette  
 Miller (WA) Schulze  
 Mollinari Sensenbrenner  
 Moorhead Shumway  
 Morrison (WA) Shuster  
 Myers Skeen  
 Nielson Slaughter (VA)  
 Oxley Smith (NE)  
 Packard Smith (NJ)  
 Parris Smith (TX)  
 Pashayan Smith, Denny  
 Porter (OR)  
 Quillen Smith, Robert  
 Ravenel (NH)  
 Regula Solomon

## NOES—243

Ackerman Flake  
 Alexander Flippo  
 Anderson Foglietta  
 Andrews Foley  
 Annunzio Ford (MI)  
 Anthony Ford (TN)  
 Applegate Frank  
 Aspin Frost  
 Atkins Garcia  
 AuCoin Gerdenson  
 Barnard Gibbons  
 Bateman Glickman  
 Bates Gonzalez  
 Bennett Gordon  
 Berman Grandy  
 Bevil Grant  
 Biaggi Gray (IL)  
 Bilbray Gray (PA)  
 Boehlert Green  
 Boggs Guarini  
 Bonker Gunderson  
 Borski Hall (OH)  
 Bosco Hamilton  
 Boucher Harris  
 Brennan Hawkins  
 Brooks Hayes (IL)  
 Brown (CA) Hayes (LA)  
 Bruce Hefner  
 Bryant Henry  
 Bustamante Hertel  
 Campbell Hochbrueckner  
 Cardin Horton  
 Carper Houghton  
 Carr Howard  
 Chapman Hoyer  
 Chappell Hubbard  
 Clarke Huckaby  
 Clay Hughes  
 Clinger Hutto  
 Coats Jacobs  
 Coelho Jeffords  
 Coleman (TX) Jenkins  
 Collins Johnson (CT)  
 Conte Johnson (SD)  
 Conyers Jones (NC)  
 Cooper Jones (TN)  
 Coughlin Jontz  
 Coyne Kanjorski  
 Darden Kaptur  
 Davis (MI) Kastenmeier  
 de la Garza Kennedy  
 Dellums Kildee  
 Derrick Kleczka  
 Dicks Kolter  
 Dingell Kostmayer  
 Dorgan (ND) LaFalce  
 Dowdy Lancaster  
 Downey Lantos  
 Durbin Leach (IA)  
 Dyson Lehman (FL)  
 Eckart Leland  
 Edwards (CA) Levin (MI)  
 English Levine (CA)  
 Erdreich Lewis (GA)  
 Espy Lloyd  
 Evans Lowry (WA)  
 Fascell Luken, Thomas  
 Fazio MacKay  
 Feighan Manton  
 Fish Markey

Spence  
 Stangeland  
 Stenholm  
 Stratton  
 Stump  
 Sundquist  
 Sweeney  
 Swindall  
 Tauke  
 Taylor  
 Upton  
 Vander Jagt  
 Vucanovich  
 Walker  
 Weber  
 Weldon  
 Wilson  
 Wolf  
 Wortley  
 Young (AK)  
 Young (FL)

(OR)  
 Snowe  
 Solarz  
 Spratt  
 St Germain  
 Staggers  
 Stallings  
 Stark  
 Stokes  
 Studds  
 Swift  
 Tallon

Akaka  
 Badham  
 Baker  
 Beilenson  
 Boland  
 Boner (TN)  
 Bonior (MI)  
 Boxer  
 Buechner  
 Crockett  
 Daniel  
 Dannemeyer  
 DeFazio  
 Dixon  
 Donnelly  
 Dwyer  
 Dymally  
 Early

Thomas (GA)  
 Torres  
 Towns  
 Traficant  
 Traxler  
 Udall  
 Valentine  
 Vento  
 Visclosky  
 Volkmer  
 Walgren  
 Watkins

Waxman  
 Weiss  
 Wheat  
 Whittaker  
 Whitten  
 Williams  
 Wolpe  
 Wyden  
 Yates  
 Yatron

## NOT VOTING—53

Florio  
 Frenzel  
 Gaydos  
 Gephardt  
 Gilman  
 Hatcher  
 Ireland  
 Kennelly  
 Konnyu  
 Leath (TX)  
 Lehman (CA)  
 Lewis (FL)  
 Lipinski  
 Livingston  
 Lukens, Donald  
 McEwen  
 Moakley  
 Morrison (CT)

Ortiz  
 Rangel  
 Ray  
 Roe  
 Roemer  
 Rostenkowski  
 Roybal  
 Sabo  
 Shaw  
 Slaughter (NY)  
 Smith (IA)  
 Synar  
 Tauzin  
 Thomas (CA)  
 Torricelli  
 Wise  
 Wylie

## □ 1710

The Clerk announced the following pairs:

On this vote:

Mr. Badham for, with Mr. Akaka against.  
 Mr. Ireland for, with Mrs. Boxer against.  
 Mr. Buechner for, with Mr. Roybal against.

Mr. Konnyu for, with Mr. Bonior of Michigan against.

Mr. Donald E. Lukens for, with Mr. Crockett against.

Mr. Thomas of California for, with Mr. Rangel against.

Messrs. APPLEGATE, DYSON, and COATS changed their votes from "aye" to "no."

Mr. MORRISON of Washington, Mr. LOWERY of California, and Mrs. BYRON changed their votes from "no" to "aye."

So the amendment was rejected.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

## PERSONAL EXPLANATION

Ms. SLAUGHTER of New York, Mr. Chairman, during debate on H.R. 1777 I was meeting with constituents and missed rollcall vote No. 198. Had I been present, I would have voted "no."

## AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. MCCOLLUM

Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. McCOLLUM: Page 70, after line 16, insert the following:

## TITLE VII—AMERICANS WORKING FOR THE SANDINISTA GOVERNMENT OF NICARAGUA

## SEC. 701. REPORT TO CONGRESS

The Secretary of State shall, within 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, transmit to the Congress an unclassified document listing all United States citizens known to be working for, directly or indirectly, in a paid or in a volunteer capacity, the Sandinista Government of Nicaragua.

Mr. MICA. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. McCOLLUM. I yield to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. MICA] for a unanimous-consent request.

Mr. MICA. Mr. Chairman, I am going to ask for a 30-minute time limit on this amendment. We have a 20-minute time limit on the following amendment, and we hope not to use all that time.

Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that all debate on the spending amendment and all amendments thereto end in 30 minutes, the time to be equally divided and controlled between myself and the gentleman from Florida [Mr. McCOLLUM].

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Florida?

There was no objection.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chairman recognizes the gentleman from Florida [Mr. McCOLLUM] for 15 minutes.

Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself as much time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, this amendment is very simple. All it does is call for a report by the State Department listing all the United States citizens who are currently working for the Government of Nicaragua. It is very plain and simple.

In my judgment, what is good for the goose is good for the gander. I have been serving on the Iran-Contra Committee for several weeks now. We have been listening to a whole series of examples of private U.S. citizens who have been supporting and aiding the Contras. We have had their names revealed in many cases. We have had lots of various innuendoes and accusations made with regard to the role of private citizens in the Central American situation in Nicaragua from the standpoint of aiding the Contras.

But apparently there is a large number of U.S. citizens involved in supporting the Sandinista government, not only in supporting the Sandinista government but in actually working for them. All this amendment does is simply ask the State Department to report to Congress on those people who are U.S. citizens who are actively working for the Sandinista government.

Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. McCOLLUM. I am glad to yield to the gentleman from Indiana.

Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Chairman, I have some concerns about how well defined the statement would be and what is really meant, or has the gentleman given more thought to a more definite definition of, if you will, directly or indirectly, in a paid or voluntary capacity working for the Sandinista government of Nicaragua? For example, of 10 volunteers from the American Friends Service Committee were to appear to give medical aid to



peasants, nonaffiliated with the government, would this be working for the Sandinista government of Nicaragua?

Mr. McCOLLUM. The gentleman's question is anticipated and it is a good question. We need to clarify this.

The answer is no, it is not intended to do that. The reason we have directly or indirectly, paid or volunteer is that there are many functionary organizations, if you will, that are controlled by the Government of Nicaragua in Nicaragua today, and I did not want there to be any ambiguity. We are talking about people working for that government, for any agency of that group, for any group that government indeed controls itself. But when we are talking about some private voluntary organization, chartered in the United States, that is not, indeed, an entity or controlled directly by the Government of Nicaragua, then we are not talking about any report on someone who voluntarily works for them or whatever.

But if you are a volunteer for the government I think you should be accounted for.

Mr. McCLOSKEY. So the American Friends Service medical volunteer would not come under this amendment?

Mr. McCOLLUM. I do not know that particular organization, but assuming that is a private, volunteer organization that is not an arm literally of the Government of Nicaragua, then of course it would not be covered. If it is like the Red Cross, I would rather use that, or Project Hope, we are not talking about any of that type of voluntary group if they happen to be down inside Nicaragua assisting in some way indirectly on projects that maybe the government supports. But if they are indeed working for the Government of Nicaragua, that is what I am concerned about.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. McCOLLUM. I am glad to yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. I thank the gentleman for yielding. I want to say I support the amendment and I would like to ask the gentleman a question, if I might.

Does the gentleman's amendment in any way prohibit anyone from carrying out the activities that it describes?

Mr. McCOLLUM. It does not in any way prohibit somebody from carrying out the activities and working for the Government of Nicaragua. They can go right ahead and do it. We just want an accounting, as the gentleman from California probably perceives, of what the situation is about private involvement in Nicaragua on behalf of that government, just as we have had an accounting in the Iran-Contra hearings of private involvement on behalf

of the Contras, so we have some balance.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. So this amendment would provide for opening the process and people can see what is going on?

Mr. McCOLLUM. That is correct.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. I thank the gentleman and I support the amendment.

Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I would like to reclaim my time and quote from a letter I received yesterday from a medical doctor at the University of Costa Rica. This is Dr. Sharon Smith de Wolf, and here is in part what she says. She says:

Living in Costa Rica for 33 years I am frequently asked:

What agencies are operating within the United States on behalf of the Sandinista regime?

Why do churches in the United States support a government pledged to the destruction of freedom of religion?

Why do U.S. news and TV services retain and distort information to the service of a regime which has eliminated freedom of the press in its own country?

Why do black leaders in the U.S. support a government which has severely punished its own black population, the traditionally peace loving, Protestant, English speaking Misquitos, for refusing to give up their children to forced conscription in the Sandinista army?

Why would CBS make a martyr of Benjamin Lindors who wore a Sandinista uniform, carried a Soviet AK while Hasenfus receives scorn for aiding the Contras (anti-communist forces.)

Why do members of our own Congress malign and identify the U.S. officials, foreign leaders friendly to the U.S. and individual citizens who seek the liberation of Nicaragua and condone those aiding forces allied to Soviet-Sandinista expansion?

Although I am not really advocating here today getting into a debate on policies in Nicaragua and the Contras, what I am doing is suggesting we need some balance in this. We need to let people who question if we are really impartial, if we are really trying to act as a body interested in peace in that region, we need to let them know we care as much about the role that private citizens are playing here in this country with respect to the Sandinista regime as we do with respect to the Contras. If we get that information, we lay it out, perhaps we have a chance of moving further along.

Mr. Chairman, I know I have more time left and there are several Members who want some of my time, but there are others I know in opposition and I would like at this time to reserve the balance of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Florida [Mr. McCOLLUM] has consumed 6 minutes.

Mr. SMITH of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. LEVINE].

Mr. LEVINE of California. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong opposition to the McCollum amendment. This is a dangerous amendment. It would require the State Department to compile a list of all United States citizens known to be working for, directly or indirectly, in a paid or volunteer capacity, the Sandinista government of Nicaragua.

The first question which must be asked about this amendment is, What is its purpose? What possible use could be intended for such a list? Proponents of this amendment offer the transparent justification that this amendment is needed to guarantee that United States citizens who work in Nicaragua are formally notified of the danger inherent in their work.

They know the danger they face. We have seen report after report of Contra attacks on civilians in Nicaragua. They know the danger in the region.

The proponents of this amendment do not seek to ensure the safety of American citizens. They seek to intimidate American citizens from exercising their right to travel freely abroad through the use of the most deplorable of McCarthyite tactics—the assembling of a blacklist. They are asking us to do nothing less than establish by legislation an enemies list for the Reagan administration.

The fact of the matter is that this amendment is unnecessary. The State Department already issues travel advisories to warn citizens of the dangers they face when they travel abroad.

U.S. citizens have traveled, worked, and served abroad on many occasions when doing so was not in agreement with the stated policy of the U.S. Government. Such was their right. Citizens may leave this country to do whatever they wish in a foreign country free from any U.S. legal restrictions other than those designed to preserve their safety and the Nation's neutrality.

Mr. Chairman, I ask again, what is the purpose of this amendment? The purpose of this amendment is to intimidate those who oppose this administration's policies in Central America. There have already been repeated reports of harassment of Americans who travel to Nicaragua. Implementation of this amendment will give this administration a blacklist that they can use to further intimidate Americans who choose to visit Nicaragua.

Let us defeat this amendment and try to move toward a more constructive discussion of the real problems we and our Central American friends face in building stability and democracy in the region.

□ 1725

Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. SWINDALL].

Mr. SWINDALL. First of all, I would like to respond to the gentleman from California's question with respect to what is the purpose of this amendment? I think the gentleman whom he mentioned, Benjamin Linder, is a very good point to focus upon with respect to the purpose. That is that we all know that among other ways the war in Nicaragua is being fought by way of propaganda and certainly it would have been very helpful at the time of Mr. Linder's death had such a list existed so we could have gone to that list and discovered the fact that Benjamin Linder was working for the Sandinista government.

I think that that in large part discredits some of the propagandistic material that has flooded into this country in an effort to win this battle in much the same way that past battles have been won, and that is within the 6-inch space between the two ears of most American people.

I would further say that it is not a black list any more so than a black list has been compiled at a much more exhaustive level at the Contra hearings, as my colleague from Florida suggested.

So I would say to the gentleman from California that if no other purpose exists for this legislation other than to allow this Congress to immediately access the names of the individuals working for the Sandinista government in the event, in the future, the Sandinistas insist on placing citizens in war zones so that they can exploit this type of situation, not only risking lives that should not be risked but also I think pulling a cruel hoax on the American people, then that purpose alone justifies its passage.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will state the gentleman from Florida [Mr. McCOLLUM] has 7 minutes remaining and the gentleman from Florida [Mr. SMITH] has 12 minutes remaining.

Mr. SMITH of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. Edwards].

Mr. EDWARDS of California. I thank the gentleman for yielding this time to me.

Mr. Chairman, 20 years ago we abolished what was known as the Attorney General's list. Now here is a proposal to bring it back and call it the Secretary of State's list.

Who will be on this list? The American doctor who treats peasants injured by a land mine on a dirt road. The American technician seeking to bring fresh water to a rural farm village. The ordinary American with no skills who thinks the best way to promote peace and freedom is by direct personal contact with people in another country.

This amendment is an act of desperation by the proponents of Contra aid. They are embarrassed by shredding parties, \$200,000 trust accounts and secret Swiss bank accounts. They are embarrassed by secret documents rewritten and congressional committees misled. So they are trying to shift the focus from profiteering patriots to Americans engaging in lawful travel, lawful dissent, and lawful humanitarian aid in a Third World country.

Mr. Chairman, the word McCarthyism is overused, but this is McCarthyism pure and simple—drawing up lists of law-abiding citizens to smear them with charges of communism. Let's not go back to the 1950's. We don't need these accusations and smear tactics. There will be a debate on Contra aid later. Let's defeat this amendment.

Mr. SMITH of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. McCLOSKEY].

Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Chairman, I think it is somewhat unfortunate that debate involving this much substance and sensitivity is coming late in the week at a time when we are pressed for time and people are concerned about leaving for their planes. But I think it is very important that things should be discussed.

I would like to yield, and I appreciate the gentleman yielding to me, but I would like to yield 10 seconds to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. McCOLLUM] to ask a neutral question.

Does the administration have a formal position on his amendment?

Mr. McCOLLUM. No, the administration is not even aware that I am offering the amendment.

Mr. McCLOSKEY. Taking back my time, Mr. Chairman, I think that shows partially the futility of such an amendment. In that if it is very important, with all concern that the Reagan administration has as to the situation in Nicaragua, they would have been asking for such a measure by now. I ask along with Mr. LEVINE: For what purpose are we doing this? And along with Mr. EDWARDS to say that the only real purpose is to develop a black list, if you will, to start a McCarthy witch-hunt to keep people from exercising constitutional rights and prerogatives that they have under the Constitution of the United States.

I submit that it could inflict embarrassment or even possible danger on numerous people making humanitarian acts of goodwill. I think my initial point also is to the question of definition, what about the medical worker, what about the coffee picker, what about the person who is just trying to help innocent peasants in a war-ravaged area? This, in effect, is a very pernicious amendment to deter people from their constitutional and humanitarian prerogatives. I very strongly urge its defeat.

Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 1 minute.

Mr. Chairman, I am astounded at the kind of reaction that some of my colleagues have to this simple request. We, 30 years-plus later, are still laboring under this idea that McCarthyism is what everything centers on when some of us try simply to point out some facts of life with regard to the relationships of our citizens who are working in this case for a foreign government. Nobody is here, not this Member, nobody else, accusing anybody of being a Communist or getting into that whole McCarthy thing. I think it is ridiculous.

Let me clear up something else: This amendment that I am offering does not ask for a report or a list of doctors or priests or reporters or volunteers or tourists. It simply asks for reports on people who are working as U.S. citizens for a government that we find hostile to our interests and we have declared it so here. We ought to know that. It has nothing else to do with the matter, whatever their philosophy is. It only deals with those people who are working for the Government. It does not involve volunteers who volunteer their services to private organizations or go down there on their own. It is a very simple amendment. So that we can get some balance in this, I wonder if some of the folks on the other side think the Iran-Contra hearings are McCarthyite the way they are going? I do not happen to think so.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Florida [Mr. McCOLLUM] has 6 minutes remaining, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. SMITH] has 8 minutes remaining.

Mr. SMITH of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. KOSTMAYER].

Mr. KOSTMAYER. Mr. Chairman, let me explain something to my friend from Florida [Mr. McCOLLUM]: The idea of the U.S. Government establishing lists of American citizens based on their ideological convictions is offensive to us. It ought to be offensive to people in your party, a party which has a long and distinguished record of defending the individual rights of the American people. This is a shameful day in the 200th anniversary of our Constitution when we would consider establishing this list.

Mr. WALKER. Mr. Chairman, I demand that the gentleman's words be taken down.

The CHAIRMAN. Would the gentleman restate what he just said?

Mr. WALKER. I demand the gentleman's words be taken down.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will report the words objected to.

Mr. KOSTMAYER. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the final



part of my statement be stricken from the RECORD.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Pennsylvania?

Mr. EMERSON. Mr. Chairman, I object.

The CHAIRMAN. Objection is heard.

Mr. EMERSON. Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my objection.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Pennsylvania?

There was no objection.

Mr. SMITH of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New York [Mr. WEISS].

Mr. WEISS. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I think we all recognize that the idea of keeping lists is a totalitarian tactic and it is a sad day when the House of Representatives of the United States of America discusses seriously the idea of keeping lists on its own citizens doing perfectly legal things. What this asks is in no way equivalent to what happened in the Iran-Contra hearings. The issue in those hearings is and I am surprised the gentleman from Florida does not remember it, is officials of the United States Government being involved in lending themselves to raising money from the private citizens to aid the Contras. And two of those people have now pleaded guilty to tax evasion. That is the only basis on which private citizens came in.

Here what you are trying to do is to take private American citizens who are acting perfectly within the law and in some intimidating fashion ask that their names be kept on an official list. I think that is deplorable. I think that really just takes us down the road away from democracy and to totalitarianism.

Mr. WALKER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WEISS. I am glad to yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. WALKER].

Mr. WALKER. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from New York [Mr. WEISS] has expired.

Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. WOLF].

Mr. WOLF. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Chairman, I was not going to speak, in fact I am going to be leaving quickly to give a commencement address.

But I could not remain silent. Let me tell you a few of these things:

When we were in Nicaragua, there were Communist troops there, it is a Communist government. They have persecuted Violetta Chamorro and closed down her newspaper, they have violated human rights, they have vio-

lated the Catholic Church. They have done many, many bad things.

When we were there on two different occasions our first interpreter was a graduate of the University of Virginia, an American citizen and she was working for the Government. The other interpreter had two brothers that lived in Montgomery County, American citizens. Descoto is an American citizen.

The head of the North American desk who is trying to defeat this government was in the People's Drug Store Training Program. We should not be, and I want the American people to know, we should know that many American citizens are down there helping this Communist government. The purpose is that we would hope they would all come home. Citizens help on both sides, but there are American citizens helping the Communists and that is the concern that the gentleman from Florida has and not the name calling that is going on on the other side.

□ 1740

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would inform both gentlemen that the gentleman from Florida [Mr. McCOLLUM] has 5 minutes remaining, and the gentleman from Florida [Mr. SMITH] has 6½ minutes remaining.

Mr. SMITH of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. FASCELL].

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, I am sorry to say that this is not a new issue. I wish it were. I lived through 20 or 25 years of this campaign, this type of campaign on the American scene, and I do not think it did the American Government one bit of good. It did a lot of damage instead.

Now, one may not agree with that particular position, I certainly do not, but people have a right to a position, and unless they are doing something illegally, then we should protect their right to it, as detestable as we may find it. I have lived through the time, as many of you on this floor have, and as the American people have, when American citizens who did nothing more than express their political opinions with their feet or their hands or their minds were characterized as something detestable. It might be all right for an individual to do that, but I do not think it is right for the U.S. Government to do that.

Now, if somebody breaks the law, then we can go after them to the full extent of the law, but otherwise it would be a shame, a disaster and a travesty to destroy the personal rights of American citizens in a fashion which seeks to do so indirectly, which is what this amendment is about. The State Department does not have a reason or no right to be running

around as a policeman chasing down American citizens in foreign countries who somebody thinks or the Congress might think are undesirable or have taken a different political position in an issue. If you want to find out who is working down there, ask the intelligence community. They know, and they are keeping track of them. If you want to know, there is a way to find out about it, and if you want to publicize it, you can buy ads in the newspaper and publicize that information. But for goodness sake, do not take the course of action which puts the Congress of the United States and two political parties on record legislatively to say that one of the departments of our Government should keep a blacklist on the American people.

Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 30 seconds.

Mr. Chairman, I am cognizant of the concerns the chairman of the committee just expressed, and even though I frankly think that the painting and the characterization going on out here is absolutely unreal and unnecessary and wrong on this amendment, I am willing to do something to change this amendment and maybe make it more appealing to some of the Members over there.

So I am going to ask unanimous consent at this time, in hopes that it will be taken seriously, that my amendment be amended so that the words after "documents listing" read "the number of" before "all United States citizens known to be working for \* \* \* the \* \* \* Government of Nicaragua," and at the end, add the words, "and describe the nature of their work."

We do not list the names of anybody in that way, but we get an idea of who is down there and what they are doing, and, therefore, you do not have any blacklist with all those kinds of accusations. I never had that intent.

Mr. Chairman, I hope that my unanimous consent request is accepted. It seems to me that would be the logical way to go here because of the sensitivity expressed today. There is no intent to do otherwise.

So, Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to so amend my amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the modification?

Mr. WEISS. I object, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Would the gentleman first submit his modification to the Clerk?

Mr. WEISS. Objection, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. For what purpose does the gentleman from New York rise?

Mr. WEISS. I object, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Objection is heard.

Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself an additional 15 seconds.

Mr. Chairman, I think what we are talking about here at this juncture is very important and very simple, and that we have now shown a clear demonstration that there is not really good faith on the other side in this regard and there is a lot of name calling that is going on. I think that is rightfully unfair in this body, and I hope my colleagues who are not present can understand why it is important for us to have this kind of amendment at this juncture and time.

Mr. WEISS. Mr. Chairman, a point of personal privilege.

The CHAIRMAN. For what purpose does the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. WALKER] rise?

Mr. WALKER. I have an amendment to the amendment, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will report the amendment.

Mr. WEISS. Mr. Chairman, I have a point of personal privilege.

The CHAIRMAN. Questions of personal privilege cannot be raised in the Committee.

Mr. WEISS. Mr. Chairman, I have a point of order. I ask that the gentleman's words be taken down, the words saying that now we know that those people have not done it in good faith, their objections are not in good faith. The question is motivation, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will report the words.

Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, may I know what the words are? I really do not recall what I said.

Mr. Chairman, may I ask unanimous consent to withdraw any words that referred to any individual Members? I do not think I intended to do that—if they referred to any individual Member or the intent of any individual Member.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Florida?

There was no objection.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will now state the division of time.

The gentleman from Florida [Mr. McCOLLUM] has 4 minutes and a quarter remaining and the gentleman from Florida [Mr. SMITH] has 4 minutes remaining.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. WALKER TO THE  
AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. McCOLLUM

Mr. WALKER. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment to the amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Pennsylvania had attempted to offer an amendment, and the Clerk will report the amendment.

Amendment offered by Mr. WALKER to the amendment offered by Mr. McCOLLUM: Page 70, after line 16, insert the following:

# TITLE VII—AMERICANS WORKING FOR THE SANDINISTA GOVERNMENT OF NICARAGUA

## SEC. 701. REPORT TO CONGRESS

The Secretary of State shall, within 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, transmit to the Congress an unclassified document listing the number of all United States citizens known to be working for, directly or indirectly, in a paid or in a volunteer capacity, the Sandinista Government of Nicaragua and describe the nature of their work.

Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. WALKER].

Mr. WALKER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, the amendment I have just offered is precisely what the gentleman from Florida has described a moment ago.

Instead of listing names, we would simply ask for the number of people that are working for the Communist Government in Nicaragua; and it would also ask what it is they might be doing for that government, and I would ask the adoption of the amendment.

Mr. SMITH of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. FRANK].

Mr. FRANK. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, this is a distinction without a difference. How will they get the number, by taking the names and adding them up?

Maybe they are going to make up a number, but I do not think we would admit that.

If there is an objection to the government taking the names, it is not solved one bit by saying they should publish the number. The number will be the sum total of the names; and if we are being told in this unclassified document, the names will remain a great secret in this well of secrecy and confidentiality at the State Department, sell a few bridges before you expect anybody to believe that.

Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FRANK. Mr. Chairman, I have about 2 seconds, but I will yield to the gentleman from Florida.

Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

The chairman of the committee said they already have the names.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California [Mr. HUNTER].

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I think if the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs had really thought through what the chairman said about Americans and this Congress supporting the rights of other Americans to help causes that they believe in, the chairman would have comported himself differently in the

hearings, in the Contra hearings, when General Secord was testifying.

What we are really talking about here is a type of a Boland amendment for the left, and it is an amendment that applies to people like Ron Ridenour who wrote a book called Yankee Sandinistas, and who said, "I was one of the vanguard so I got to carry the flag when we marched sometimes. Another gringo from Salt Lake City was with me. He'd never fired a rifle before and nearly shot his pants when he fired the AK. \* \* \* No one wants to go off in the mountains and kill people and lose their lives, but the point is if the Marines come that's what's gonna happen, they're gonna die. Me and plenty of others like me are going to defend this place. \* \* \* It doesn't matter who invades, Marines or not, we're going to kill people."

This is a good amendment, and I would urge its passage.

Mr. SMITH of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. HOYER].

Mr. HOYER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding, and I rise in opposition to the McCollum amendment.

I agree that the change assists somewhat, but also agree with the gentleman from Massachusetts. The FBI is going around interviewing people who visit Nicaragua. I think that is wrong.

All of us know I am the chairman of the Helsinki Commission; and if we heard the Soviet Union, and they do, of course, interview everybody who comes to the United States or might visit Western Europe, we would say that that was an undercutting of their rights; and it was an effort to intimidate them.

It was an effort to force them to believe as the government believes; and as chairman of the Helsinki Commission, I would object to that on behalf of those who live in captive nations.

I see a definite relationship between the two; and therefore, I think we ought to reject both of these amendments.

We have the information. It is classified. Our Government keeps it, and that is sufficient.

□ 1755

Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1½ minutes to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. BILIRAKIS].

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the McCollum amendment, as amended by the Walker amendment.

Mr. Chairman, let us be realistic. Let us get back into the real world. Recent events tell us that the environment for Americans working in Nicaragua has changed. We have reached the point where some action is needed. In the past, many Americans working in war



zones felt immune to bodily harm by virtue of being American.

Such is no longer the case. The United States should be aware of the activities as well as whereabouts of its citizens in Nicaragua. We must warn our citizens not to travel to Nicaragua, as we currently warn them not to travel to Beirut. In the absence of an absolute travel ban, United States citizens cannot be prohibited from travel to Nicaragua. We can, however, and we must, alert them to the dangers present.

The threat to Americans in Nicaragua does not come from the Contras, but instead, from the Sandinistas. The American killed in Nicaragua was armed and in fatigues—is it the fault of the Contras that in war, they fired upon individuals who to all appearances were armed combatants, or is it the fault of the host government that allows foreigners to carry weapons within its borders and permits them to work in areas where they know they will come under fire?

Is it the fault of the Contras that an American might take foreign policy in his own hands contrary to the official position of the United States and suffer injury or death as the result? I think not!

Americans are being used for propaganda value, Mr. Chairman, and the value of an American life to the Sandinistas seems to be worth only the notoriety they know they will receive from the American media.

As long as this situation exists we must account for our citizens. I do not want to see Americans dying overseas, whether it is in Lebanon, or Nicaragua, Mr. Chairman, the hour is late, do we know where our Americans are?

The CHAIRMAN. It is the understanding of the Chair that there is an agreement that the gentleman from Florida [Mr. McCOLLUM], the author of the amendment, will conclude the debate. The gentleman has 1½ minutes remaining. The time remaining for the gentleman from Florida [Mr. SMITH] is 2½ minutes.

Mr. SMITH of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of the time remaining.

Mr. Chairman, we heard a couple minutes ago from the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, who has a great well of historical context from which to draw, and he drew from that well and I think told us something that he has seen that many others in this House have seen as well; but more than that, it is not just the historical context. Put it in today's context. Let us be realistic.

I think the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. FRANK] was fairly accurate when he characterized the amendment of the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. WALKER] as really not changing the essential nature of the McCollum amendment. In order to

get at the number, you must count names.

But let us be honest. Is anyone here willing to extend this to people who go to Poland? Are we going to count names of people who go to the Soviet Union or to any other of the countries from which they may have originally come and who are now American citizens? We are talking, after all, about American citizens.

We are talking about taking names and we are talking about taking names from people and of people who have not committed any crime under United States law.

Is anybody willing to extend this to every other country which has the same kind of Communistic rule as the Sandinista government is in Nicaragua? We make no bones about that.

If those of you who want to extend that will reflect, I think you will find that a great many Americans then will be caught in a net that no one ever intended. People of good will who are Americans to the core, patriotic to the teeth, are you going to deny them the right to travel in this world only because they want to go to a country whose government, even though we recognize it, may not be one we like at all?

I think you are treading on the entry point of a very dangerous road. Think clearly about this. It sounds good. Yes, we should be balanced and fair, but in reality, no Americans should have their names recorded in this kind of context until they break the law. Frankly, when they go to Nicaragua under current law, they are not breaking any laws.

Do you want your name recorded in a book like this to be counted solely because you chose to exercise your rights as an American citizen? I think not.

Mr. Chairman, I would urge a "no" vote on the amendment to the amendment on the amendment.

Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I think in this impassioned debate in the last 30 minutes we have really had a lot of characterizations that probably have misled some people as to what this amendment does. I certainly advocate supporting the amendment to the amendment, so we do not get into the name listing business; but surely, my colleagues can understand the fairness and the importance to the American people of having the opportunity to have the knowledge, not necessarily of the names, if they do not want that, that is not what is important to this Member; but the knowledge of how many people, how many United States citizens actually are working for the Communist Government, the Sandinista government of Nicaragua.

We have already seen the parade of a list of names of people who are supposedly giving private help, who are

United States citizens, to the Contras. In the name of balance, in the name of appropriateness, in the name of information and freedom to the American people, let us at least give the numbers and the description of the people who are U.S. citizens who are now presently actively working for a government which this government opposes in its present form, who this government has stated and we in this body have agreed has violated human rights left and right, who violates freedom of the press and religion and whose government needs to change its ways about expropriating its policies to neighboring countries, if we are going to have our national security protected in this country.

Mr. Chairman, I urge the adoption of my amendment and the amendment thereto to give this information. If we do that tonight, I think the American people will know a whole lot more and nobody is going to be harmed. We are not naming tourists who are going down there. We are naming people who are working for the government. We are listing numbers, if the amendment is adopted, and not names.

Mr. Chairman, I urge adoption of this amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. WALKER] to the amendment offered by the gentleman from Florida [Mr. McCOLLUM].

The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes appeared to have it.

Mr. WALKER. Mr. Chairman, on that I ask for a division.

The CHAIRMAN. A division is requested.

#### RECORDED VOTE

Mr. WALKER. Mr. Chairman, I withdraw that request and demand a recorded vote.

A recorded vote was ordered.

Mr. GREGG. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the vote on the McCollum amendment, following the Walker amendment, should it occur, be 5 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair cannot entertain that request. Members would not have noticed and there could be intervening business.

Members will record their votes by electronic device.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—ayes 144, noes 224, not voting 65, as follows:

[Roll No. 199]

#### AYES—144

Archer	Broomfield	Combest
Armey	Brown (CO)	Courter
Ballenger	Bunning	Craig
Bartlett	Burton	Daub
Barton	Callahan	Davis (IL)
Bateman	Chandler	DeLay
Bentley	Chappell	DeWine
Bereuter	Cheney	Dickinson
Bilirakis	Coats	DioGuardi
Billey	Coble	Dornan (CA)
Boulter	Coleman (MO)	Dreier

Duncan	Lagomarsino	Schaefer
Dyson	Latta	Schuette
Emerson	Lent	Schulze
English	Lewis (CA)	Sensenbrenner
Erdreich	Lightfoot	Shumway
Fields	Lott	Shuster
Filippo	Lowery (CA)	Skeen
Gallegly	Lujan	Skelton
Gekas	Lungren	Slaughter (VA)
Gingrich	Mack	Smith (NE)
Goodling	Madigan	Smith (NJ)
Gradison	Marlenee	Smith (TX)
Grandy	Martin (IL)	Smith, Denny
Gregg	McCandless	(OR)
Gunderson	McCollum	Smith, Robert
Hall (TX)	McGrath	(NH)
Hammerschmidt	McMillan (NC)	Solomon
Hansen	Michel	Spence
Harris	Miller (OH)	Stangeland
Hastert	Montgomery	Stenholm
Hefley	Moorhead	Stratton
Heger	Myers	Stump
Hiler	Nichols	Sundquist
Holloway	Nielson	Sweeney
Hopkins	Oxley	Swift
Hubbard	Packard	Swindall
Huckaby	Parris	Taylor
Hunter	Pashayan	Vander Jagt
Hutto	Porter	Volkmer
Hyde	Quillen	Vucanovich
Inhofe	Rhodes	Walgren
Jenkins	Ridge	Walker
Johnson (CT)	Rinaldo	Weber
Kasich	Ritter	Weldon
Kemp	Robinson	Wortley
Kolbe	Rogers	Young (AK)
Kyl	Roth	Young (FL)
LaFalce	Saiki	

## NOES—224

Ackerman	Durbin	Lehman (FL)
Alexander	Eckart	Leland
Anderson	Edwards (CA)	Levin (MI)
Andrews	Edwards (OK)	Levine (CA)
Annunzio	Espy	Lewis (GA)
Anthony	Evans	Lloyd
Applegate	Fascell	Lowry (WA)
Aspin	Fawell	Lucken, Thomas
Atkins	Fazio	MacKay
AuCoin	Feighan	Manton
Baker	Fish	Markey
Barnard	Flake	Martinez
Bates	Foglietta	Matsui
Bennett	Foley	Mavroules
Berman	Ford (MI)	Mazzoli
Biaggi	Frank	McCloskey
Bilbray	Frost	McCurdy
Boehlt	Gallo	McDade
Boggs	Garcia	McHugh
Bonker	Gejdenson	McMillen (MD)
Borski	Gibbons	Meyers
Bosco	Gonzalez	Mfume
Boucher	Gordon	Mica
Brennan	Gray (IL)	Miller (CA)
Brooks	Gray (PA)	Miller (WA)
Bruce	Green	Mineta
Bryant	Guarini	Molinari
Bustamante	Hall (OH)	Mollohan
Byron	Hamilton	Moody
Campbell	Hawkins	Morella
Cardin	Hayes (IL)	Morrison (WA)
Carper	Hayes (LA)	Mrazek
Carr	Hefner	Murphy
Chapman	Henry	Murtha
Clarke	Hertel	Nagle
Clay	Hochbrueckner	Natcher
Clinger	Horton	Neal
Coelho	Houghton	Nelson
Coleman (TX)	Howard	Nowak
Collins	Hoyer	Oakar
Conte	Hughes	Oberstar
Conyers	Jacobs	Obey
Cooper	Jeffords	Olin
Coughlin	Johnson (SD)	Owens (NY)
Coyne	Jones (NC)	Owens (UT)
Darden	Jontz	Panetta
Davis (MI)	Kanjorski	Patterson
de la Garza	Kaptur	Pease
Dellums	Kastenmeier	Pelosi
Derrick	Kildee	Penny
Dicks	Kleczka	Pepper
Dingell	Kostmayer	Perkins
Dorgan (ND)	Lancaster	Petri
Dowdy	Lantos	Pickett
Downey	Leach (IA)	Pickle

Price (IL)	Sharp	Torres
Price (NC)	Sikorski	Towns
Pursell	Sisisky	Trafcant
Rahall	Skaggs	Traxler
Ravenel	Slattery	Udall
Regula	Slaughter (NY)	Upton
Richardson	Smith (FL)	Valentine
Roberts	Smith, Robert	Vento
Rodino	(OR)	Visclosky
Rose	Snowe	Watkins
Rowland (CT)	Solarz	Weiss
Rowland (GA)	Spratt	Wheat
Russo	Staggers	Whittaker
Savage	Stallings	Whitten
Sawyer	Stark	Williams
Saxton	Stokes	Wilson
Scheuer	Studds	Wolpe
Schneider	Tallon	Wyden
Schroeder	Tauke	Yates
	Thomas (GA)	Yatron

## NOT VOTING—65

Akaka	Frenzel	Morrison (CT)
Badham	Gaydos	Ortiz
Bellenson	Gephardt	Rangel
Bevill	Gilman	Ray
Boland	Glickman	Roe
Boner (TN)	Grant	Roemer
Bonior (MI)	Hatcher	Rostenkowski
Boxer	Ireland	Roybal
Brown (CA)	Jones (TN)	Sabo
Buechner	Kennedy	Schumer
Crane	Kennelly	Shaw
Crockett	Kolter	Smith (IA)
Daniel	Konnyu	St Germain
Dannemeyer	Leath (TX)	Synar
DeFazio	Lehman (CA)	Tauzin
Dixon	Lewis (FL)	Thomas (CA)
Donnelly	Lipinski	Torricelli
Dwyer	Livingston	Waxman
Dymally	Lukens, Donald	Wise
Early	Martin (NY)	Wolf
Florio	McEwen	Wylie
Ford (TN)	Moakley	

## □ 1810

The Clerk announced the following pairs:

On this vote:

Mr. Ireland for, with Mr. Akaka against.

Mr. Shaw for, with Mr. Roybal against.

Mr. Thomas of Georgia for, with Mrs.

Boxer against.

Mr. Dannemeyer for, with Mr. Bonior of Michigan against.

Mr. Badham for, with Mr. Crockett against.

Mr. Crane for, with Mr. Rangel against.

Mr. Konnyu for, with Mr. Ford of Tennessee against.

Mr. Donald E. Lukens for, with Mr. Glickman against.

Mr. Buechner for, with Mr. Moakley against.

Messrs. ALEXANDER, ROWLAND of Connecticut, and WHITTAKER changed their votes from "aye" to "no."

Mr. STRATTON changed his vote from "no" to "aye."

So the amendment to the amendment was rejected.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

## □ 1820

(By unanimous consent Mr. FOLEY was allowed to speak out of order for 1 minute.)

## LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM

Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Chairman, I take this time to advise the membership on both sides of what we anticipate to be the program for the rest of the evening.

After the consideration of the McCollum amendment, which is next in order, and any rollcall vote which may be ordered on the McCollum amendment, we believe that that will be the last rollcall of the evening.

Following the consideration and vote on the McCollum amendment, the Walker amendment will be offered and I believe there is an agreed time limit on the Walker amendment, following which it will be the intention on this side to move to rise. We have discussed this with our colleagues on the Republican side, and we have at least as far as this motion to rise and any motion to adjourn been assured there would be no rollcall votes. So Members can be advised that this bill will be scheduled for consideration again on Tuesday next, and that following the rollcall vote which may occur on the next amendment, the business of the evening will be done as far as rollcall votes are concerned.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Florida [Mr. McCOLLUM].

The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes appeared to have it.

## RECORDED VOTE

Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.

A recorded vote was ordered.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—ayes 103, noes 257, not voting 73, as follows:

## [Roll No. 200]

## AYES—103

Archer	Heger	Quillen
Armey	Holloway	Ridge
Barton	Hopkins	Rinaldo
Bentley	Hubbard	Ritter
Billakis	Huckaby	Robinson
Boulter	Hunter	Rogers
Broomfield	Hutto	Roth
Brown (CO)	Hyde	Schaefer
Bunning	Inhofe	Schulze
Burton	Kasich	Shumway
Callahan	Kyl	Skeen
Cheney	LaFalce	Smith (NJ)
Coble	Lagomarsino	Smith (TX)
Coleman (MO)	Latta	Smith, Denny
Combest	Lewis (CA)	(OR)
Craig	Lott	Smith, Robert
Daub	Lowery (CA)	(NH)
Davis (IL)	Lujan	Solomon
DeLay	Lungren	Spence
DeWine	Mack	Stangeland
Dickinson	Marlenee	Stenholm
DioGuardi	Martin (IL)	Stratton
Dornan (CA)	McCandless	Stump
Dreier	McCollum	Sundquist
Duncan	Michel	Sweeney
Edwards (OK)	Miller (OH)	Swindall
Emerson	Moorhead	Taylor
Fields	Myers	Vander Jagt
Gallegly	Nelson	Vucanovich
Gekas	Nichols	Walker
Gingrich	Nielson	Weber
Goodling	Packard	Wilson
Hall (TX)	Parris	Wortley
Hammerschmidt	Pashayan	Young (AK)
Hansen	Pepper	Young (FL)

## NOES—257

Ackerman	Applegate	Barnard
Alexander	Aspin	Bartlett
Anderson	Atkins	Bateman
Andrews	AuCoin	Bennett
Annunzio	Baker	Bereuter
Anthony	Ballenger	Berman



Biaggi	Hastert	Patterson
Billbray	Hawkins	Pease
Bliley	Hayes (IL)	Pelosi
Boehlert	Hayes (LA)	Penny
Boggs	Hefley	Perkins
Borski	Hefner	Petri
Bosco	Henry	Pickett
Boucher	Hertel	Pickle
Brennan	Hiler	Porter
Brooks	Hochbrueckner	Price (IL)
Bruce	Horton	Price (NC)
Bryant	Houghton	Rahall
Bustamante	Howard	Ravenel
Byron	Hoyer	Regula
Campbell	Hughes	Rhodes
Cardin	Jacobs	Richardson
Carper	Jeffords	Roberts
Carr	Jenkins	Rodino
Chandler	Johnson (CT)	Rose
Chapman	Johnson (SD)	Roukema
Chappell	Jontz	Rowland (CT)
Clarke	Kanjorski	Rowland (GA)
Clay	Kaptur	Russo
Clinger	Kastenmeier	Saiki
Coats	Kildee	Savage
Coelho	Kleczka	Sawyer
Coleman (TX)	Kolbe	Saxton
Collins	Kostmayer	Scheuer
Conte	Lantos	Schneider
Conyers	Leach (IA)	Schroeder
Cooper	Lehman (FL)	Schuetz
Coughlin	Leland	Sensenbrenner
Courter	Lent	Sharp
Coyne	Levin (MI)	Shuster
Darden	Levine (CA)	Sikorski
Davis (MI)	Lewis (GA)	Sisisky
de la Garza	Lightfoot	Skaggs
Dellums	Lowry (WA)	Skelton
Derrick	Lukens, Thomas	Slattery
Dicks	MacKay	Slaughter (NY)
Dingell	Madigan	Slaughter (VA)
Dorgan (ND)	Manton	Smith (FL)
Dowdy	Markley	Smith (NE)
Downey	Matsui	Smith, Robert
Durbin	Mavroules	(OR)
Dyson	Mazzoli	Snowe
Eckart	McCloskey	Solarz
Edwards (CA)	McCurdy	Spratt
English	McDade	Staggers
Erdreich	McGrath	Stallings
Espy	McHugh	Stark
Evans	McMillan (NC)	Stokes
Fascell	McMillen (MD)	Studds
Fawell	Meyers	Swift
Fazio	Mfume	Tallon
Feighan	Mica	Tauke
Fish	Miller (CA)	Thomas (GA)
Flake	Miller (WA)	Torres
Flippo	Mineta	Towns
Foglietta	Mollinari	Traffant
Foley	Mollohan	Traxler
Ford (MI)	Montgomery	Udall
Frank	Moody	Upton
Frost	Morella	Valentine
Garcia	Morrison (WA)	Vento
Geldenson	Mrazek	Visclosky
Gibbons	Murphy	Volkmer
Gonzalez	Murtha	Walgren
Gordon	Nagle	Watkins
Gradison	Natcher	Waxman
Grandy	Neal	Weiss
Gray (IL)	Nowak	Weldon
Gray (PA)	Oaker	Wheat
Green	Oberstar	Whittaker
Gregg	Obey	Whitten
Guarini	Olin	Williams
Gunderson	Owens (NY)	Wolpe
Hall (OH)	Owens (UT)	Wyden
Hamilton	Oxley	Yates
Harris	Panetta	Yatron

## NOT VOTING—73

Akaka	Crockett	Gaydos
Badham	Daniel	Gephardt
Bates	Dannemeyer	Gilman
Bellenson	DeFazio	Glickman
Bevill	Dixon	Grant
Boland	Donnelly	Hatcher
Boner (TN)	Dwyer	Ireland
Bonior (MI)	Dymally	Jones (NC)
Bonker	Early	Jones (TN)
Boxer	Florio	Kemp
Brown (CA)	Ford (TN)	Kennedy
Buechner	Frenzel	Kennelly
Crane	Gallo	Kolter

Konnyu	Moakley	Shaw
Lancaster	Morrison (CT)	Smith (IA)
Leath (TX)	Ortiz	St Germain
Lehman (CA)	Pursell	Synar
Lewis (FL)	Rangel	Tauzin
Lipinski	Ray	Thomas (CA)
Livingston	Roe	Torricelli
Lloyd	Roemer	Wise
Lukens, Donald	Rostenkowski	Wolf
Martin (NY)	Roybal	Wylie
Martinez	Sabo	
McEwen	Schumer	

□ 1835

The Clerk announced the following pairs:

On this vote:

Mr. Ireland for, with Mr. Akaka against.  
Mr. Shaw for, with Mr. Crockett against.  
Mr. Thomas of California for, with Mr. Lancaster against.  
Mr. Dannemeyer for, with Mr. Ford of Tennessee against.

Mr. STARK changed his vote from "aye" to "no."

So the amendment was rejected.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

## AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. WALKER

Mr. WALKER. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. WALKER: Page 70, after line 16, add the following:

**TITLE VII—STATE DEPARTMENT ACTION TO RESTRICT TRAVEL IN SUPPORT OF COMMUNISM IN CENTRAL AMERICA**

## SEC. 701. PASSPORT RESTRICTIONS.

(a) FINDING.—The Congress finds that travel by United States citizens to Central America for the purpose of performing services or providing other assistance for the Government of Nicaragua or for Communist or Communist-supported guerrilla groups causes serious damage to the national security and foreign policy of the United States.

(b) DESIGNATION OF PASSPORTS AS RESTRICTED FOR CERTAIN TRAVEL TO CENTRAL AMERICA.—Accordingly, the Secretary of State shall designate all United States passports—

(1) as restricted for travel to and use in Nicaragua if the purpose of the travel is to perform services or provide other assistance for the Government of Nicaragua; and

(2) as restricted for travel to and use anywhere in Central America if the purpose of the travel is to perform services or provide other assistance for any group which the President has designated as a Communist guerrilla group or as a guerrilla group which receives assistance from the Soviet Union, Cuba, or Nicaragua.

(c) TERMINATION OF RESTRICTIONS REGARDING NICARAGUA.—Paragraph (1) of subsection (b) shall remain in effect until the President certifies to the Congress that the Government of Nicaragua is abiding by the commitments made to the Organization of American States in July 1979.

Mr. WALKER (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the RECORD.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Pennsylvania?

There was no objection.

Mr. MICA. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that all debate on the pending amendment and all amendments thereto end in 40 minutes, and that the time be equally divided and controlled by myself and the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. WALKER].

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Florida?

Mr. WALKER. Reserving the right to object, Mr. Chairman, I do so just to clarify the point. The gentleman says 40 minutes. I want to make sure that it is 40 minutes from the time that we come back onto the amendment on the day proceeding, not in the next 40 minutes.

Mr. MICA. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WALKER. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.

Mr. MICA. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

No, it is 40 minutes on the day we return on this amendment, 20 minutes each.

Mr. WALKER. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my reservation of objection.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Florida?

There was no objection.

Mr. MICA. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise.

The motion was agreed to.

Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore [Mr. ECKART] having assumed the chair, Mr. SWIFT, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 1777) to authorize appropriations for final years 1988 and 1989 for the Department of State, the U.S. Information Agency, and for other purposes, had come to no resolution thereon.

## GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. MICA. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks, and include extraneous material, on H.R. 1777, the bill just considered.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Florida?

There was no objection.

**REPORT ON RESOLUTION WAIVING CERTAIN POINTS OF ORDER AGAINST THE CONFERENCE REPORT ON HOUSE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 93, BUDGET FOR U.S. GOVERNMENT FOR FISCAL YEARS 1988, 1989, AND 1990 AND AGAINST THE CONSIDERATION OF SUCH CONFERENCE REPORT**

Mr. PEPPER, from the Committee on Rules, submitted a privileged report (Rept. 100-170) on the resolution (H. Res. 201) waiving certain points of order against the conference report on the concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 93) setting forth the congressional budget for fiscal years 1988, 1989, and 1990 and against the consideration of such conference report, which was referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed.

**REPORT ON H.R. 2712, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND RELATED AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS, 1988**

Mr. YATES, from the Committee on Appropriations, submitted a privileged report (Rept. 100-171) on the bill (H.R. 2712) making appropriations for the Department of the Interior and related agencies for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1988, and for other purposes, which was referred to the Union Calendar and ordered to be printed.

Mr. CONTE reserved all points of order on the bill.

**REPORT ON H.R. 2713, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA APPROPRIATIONS, 1988**

Mr. FAZIO, from the Committee on Appropriations, submitted a privileged report (Rept. 100-172) on the bill (H.R. 2713) making appropriations for the government of the District of Columbia and other activities chargeable in whole or in part against the revenues of said District for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1988, and for other purposes, which was referred to the Union Calendar and ordered to be printed.

Mr. CONTE reserved all points of order on the bill.

**REPORT ON H.R. 2714, LEGISLATIVE BRANCH APPROPRIATIONS, 1988**

Mr. FAZIO, from the Committee on Appropriations, submitted a privileged report (Rept. 100-173) on the bill (H.R. 2714) making appropriations for the legislative branch for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1988, and for other purposes, which was referred to the Union Calendar and ordered to be printed.

Mr. CONTE reserved all points of order on the bill.

**ELECTION AS MEMBER TO CERTAIN STANDING COMMITTEES**

Ms. OAKAR. Mr. Speaker, I offer a privileged resolution (H. Res. 202), and I ask for its immediate consideration.

The Clerk read the resolution as follows:

H. RES. 202

*Resolved*, That Nancy Pelosi be, and is hereby, elected to the following standing committees of the House of Representatives:

Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs; and  
Committee on Government Operations.

The resolution was agreed to.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

**ELECTION AS MEMBERS TO CERTAIN STANDING COMMITTEES**

Mr. LOTT. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the House Republican Conference, I offer a privileged resolution (H. Res. 203) and ask for its immediate consideration.

The Clerk read the resolution as follows:

H. RES. 203

*Resolved*, That the following named Members be, and they are hereby elected to the following standing committees of the House of Representatives:

Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs: Mr. DiOGUARDI of New York; and  
Committee on Small Business: Mr. HOLLOWAY of Louisiana.

The resolution was agreed to.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

**PERMISSION TO HAVE UNTIL MIDNIGHT FRIDAY, JUNE 19, 1987, TO FILE CONFERENCE REPORT ON H.R. 558, URGENT RELIEF FOR THE HOMELESS ACT**

Mr. GONZALEZ. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the managers may have until midnight Friday, June 19, 1987, to file a conference report to accompany the bill (H.R. 558) to provide urgently needed assistance to protect and improve the lives and safety of the homeless, with special emphasis on elderly persons, handicapped persons, and families with children.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Texas?

There was no objection.

**PERSONAL EXPLANATION**

Ms. SLAUGHTER of New York. Mr. Speaker, due to a death in my family, I was unable to be present for rollcall votes 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 190, and 191.

Had I been present I would have voted "yea" on rollcall numbers: 181, 182, 183, 184 and 191; and "nay" on

rollcall numbers: 180, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, and 190.

**LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM**

(Mr. LOTT asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.)

Mr. LOTT. Mr. Speaker, I take this time to inquire of the distinguished majority leader the schedule for the balance of the week and for next week.

Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. LOTT. I yield to the distinguished majority leader.

Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Speaker, I thank the distinguished whip for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, the program for today has concluded. We will not be in session tomorrow.

On Monday, the House will meet at noon to consider nine bills under suspension:

H.R. 2020, Office of Environmental Quality Authorization;

H.R. 2480, to extend the Governing International Fishery Agreement United States and Korea;

H. Con. Res. 130, to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the Federal Aid in Wildlife Restoration Act;

H.R. 1101, to ensure fair treatment of airline employees in airline mergers and similar transactions;

H.R. 1163, to impose criminal penalties for offenses relating to certain aviation reports and records;

H.R. 2182, Criminal Law and Procedure Minor Substantive and Technical Amendments Act of 1987;

H.R. 1744, National Historic Preservation Act amendments;

H.R. 145, Computer Security Act of 1987; and

H. Con. Res. 50, to encourage international negotiations by the President to develop a protocol to the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer regarding the adverse effects of chlorofluorocarbons.

The House will meet at noon on Tuesday, June 23, and consider recorded votes on suspensions debated on Monday, June 22. It will also consider the conference report on House Concurrent Resolution 93, the first concurrent budget resolution for fiscal year 1988. The rules waives certain points of order. Also an unnumbered H.R., for the interior appropriations, fiscal year 1988, open rule, 1 hour of debate. And H.R. 1777, State Department authorization for fiscal years 1988 and 1989, to complete consideration.

Mr. LOTT. If the gentleman will yield at that point so I could ask a couple of questions: On Tuesday, first the conference report on the budget resolution, I know the staff is busily now filling in the blanks of what has been agreed to supposedly by the con-



feres, but does the gentleman know when this report might be available, when it will be filed?

□ 1850

Mr. FOLEY. We expect the report to be filed on Monday.

Mr. LOTT. Then on that Tuesday, you expect to take up both the budget resolution, Interior appropriations, and complete consideration of the State Department authorization?

Mr. FOLEY. Yes, I recognize that that is a full program for Tuesday and may involve a somewhat later than normal adjournment hour.

Mr. LOTT. Of course, there would also be recorded votes on suspensions that have been carried over from the previous day?

Mr. FOLEY. The gentleman is correct.

Mr. LOTT. Should the Members anticipate a late night on Tuesday?

Mr. WALKER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. WALKER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Is the schedule going to be as listed on the calendar, that we would take up the votes on held-over suspensions first, the budget second, Interior appropriations third, and State Department authorization fourth, so that the State Department authorization would be the thing we would be taking up late at night?

Mr. FOLEY. That is our present intention, obviously subject to some further announcement change, if there is a change of plan; but that is the intention to proceed as I have announced the schedule.

Mr. WALKER. One additional question.

On the budget resolution it is my understanding from what the gentleman just said, we will not have the budget resolution available to us until Monday, that the 3-day rule has been waived with regard to the budget; and that instead of 5 hours to debate as given under the law, we are only going to have 1 hour of debate on this budget that no Member has seen up until this point.

Is that in fact what is going to happen?

Mr. LOTT. That is exactly what is going to happen. I think the idea is, they do not want anybody to see what is in it, and I can understand that.

Mr. WALKER. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman would yield further, my understanding is that we have some taxes in it, that we do not know exactly what they are.

Are we going to find out what is in this thing at any reasonable time before we have to vote on it early on Tuesday?

Mr. LOTT. Since the Committee on Rules has waived the 3-day rule,

unless we defeat the rule, which would be a very good idea, you will have, I guess, Tuesday morning to try to take a look at what is in this budget resolution, because we only have 1 hour of debate too instead of 5 hours as required under the Budget Act?

Mr. FOLEY. If the gentleman will yield, there may be an intention on the part of the other body to file tonight; and in that case if the Members have friends in the other body, the Members might be able to get an advance look at the budget resolution after the Senate filing.

The main outlines have been fairly well reported in the press; and as the gentleman from Pennsylvania knows so well, any revenue portion of the bill is not specific. It is a number. The number is 19.3.

Mr. WALKER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. WALKER].

Mr. WALKER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

It is very, very useful to have that number. As I recall, however, when we have discussed budgets on the floor, we have discussed in some specificity on the floor exactly where we are going to make cuts and where the revenues were going to come from.

That number obviously has a few blanks to be filled in, and I think the Members might want to find out just what those blanks are; but it is helpful to know the other body is going to be considering this bill, and we hope that all of that consideration does not fill the RECORD to the point that it costs the taxpayers another \$197,000 to publish it.

Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chairman, would the gentleman like to complete the schedule for next week?

Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman.

On Wednesday, June 24, the House will meet at 10 a.m. and consider energy and water appropriations for fiscal year 1988 subject to a rule; and on Thursday, June 25, the House will meet at 10 a.m. to consider an unnumbered H.R. for the appropriations for the District of Columbia for fiscal year 1988.

On Friday, June 26, the House would meet at 10 a.m. to consider an unnumbered H.R. for the legislative appropriations for fiscal year 1988.

As we have announced previously, there will be a session on Friday, and a session is expected the following Monday, the 29th of June.

Mr. LOTT. One last question. Should the Members anticipate recorded votes on July 7?

Mr. FOLEY. I am glad the gentleman asked that question. July 7 is the date scheduled for some time now for the returns.

Mr. LOTT. There has been no change in that this week?

Mr. FOLEY. There has been no change on that, and it will be the date on which we will return from the Fourth of July recess.

Members should expect votes on Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday of that week.

#### ADJOURNMENT TO MONDAY, JUNE 22, 1987

Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that when the House adjourns today it adjourn to meet at noon on Monday next.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. ECKART). Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Washington?

There was no objection.

#### DISPENSING OF CALENDAR WEDNESDAY BUSINESS ON WEDNESDAY NEXT

Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the business in order under the Calendar Wednesday rule be dispensed with on Wednesday next.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Washington?

There was no objection.

#### DESIGNATION OF THE HONORABLE THOMAS S. FOLEY TO ACT AS SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE TO SIGN ENROLLED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS THROUGH TUESDAY, JUNE 23, 1987

The SPEAKER pro tempore laid before the House the following communication from the Speaker:

WASHINGTON, DC,

June 18, 1987.

I hereby designate the Honorable THOMAS S. FOLEY to act as Speaker pro tempore to sign enrolled bills and joint resolutions through Tuesday, June 23, 1987.

JIM WRIGHT,

*Speaker of the House of Representatives.*

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the designation is agreed to.

There was no objection.

#### NATIONAL IMMIGRANTS DAY

Mr. UDALL. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service be discharged from further consideration of the Senate joint resolution (S.J. Res. 86) to designate October 28, 1987, as "National Immigrants Day," and ask for its immediate consideration.

The Clerk read the title of the Senate joint resolution.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Arizona?

Mrs. MORELLA. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, I do not object, but would like the Members to know that the minority has no objection to the legislation now being considered.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of Senate Joint Resolution 86, designating October 28, 1987, as "National Immigrants Day."

Mr. Speaker, I believe it only fitting that we honor this Nation's immigrants on the same day the people of France dedicated the Lady of Liberty to the people of America on October 28, 1886. This year will be the 101st anniversary of her arrival in America; she has since welcomed millions who have emigrated to our shores. The Statue of Liberty has represented freedom, hope, and opportunity to those millions of immigrants entering the New York Harbor. She has personally welcomed many of our ancestors and is a lasting memorial to the immigrants who have made this country great.

Mr. Speaker, I am also the child of immigrants. I take this opportunity to thank my parents for taking the brave step of crossing the oceans to come to a new culture, to start afresh and for giving me the opportunities that are afforded by our great Nation.

America is a nation of nations. Immigrants from all walks of life in our Nation have contributed to the development and growth of the American way of life. That we are a nation of immigrants truly reflects the determination by which people of all backgrounds and heritages are able to pursue their dreams of independence, freedom, and liberty.

I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting this legislation.

Mr. DYMALLY. Mr. Speaker, I wish to take this opportunity to commend the authors of Senate Joint Resolution 86, and its companion bill, House Joint Resolution 220, which designate October 28, 1987 as "National Immigrants Day," and to express my support of this observance.

Welcoming immigrants from all nations will always be a shining part of our country's history. That history is brightened by the invaluable contributions made by immigrants to our neighborhoods, cities, States, and Nation.

I submit to Members of this body that in any profession and in any walk of life—in fact—even within the Halls of Congress, one will find people who immigrated from other parts of the world.

For many, the road to this country was a struggle; particularly so for people who entered with literally nothing more than hopes and dreams.

Last year, Americans and the entire world united in witnessing an unforgettable celebration of freedom when the Statue of Liberty was again unveiled. Just last month, we witnessed the realization of a dream of many

aliens when the legalization program went into effect.

And now, proclaiming October 27, 1987, as "National Immigrants Day" is a fitting tribute to people that have sought nothing more than a better life and to share in the greatness of this country.

Mr. Speaker, I thank the authors of this measure for offering it, and urge my colleagues to adopt the resolution.

Mr. LIPINSKI. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to applaud the House in its decision to take up House Joint Resolution 220, legislation which would recognize our Nation's rich ethnic, immigrant heritage. Last year, National Immigrants Day fell on the Fourth of July, coinciding with the relighting of the Statue of Liberty's torch. The Mother of Exiles is famous the world over as a symbol of freedom, hope, and opportunity for all who have come and who continue to come to America. This year, the bill sets aside October 28, 1987, as National Immigrant's Day—the same date Lady Liberty began welcoming the peoples of the world to our shores 101 years ago.

America is a Nation of many peoples. Our history cannot be separated from mentioning those who have come to our country from abroad. America's first immigrants, those colonists who settled Jamestown, VA, reflect the spirit of all immigrants. Those brave colonists came to a strange, unknown land in order to live and worship freely. And while they were not prepared for the often harsh conditions which greeted them, they persevered and, with hard work and determination, created a legacy for all who have followed.

Mr. Speaker, that legacy is alive and well today. Refugees escaping fear and persecution for their religious and political beliefs continue to regard America as a beacon of hope and a land in which they can secure a better way of life for themselves and their families. The immigrants of today, like those of old, have instilled a vibrancy and dynamism in our Nation—the many small shopkeepers we see all around us in the Washington area who are willing to work long hours for the promise of success are a stirring testimony to this truth.

From all walks of life and from every geographical area of our country, immigrants for centuries have been a vital component of America's growth and development. As a Nation of immigrants we are an example to all the world of what a country can accomplish when peoples of all backgrounds and heritages are able to pursue their dreams and aspirations freely.

Mrs. MORELLA. Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my reservation of objection.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Arizona?

There was no objection.

The Clerk read the Senate joint resolution as follows:

S. J. RES. 86

Whereas the Statue of Liberty has been the symbol of freedom, hope, and opportunity for millions of immigrants since the people of France dedicated the Lady of Liberty to the people of America on October 28, 1886:

Whereas the Statue of Liberty serves as a reminder to all that the United States is a nation of immigrants, a nation of nations;

Whereas the Statue of Liberty is a lasting memorial to the immigrants who have made America great;

Whereas millions of immigrants settled throughout the vast territory of the United States, and supported the ideals of independence and liberty;

Whereas the torch held by the Statue of Liberty serves as a beacon of freedom that lives in the soul of every American;

Whereas on October 28, 1886, the Statue of Liberty began to greet immigrants who came to America in pursuit of their dreams; and

Whereas it is only fitting that we set aside October 28, 1987, as a day of celebration to honor the immigrants welcomed by the burning torch of the Lady of Liberty to this land of freedom: Now, therefore, be it

*Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled*, That October 28, 1987, is designated as "National Immigrants Day", and the President is authorized and requested to issue a proclamation calling on the people of the United States to observe such day with appropriate ceremonies and activities.

The Senate joint resolution was ordered to be read a third time, was read the third time, and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

#### NATIONAL OUTWARD BOUND WEEK

Mr. UDALL. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service be discharged from further consideration of the joint resolution (H.J. Res. 284) designating the week beginning June 21, 1987, as "National Outward Bound Week," and ask for its immediate consideration.

The Clerk read the title of the joint resolution.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. ECKART). Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Arizona?

Mrs. MORELLA. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, I do not object, but I would like this body to know that the minority has no objection to this legislation now being considered.

Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from Arizona (Mr. UDALL).

Mr. UDALL. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of House Resolution 284, which designates the week beginning June 21, 1987, as National Outward Bound Week, commemorating the 25th anniversary of the first Outward Bound course in the United States.

Outward Bound is the largest and oldest adventure-based organization in the United States. This nonprofit organization is supported by contributions from individuals, corporations, and foundations of varying political philosophies, all contributing toward developing leadership potential among our American youth.

The primary mission of Outward Bound is to develop leadership, self-



esteem, and responsibility among youths. However, Outward Bound also serves adults and those with special needs. Model programs have been developed that serve youth-at-risk, alcohol and substance abusers, the handicapped, Vietnam veterans, and others. The Outward Bound concept places people in value forming experiences. It assumes that learning and understanding takes place when people engage in and reflect upon experiences in challenging environments in which they must make choices, take responsible action, acquire new skills, and work with others.

Teamwork among participants is vital in order to instill a love and appreciation of the wilderness environment. All courses subscribe to this philosophy and take place in the wilderness as an integral part of what has become Outward Bound experience.

Over 150,000 students have participated in Outward Bound courses during the last 25 years. Outward Bound now has schools located throughout the United States offering our American youth an opportunity to take risks and learn the skills needed to become our future leaders.

Mr. Speaker, I urge adoption of the resolution.

Mrs. MORELLA. Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my reservation of objection.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Arizona?

There was no objection.

The Clerk read the joint resolution, as follows:

#### H.J. Res. 284

Whereas Outward Bound is an organization that offers young people the opportunity to participate in rigorous outdoor recreational programs to improve their self-confidence, physical fitness, outdoor skills, and sense of social responsibility;

Whereas, since 1962 when Outward Bound offered its 1st program in the United States in the State of Colorado, Outward Bound has dedicated its resources and leadership to the betterment of young people and the environment of the United States;

Whereas Outward Bound is a pioneer in the development and application of experience-based outdoor recreational programs in the United States;

Whereas the principles of Outward Bound, including accomplishment through perseverance, teamwork, leadership, and social responsibility, give countless young people the courage to cope better with adversities, overcome personal obstacles, and discover their potential for achievement and compassion;

Whereas over 150,000 people in the United States have participated in the rigorous outdoor recreational programs offered by Outward Bound; and

Whereas Outward Bound serves as the model and inspiration for hundreds of other experience-based programs that have been established in the United States since 1962: Now, therefore, be it

*Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the week beginning June 21, 1987, is designated as "Na-*

*tional Outward Bound Week" in honor of the 25th anniversary of the 1st Outward Bound outdoor recreational program offered in the United States, and the President is authorized and requested to issue a proclamation calling upon the people of the United States to observe such week with appropriate ceremonies and activities.*

The joint resolution was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, was read the third time, and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

#### GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. UDALL. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks on the two joint resolutions just passed.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Arizona?

There was no objection.

#### DICK HOWSER

(Mr. SLATTERY asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SLATTERY. Mr. Speaker, the sports world mourns today the passing of one of the great gentleman of baseball.

Dick Howser, the former manager of the Kansas City Royals, who delighted his fans with a 1985 World Series championship, lost his courage with brain cancer and died at the age of 51.

The same determination of spirit Dick was famous for on the field earned him the respect and admiration of his family, friends, and fans when he applied it off the field in his fight against cancer.

Dick Howser was not used to losing. He never managed a team that finished worse than second.

His career highlights are a string of successes that even the most seasoned baseball professional could envy.

In 1980, he managed the New York Yankees to the best record in baseball and became only the fourth manager in major league history to win 100 games in his rookie season.

In 1981, he took over the Kansas City Royals and led them to American League west titles in 1984 and 1985.

And, in 1985, the great triumph of his managerial career: Dick led the Royal's drive to capture the world championship from the St. Louis Cardinals.

Dick Howser, a man of kindness and courage, will be missed not only by Kansas City and the Royals, but by baseball fans the world over.

I extend my deepest sympathies to Dick's wife Nancy, and his twin daughters Jill and Jan, and thank them for sharing the man who brought so much distinction and class to the game of baseball.

#### MEMORIAL FOR DICK HOWSER

(Mrs. MEYERS of Kansas asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend her remarks.)

Mrs. MEYERS of Kansas. Mr. Speaker, in October 1985 Dick Howser led the Kansas City Royals to their come from behind triumph in the World Series.

Just last July, Dick Howser managed the 1986 American League All Star Team to a victory over the National League.

Yesterday, Dick Howser died of cancer.

Today, all of Kansas City, all of sports, mourns his passing.

Dick Howser's baseball career began and ended in Kansas City. In 1958 he signed on with the Kansas City Athletics and became the starting shortstop. During the intervening years Dick played for the Cleveland Indians, and coached and managed the New York Yankees. In August 1981, Dick returned to manage the Kansas City Royals, and in 1985 took the team to its greatest moment.

We share Dick's loss with his wife, Nancy, and daughters Jan and Jill, and hope that they will be comforted and uplifted by respect and love so many people had for him.

□ 1905

#### THE FEDERAL FISCAL PROCEDURES IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 1987

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. SCHUETTE] is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. SCHUETTE. Mr. Speaker, despite much discussion and contemplation over the years, there is widespread agreement in the Congress that very little has been accomplished in the area of budget reform. With the exception of the Balance Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, efforts to reform the budget process have been as piecemeal and almost as parochial as the budget writing process itself. That is why today I am introducing legislation to reform the budget process.

It is indeed unfortunate that politics and policy gridlock have generally stymied progress on both eliminating the deficit and implementing this much-needed reform. However, President Reagan recently extended an offer to the Congress to help implement substantive reform before he leaves office in 1989. Congress should take him up on his offer and work expeditiously toward strengthening the congressional machinery to eliminate the Federal deficit.

There can be no doubt that the Federal budget process is broken. The Federal Government has been in the red 18 straight years, and it is getting worse. Budget deficits over the last 5 years have risen to enormous proportions, and they have underpinned a virtual

explosion in the national debt. This "sea of red ink" will continue unless or until something is done to alter its course.

Until just a few years ago, deficits of this size were unimaginable, even under the worst of circumstances. Yet today, we have become dangerously accustomed to the practice of budgeting for these deficits. We have been become complacent about accepting them as part of spending blueprints under good time scenarios—scenarios which include an unprecedented, peacetime economic expansion of over 8 years.

That is asking a lot from an economy that has endured a recession roughly every 4 years since World War II. A recession sometime during the next 3 years would result in an astronomical increase in the deficit and the national debt. But this time there would be no guarantor of last resort to bail us out. Those out of work and truly in need would find only a frayed safety net, one simply unable to provide the necessary assistance to bridge the gap until good times returned.

Nevertheless, even if the economy were able to dodge the recession bullet for 4 more years, the best that will happen is that we will continue to mortgage our Nation's future. It is no secret that in just the last half decade, the United States has declined in status from the world's largest creditor nation to the world's biggest debtor. At some point in time, those debts will have to be repaid, and it will be up to our children and to our children's children to pick up the tab.

#### THE DOMENICI-SCHUETTE PACKAGE OF COMPREHENSIVE BUDGET REFORM

What is needed is a healthy dose of fiscal restraint on the part of budget writers before a crisis emerges and the Nation truly cannot honor its obligations. That is why today I am introducing in the House a comprehensive seven-point package for budget reform. This legislation, if adopted, would strengthen budgetary discipline, streamline the budget mechanism, and restore credibility and accountability to the budget process.

The fact of the matter is that as long as the Congress is permitted to do so, Members will continue to use the wide variety of gimmicks and escape hatches now at its disposal. The availability of such devices essentially renders the current procedures and deadlines for budget writing discipline largely unenforceable. No one really pays attention to them, and virtually every major budget deadline in the process is missed.

The adoption of the Domenici-Schuetter budget reform bill will go a long way toward implementing comprehensive budget process reform. Among the major reform provisions embodied in this bill are: First, the implementation of a streamlining 2-year budget process; second, the revitalization of executive rescission authority; third, the restoration and stricter enforcement of the budget resolution; and fourth, the restoration of the G-R-H automatic spending cuts mechanism. In addition, this plan, which embodies many of the best of the practical ideas today for budget reform, calls for the passage and ratification of a constitutional amendment to balance the budget.

#### THE 2-YEAR BUDGET

Right now, the Congress spends nearly a full year piecing together a budget which usu-

ally is not completed until well after the fiscal year has already begun. This proposal would implement a 2-year budget cycle, which is the normal practice in State capitals around the Nation.

Among the many advantages of the biennial budget proposal contained in this plan, is significant time savings in the second year of the process, because effort would be targeted at oversight and not on having to build a spending plan from ground zero. In addition, a biennial budget would reduce the tendency of budget-writers to project illusory savings in the out-years, because the Congress would be bound by second-year spending and revenue targets.

A biennial budget would also produce substantial expenditure savings for the Government by allowing multiyear contracting. This would be especially helpful for the Pentagon, where single year budgets prohibit the purchase of items such as spare parts in more economical quantities. Finally, the adoption of this plan, which includes crafting the Government's spending plan in election off-years, would significantly reduce the temptation for the Congress to engage in special interest spending.

#### ENHANCED RESCISSION AUTHORITY

In the absence of any possibility for Presidential line-item veto, The Domenici/Schuetter budget reform proposal would revitalize the traditional powers of the executive to control spending. Over the past decade, there has been a significant erosion in the President's power to control excessive spending, and this plan would restore executive authority to propose rescissions.

Currently, the Congress can disapprove a rescission request simply by not acting on it. This plan would require an up-or-down vote on any Presidential rescission request within 15 days. This component of the Domenici-Schuetter proposal would ensure that the Congress would give serious consideration to proposed White House spending cuts instead of the present practice of simply ignoring them.

#### STRONGER ENFORCEMENT OF BUDGET RULES

Over the last 7 years, the Congress has enacted spending bills which have exceeded its own guidelines by an average of \$24.4 billion per year. Although the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 was designed to prevent such fiscal irresponsibility, the appropriations committees have found a variety of loopholes and trapdoors in the procedural guidelines to circumvent or ignore the budget resolution's guidelines.

This circumvention of the budget rules reached new heights with the implementation of the so-called Fazio exemption. Under the Fazio exemption, the House may breach its own budget ceilings by considering spending bills which exceed those set in the budget resolution. Obviously, the Fazio exemption makes it extraordinarily difficult to reduce the deficit by cutting spending.

This proposal would amend the House rules and repeal this harmful provision. Under the Domenici-Schuetter plan, consideration of bills on the House floor which exceed spending targets would again be disallowed by making them subject to points of order.

#### PENALIZE CONTINUING RESOLUTIONS

One of the favorite devices of the Congress in this day of chronically missed deadlines, is to lump as many of the 13 individual appropriations bills as it can into a huge monster of a spending bill. While these end-of-the-year spending plans are supposed to simply continue at amounts appropriated in the previous year, today these omnibus testimonials to fiscal irresponsibility have been used to increase spending.

This proposal would punish the use of continuing resolution as a device to increase spending by disallowing them. If any one of the 13 regular spending bills fails to pass by the start of the fiscal year, program spending would automatically be funded at prescribed levels in the previous year. This rule would hold unless or until a new spending bill for the new fiscal year was enacted.

#### REFORMS FEDERAL ACCOUNTING PROCEDURES FOR CREDIT PROGRAMS

It is no secret that the present budgetary treatment of Federal activities in its credit programs gives an erroneous, often misleading, picture of the budgetary impact of these programs. This shortcoming is made all the more troublesome by the growing level of activity in Federal credit programs.

The Domenici-Schuetter proposal would substantially increase accountability and change the way the government keeps its books on Federal loans. Under the Domenici-Schuetter plan, new direct loans would be sold in secondary markets soon after disbursement and loan guarantees would be reinsured in the private market so that a more accurate budgetary impact of these activities is achieved. This market transactions approach to accounting for loans would serve to tighten the link between the budget and the true costs of Federal credit activities.

#### FIXING G-R-H

One of the more important components of this reform package is the revitalization of the intent of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings [G-R-H] budget balancing law. This process has played an instrumental role in making some progress on reducing the deficit. The Domenici-Schuetter proposal would put teeth back in the G-R-H sequestration mechanism, by satisfying the constitutional problems of the original 1985 law. It also would enforce the original budget deficit targets in the odd-year in order to achieve a balanced budget by the end of 1991.

#### ENCOURAGES THE PASSAGE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT TO BALANCE THE BUDGET

The final piece of my proposal is a sense of the Congress resolution that the House and the Senate should pass a constitutional amendment to balance the budget. Although I generally am opposed to amending the fundamental charter of the land for such purposes, this amendment is needed as a last resort to force the hand of the Congress to make the tough decisions needed to balance the budget.

Without this amendment and these much-needed reforms, budget writers and spending bill architects will simply continue to miss deadlines and use gimmicks, smoke and mirrors to reduce the deficit. However, the supply



of smoke is running out and the mirrors are breaking.

It is now time for the Congress to take the deficit bull by the horns and implement honest and substantial budget reforms. This bill provides the Congress with the vehicle to accomplish just that. It gives Members a rare opportunity to act proactively, before a crisis emerges, and my colleagues in both Chambers should not allow this to pass us by.

#### ONLY ADEQUATE FINANCING OF FSLIC CAN PROTECT THE TAXPAYERS

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Rhode Island [Mr. ST GERMAIN] is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. ST GERMAIN. Mr. Speaker, next week we will be sitting down with conferees from the Senate in an attempt to work out the difficult issues involved in the recapitalization of the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation.

It is essential that we restore confidence in the savings and loan industry and place FSLIC on a firm footing for the long recovery process.

Mr. Speaker, the recovery will take money—billions of dollars—and it has been our hope—which I believe is shared fully by our Senate counterparts—that this can be financed by the industry and not by the taxpayers. Both the House and Senate bills are structured so that the industry bears the costs of raising the new funds in the marketplace.

How well this plan works—and how successful we are in protecting the American taxpayer—depends on the ultimate structure of the FSLIC recapitalization plan and the adequacy of its financing.

Mr. Speaker, the General Accounting Office tells us that the FSLIC fund was \$6.3 billion in deficit at the end of 1986. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board says as of April 30 the deficit figure had risen to \$9.3 billion.

Through the months there has been disagreement about the level of financing needed for the recapitalization and how long the plan should remain in place. I doubt that there is a magical number.

The recapitalization needs to be carried out at a level that will give FSLIC the ability to deal with hopelessly insolvent institutions that have no chance of recovery and with situations where fraud and gross mismanagement have crept into the industry. Recapitalization must also be at a level that assures the marketplace—and the public—that the recovery plan is viable and that the Congress is serious about returning the industry and its regulatory arm to health.

Many of us in the House supported a higher figure than the \$5 billion, 2-year plan ultimately adopted. The last Congress, the House adopted a \$15 billion 5-year plan, as proposed by the administration. The Senate earlier this year adopted a \$7.5 billion plan. Many have been vocal about concerns that neither the House nor the Senate numbers deal adequately with the problem.

Mr. Speaker, I sincerely hope that the conferees for both the Senate and House will think long and hard about the need for adequate financing of the recapitalization. Frankly,

I don't think it would serve either House well or the industry well to adopt a plan that required us to return to these issues a few months down the road. We need to come out of the conference with legislation that we can hold up and tell the American people that we are serious about efforts to bring about recovery in this important financial industry. We need to come out of conference with legislation that provides some reasonable assurance that the plan is not just a way station enroute to tapping the U.S. Treasury and the American taxpayers for the recovery funds.

#### SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN AMENDMENTS OF 1987

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from California [Mr. COELHO] is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. COELHO. Mr. Speaker, along with my colleagues Mr. LEACH of Iowa and Mr. SYNAR of Oklahoma, I am today introducing legislation which addresses in a comprehensive manner the many valid concerns about the insufficiencies in our current campaign laws for House races. We submit for your review a section-by-section analysis of our Federal Election Campaign Amendments of 1987.

#### COELHO-LEACH-SYNAR FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN AMENDMENTS OF 1987—Section-by-Section Analysis

##### SECTION 2.

Amends the FECA of 1971 by adding Title V, voluntary expenditure limitations and public financing for House general elections.

Sec. 501. Definitions of "eligible candidate," "general elections" and "election cycle" (the two-year period between general elections).

Sec. 502. Eligibility for Payments.

(a) to be eligible to receive payments, general election candidates, within 7 days of qualifying, must agree that the candidate has not and will not exceed the spending limits, will not accept contributions over the limits, will deposit any payments in a separate account, will provide requested information to the FEC and will cooperate with any audit.

(b) and (c) to receive payments, a general election candidate must have received 10% (\$40,000) of the spending limit from individuals, 80% of which (\$32,000) is from home state individuals, in amounts of \$250 or less.

Sec. 503. Limitations on Expenditures.

(a) eligible candidates may only spend \$40,000 in personal funds during the election cycle.

(b) eligible candidates may only expend \$400,000 in personal funds during the election cycle. This limit will be adjusted by CPI. Eligible candidates who participate in a primary runoff election may make additional expenditures up to \$150,000 during that election.

(c) if independent expenditures are made during the election cycle in opposition to an eligible candidate or for the opponent of an eligible candidate which aggregate \$10,000 or more, the eligible candidate may make additional expenditures above the spending limit in an equal amount.

Sec. 504. Entitlement of Eligible Candidates to Payments. Eligible candidates will be entitled to matching payments up to 50% of the spending limit in amounts equal to contributions from individuals, not given

through intermediaries or conduits, in amounts of \$250 or less.

Eligible candidates will be entitled to additional payments when \$10,000 or more of independent expenditures are made in the general election in opposition to, or on behalf of an opponent of, such eligible candidate.

Eligible candidates will be entitled to additional payments if any candidate in the general election either receives contributions or makes expenditures during the election cycle in excess of the amount of the spending limit.

Eligible candidates will receive third-class mailing rates as do parties.

Payments to eligible candidates may only be used to defray general election period expenditures and only to further the election of the candidate.

Sec. 505. Certification by Commission.

Within 48 hours after the Commission receives a request for payments, the Commission shall certify to Treasury the eligibility for such payments. Candidates' requests must be in amounts of at least \$10,000 (the initial request must be at least \$40,000—Sec. 503) except for one final payment request which may be in lesser amounts.

A request for funds will be in the form required by the Commission but must be signed by the candidate, treasurer and a state licensed accountant (who may be the treasurer). The Commission's role in certifying is ministerial and the Commission may not delay certification unless the verification is clearly incorrect. If a verification signed by an accountant is incorrect, the Commission must notify the account's State licensing authority.

Sec. 506. Establishment of Account: Payments.

The Secretary of the Treasury will maintain a new, separate account known as "House of Representatives Election Campaign Account." When the Secretary receives a certification from the Commission, the eligible candidate shall receive from the account the amount certified. If the amounts in the account are insufficient, the Secretary shall pay a pro rata share to each eligible candidate.

Sec. 507. Examination & Audits.

The Commission will conduct examinations and audits of 10% of eligible candidates. In selecting the accounts to be audited, the Commission will audit all candidates in any race when any eligible candidate is selected.

If the Commission determines amounts paid were in excess of amounts due, the candidate must repay an equal amount.

If any amount was not used properly, the candidate must repay 200% of the amount.

If expenditures exceeded the limit by 5% or less, the candidate must pay an amount equal to the excess.

If expenditures exceeded the limit by more than 5%, the candidate must repay 300% of the excess.

Payments not expended may be retained for 60 days after the general election for liquidation of obligation incurred during the election period.

Sec. 508. Judicial Review.

Commission action is subject to review by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.

Sec. 509. Participation by Commission in Judicial Proceedings.

The Commission is authorized to institute action in district courts to seek recoveries and to obtain injunctive relief if necessary

and to appear, on behalf of the US, in the Supreme Court in these actions.

#### Sec. 510. Reports to Congress.

The Commission shall make full reports to Congress on the payments to and expenditures by eligible candidates and shall prescribe rules, etc., to carry out its duties. There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as are necessary for carrying out the Commission's functions under this title.

#### Sec. 511. Authorization of Appropriation.

Such sums as may be necessary for the Commission to carry out functions in this bill are authorized.

#### SECTION 3. AMENDMENTS TO §§ 301 AND 304 OF FECA

Immediately upon filing for candidacy under State law, all candidates must declare whether or not the candidate intends to make expenditures in excess of the spending limitation established for eligible candidates.

Any candidate who is not an eligible candidate and who receives aggregate contributions or makes aggregate expenditures which would exceed the spending limits, shall report to the Commission either when such contributions are received or when such expenditures are made or when the candidate qualifies for the general election ballot, whichever is later. The Commission shall then notify any eligible candidate of such reports and shall certify any additional payments for which any eligible candidate is eligible. The Commission, on its own, may conclude that such contributions have been received or expenditures made and certify additional amounts. Expenditures are deemed made when incurred.

Independent expenditures by any person in an election cycle which aggregate \$5,000 must be reported within 24 hours. Under penalty of perjury, the person making such expenditures shall indicate whom the expenditures are actually intended to help or defeat. The Commission shall notify other candidates in the race and, in the case of an eligible candidate, shall certify any additional payments for which such candidate is eligible.

**Soft Money:** All political committees engaged in non-Federal elections and maintaining separate non-federal accounts, shall report funds received into and disbursements made from such accounts which may influence a federal election (e.g. voter registration, GOTV, general public political advertising, etc.). In addition, donations for building funds must be disclosed.

#### SECTION 4. CONTRIBUTION LIMITATIONS ON PERSONS OTHER THAN MULTICANDIDATE POLITICAL COMMITTEES

Persons, other than multicandidate committees, may make contributions to House candidates up to \$2,000 during an election cycle and \$20,000 to national party committees and \$5,000 to other political committees in a calendar year. This Section and Section 5 change the contribution limits for House candidates from "per election" limits to limits for full election cycles.

#### SECTION 5. CONTRIBUTION LIMITATIONS FOR MULTICANDIDATE COMMITTEES AND HOUSE CANDIDATES

(a) PACs may contribute to House candidates up to \$10,000 in any election cycle, and \$30,000 to national party committees and \$5,000 to other political committees in any calendar year.

(b) This Section makes clear that the 441a(d) limits apply to party committee spending for general public political advertising whenever made which clearly identify

by name an individual who is, or who is seeking nomination to be, a candidate in the general election for federal office.

(c) During the election cycle, candidates for the House may not accept contributions from nonparty multicandidate committees (PACs) which aggregate in excess of \$100,000 (\$125,000 if 2 candidates in both the primary and the general).

House candidates in a primary runoff election may accept up to \$40,000 in additional contributions from nonparty multicandidate committees.

#### SECTION 6. LIMITATION ON CANDIDATE PACS

Federal candidates may not establish, maintain, or control multicandidate political committees.

#### SECTION 7. INTERMEDIARY OR CONDUIT (BUNDLING)

This provision clarifies and strengthens current law with regard to when contributions, which are raised by or go through persons other than the contributor and the candidate, will be considered contributions by both the contributor and the conduit.

#### SECTION 8. INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURES

This provision clarifies and strengthens current law with regard to when expenditures are independent and when coordinated and, therefore, considered contributions.

#### SECTION 9. INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURES BROADCAST REQUIREMENTS

Requires persons making independent expenditures through communications on TV to include a clearly readable continuous statement setting forth the person's name and any connected organization in the case of a PAC.

Requires any independent expenditure made through a newspaper, outdoor advertising facility, direct mailing, etc., to state the name of the person making the expenditure, any connected organization, in the case of a PAC, and a statement that the cost is not subject to any limitation.

#### SECTION 10. INCREASE IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN FUND INCOME TAX CHECKOFF

Changes from \$1 or \$2, the checkoff effective the first December 31 after enactment.

#### SECTION 11. BROADCAST RATES

Requires the candidate to be identified or identifiable for a substantial portion of time of use in order to receive lowest unit rate.

#### SECTION 12. EFFECTIVE DATE

Next regularly scheduled election during 1990.

#### SECTION 13. NONSEVERABILITY

Requires the entire legislation to fail should a final decision by the U.S. courts determine that any provision in the legislation is unconstitutional.

#### LEAVE OF ABSENCE

By unanimous consent, leave of absence was granted to:

Mr. ROYBAL (at the request of Mr. FOLEY) for today, on account of official business.

Mr. LEATH of Texas (at the request of Mr. FOLEY) for today, after 2 p.m., on account of official business.

Mr. LEWIS of Florida (at the request of Mr. MICHEL) for today, on account of a death in the family.

Mr. DANIEL (at the request of Mr. NICHOLS) for Wednesday, June 17, until further notice, on account of illness.

#### SPECIAL ORDERS GRANTED

By unanimous consent, permission to address the House, following the legislative program and any special orders heretofore entered, was granted to:

(The following Members (at the request of Mrs. MORELLA) to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material:)

Mr. LUNGREN, for 5 minutes, on June 23.

Mr. LUNGREN, for 5 minutes, on June 24.

Mr. LUNGREN, for 5 minutes, on June 25.

Mr. SCHUETTE, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. GINGRICH, for 60 minutes, today.

Mrs. BENTLEY, for 60 minutes, on June 24.

Mrs. BENTLEY, for 60 minutes, on June 25.

Mrs. BENTLEY, for 60 minutes, on July 1.

(The following Members (at the request of Mrs. SLATTERY) to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material:)

Mr. ANNUNZIO, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. ST GERMAIN, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. COELHO, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. GONZALEZ, for 60 minutes, on June 22.

Mr. DYMALLY, for 60 minutes, on June 24.

#### EXTENSION OF REMARKS

By unanimous consent, permission to revise and extend remarks was granted to:

Mr. NEAL, immediately preceding the vote on the Mica en bloc amendments to H.R. 1777 in the Committee of the Whole today.

(The following Members (at the request of Mrs. MORELLA) and to include extraneous matter:)

Mr. OXLEY.

Mr. SOLOMON in two instances.

Mr. LUJAN.

Mr. BARTON of Texas in two instances.

Mr. CLINGER.

Mr. IRELAND.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO.

Mr. FIELDS in two instances.

Mr. FAWELL.

Mr. McMILLAN of North Carolina.

Mr. DICKINSON.

Mr. GREEN.

Mrs. JOHNSON of Connecticut.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey.

Mr. McEWEN.

Mr. BEREUTER.

Mr. PORTER.

Mr. DELAY.

Mrs. BENTLEY.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. SLATTERY) and to include extraneous matter:)

Mr. FASCELL in two instances.

Mr. BONIOR of Michigan.



Mr. SMITH of Florida.  
 Mr. ANNUNZIO.  
 Mr. HOWARD.  
 Mr. DORGAN of North Dakota.  
 Mr. SHARP.  
 Mr. GARCIA.  
 Mr. BUSTAMANTE.  
 Mr. MONTGOMERY.  
 Mr. PEPPER.  
 Mr. BOSCO.  
 Mr. HOWARD.  
 Mr. BERMAN.  
 Mr. VENTO.  
 Mr. RICHARDSON.  
 Mrs. SCHROEDER.  
 Mr. BRYANT.  
 Mr. SCHUMER.  
 Mr. DIXON.  
 Mr. TORRICELLI in three instances.  
 Mr. DE LA GARZA.  
 Mr. BONKER.  
 Mr. HAMILTON.  
 Mr. KOSTMAYER.

#### ENROLLED BILL AND JOINT RESOLUTION

Mr. ANNUNZIO, from the Committee on House Administration, reported that that committee had examined and found truly enrolled a bill and joint resolution of the House of the following titles, which were thereupon signed by the Speaker:

H.R. 2100. An act to designate the border station at 9931 Guide Meridian Road, Lynden, Washington, as the "Kenneth G. Ward Border Station"; and

H.J. Res. 17. Joint resolution to designate the third week in June 1987 as "National Dairy Goat Awareness Week."

#### ADJOURNMENT

Mrs. MORELLA. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House do now adjourn.

The motion was agreed to; accordingly (at 7 o'clock and 5 minutes p.m.), under its previous order, the House adjourned until Monday, June 22, 1987, at 12 o'clock noon.

#### EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

Under clause 2 of rule XXIV, executive communications were taken from the Speaker's table and referred as follows:

1627. A letter from the Chairman, Merit Systems Protection Board, transmitting the eighth annual report of the Merit Systems Protection Board, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 1209(b); to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

1628. A letter from the Ambassador, Embassy of the Republic of Korea, transmitting a report concerning trade liberalization measures taken by the Korean Government in 1987; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

#### REPORTS OF COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 2 of rule XIII, reports of committees were delivered to the Clerk for printing and reference to the proper calendar, as follows:

Mr. UDALL: Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. H.R. 1860. A bill entitled the "Federal Land Exchange Facilitation Act of 1987"; with an amendment (Rept. 100-165, Pt. 1). Ordered to be printed.

Mr. JONES of North Carolina: Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries. H.R. 2020. A bill to authorize appropriations for the Office of Environmental Quality for fiscal years 1987, 1988, and 1989; with an amendment (Rept. 100-166). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

Mr. BROOKS: Committee on Government Operations. A report on NRC's regulation of fuel cycle facilities: A paper tiger; (Rept. 100-167). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

Mr. JONES of North Carolina: Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries. House Concurrent Resolution 130. Concurrent resolution recognizing the accomplishments of the Federal Aid in Wildlife Restoration Act in honor of its 50th anniversary (Rept. 100-168). Referred to the House Calendar.

Mr. CONYERS: Committee on the Judiciary. H.R. 2182. A bill to make minor substantive and technical amendments to title 18, United States Code, and for other purposes; with an amendment (Rept. 100-169). Referred to the Committee on the Whole House on the State of the Union.

Mr. DERRICK: Committee on Rules. House Resolution 201. Resolution waiving certain points of order against the conference report on the concurrent resolutions (H. Con. Res. 93) setting forth the congressional budget for fiscal years 1988, 1989, and 1990 and against the consideration of such conference report (Rept. 100-170). Referred to the House Calendar.

Mr. YATES: Committee on Appropriations. H.R. 2712. A bill making appropriations for the Department of the Interior and related agencies for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1988, and for other purposes (Rept. 100-171). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

Mr. DIXON: Committee on Appropriations. H.R. 2713. A bill making appropriations for the government of the District of Columbia and other activities chargeable in whole or in part against the revenues of said District for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1988, and for other purposes (Rept. 100-172). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

Mr. FAZIO: Committee on Appropriations. H.R. 2714. A bill making appropriations for the legislative branch for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1988, and for other purposes (Rept. 100-173). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

#### PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 5 of rule X and clause 4 of rule XXII, public bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. YATES:

H.R. 2712. A bill making appropriations for the Department of the Interior and related agencies for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1988, and for other purposes.

By Mr. DIXON:

H.R. 2713. A bill making appropriations for the government of the District of Columbia and other activities chargeable in whole or in part against the revenues of said District for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1988, and for other purposes.

By Mr. FAZIO:

H.R. 2714. A bill making appropriations for the legislative branch for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1988, and for other purposes.

By Mr. AKAKA:

H.R. 2715. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to make a technical correction relating to the harbor maintenance tax; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. BONKER (for himself, Mr.

BILBRAY, Mr. BUSTAMANTE, Ms. KAPTUR, Mr. NEAL, Mr. PORTER, Mr. SMITH of Florida, and Mr. WATKINS):

H.R. 2716. A bill to establish as an executive department of the U.S. Government a Department of Commerce and Trade, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Government Operations.

By Mr. COELHO (for himself, Mr. LEACH of Iowa, and Mr. SYNAR):

H.R. 2717. A bill to amend the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 to provide for voluntary expenditure limitations and partial public financing for House of Representatives general elections, to further limit contributions by multicandidate political committees to candidates in elections for Federal office, and for other purposes; jointly, to the Committees on House Administration and Energy and Commerce.

By Mr. CONTE (for himself, Mr.

CRANE, Mr. DELAY, and Mr. GINGRICH):

H.R. 2718. A bill to authorize the study of the transfer of the Southeastern Power Administration out of Federal ownership; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

By Mr. DICKINSON:

H.R. 2719. A bill to amend title 10, United States Code, to increase the combat support assignments open to women in the Armed Forces; to the Committee on Armed Services.

By Mr. FIELDS:

H.R. 2720. A bill to increase the investment of the United States in the Panama Canal by certain amounts in the Panama Canal Commission Fund, and to use that amount of tolls and other receipts that covers interest on that increased investment for a Scholarship for Democracy Program; jointly, to the Committees on Merchant Marine and Fisheries and Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. FLORIO:

H.R. 2721. A bill to establish an alternative dispute resolution procedure; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H.R. 2722. A bill to amend title 9 of the United States Code to improve the appellate process in the Federal courts of appeals with respect to arbitration; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. FOGLIETTA (for himself, Mr. STARK, Mr. EVANS, Mr. LEVINE of California, and Mr. DELUMS):

H.R. 2723. A bill to rescind certain United States economic benefits to the Republic of Korea unless steps are taken to promote democracy and respect human rights; jointly,

to the Committees on Foreign Affairs; Ways and Means; and Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs.

By Mr. GREEN:

H.R. 2724. A bill to limit the killing of wildlife in the National Wildlife Refuge System; to the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries.

By Mrs. JOHNSON of Connecticut (for herself, Mr. CLINGER, Mr. MICHEL, Mr. ECKART, Mr. CONTE, Mr. CONYERS, Mrs. MARTIN of Illinois, Mr. SAVAGE, Mr. McDADE, Mr. BOEHLERT, Mr. BEREUTER, Mr. FISH, Mr. COUGHLIN, Mr. MORRISON of Washington, Mr. HENRY, Mr. PURSELL, Mr. ROWLAND of Connecticut, Mrs. ROUKEMA, Mr. DeWINE, Mr. LIGHTFOOT, Mr. DANIEL, Ms. KAPTUR, and Mr. OBERSTAR):

H.R. 2725. A bill to provide incentives for worker training through both employer and individual initiative and to require the Secretary of Labor to study the feasibility and cost of a national job bank; jointly, to the Committees on Education and Labor and Ways and Means.

By Mr. MURPHY (for himself, Mr. KANJORSKI, Mr. CLAY, Mrs. ROUKEMA, Mr. COELHO, Mr. McDADE, Mr. FLIPPO, Mr. SCHUMER, Mr. STENHOLM, Mr. HYDE, Mr. HUGHES, Mr. BOLAND, Mr. STAGGERS, Mr. WYDEN, Mr. SWINDALL, Mr. BOUCHER, Mr. BEVILL, Mr. MURTHA, Mr. BOEHLERT, Mr. MARTINEZ, Mr. RAHALI, Mr. BRYANT, Mr. FAZIO, Mr. WALGREN, Mr. CLINGER, Mr. BIAGGI, Mr. MRAZEK, Mr. YATRON, Mr. SIKORSKI, Mr. TRAFICANT, Mr. LOWERY of California, Mr. DWYER of New Jersey, Mr. BORSKI, Mr. GONZALEZ, Mr. MANTON, Mr. STOKES, Mr. BUSTAMANTE, Mr. COYNE, Mr. GAYDOS, Mr. LIPINSKI, Mr. KILDEE, Mr. McCURDY, Mr. GRAY of Illinois, Mr. TOWNS, Mr. OWENS of New York, Mr. PUSTER, Mr. STALLINGS, Mr. RITTER, Mr. FAUNTROY, Mr. KLECZKA, and Mr. GARCIA):

H.R. 2726. A bill to establish a corps of administrative law judges to preside at certain Federal proceedings, and for other purposes; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. EDWARDS of California (for himself, Mr. LaFALCE, Mr. PEPPER, Mr. FRANK, Mr. STAGGERS, and Mr. MATSUI):

H.R. 2727. A bill to repeal the antitrust exemption applicable to the business of insurance; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. OWENS of Utah:

H.R. 2728. A bill to establish in the Department of Education an Office of Comprehensive School Health Education, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Education and Labor.

By Mr. RINALDO:

H.R. 2729. A bill to provide for the monthly publication of a Consumer Price Index for the elderly and to provide for the utilization of such an index in the determination of cost-of-living adjustments authorized under certain Federal programs for individuals who are at least 62 years of age; to the Committee on Education and Labor.

By Mr. ROWLAND of Connecticut:

H.R. 2730. A bill to amend title 10, United States Code, to require the Secretary concerned to notify Congress whenever a progress payment is withheld under a contract in excess of \$1 million; to the Committee on Armed Services.

By Mr. ROWLAND of Connecticut (for himself and Mr. HUNTER):

H.R. 2731. A bill to prohibit procurement by the Federal Government from firms that have jeopardized the national security of the United States; jointly, to the Committees on Government Operations and Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. RUSSO (for himself, Mr. BEIL-ENSON, Mrs. BOXER, Mrs. COLLINS, Mr. CONYERS, Mr. DELUMS, Mr. De LUGO, Mr. FOGLIETTA, Mr. GONZALEZ, Mr. LEHMAN of Florida, Mr. LIPINSKI, Mr. MORRISON of Connecticut, Mr. MRAZEK, Mr. RANGEL, Mr. SCHEUER, Mr. SMITH of Florida, Mr. STARK, Mr. TOWNS, Mr. YATES, and Mr. ACKERMAN):

H.R. 2732. A bill to amend title 18, United States Code, with respect to firearms; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. SCHUETTE:

H.R. 2733. A bill to provide for improved Federal fiscal procedures; jointly, to the Committees on Rules; Government Operations; Ways and Means; and Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs.

By Mr. SYNAR (for himself, and Mr. FIELDS):

H.R. 2734. A bill to reform the regulation of oil pipelines; jointly, to the Committees on Energy and Commerce and Public Works and Transportation.

By Mr. FORD of Tennessee:

H. Con. Res. 143. Concurrent resolution to express the sense of the Congress concerning minority employment practices of the Department of State; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Ms. OAKAR:

H. Res. 202. Resolution designating membership on certain standing committees of the House; considered and agreed to.

By Mr. LOTT:

H. Res. 203. Resolution designating membership on certain standing committees of the House; considered and agreed to.

By Mr. DORGAN of North Dakota (for himself, Mr. JOHNSON of South Dakota, and Mr. PENNY):

H. Res. 204. Resolution expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that any legislation that provides additional financial assistance to the Farm Credit System should enable the banks and associations of the System to make loans at lower interest rates, ensure the continued participation of borrowers in the System, and assist borrowers to repay their loans obtained from banks and associations of the System; to the Committee on Agriculture.

By Mr. HERTEL (for himself, Mr. FORD of Michigan, Mr. TRAXLER, Mr. DINGELL, Mr. LIPINSKI, Mr. RICHARDSON, Mr. KENNEDY, Mr. DYSON, Mr. KILDEE, Ms. OAKAR, Ms. KAPTUR, Mr. FOGLIETTA, Mr. KOLTER, Mr. GAYDOS, Mr. KANJORSKI, Mr. ORTIZ, Mr. RUSSO, Mr. LOWRY of Washington, Mr. WOLFE, and Mr. MICA):

H. Res. 205. Resolution providing that the Secretary of State should recommend the continued extension of voluntary departure status for nationals of Poland in the United States, and the Attorney General should continue such extension; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

## MEMORIALS

Under clause 4 of rule XXII, memorials were presented and referred as follows:

132. By the SPEAKER: Memorial of the Legislature of the State of Nevada, relative to training the drivers of motor vehicles

which carry hazardous materials and for tracking shipments of hazardous materials; to the Committee on Public Works and Transportation.

133. Also, memorial of the Legislature of the State of Nevada, relative to the Nevada test site; jointly, to the Committees on Armed Services and Science, Space, and Technology.

134. Also, memorial of the Legislature of the State of Nevada, relative to availability of money for judicial review relating to the high-level nuclear waste program; jointly, to the Committees on Interior and Insular Affairs and Energy and Commerce.

## PRIVATE BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 1 of rule XXII,

Mr. ACKERMAN introduced a bill (H.R. 2735) for the relief of Lea Gelb, Chaim Morris Gelb, and Sidney Gelb; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

## ADDITIONAL SPONSORS

Under clause 4 of rule XXII, sponsors were added to public bills and resolutions as follows:

H.R. 25: Mr. JOHNSON of South Dakota.  
H.R. 80: Mr. McDADE and Mr. TORRICELLI.  
H.R. 81: Mr. OBERSTAR, Mr. CLAY, and Mr. STOKES.  
H.R. 118: Mr. STENHOLM, Mr. SWINDALL, and Mr. KONNYU.  
H.R. 176: Mr. KENNEDY.  
H.R. 243: Mr. STRATTON.  
H.R. 306: Mr. TALLON, Mr. MARLENEE, and Mr. SAXTON.  
H.R. 343: Mr. CRAIG, Mr. FIELDS, and Mr. STUMP.  
H.R. 379: Mr. HYDE.  
H.R. 457: Mr. MINETA.  
H.R. 613: Mr. McMILLEN of Maryland, Mr. KENNEDY, Mr. SYNAR, Mr. De LUGO, Mr. KANJORSKI, Mr. SKAGGS, Mrs. BYRON, Mr. WILLIAMS, Mr. HOLLOWAY, Mr. DYSON, Mr. HOCHBRUECKNER, Mr. KOLTER, and Mr. McEWEN.  
H.R. 618: Mr. STAGGERS, Mr. CLINGER, and Mr. JOHNSON of South Dakota.  
H.R. 634: Mr. BOULTER, Mr. DUNCAN, and Mr. SCHAEFER.  
H.R. 637: Mr. LANTOS and Mr. ROWLAND of Connecticut.  
H.R. 813: Mr. GEJDENSON.  
H.R. 898: Mr. JOHNSON of South Dakota.  
H.R. 920: Ms. PELOSI.  
H.R. 956: Mr. FOGLIETTA.  
H.R. 1001: Mr. VENTO and Mr. MINETA.  
H.R. 1082: Mr. VANDER JAGT, Mr. DAUB, Mr. ANDREWS, and Mr. KOLBE.  
H.R. 1172: Mr. GARCIA, Mr. STOKES, and Mr. MURPHY.  
H.R. 1173: Mr. FAUNTROY.  
H.R. 1181: Mr. STOKES.  
H.R. 1242: Mr. SAVAGE and Mr. ATKINS.  
H.R. 1325: Mr. SKEEN, Mr. CONYERS, Mr. MAVROULES, Mr. COURTER, Mr. HUTTO, Mr. LaFALCE, and Mr. SAXTON.  
H.R. 1352: Mr. De LUGO and Mr. HOCHBRUECKNER.  
H.R. 1393: Mr. ATKINS, Mr. PENNY, Mr. GRAY of Illinois, Mr. HUTTO, Mr. SIKORSKI, Mr. LEVINE of California, and Mr. SUNIA.  
H.R. 1396: Mr. BLILEY.  
H.R. 1445: Mr. WATKINS.  
H.R. 1543: Mr. EMERSON and Mr. McMIL-  
LAN of North Carolina.  
H.R. 1544: Mr. EMERSON and Mr. McMIL-  
LAN of North Carolina.



H.R. 1583: Mr. BUECHNER, Mr. GIBBONS, Mr. DeLAY, and Mrs. MORELLA.  
 H.R. 1588: Mr. CROCKETT and Mr. De LUGO.  
 H.R. 1604: Mr. SCHUETTE, Mr. LEWIS of Florida, and Mr. LANTOS.  
 H.R. 1620: Mr. SAXTON.  
 H.R. 1635: Miss SCHNEIDER, Mr. CLAY, Mr. SISISKY, Mr. GILMAN, Mr. RAHALL, Mr. WORTLEY, Mr. LIPINSKI, Mrs. MORELLA, Mr. GREGG, Mr. GEJDENSON, Mr. FISH, Mr. YATES, Mr. WEISS, Mr. BORSKI, Mr. CHAPPELL, Mr. PEPPER, and Mr. MARKEY.  
 H.R. 1707: Mr. TORRES, Mr. FLORIO, Mr. HUGHES, Mrs. SMITH of Nebraska, Mr. ECKART, Mr. SWINDALL, Mr. HUNTER, Mr. PETRI, Mr. BAKER, Mr. HOPKINS, Mr. YOUNG of Alaska, Mr. MYERS of Indiana, Mr. LIGHTFOOT, Mr. GRANDY, and Mr. MARTIN of New York.  
 H.R. 1729: Mr. CHENEY and Mr. FLAKE.  
 H.R. 1731: Mr. LANCASTER, Mr. GRANDY, and Mr. STALLINGS.  
 H.R. 1770: Mr. RHODES and Mr. BORSKI.  
 H.R. 1797: Mr. LIVINGSTON.  
 H.R. 1808: Mr. GARCIA and Mr. MARKEY.  
 H.R. 1857: Mr. BARNARD.  
 H.R. 1885: Mr. ROTH, Mr. DURBIN, Mr. McMILLAN of North Carolina, Mrs. JOHNSON of Connecticut, and Mr. KOLBE.  
 H.R. 1924: Mr. KOLTER.  
 H.R. 1929: Mr. CARDIN, Mr. DAUB, Mr. De LA GARZA, Mr. FUSTER, Mr. GARCIA, Mr. HUGHES, Mr. NIELSON of Utah, Mr. PERKINS, Mr. TOWNS, and Mr. VENTO.  
 H.R. 1977: Mr. BORSKI and Mr. GARCIA.  
 H.R. 1985: Mr. WORTLEY and Mr. EMERSON.  
 H.R. 2062: Mr. HAWKINS.  
 H.R. 2068: Mr. HAYES of Louisiana, Mr. SKAGGS, and Mr. MARTINEZ.  
 H.R. 2070: Mr. GARCIA.  
 H.R. 2125: Mr. HUGHES and Mr. ROE.  
 H.R. 2165: Mr. HAYES of Louisiana, Mr. SYNAR, Mr. LaFALCE, and Mr. McCURDY.  
 H.R. 2210: Mr. HUTTO and Mr. ANDERSON.  
 H.R. 2241: Mr. HANSEN, Mr. HILER, Mr. GILMAN, Mr. McCOLLUM, Mr. WELDON, Mr. BLILEY, Mr. ROBINSON, and Mr. HYDE.  
 H.R. 2249: Mrs. KENNELLY.  
 H.R. 2306: Mr. GILMAN.  
 H.R. 2327: Mr. BORSKI, Mr. MOODY, Mr. ROTH, Mr. RUSSO, Mr. BROWN of California, Mr. FLORIO, and Mr. JENKINS.

H.R. 2375: Mr. DeLAY.  
 H.R. 2392: Mr. RUSSO, Mr. WHITTAKER, Mr. McGRATH, and Mr. ROE.  
 H.R. 2410: Mr. RINALDO.  
 H.R. 2434: Mr. BEVILL, Mr. FISH, Mr. LEWIS of Florida, Mr. PICKLE, Mr. PARRIS, Mr. RODINO, Mr. WILSON, Mr. JOHNSON of South Dakota, Mr. HERTEL, Mr. FEIGHAN, Mr. PRICE of North Carolina, Mr. KLECZKA, Mr. THOMAS of Georgia, Mr. ANDREWS, Mr. SOLARZ, Mr. GIBBONS, Mr. TOWNS, Mr. GEJDENSON, Mr. LIPINSKI, Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma, Mr. LEVINE of California, Mr. KOLBE, Mr. LANTOS, Mr. KENNEDY, Mr. BLILEY, Mr. LaFALCE, Mr. OWENS of Utah, and Mr. DELUMS.  
 H.R. 2464: Mrs. KENNELLY and Mr. WALGREEN.  
 H.R. 2470: Mr. PURSELL, Mr. SAWYER, Mr. SABO and Ms. KAPTUR.  
 H.R. 2476: Mr. LEVINE of California, Mr. TOWNS, Mr. STALLINGS, Mr. LANTOS, and Mr. CONYERS.  
 H.R. 2546: Mr. KOLTER, Mr. DeFAZIO, and Mr. NEAL.  
 H.R. 2579: Mr. LANCASTER.  
 H.R. 2587: Mr. STUMP, Mr. DORNAN of California, Mr. WORTLEY, Mr. BURTON of Indiana, Mr. SOLOMON, Mr. TALLON, Mr. SWINDALL, Mr. DiOGUARDI, Mr. SCHUMER, Mr. LUNGREN, Mr. DONALD E. LUKENS, Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire, Mr. DeLAY, Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma, Mr. BIAGGI, Mr. BILBRAY, Mr. LANCASTER, Mr. SAXTON, Mr. McGRATH, Mr. BLILEY, Mr. SUNDQUIST, Mr. LANTOS, Mr. SCHEUER, Mr. CHANDLER, Mr. BLAZ, Mr. CARDIN, Mr. ROBINSON, Mr. DAVIS of Illinois, and Mr. SCHUETTE.  
 H.R. 2607: Mr. FRANK, Mr. MFUME, Mr. FRENZEL, Mr. MURPHY, and Mr. LIPINSKI.  
 H.R. 2609: Mr. TAUKE, Mr. HAWKINS, Mr. BUSTAMANTE, Mr. DAUB, Mr. ATKINS, and Mr. SOLARZ.  
 H.R. 2623: Mr. CONYERS, Mr. BUSTAMANTE, Mr. OWENS of New York, Mr. ACKERMAN, Mr. FRANK, Mr. DELLUMS, Mr. FEIGHAN, Mr. GRAY of Pennsylvania, and Mr. PEASE.  
 H.R. 2668: Mr. MADIGAN.  
 H.R. 2692: Mr. ANNUNZIO.  
 H.J. Res. 180: Mr. CLINGER, Mr. DYSON, and Mr. BOULTER.  
 H.J. Res. 206: Mr. ROE, Mr. CONTE, Mr. WAXMAN, Mr. MARKEY, and Mr. MINETA.

H.J. Res. 208: Ms. OAKAR, Mr. ATKINS, Mr. SCHUETTE, Mr. DENNY SMITH, Ms. KAPTUR, Mr. GEPHARDT, Mr. BRYANT, Mr. LANTOS, Mr. WYLIE, Mr. GALLO, Mr. DeWINE, Mr. GUARINI, Mr. SHUMWAY, Mr. DARDEN, Mr. LEWIS of California, Mr. TOWNS, Mr. DANNEMEYER, Mr. FAUNTROY, Mr. KENNEDY, Mrs. JOHNSON of Connecticut, and Mr. LIVINGSTON.  
 H.J. Res. 254: Mr. CARDIN, Mr. TOWNS, Mr. MFUME, Mrs. BENTLEY, Mr. McDADDE, Mr. LEWIS of Florida, Mr. SCHUETTE, Mr. BADHAM, Mr. HOCHBRUECKNER, Mr. KASICH, Mr. COBLE, Mr. VENTO, Mr. RICHARDSON, Mr. De LUGO, Mr. LIGHTFOOT, Mrs. MORELLA, Mr. STAGGERS, Mr. FRENZEL, Mr. BLILEY, Mr. GEKAS, Mr. ROWLAND of Georgia, Mr. EVANS, Mr. JONES of North Carolina, Mr. FUSTER, Mr. BONER of Tennessee, Mr. TRAXLER, Mr. BROOKS, Mr. RINALDO, Mr. MARKEY, Mr. DWYER of New Jersey, Mr. HALL of Texas, Mr. SMITH of Iowa, Mr. YOUNG of Alaska, Mrs. LLOYD, Mr. CARPER, Mr. HUBBARD, Mr. RANGEL, Mr. LOWRY of Washington, Mr. WAXMAN, Mr. CROCKETT, Mr. LaFALCE, Mrs. ROUKEMA, Mr. BALLENGER, Mr. LOWERY of California, Mr. DENNY SMITH, Mr. GARCIA, Mr. LEVINE of California, Mr. WYDEN, Mr. RUSSO, Mr. TORRES, Mrs. MEYERS of Kansas, Mr. CHAPPELL, Mr. WALGREN, Mr. DARDEN, and Mr. ROBERT F. SMITH.  
 H.J. Res. 261: Mr. STOKES and Mr. CLINGER.  
 H.J. Res. 284: Mr. LANTOS.  
 H.J. Res. 311: Mr. SOLARZ, Mr. DeFAZIO, Mr. TOWNS, Mr. MRAZEK, Mr. MOODY, and Mr. LANCASTER.  
 H.J. Res. 313: Mr. LAGOMARSINO, Mr. RICHARDSON, Mr. HOLLOWAY, Mr. GRAY of Illinois, and Mr. FIELDS.  
 H. Con. Res. 41: Mrs. VUCANOVICH, Mr. FIELDS, Mr. INHOFE, Mr. BILIRAKIS, Mr. BLAZ, Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma, Mr. DANIEL, and Mr. HOLLOWAY.  
 H. Con. Res. 61: Mr. DELLUMS, Mr. GUARINI, Mr. LEVIN of Michigan, Mr. NIELSON of Utah, Mr. SCHEUER, Mr. MOAKLEY, Mr. MRAZEK, Mr. LANCASTER, Mr. KOLTER, and Mr. TRAFICANT.  
 H. Con. Res. 101: Mr. HAMMERSCHMIDT, Mr. DAVIS of Illinois, Mr. VENTO, Mr. BEVILL, Mr. LEWIS of Georgia, Mr. De LUGO, Mr. SAXTON, Mr. JONTZ, Mr. LEWIS of Florida, and Mr. CLINGER.  
 H. Con. Res. 114: Mr. BROOKS.